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ABSTRACT
This thesis provides a detailed examination of the processes of participation which 
developed during the years of the Sandinista Government in Nicaragua (1979-90) and is 
based on extensive fieldwork on two rural cooperatives. Whereas the predominant 
analysis of the experience of popular participation during the period has emphasised 
structural level phenomena, here an attempt is made to combine actor-oriented and 
structural-historical approaches in order to identify the key factors which operated to shape 
the development of local participation. In such a way the thesis stresses how micro-level 
factors - life experiences, subjective meanings and group dynamics - interacted with 
macro-level processes.
The thesis starts by identifying the dimensions and theories of popular participation 
which relate to its objectives, intensities and outcomes, in order to frame the research 
questions. The period studied is then contextualised with a history of Nicaragua, 
establishing the authoritarian conditions which marginalised the majority of Nicaraguans 
from economic development and political processes. Next, the thesis examines Sandinista 
political theory, the channels of popular participation and the macro-level factors which 
restricted its development. It also describes how the cooperative movement evolved 
during the period of Sandinista rule as an expression of the peasant movement in the 
context of state paternalism.
The main analytical body of the thesis starts by providing background details about 
the two case studies. Then it details and compares the participatory processes underway 
within the cooperatives, focusing on the assembly, leadership and women; the different 
intensities of participation; and the social factors influencing it. These processes are 
evaluated qualitatively and it is demonstrated that despite apparent limitations, 
participation enhanced the social, political and psychological power of cooperative 
members although in different, uneven and contradictory ways.
The thesis concludes that although the participation of peasants in national level 
structures was restricted, the objective conditions created by the FSLN contributed to the 
qualitative empowerment of individuals incorporated into cooperatives. International 
comparisons, theoretical and policy implications are finally noted.
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INTRODUCTION
Democracy has been a central issue in political struggles and controversies since the
concept and practices were first devised in Classical Greece and has since been subject to
numerous ideological interpretations and political mutations. Never were its definitions
more polarised or entrenched than during the Cold War when regimes either appealed for
legitimacy in terms of the democratic objectives they allegedly upheld, or justified foreign
intervention in terms of the need to safeguard "democracy".
In the West, the dominant hegemonic notion of democracy has become conflated
with a representative system of government. It is based on theories of democracy, in
particular that which was advocated by Schumpeter (1943), which defined democracy as
a "political method" and saw democracy as:
".. that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which 
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for 
the people’s vote."
Here democracy is understood as "access to government" and the emphasis in placed on 
the selection of representatives. Participation is assigned a minimal role; rather, the 
political participation of mass society is reduced to the periodic assertion of electoral 
preferences in the choice of leaders. The primary concern of those ascribing to such 
classical elitist theory (elitist because they opt for an entrenchment of elite caucuses) is 
the maintenance of political stability. Consequently, they emphasise those decision­
making processes and structures which favour efficiency above popular equality in 
participation (Fagence, 1977:28). The underlying assumption is that society as a mass is 
politically naive, incompetent and apathetic. Overlooked in this perspective are the ways 
in which political power is exerted, how governing elites use formal democratic 
institutions to serve their own class interests and the possibilities for citizens to influence 
decision-making. Moreover, this notion of democracy is restricted to the political domain 
and politics is conceived as a sphere of activity autonomous from the economy.
The socioeconomic systems in these Western representative democracies are based 
on the principles of private ownership and competition of the free-market. This has in 
turn facilitated the equation of market equals democracy (Amin, 1991:87). Thus, in the 
ideological confrontation between capitalism and socialism, the West appropriated 
exclusive rights over the use of the term "democracy" and the conflict between the two
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opposing systems was reduced crudely to that of "democracy" versus "socialism". Those 
countries not operating with the free-market principle were thereby characterised as 
"undemocratic".
Historically, socialist countries have also proclaimed themselves as democratic but 
unlike the representative model of democracy where the notion of individual liberty is 
given priority, in general terms the socialist concept of democracy emphasises the idea of 
equality between individuals (Held, 1991). Here democracy is rooted in socioeconomic 
equality since it is perceived that once freed of economic alienation new social relations 
give rise to an equality based on cooperation among workers, rather than their subjugation 
(Amin, 1991:87). Harking back to the classical tradition of democracy - a mooring from 
which liberal discourse and practice has long been severed - Marxist theory also 
emphasises the importance of participation. Participatory democracy is seen as central in 
order to reduce the gap between government and governed, between state and society 
(Marchetti, 1986) and to influence the direction of official decisions. Consequently, 
Marxists propositions are generally pro-participationist even though Marxist philosophy 
also conditionally accepts the inevitability of involving representatives in decision-making 
structures (Fagence, 1977:44).
In practice, political democracy has been the Achilles heel in the construction of 
socialism and was most explicitly absent in cases of those authoritarian eastern bloc 
models which stifled democratic liberties and obstructed the development of genuine 
socialist democracy (Lowry, 1986:267). Moreover, as with all political systems its 
development was subject to the particular objective conditions and historic circumstancces.
Nicaragua: a special case
Until 1979, Nicaragua, a country in the Central American isthmus with a population of 
just under three million, was ruled by the Somoza family dynasty which had monopolised 
power since 1934 and resisted all forms of political, social and economic modernisation 
(Weeks, 1986:48). It excluded all but an elite group of cohorts known as the Somocistas, 
from the political process and from access to the wealth of the country’s resources. 
Landownership was concentrated amongst this small minority. The hallmarks of the 
Somozan rule were its authoritarianism, lack of democracy and a coercive hegemonic 
apparatus. The regime met opposition with violence, oppression or cooption, violated the
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constitutional order, rigged elections and maintained absolute control of the country’s 
army, the National Guard. Reform was impossible through anything but the trauma of 
civil war.
On 19 July 1979, the Popular Sandinista Revolution swept the Sandinista Front for 
National Liberation (FSLN) into power. The following experiment in power broke the 
orthodox socialist mould because the Sandinistas aimed not just for structural 
transformation but also for political pluralism. Moreover, they wanted to establish popular 
democratic control over the state and society, ensure democratic freedoms of speech, 
assembly and petition and adopt westem-style representative institutions; that is, guarantee 
individual liberty. This was all the more remarkable considering the objective conditions 
the Revolution encountered as well as the historic legacy of Somozan rule where even the 
principle that governments are based upon general consent was novel. As Molyneux 
reminds us, its task represented an "extreme case" in the capitalist periphery of having to 
construct a socialist society in the context of severe poverty and underdevelopment while 
having to confront counter-revolution and external intervention (Molyneux, 1986:286). 
Nonetheless, the FSLN effectively refreshed the ongoing and entrenched debate about the 
theory and practice of democracy. It attempted to transform the historically diverging 
views and practice of democracy by declaring its intention to combine social revolution 
with pluralism and to establish "participatory democracy" alongside westem-style 
representative democracy. The FSLN created, in the words of the social scientist 
Coraggio, "the possibility of a new way of thinking about democracy and socialism" 
(1985:xvi).
According to Sandinista theory, if the revolutionary project was to benefit the poor 
it had to promote direct popular participation as a way of ensuring that the interests of the 
hitherto excluded "majority" were represented. Participatory democracy was deemed 
necessary to enable the least priveleged sectors to organise themselves and develop their 
political consciousness, to become more effective in competing with other sectors and to 
improve their ability of negotiating their demands within the state’s formal political 
institutions. The Sandinista Government also saw representative democracy as a way of 
institutionalising political pluralism and of facilitating the incorporation into the political 
system of those other social sectors which had joined with the FSLN in the revolutionary
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alliance to topple the dictatorship. This included sectors of the middle classes whose class
interests had been frustrated by the Somozan monopoly of economic activities.
The political system which emerged in Nicaragua following the overthrow of
Somoza became the focus of critical examination. Some scholars examined the theoretical
contradictions and practical implications embodied in the Sandinistas’ declared
commitment to create a popular democracy aimed at benefitting the poor sectors of society
while seeking to unify the multi-class alliance in a policy of national unity. Amongst
these are Coraggio (1986), who together with Irvin (1985) produced excellent works.
Other scholars focussed their analysis on the nascent expressions of popular participation
channeled through the mass organisations which had developed during the insurrection and
multiplied in response to the overthrow of the dictator. These mass organisations were
officially encouraged by the Sandinista Government. Reporting in the journal NACLA,
the observations of Burbach and Draimin (1980) were typical of the immediate
impressions of visitors to Nicaragua following the fall of Somoza:
"The entire country is intense with activity. Throughout the cities crews on 
government-sponsored public projects repair the enormous destruction caused 
by the Somoza regime. On weekends, thousands of volunteers head into the 
countryside on buses and trucks to work on state-owned farms and plantations.
Both neighbourhood mobilisations and massive demonstrations are 
commonplace. The causes can be domestic - the inauguration of the literacy 
campaign, or international - the assassination of Archbishop Romero in 
neighbouring El Salvador."
The historic significance of this new and evolving political system which provided the
Nicaraguan masses with unprecedented opportunities to participate in the political process
was not lost on academics. Of these Burbach and Draimin (1980) must be credited for
suggesting - even in the early days - that there would be practical and political difficulties
arising from the incorporation of the masses into the decision-making process. Their
illiteracy, lack of organisational experience, limited political awareness and the country’s
absence of any democratic tradition were identified as presenting potential problems.
Despite these acknowledgements, little systematic attention was paid then nor since to the
political obstacles created by the country’s dictatorial legacy and the political culture it
generated.
During the Sandinista years in government, the literature produced examined the 
experiences of the mass organisations which had emerged as the principal chaimels for
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popular participation for neighbourhood committees, agricultural workers, women, 
industrial workers and students. Serra (1985), Ruchwarger (1987) and Lowry (1986) 
examined their various functions and their relationship with the revolutionary authorities. 
The extent of autonomy of these popular organisations - which appeared possible during 
the initial years of the revolution - was seen by some (Coraggio and Irvin, 1985:30; Vilas, 
1986a) as a barometer of the healthiness of participatory democracy, if not of the entire 
democratic project itself. Only a few commentators, including those noted below, studied 
other developments and expressions of participatory democracy in Nicaragua. For 
example, Lobel examined the processes by which the National Constitution (finally 
promulgated in 1987) and its accompanying Autonomy Statute were drawn up. These 
involved prolonged and extensive consultation with different social groups and citizens 
and their outcome provided legal guarantees in the institutionalisation of participatory 
democracy (Lobel, 1988:845-853). Serra (1991), provided a detailed documentation of 
the political participation of the organised peasantry in national politics. Ortega (1985), 
in a brief article outlined the developments of workplace participation in the management 
of state enterprise and Vance (1987) studied the participatory experience of women in an 
urban housing project.
This literature on the experience of popular participation during the Sandinista 
Government has three distinct characteristics. Firstly, it is dominated by a concern with 
mass organisations as the main vehicle of participation, their role in the démocratisation 
of political life and their position within the political system. Secondly, given the above 
emphasis, the examination of popular participation in the literature is dominated by macro­
level structural analysis, in particular it focuses on the politico-institutional relationship 
between the mass organisations, the FSLN and the state, or the ideology of the FSLN, 
known as Sandinismo. With the exception of Vance (1987), none of the literature 
mentioned here was concerned with the practices and processes of participation at the local 
or grassroots level nor with the significance of it in the transformation within the 
institutions of civil society.
These structural, macro-level concerns have given rise to a third, conceptual feature 
of the literature. Defining participation as the access to resources through decision­
making, commentators have implicitly adopted for their analysis an approach which sees 
participation as an outcome. In these instances participation is evaluated according to
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whether it has led to the redistribution of power and resources. This approach however, 
fails to appreciate participation as a dynamic process through which fundamental 
transformations in organisation, skills and consciousness can increase the power of 
individuals, therefore enabling them to operate as more effective political actors. That the 
literature on the Nicaraguan experience of participatory democracy has largely ignored 
analysis of the processes of participation is consistent with the absence of consideration 
for this dimension of the subject in the general literature of participation. Yet, an 
examination of these processes will serve to identify how various forces operated to 
influence participation at different levels of analysis, translated into daily practices and 
gave rise to different participatory experiences. It is precisely this process of participation 
which this thesis sets out to examine.
This is a relevant dimension to study as regards the assessment of the Sandinista 
experiment since the objective of developing popular democracy is not just the 
transformation of the structures of power but the creation of and changes within 
institutions of society. It remains a legitimate and pertinent inquiry even in the context 
of the defeat of the FSLN in elections held on 25th February 1990 by the UNO (National 
Opposition Union) coalition, since it raises questions about the obstacles to the 
implementation of democratic models in the context of Nicaraguan society. A study of 
the grassroots participatory process will serve to contribute to an evaluation of the nature 
and extent of transformations underway during this period and to identify the limitations 
the Sandinista project encountered.
The literature written contemporaneously to the period of Sandinista government is 
unequivocal in recognising that the creation of various channels of participation facilitated 
the incorporation of the masses who had previously been excluded from the political 
processes under the Somoza regime. Commentators also agree that the opportunities for 
authentic popular participation were increasingly constrained as a tendency emerged for 
the FSLN to centralise its control over the mass organisations. This process reportedly 
became most pronounced from mid-1982 onwards as the war of attrition progressed and 
the economic crisis deepened (Vilas, 1986a:22). Different authors sought to identify the 
precise causes. The tendency for mass organisations to become subordinated to the 
interests of the party (FSLN), government and state was identified by Serra as a 
consequence of politico-institutional arrangements (1988). Also, together with Marchetti
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(1986), he noted the onset of bureaucratisation of both the party and mass organisations 
as inhibiting the development of effective participation. Dore and Weeks (1992), in a 
contentious reinterpretation of the Sandinista years, attributed this to the consequence of 
the FSLN’s recourse to a political discourse which was dominated by nationalist ideology 
and lacked clearly delineated class-based concepts. This, they believe, impeded the 
development of class politics and created a barrier to effective mass participation.
In the light of the predominant approaches and evaluations of popular participation 
during the Sandinista Government, I set out to start fieldwork in August 1989 convinced 
that a micro-level study of participatory processes would reveal other dimensions of this 
experience of participatory democracy and might lead to a re-evaluation of the FSLN’s 
experience. The main questions I wanted to pursue were: how did groups and individuals 
interact with structural factors; how were individuals constrained by the country’s legacy 
of authoritarianism and how did these circumstances translate into daily practices of 
participation? Indeed, how far did the new mechanisms created under the auspices of the 
Sandinistas account for local level responses? Such questions inform my research 
approach.
Research objectives: identifying agents and evaluating
practices
Analysis which emphasises the role of external forces in determining participation, hitherto 
the predominant characteristic of the Nicaraguan literature, provides an incomplete 
appreciation of participation. This is because it tends to overlook other local or micro­
level factors which shape participation. Nor can it explain how participation translates 
from the macro-level (or remote social forces) into everyday life experiences and 
practices. It also underplays the role of individuals and groups, that is "actors", and how 
their action and consciousness contribute to determining the nature of participator}^ 
practices. What is needed is an approach which stresses the interaction of these macro­
processes and phenomena with those at the micro-level and one which places more 
emphasis on the role played by the individual in shaping participation. As Gledhill 
(1994:150) states, understanding how these levels mutually articulate also serves the wider 
analysis of the processes of social and historical change.
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With its primary concern on the processes of popular participation this thesis aims 
to identify the various factors or agencies - at different levels of analysis - which influence 
participatory practices. Consequently, the thesis seeks to examine the historical and 
structural aspects which shape life experiences and the role of intervening institutions in 
developing participation. It also identifies micro-level phenomena including beliefs, group 
dynamics, leadership and social differences (such as education and gender) which 
influence the participatory process. How these different factors interacted and shaped 
political practice is a key concern. The study also examines the nature and extent of 
popular participation. It analyses practices on the one hand and subjective interpretations 
and political consciousness on the other and evaluates popular participation according to 
its intensities and the skills and awareness it generates. Finally, the thesis illustrates the 
critical issues and the ambiguities and contradictions of the Nicaraguan rural experience 
of participation.
The analysis of the socialist-state sponsored experience of participation requires that 
specific analytical attention be paid to the historical reality of the conditions under which 
radical transformation of society takes place. This includes consideration of the objective 
conditions of underdevelopment and the lack of resources this entails and the subjective 
features of the political model adopted, including the nature of class alliances. 
Examination of participation in the transition to socialism in the capitalist periphery also 
means examining the effects of counterrevolution, military intervention and economic 
embargoes, since a brief look at Latin America alone reveals that the US has either overtly 
or covertly intervened militarily to overthrow every government which attempted to 
institute radical socioeconomic changes since World War II (Guatemala 1954; Cuba 1961; 
Dominican Republic 1965; Chile 1973; Grenada 1983 and Nicaragua 1982-90). This 
means that any serious enquiry into the experiences and processes of participation in 
countries undergoing socialist transition necessitates consideration of the aggression and 
economic pressures from the capitalist bloc. War, is the context in which socialism is 
born and must develop and as Marchetti (1986:304) reminds us, has to be considered 
centrally in any analysis of the experience of popular participation in young socialist 
societies of the Third World. Examination of the effects of externally imposed influences 
of military and economic aggression on the participatory process becomes crucial.
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I chose the cooperative sector for study above other social sectors for several 
reasons. Firstly, its constituents - the rural poor and landless - as beneficiaries of the 
Sandinista Agrarian Reform had experienced fundamental objective material and social 
changes during the Sandinista Government. This was particularly the case with those 
organised in production cooperatives known as Sandinista Agricultural Cooperatives 
(CAS) who had gained access to land, credit and technical assistance, education and 
training. As the most collectivised type of cooperatives, members organised in these were 
also confronted with new organisational, production and management methods. Secondly, 
more than other cooperatives, CAS articulated more integrally into the structures of the 
state and party and, as the prioritised model of cooperatives, experienced the highest levels 
of direct intervention. They were also the main source of military recruitment and thus 
were formally linked to the national army. Finally, since CAS were affiliated to a 
producers association, the Association of National Farmers and Ranchers (UNAG), and 
later into the emergent cooperative movement they were also incorporated into rural mass 
organisations and the national peasant movement.
Although it is necessary to perceive the cooperatives as an expression of the peasant 
movement, the CAS sector generally had been confronted with extreme instances of 
intervention by external agents. Thus, above other sectors the issues of "top-down", 
"bottom-up" processes and social change were condensed. So, it seemed a particularly 
appropriate sector for a study examining the processes, agents and contradictions of 
participation.
While cooperatives comprise the sector researched, the wider debates about the role 
of cooperatives in agrarian development and transitions are not primary concerns of the 
thesis. However, the research findings do raise questions about the viability and 
appropriateness of cooperativisation in socialist agrarian transition. In fact, these more 
general issues are germane to the thesis because they reveal the multi-dimensional 
contradictions of the project of promoting popular participation in the Nicaraguan 
countryside.
Methodological note: cooperative case and membership data
This thesis is based on a detailed case study analysis of two cooperatives. This provides 
a comparative basis from which to identify the various factors which influenced
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participation and follow the connections and relationships between a number of variables 
as they related to its processes.
I planned to select cooperatives from within the Pacific region of Nicaragua where 
the CAS were concentrated and ultimately opted for the country’s Region IV which lies 
south of Managua. Both cooperatives were located within this region, providing a degree 
of consistency concerning historical experiences, rural social structures, regional and 
administrative arrangements and party and mass organisational leadership (see Figure 1 
for map indicating the location of the two cases). No attempt was made to select a 
"typical" cooperative for methodological reasons since I did not intend this to be a study 
from which to infer statistically significant statements about participation. Rather, the 
cases were used to identify the complexity and interplay of different social phenomena in 
influencing processes. Consequently, I adopted the use of "case study" as advanced by 
the anthropologist Mitchell (1983), who indicated that they can be used to establish the 
validity of a particular theoretical principle, not by achieving statistical significance but 
through testing them with the complexity of empirical reality. Therefore, I did not select 
the case studies because they were illustrative but on the basis of particular characteristics 
which suggested that they would be theoretically compelling.
The first cooperative, German Pomares (henceforth GP) was suggested to me by 
Mariano Leal, President of the UNAG Tola in the department of Rivas, in southern 
Nicaragua. The GP cooperative had been prioritised during the mid-1980s for state 
assistance and was renowned as a "vanguard cooperative" in the region because of its 
military commitments. This indicated that it articulated to a high degree with the 
revolutionary authorities, a characteristic which rendered it a good candidate for study. 
A brief visit and initial introductory discussion with the cooperative’s council (one of its 
decision-making bodies), verified that it also met my preliminary shortlist of criteria, again 
compiled for their theoretical implications. This included the following factors: that it 
produce both agroexport crops and basic grains, because I wanted to select cooperatives 
which were affected by a range of national and international macroeconomic factors; have 
a substantial membership (of approximately 40 members) because smaller cooperatives 
were typically dominated by families; and should include women.
The initial research findings from GP confirmed the cooperative’s high level of 
"vertical integration" vis a vis the state, party and government (to the exclusion of
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horizontal relations with other cooperatives) and indicated that this exerted a strong 
influence on the processes of participation. I therefore decided to select a second 
cooperative on the basis of its relatively weak articulation with the authorities. It seemed 
logical to consider one which was integrated with other cooperatives into an UCA (Union 
of Agricultural Cooperatives), a second level cooperative structure which undertook basic 
technical, financial and commercial functions.
The largest and oldest UCA in Region IV was in Carazo and although the majority 
of its affiliated cooperatives were coffee producers, it seemed particularly promising not 
least because it was in the midst of a dispute with state agencies regarding control over 
a retail shop, the Tienda Campesina or Peasant Shop, in fact the dispute subsequently 
developed into one of national significance. I visited eight of the twenty two affiliated 
cooperatives after which I was able to select the Pedro Joaquin Chamorro cooperative 
(henceforth PJCh) on the basis of the key characteristics it shared with GP. On the one 
hand this included my original specifications: the production of agroexport crops and basic 
grains, similar-sized membership and inclusion of women; on the other hand, this also 
included other organisational characteristics, namely collective production combined with 
individual plots, length of time established and proximity to local communities.
The research is based on primary data: on qualitative and quantitative data collected 
during ten months of fieldwork which was carried out between 1989 and 1990. Secondary 
material was collected from public records, policy statements, media sources and published 
secondary literature. The methodological approaches adopted (described here in brief and 
in more detail in the Annex 1) are those of participant observation, "flexibly structured" 
(Whyte, 1979) informal interviews and surveys.
Participant observation, an interpretative method appropriate for gaining access to 
the subjective perspectives of each social "actor" was facilitated by extended residence in 
the locality of the cooperatives, specifically in the homes of cooperative members and 
residents from the surrounding communities. This enabled me to take part in productive 
and social activities. My time was divided between the cooperative buildings, the fields 
and homes which served to create a degree of familiarity and confidence particularly 
amongst a group of key informants. The various meetings involving the cooperatives, in 
particular their own assemblies, provided a source of material on political practices, 
individual behaviour and leadership styles. Informal interviews were conducted with
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cooperative members in order to clarify information obtained, seek opinions or document 
personal histories. Local government officials, union representatives and rural inhabitants 
were interviewed for objective information relating to the area, community and 
cooperative.
Quantitative data on social "facts", such as socio-demography, economic activities 
and organisational experience of individuals was collected with the use of surveys. These 
had additional sections for the leaders and for women members. Questionnaires also 
sought data on opinions, beliefs and subjective interpretations. This served to indicate the 
location of the individual in the group and assisted in the identification of their 
involvement in actions or decisions (van Velsen, 1979). It also served as a basis by which 
to make statements of statistical significance concerning the cooperative’s constituent 
members. Survey material indicated relationships between factors which might otherwise 
have been overlooked and which merited exploration via qualitative methods. Combined 
with qualitative data, the surveys also provided the opportunity of verifying observed 
phenomenon and guarded against any bias resulting from reliance on a limited number of 
informants.
A final note concerning the period in which the study was conducted is required. 
That research started two months before preparations for the national presidential and 
congressional elections (held on 25th February 1990) presented specific research 
opportunities and difficulties. The run-up to the elections involved the cooperatives and 
particular individual members in political activities. These activities generated debates 
within the cooperatives concerning the FSLN, the government and the problems of the 
cooperative sector. Such discussions became intensified in the aftermath of the defeat of 
the FSLN in these elections at which point, faced with the loss of state support, the 
cooperatives were forced to reassess their own economic strategies.
After the UNO victory, political identities became polarised and a situation of 
instability prevailed nationwide. In the rural areas it was expressed in conflicts of 
differing intensity between sectors defending their specific interests. Thus the anti- 
Sandinistas - including the UNO leaders and activists, ex-contras, landowners and 
producers adversely affected by the Sandinista Agrarian Reform (RAS) and ex-Somocistas 
- aimed to re-establish the pre-revolutionary social order. Having won the elections, they 
sought to re-appropriate power and resources which they now considered their exclusive
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prerogative. Opposing these efforts were the Sandinistas, their supporters, the 
beneficiaries of the RAS and the national army soldiers who had been demobilised in the 
dramatic reduction of armed forces which followed the elections. These sectors claimed 
they were defending the changes of the revolutionary period. Thus lands comprising the 
reformed sector including the state sector and cooperatives, were invaded by ex-Contras, 
disaffected and UNO led-peasants, while the landless and workers from state farms 
invaded private lands demanding that they be favoured in privatisation of land (CIPRES, 
1990; Amador y Ribbink, 1991).
As regards the two case studies, contradictions between the cooperatives and the 
local communities became acute and violence erupted. In separate incidents in GP, one 
member was temporarily imprisoned and two hundred armed contras arrived to take the 
cooperative by force in July 1990. Members became seriously concerned that they would 
be attacked by those from their own communities. Although such conflict did not occur 
in and around PJCh, tensions were high as local UNO supporters threatened to invade. 
Members with families in the nearby UNO stronghold of Dulce Nombre did not return 
home fearing attack from extended-family members.
The FSLN electoral defeat presented a methodological problem given my concern 
with the development of participation under the auspices of the Sandinista Government. 
This I resolved by deciding to concentrate on developments before the elections. Prior 
to them, I had divided my time between the two cooperatives and had managed to 
complete both sets of questionnaires before 25 February. This rendered the core of 
qualitative data of the research consistent. Following the elections, I continued research, 
directing it towards seeking complementary information relating to historical and personal 
data. Where information relating to the subjective experiences of participation has been 
used from this post-electoral period it is indicated in the study.
Thesis outline
The thesis starts by providing an analytical and theoretical framework for the examination 
of participation. Chapter 1 explores the concepts and dimensions of popular participation 
and identifies the theories and controversies as they relate to the main questions and 
approach of this study. It also establishes the basis by which participatory processes can 
be evaluated.
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Chapter 2 contextualises the Sandinista period of government with a description of 
socioeconomic and political conditions facing Nicaraguans and in particular the rural 
population on the eve of the revolution. An historical overview, this chapter shows how 
rural resistance against marginalisation and the conditions imposed by the development 
of agroexports has characterised Nicaragua since the Spanish Conquest. It also indicates 
how this was matched by political exclusion accompanied by overt repression, cooptation 
and ideological hegemony. As such, the chapter not only serves to historicise the 
Nicaraguan Revolution but also starts the analytical task of disaggregating the process of 
participation by taking into account the historical, structural and regional aspects of 
Nicaraguan development which shaped the immediate life circumstances of its population.
Chapter 3 examines the theory and political practices of the FSLN, identifying the 
role assigned to popular participation and tracing the evolution of the concept and practice 
within the FSLN from political movement to government. It focuses analysis at the 
national level because the conditions, institutions and mechanisms created by the 
Sandinistas established the parameters for participatory action. The chapter details how 
participation was operationalised and examines the factors which constrained participation 
at a structural level, including the contradictions embodied in the policy of national unity, 
the subordination of mass organisations to the FSLN and the effects of external aggression 
and the economic embargo.
Chapter 4 describes the development of the cooperative movement in the Sandinista 
years, its organisation, representation and relationship to the FSLN and state. It examines 
the prevalent notions concerning the peasantry which informed agrarian reform policies 
towards the cooperative sector and identifies the precise nature of state intervention. It 
also documents the emergence of the cooperative movement and examines the relationship 
between rural organisations and the FSLN and their influence on rural policies.
Having indicated how these different levels contributed to shaping local expressions 
of participation, the thesis moves on to the analysis of grassroots factors and processes. 
Chapter 5 serves as an introduction to the two case studies, describing the cooperatives, 
their geographical location, their history and relationship to surrounding communities. 
This provides a basis from which to understand how the cooperatives collectively 
responded to economic, social and political phenomena. Chapter 6 comprises an 
examination of the productive and economic activities of the two cooperatives. Discussion
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focuses on the material conditions of the cooperative, raising the question about the 
economic motivation for membership and the contradictions of collectivised production 
as regards the aspirations of the constituent members.
In Chapter 7, the political aspects of cooperative organisation, decision-making and 
participation are described and then examined in relation to internal group dynamics and 
external intervention. They are also analysed in relation to past political experiences and 
are evaluated according to the intensities of the participatory processes. Chapter 8 goes 
on to examine the leadership as both a significant element in the determination of the 
nature of participation and product of opportunities created by the Revolution which 
enabled leaders to emerge from a previously marginalised social sector. It describes 
precisely how leadership exerted its power and establishes the importance of seeking 
explanation for political behaviour from external sources and influences, as much as 
internal legitimacy and group dynamics. Beyond this, the chapter also highlights the 
critical issues of participatory democracy and the role of leadership in securing the 
economic viability of the cooperatives. Finally, Chapter 9 reveals the individual 
differences in participation and identifies the constraining and facilitating factors which 
account for this. In particular, it examines the influence of socio-cultural and 
psychological factors and focuses on the practical and psychological constraints imposed 
by the gender division of labour.
The thesis concludes with a discussion and evaluation of the rural cooperative 
experience of participation. It places the discussion in a wider context with reference to 
international experiences and indicates the arising theoretical and policy implications.
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Chapter 1
POPULAR PARTICIPATION: 
CONCEPTUALISATION AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
In a long tradition of concentration on single issues on the development agenda, "popular 
participation" emerged during the 1970s as a key issue at the international level. Within 
the UN and its member agencies, popular participation was identified and encouraged as 
a fundamental goal and policy instrument to achieve sustained economic growth and social 
progress. This in turn generated a substantial literature which scrutinised the multi­
dimensional aspects of popular participation, its theory, implementation and practice in the 
various contexts to which it was applied.
Scholars have advanced various socio-political factors to explain the interest in 
participation in the debate about the development process. Midgley (1986), Oakley and 
Marsden (1984) and Hall (1986) consider that it came from the search for an alternative 
strategy of development to the modernisation model which emphasised economic growth 
in the context of centralised planning through capital intensive projects and 
industrialisation. This strategy has been adopted by numerous developing countries in the 
post-war period. Since the 1960s its failings have been all too evident: the supposed 
beneficiaries of this economic growth turned out not to be the rural poor but the urban 
upper and middle income groups and the rural elites. It produced high unemployment, 
exacerbated urbanisation and aggravated social inequalities (Todaro, 1982:125). 
Worldwide rural poverty has remained pervasive and rural populations comprise an 
estimated 85% of those living in absolute poverty (World Bank, 1975).
The failure of the modernisation model to eradicate rural poverty was largely 
attributable to two factors. Firstly, rural development was a low priority on its agenda^ 
and secondly, the centralised and bureaucratic policy process it generated excluded the 
intended beneficiaries from development activities. This neglect of the agricultural sector 
was perpetuated by the erroneous notion that the rural poor themselves were a major 
"obstacle" to development: they were perceived to be resistant to the changes which 
modernisation brought. Their lack of education, organisational weakness and physical 
isolation from urban-based politicians and planners translated into a lack of political
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representation and power which meant that such policies went unsuccessfully challenged 
by the rural poor themselves^.
A fundamental aspect of the development "rethink" was the role that agricultural 
production should assume in national development. Ideas about how this should occur 
evolved over the decades. The so-called "green revolution" illustrated that merely 
targeting investment at agricultural production would not automatically benefit the poorer 
sectors. When agriculture was commercialised and technology improved, the larger 
landowners came to monopolise agricultural inputs (fertilisers, insecticides and irrigation), 
credit and other agricultural extension facilities (Hall, 1986:91-92). The fruits of 
development did not "trickle down" to the masses as initially anticipated.
That benefits ought be directed to the poorer sectors was eventually recognised by 
organisations including the International Labour Office (ILO) (Hall, 1986:92). The ILO 
identified the centralised and bureaucratic policy process, which excluded the beneficiaries 
from the implementation and evaluation of planning, as causing the failure of development 
schemes. Consequently, the ILO advocated the incorporation of local rural populations 
into development activities. Hence the idea of "participation" - and specifically that of 
rural populations - emerged as a central element in the reconsideration of how 
development could be achieved.
The situation in Central America - the region of the country case study in this thesis 
- was different in many respects as regards the perpetuation of extreme rural poverty and 
gross social inequalities. Here, the traditional oligarchy whose landed interests were based 
in the agroexport sector, resisted all pressures for liberal reforms as they related to 
economic modernisation and created effective barriers to capitalist development. Even the 
expansion of coffee production and commercialisation in the region was not accompanied 
by the transformation of labour relations according to "usual" capitalist logic whereby 
peasants become "free" labourers able to sell their labour. Instead, it led to a system of 
coercive labour enforced by the intervention of the governments while its expansion was 
facilitated by the states’ removal of the peasantry from the land.
As late as the nineteenth century. Central America was in the early stages of 
"country formation" and consequently its political organisation and institutions of state 
were weak. This rendered it essentially vulnerable to external intervention while the 
ruling elites were also prone to vying for the support of the US government in order to
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bolster their power in internal disputes. While Washington proved itself willing to use 
force to keep certain groups in power, the elites could remain immune to the demands of 
middle or lower classes for economic or political reform. The resultant regimes were 
characterised by their despotic and anti-democratic nature and use of coercion and ruled 
by obtaining consensus through ideological hegemony. After the Second World War, 
when US military advisers created armies within the region, military force then became 
an additional bulwark to elite power (Weeks, 1986:31-51).
Even the attempts promoted by the UN Economic Commission for Latin America 
during the 1950s and 1960s to steer the region into the modem economic, social and 
political world through via industrialisation failed. Through their total monopoly of 
political affairs, the dominant social groups resisted attempts to develop economic power 
divorced from property in land and ensured that the economies throughout the isthmus 
remained dominated by agriculture. Thus, the possibilities to stimulate income distribution 
which could have facilitated the expansion of internal market for industrialisation were 
thrawted and the capitalists and oligarchs continued to live off an oppressed rural 
population (Weeks, 1986:37-39; Bulmer-Thomas, 1988:20). This exacerbated social 
inequalities. Economic marginalisation of rural populations and political exclusion were 
inextricably related.
In effect, these political regimes predated the Age of Liberalism as experienced in 
Europe during the seventeenth century and rejected even the idea of a secular state as one 
based on the principle that governments rule by the consent of the governed and that 
people are equal before the law (Weeks, 1986:49-50). The absence of alternative means 
for reforming these regimes generated political and social crises which erupted as war and 
civil disturbances during the 1960s and 1970s. The hegemony of the oligarchs was 
challenged by revolutionary movements which proposed alternative economic models and 
political systems to redress the social inequalities. Historical legacies would not only 
present major obstacles to the development of new political regimes but would give those 
forces who opposed the "reactionary despotic oligarchy" an essentially modernising 
political role (Weeks, 1986:50; Torres-Rivas, 1992:134).
Participation is not a new concept. It first appeared during the rise of Athenian 
political culture when the theory and practice of "democracy" arrived on the political 
landscape. Although this initial practice excluded the majority of the city’s residents, its
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central feature was the direct personal participation of the citizen body in all aspects of 
government (Arblaster, 1991). The characteristics which made the direct democracy of 
the Greek city-state feasible namely, the small numbers of citizens and the absence of 
formal political parties, are inappropriate for adoption in contemporary complex societies 
without major adaptations. Since then the notion of participation has been radically 
transformed and has occupied a central role in the discourse of political theory.
Modem theories of participation as they relate to the notion of democracy, are 
predominantly derived from the contributions of Rousseau, Madison, Calhoun, Mill and 
de Tocqueville (Fagence, 1977), who wrote about the ideological and philosophical bases 
of systems of government during the liberal enlightenment. Recurrent preoccupations of 
these scholars are reflected in the work of contemporary authors and relate to the role of 
forces raised above society (an enlightened despot, supreme legislator or revolutionary 
elite) in transforming society (Lowy, 1986:265) and the relationship between 
representation and the interests of the people^.
As we saw from the Introduction, many of the modern commentators such as 
Schumpeter, have conflated democracy and representative government and this has become 
the dominant hegemonic notion of democracy. This schema emphasises the election of 
representatives and reduces participation to the election of them (Lobel, 1988) and it is 
precisely the recognition of the limitations of the West’s notion and practice of democracy 
which has contributed to the surge of interest in popular participation and planning in the 
1960s. Indeed, a brief glance at the participation literature in the areas of planning, 
service provision or development reflects a common concern that significant sectors of the 
community are denied an effective role in the decision-making process at local levels.
By contrast to dominant western notions of political democracy participation is 
central to the theory of socialism. In Marx’s The German Ideoloev emphasis is placed 
on the role of revolutionary struggle not only to remove the ruling class but in the 
practical process of the reconstruction of the new democratic society. In his early work, 
Marx also identified political activity as the "universal" duty of every citizen, close to the 
classical form of total citizen involvement. In the context of class struggle Marx saw 
participation as a way of redressing the inequality of power and through the process of 
participation itself, of generating knowledge and consciousness for class struggle (Fagence, 
1977:31-34). In an ideal situation where pre-existing political structures have been
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overthrown, the creation of new social relations to provide an equality based on 
cooperation amongst workers is prioritised as the basis to guarantee participation.
There is also an idea in Marxism that the individual accrues certain socio- 
psychological benefits through active involvement in political events which enhance the 
individual’s sense of worth, self-esteem and control. The praxis^ of participation is seen 
as crucial as a subjective factor which permits human potential to be realised. For Marx, 
this praxis is also important to break the old division of labour and fulfil multiple 
objectives for cultural revolution, namely the involvement of workers in management, 
political education, communication and recreation (Marchetti, 1986).
Marx, along with Hobbes, Rosseau and Burke, emphasised the need to educate the 
participants to adequate levels of competence and responsibility and to develop appropriate 
instruments or organisations capable of reaching meaningful levels of participation. It is 
the difficulty of meeting these requirements which strengthens the case of the elitists for 
representatives and explains the priority assigned to political leadership in socialist models 
(Fagence, 1977:34). However, the creation of democracy based on mass organisation and 
politics in the transition to socialism in small peripheral countries was presented with a 
series of other problems which deformed practices. These relate to the objective 
conditions inherited, transformations of the state apparatus and the tendencies towards 
bureacuratic degeneration.
The breaking of an oligarchical-capitalist state and its police and military apparatus 
at the time of violent overthrow of a regime represented the beginning of the transition 
to socialism, but the legacy of authoritarian rule creates various obstacles. In such a 
context the population is predominantly illiterate and is consequently prevented from 
participating consciously and critically in the creation of a democratic society until 
equipped with appropriate educational skills. The popular sectors also lack organisational 
cohesion, which combined with their cultural backwardness, weakens their capacity to 
represent and protect their own interests. While national literacy programmes and 
organisational efforts can redress these problems there are more profound implications of 
a transition from authoritiarism regarding the underdeveloped nature of "civil society".
The term "civil society" while an inherently problematic theoretical concept is a 
useful description with which to identify all those institutions and mechanisms which 
remain outside the boundaries of the state system proper (Gramsci, 1991). Amongst the
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institutions of civil society are schools, the family, the church, businesses and trade 
unions: that is the ensemble of organisations or associations commonly called "private". 
However, the line of demarcation between civil society and the state or "political society" 
fluctuates according to the extent to which it is able to retain autonomy from the state. 
The conceptual dualism also comprises the two respective "sites" in which power is 
asserted or challenged within society.
Writing on these oppositions from observations of how political power is exercised 
in the capitalist social order, Gramsci (1991) in the Prison Notebooks identified that a 
dominant social group asserts power through the state via mechanisms of domination and 
coercion while power in civil society is exercised through hegemony and consent. In fact, 
these sets of oppositions were later modified by Gramsci to indicate that although the state 
retains the function of coercion but is also an apparatus of hegemony. The opposition 
with civil society is thereby maintained with the adoption of the nuance of "political 
hegemony" to refer to the consent-coercion function of the state (Anderson, 1977).
To speak of the underdeveloped nature of civil society in aftermath of an 
authoritarian regime in part refers to the paucitv of institutions located within civil society, 
be they organisations representing different groups, such as students, women, ethnic 
minorities or sporting or cultural associations. Without such institutions groups are unable 
to further their particular interests, compete with other groups for resources or protect 
themselves against a potentially encroaching state. It also refers to the historical 
circumstances whereby power is imposed predominantly through a coercive apparatus in 
order to ensure that the popular masses conform to the dominant type of production and 
economy within the system. In such situations, although instruments of political 
hegemony may also be used, the principle of consensus remains novel and the practices 
and selection of representatives are unfamiliar.
The pertinence of this latter point gains greater significance in the issue of political 
change if we consider the theoretical conceptualisation of habitus, as devised by Bourdieu 
(1977). This explains how social agents are imbued with a disposition to behave and 
think in ways which are shaped by the action of historical social forces which generate 
particular practices. This - essentially an explanation of the process of socialisation - 
contributes to our understanding of how systems of domination are reproduced over time. 
It applies even under conditions where objective political and economic circumstances
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change since individuals from different social groups share the same historical conditions 
which shape collective cognitive constructions about power, class and group identity 
(Bourdieu, 1977:78).
There were other problems confronting the attempts to construct a democracy based 
on popular participation in the capitalist periphery. The conditions of underdevelopment 
and the concommitant lack of resources, including sufficiently trained technical personnel 
as well as the aforementioned absence of democratic traditions, combine to exert pressure 
towards bureaucratisation: a tendency which plagues most third world countries. Given 
the role assigned to the state in the transition to socialism the state apparatus is expanded 
in order that it fulfil the new tasks of service provision, planning and development. A 
layer of functionaries, administrators and managers emerge and come to authoritatively 
monopolise decision-making and political and military power, thereby excluding the 
people from access to the decision-making processes and material resources (Lowy, 1986).
Beyond the immediate state apparatus, bureaucratisation also occurs within both 
political parties and ultimately in mass organisations. This tendency has been analised by 
Bourdieu (1991:174-188), who identified how the political field becomes professionalised, 
particularly in respect to subaltern classes who lack both the leisure time and cultural 
background or capital and ultimately have to cede power to the political leadership of 
permanent organisations which represent their class interests or to political parties. The 
cultural and economic deprivation of the people these organisations represent means that 
the political sphere becomes autonomous and a social layer of bureaucrats develops with 
its own interests, different from those of the popular sectors. These organisations become 
more like apparatuses of mobilisation than as a means to express the will of the base they 
formally represent (Gledhill, 1994:136). Moreover, this degenerative process is 
exacerbated when the political model of vanguardism is adopted.
Theoretically the revolutionary party, as Lenin insisted, is assigned the historic task 
of providing a leadership role in order to steer the workers and peasants through the 
transition by gaining hegemony from within their popular organisations but this can only 
be achieved where it has confidence in the expression of these masses. However, where 
these sectors express other currents of thought which do not coincide with the vanguard’s 
own vision, these are easily repressed. At this point the popular organisations loose their 
autonomy in relation to the party and state and their effectiveness as institutions of civil
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society (Lowy, 1986:272).
Returning now from this theoretical and conceptual excursion of the essential issues 
at stake in the historical, political and social conditions of transitions to democracy in the 
small perifery countries, we move on to consider how to operationalise the analysis of 
participation in the grassroots. However, at once we see that despite shared theoretical 
antecedents, the body of literature on participation and democracy remains resolutely 
separate from the literature concerning the relationship between participation and 
development. Although the latter area contributes to our understanding of the political and 
ideological aspects of participation, they are largely avoided by contributors concerned 
with development because they are not seen as helpful to their concern with tangible 
socio-economic improvements^
In this chapter I make no attempt to reconcile these distinct theoretical bodies (a task 
of sufficient magnitude to justify an entire thesis). Instead, I draw on the theories and the 
literature from the two areas since they are both relevant because: the issues of democracy 
and development are integrally related since power and the control of resources are 
germane to both; and because popular participation was a central concept to the FSLN’s 
theory and practice of creating new democratic practices and stimulating national 
development. Consequently, if we are to understand the experience of participation under 
the FSLN it is necessary to consider the issue as it relates to both development and 
democracy. Rather than review the literature which relates to the different dimensions of 
participation, discussion in this chapter is limited to those critical issues of participation 
which are pertinent to the context of the study, its approach and specific research
concerns^.
Researching popular participation is no easy matter given the complexity of the 
topic, its intangible characteristics and its numerous dimensions and contending 
interpretations. There is not even agreement about what to call it since popular 
participation is also referred to as political participation or peoples’ participation and, in 
the context of some development projects, it is called community participation. Although 
this latter term is slightly different because it specifies the community as the vehicle of 
participation, the literature on these experiences is pertinent to the wider questions of 
participation^. From the outset it is also important to emphasise that the different 
perspectives on participation do not simply reflect ideology since they are also determined
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by views on the planning process and intervention.
The chapter follows here with a description of the various objectives for which 
participation is advocated from different perspectives. This leads to a brief discussion 
about how participatory processes and activities will be evaluated in this study. The 
constraints to participation are then examined and for analytical purposes are identified as 
macro-level structural phenomena and micro-level phenomena. The recognition of these 
contraints not only informs decisions about prescriptive measures adopted to encourage 
participation but is crucial for its heuristic value to this thesis.
I Grasping the notion
A convenient way of understanding the amorphous notion of popular participation is to 
start by identifying the different objectives of participation as advocated by the academics, 
promoters or actors involved.
II Participation for instrumental objectives and empowerment
In some contexts the objective of popular participation is perceived as meaning increasing 
the "efficiency" of a development project or scheme. Here, its virtues are seen to lie in 
facilitating the promotion of consensus among beneficiaries and between them and the 
implementing agencies. Its value lies in the reduction of delays and overall costs through 
the most productive use of available resources: material, financial and human. A second 
objective of participation is "cost-sharing", whereby the beneficiaries of a development 
project contribute their labour and resources and reduce the costs of the project to the 
sponsor, be it a public institution, non-governmental organisation (NGO), or international 
agency. The contribution of intended beneficiaries subsequently generates a sense of 
ownership and commitment to the project and thereby enhances project success (Paul, 
1987). Yet a third perspective defines participation in terms of increasing "effectiveness" 
in relation to specified goals. This allows people access to decision-making in 
determining the objectives of a project and involvement in its administration. According 
to this perspective, the primary function of participation is to provide an effective means 
of mobilising and channeling available local resources into fulfilling material needs such 
as shelter, clothing and the non-material needs of employment and political liberty. The
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contribution of local knowledge, skills and resources that beneficiaries bring to project
results in more effective projects since they become congruent with beneficiary needs
(Oakley et al, 1991:16). This perspective of participation was adopted by the ILO in 1976
during its World Employment Conference when it incorporated the concept of
participation into the basic needs approach to development^
Participation is also used for the objective of facilitating the development of
"beneficiary capacity" in such a way that the people involved may take an active role in
the management and operational responsibilities of a development project. Capacity
building would therefore be aimed at strengthening the skills and knowledge of intended
beneficiaries to enhance their abilities and competence (Paul, 1987:3,18)).
Common to all these above objectives is an instrumental view of participation which
places the focus on the means to the achievement of development objectives. However,
there is also a view that sees participation as a final objective. This has gained increasing
support amongst the international institutions and agencies since it was endorsed officially
by United Nations Research Institute of Social Development (UNRISD) and the World
Conference on Agrarian Reform and Development in 1979. This view sees participation
as an end where the objective of popular participation is identified as:
"..to increase control over resources and regulative institutions in given social 
situations, on the part of groups and movements of those hitherto excluded 
from such control.."^
According to this perspective, participation should be an instrument of empowerment that 
leads to the transfer of power and increased political awareness as social groups attempt 
to control their lives and improve their living conditions. This objective implies a new 
sharing-out and then transfer of decision-making power because only through achieving 
power can individuals or groups determine how and what resources are to be distributed 
and thereby improve their livelihoods. It is this equation of participation with achieving 
some form of power which distinguishes it from the other objectives and constitutes an 
element which reflects its Marxist political legacy because it is primarily concerned with 
redressing the material and political inequalities.
The view of participation as meaning access to the decision-making process is used 
by several contributors to the literature as the criterion by which to distinguish "true" 
participation from its lesser imitations in order to exclude those circumstances where 
participants have no effective influence or power. According to this perspective
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participation has no meaning unless the people involved have significant control over the 
decisions concerning the organisation to which they belong. The term "pseudo­
participation" is then applied to participatory practices which are confined to 
implementation or ratification of decisions already made by external sources (Oakley and 
Marsden, 1984; Paul, 1987). Although this mechanistic dichotomy is useful for 
distinguishing whether the objective of empowerment is present it excludes most 
experiences of participation and therefore has limited analytical utility.
Another distinction in the quality of participation is made by the Brazilian 
educationalist, Paulo Freire (1972). He distinguishes "meaningful participation" which 
applies to situations where individuals have political awareness and consciousness from 
"pseudo-participation" where they do not. This dualism reflects the Marxist conviction 
that a deep understanding of society is essential for meaningful participation and is 
consistent with the Marxist emphasis that social or class consciousness is the most 
important ingredient for popular participation’® (Fagence, 1977:31-34). Unlike the 
previous dichotomy this one does not preclude the capacity of participation to develop or 
progress. Indeed, Freire points to the non-formal educational potential of participation as 
praxis, through which a knowledge of reality is attained and through which the poor 
discover themselves as its:
"permanent re-creators. In this way, the presence of the oppressed in the 
struggle for their liberation will be what it should be: not pseudo-participation, 
but committed involvement." (Freire, 1972:56)
According to Freire the active involvement of the poor in the organised struggle
transforms consciousness, thereby providing the basis for further political action. Once
the poor have become aware of their subordination they reach the "point of liberation".
This level of consciousness, although problematic in its methodological value because of
its essentially subjective quality, is used in this thesis as one criterion of empowerment.
The redistribution of power that empowerment implies is an inherently conflictual
process arising from the situation where groups hitherto excluded from the process of
participation try to increase control over resources and enter into competition with other
groups or the state. This is acknowledged by international institutions, including
UNRISD” . Consequently, it is perhaps informative to reflect on the polemic remark of
one contributor to the Inquirv into Participation (Pearse and Stiefel, 1980)’^ , who suggests
that the term popular participation is in fact a "sanitised" term, a euphemism substituted
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for "struggle for power" which has been used in an attempt to disassociate itself from 
"sensitive Marxist terminology".
There is little disagreement amongst writers that organisation is central to this 
concept of empowerment since it is the mechanism which brings together individuals who 
are individually powerless and transforms them into a social force (Pearse and Stiefel, 
1981:53). Hence the emphasis of sponsors on the creation or stimulation of an 
organisational basis and the development of groups, be it small beneficiary groups or 
social movements in which individuals within the rural sector might achieve their 
participation (Oakley and Marsden, 1984:10,74).
At this point enter the "agent" of participation who may support the group through 
the assumption of two key roles: first, by stimulating awareness within the group to build 
an organisational base which enables it to begin the active process in development; second, 
by facilitating the group’s access to resources for development. These functions may or 
may not be fulfilled by same person, by professionals, outsiders or cadres or, in more 
radical situations, they may be fulfilled by emergent local or peasant leadership (Oakley 
and Marsden, 1984:75). The quality of their methods and skills in building the 
organisational base of the group, consolidating internal solidarity and encouraging active 
intervention are crucial to the participation process. Hence, in the analysis of the rural 
participatory experience attention must be accorded to the influence of such agents or 
leaders in the participatory practice.
While advocates of popular participation are bound together in the belief that 
involving the poor in decision-making and implementation of development programmes 
will radically improve their social conditions and that organisation is a major task within 
any rural development project, precisely who amongst the broad category of rural people 
is supposed or expected to participate depends on the situation. They have been variously 
identified in general categories as "the rural poor", "the landless", "small producers" or 
"the last" with increasing recognition that rural development should be directed at discrete 
but homogeneous socio-economic groups. This is because development previously aimed 
unspecifically at "the community", resulted in benefitting only the most powerful and 
better-off sections (Oakley and Marsden, 1984:72). During the last two decades the 
importance of orienting efforts to incorporate women more fully into the development 
process has been increasingly recognised. This is not only because of their nominal rights
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to participate in the decision-making process but also because women occupy a crucial 
role in the development process as producers and as reproducers primarily responsible for 
the welfare of the household and because - as an extension of their domestic role - they 
often assume responsibilities in community organisation (Moser, 1991).
Those interpretations which see participation as increasing efficiency, sharing costs, 
improving effectiveness and building beneficiary capacity can also be defined as the means 
approach. Typically, this participation is conceived as an intervention in the development 
process for instrumental purpose to achieve predetermined development goals and is 
generally equated with a form of mobilisation to "get things done". It is seen as a kind 
of planning process which has the accompanying mechanisms and control (Oakley and 
Marsden, 1984:17). As a result, it can be characterised as a "top-down" approach where 
the sponsor of the project or programme, the government or the political party is the chief 
protagonist.
The type of intervention prescribed by this means perspective was seen in the 
community development programmes which were internationally endorsed during the 
1950s and 1960s. These were formulated by urban planners and were aimed at preparing 
the rural population through formal education programmes, to communicate development 
objectives to prepare beneficiaries to collaborate with official programmes (Midgley, 
1986). Other forms by which the means perspective is implemented can include the 
creation - by governments - of formal organisations such as cooperatives and farmers 
associations (Oakley and Marsden, 1984; Hall, 1986). Indeed, cooperatives in the 
developing world, including Nicaragua under the Sandinista Government, have constituted 
an integral strategy for the agricultural transition to socialism’^  and as a means to provide 
a structure in which rural people can have some say in development. However, peasants 
don’t necessarily want to be organised in collectivised agriculture and as Hall notes, the 
experience of officially established cooperatives indicates that they often become used by 
the state as mechanisms through which to promote top-down policies and to control 
production and the rural areas (Hall, 1986:54-56,95).
By contrast to the instrumental means approach, the interpretation of participation 
as empowerment sees it as an end in itself. Here, participation is not a fixed development 
goal but is a process which results in increasingly "meaningful" participation in the 
development process. It is attained either through the creation of political space on the
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one hand or on the other, through the movement or pushing out and demanding of space 
through concerted group action or class struggle. As such, it is essentially a bottom-up 
process and is identified by some as the only "authentic" participation because it is created 
by the people themselves (Oakley and Marsden, 1984:27). For community 
participationists^'^ it is associated exclusively with the non-government sector.
12 Participation as a dynamic process
Oakley and Marsden consider that participation as "means" and "end" cannot be unified 
in any practice of participation because:
"(w)here "participation" is the means to achieving previously established 
development objectives, its strategy is to reform and improve. Where 
"participation" aims at achieving power in order to demand meaningful 
participation, it implicitly demands some kind of structural change." (1984:29)
However, this distinction is contended by Paul who, in a report on the experiences of
community participation in World Bank development projects, provides an important
contribution to the general debate about participation and indicates that means and end
objectives are not mutually exclusive (Paul, 1987). He presents the objectives of
participation as a five-fold continuum from participation for the "lower level" objectives
which includes efficiency, cost-sharing and effectiveness, to the "higher level" objectives
of participation for capacity building and empowerment. This approach is useful since it
facilitates an appreciation of the dynamic nature of the process of participation and the
ability for activities instrumentally linked with participation to lead the poor to seek
participation in other spheres of life and even ultimately increase their power. Also, as
Paul indicates, it provides for several objectives to be pursued simultaneously. For
example, the higher objective of empowering individuals can often incorporate lower level
objectives such as efficiency and cost sharing.
Paul’s continuum also accommodates the view presented by Pateman (1970), that
participation can serve as a learning experience during which individuals may come to
redefine their "interests", gain confidence and skills which can ultimately empower
participants for future encounters. Paul himself notes this tendency in his observation that
earlier projects may strengthen the capacity for cooperative action of the groups which
may subsequently go on to achieve higher levels of participation (1987:5). This
understanding of participation implies that participation for instrumental purposes has the
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capacity to move towards participation for empowerment.
Therefore, although the notion of empowerment is central to participation, the
definition of participation ^  power is inherently problematic. This is because power is
an outcome of an activity or encounter and cannot be established before-hand. Richardson
notes the analytical implications:
"(p)articipation should not be defined in terms of the degrees of influence it 
brings about, this must be studied as one possible effects of participation, not 
its essence." (Richardson, 1983:28)
People are influenced by different encounters and experiences, they can and do influence
each other in varied ways: who gains what emerges only after particular activities have
occurred or decisions have been taken. Therefore, implicit in this view is the recognition
that participation is a dynamic process and that the output of participation is not just the
policies (the decisions reached) but also the development of social and political capacities
of each individual which occurs during the process (Pateman, 1970). This is the concern
of those defined by Richardson as the "developmentalists" and is an aspect addressed by
Marxists from Marx through to Freire. It is also explored in this thesis.
Throughout the participation literature little attention has been paid to the concrete
processes involved. Yet, the processes are particularly relevant to the inquiry into the
practice of participation since there is nothing automatic about it. The creation of
institutions and mechanisms which encourage or are conducive to the development of
popular participation do not immediately translate into a participatory society.
Participation cannot be guaranteed by formally legislating for it, by creating mechanisms
for it or by injecting it into a group.
An appreciation of the dynamic nature of participation and the benefits accruing
from it for human developmental in general are also emphasised by the Marxist tradition.
They perceive that the sense of control accruing from participation helps to break the
mentality of dependence and leads to empowerment because it enables rural people to
examine their collective problems and seek constructive solutions (Oakley, 1991:13-18).
13 Constraints to participation
A consideration of the obstacles which constrain participation is important to the 
understanding of it, to the analysis of its practice and to the search for prescriptive 
measures. Constraining factors can be most easily conceptualised as "external" in origin,
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relating to aggregate structures and trends and "internal", relating to socio-cultural and 
psychological factors. This distinction is of course crude since the former factors may 
generate the latter. Scholars (informed by their respective levels of analysis), 
governments, mass movements and other sponsors (informed by ideology and notions of 
planning) place different emphasis on the significance of these elements.
"External" constraints comprise those economic and political structures which 
reproduce inequality. These consist of the dominant relations of power and production, 
the existing class structure and the ideological values which legitimize them. They are 
denoted "anti-participatory" by authors such as Streeten (1981) and by the ILO which was 
concerned with securing the basic needs of poor populations. Commentators, including 
Oakley and Marsden (1984:63), emphasise these constraining factors and claim that 
tangible improvements in welfare result not from the mobilisation of local resources but 
from wider social and economic changes in society. They stress that participation cannot 
by definition be obtained in capitalist society since the primary impediment to 
participation is the capitalist system itself. Consequently, they call for profound social 
structural changes at both the national and international level to provide conditions for 
popular participation, without which the possibilities for real participation look bleak. 
However, in the recognition that existing socio-political frameworks inhibit meaningful 
grassroots participation and prevent the pre-conditions to participation from occurring in 
the foreseeable future, many analysts have tempered their approach to participation. They 
have consequently decided to concentrate on ways to achieve participation in the context 
of existing capitalist socio-political and economic structures by focussing on how local 
level initiatives may be fostered to improve the material and social conditions of the poor.
The significance of the socio-political system necessitates that any analysis of 
popular participation be made within the framework of its political context. However, this 
should be done with caution since it is overdeterministic. As Walton (1978) correctly 
reminds us, conceptualising participation from a purely structural perspective assumes that 
participation is constrained entirely by the political space it is afforded. This denies its 
potential to challenge existing power structures and create its own political space. 
Nonetheless, since the characteristics of the macro-level socio-political system establish 
the parameters for participation, including those at micro-level, any analysis of its practice 
need be placed firmly within the socio-political context, as does this thesis.
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The administrative structures of government, namely the territorial, spatial and socio­
economic divisions of the country into administrative units are also external factors 
influencing the potential of local level participation. This is because the degree of 
delegation of power to local authorities and the retention of control over decision-making, 
resource allocation and information by administrators can also prevent rural people from 
being incorporated effectively into development activities (Majeres, 1985; Oakley, 
1991:12). The significance of these constraints has led to the consideration of the 
potential of restructuring the politico-institutional framework to facilitate the incorporation 
of local people in the decision-making process. In particular, the ILO set out to examine 
the potential of such decentralised political and administrative institutions as a mechanism 
by which to incorporate local participation in formal decision-making institutions to meet 
basic needs.
Socio-cultural factors also comprise powerful barriers to participation and fall into 
the "internal" category of constraints. One such constraint is the poor’s apparent 
"fatalism" to their situation and their "mentality of dependence" (Oakley, 1991:13). 
Whereas, in the early development literature this was erroneously attributed to the poor’s 
inherent "docility", Freire showed this to be a superficial interpretation. He forced a 
reappraisal by indicating that the poor’s apparent resignation to his/her situation was in 
fact the manifestation of an historical and social situation and not an "essential 
characteristic of a people’s behaviour" (Freire, 1972:48). Introducing the concepts of 
marginalisation, dependency and oppression, Freire explained how culture operates as part 
of the structural and ideological infrastructure which systematically excludes the rural 
masses from participating in development. In such a way, the dominant cultural and 
social order generated by the social relations of production, influences attitudes and 
behaviour and subordinates rural poor to local elites. Hence the link between external and 
internal factors which limit participation.
Freire expanded his thesis by examining the socio-psychological process which 
complements the notion of habitus of Bourdieu (1977). Freire explains how peasants 
internalise the opinion the oppressor (the landlord or state official) holds of them. While 
peasants can be variously defined, it is understood that Freire referred to individuals who 
produce from the land and may or may not possess adequate amounts of land to meet 
family needs and are enmeshed in social relations of exploitation with a landlord through
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rentier arrangements or seasonal employment. In such circumstances they repeatedly hear 
that they are good for nothing, are ignorant and incapable of learning anything and that 
they are lazy and unproductive. Peasants consequently become convinced of their own 
failings and become self-deprecating (Freire, 1972). Thus, the poor become unaccustomed 
to taking decisions or challenging existing power structures and this accounts, as Godelier 
observes in another context, for the consent of the dominated to their domination 
(Godelier, 1986:157).
This idea of peasants as passive subordinates to oppressive social orders is 
challenged by the contribution of Scott (1985), who indicates in his study of "everyday 
forms of resistance" the numerous ways in which peasants struggle against exploitative 
conditions. According to Scott, these daily confrontations may not be expressed publicly 
or constitute serious challenges to the dominant order but they nonetheless serve to 
delegitimise the dominant political and moral order and demonstrate that peasants are able 
to challenge the ideological hegemony of ruling elites. However, the conflicting 
perspectives on peasant acquiesence, represented by the Freire and Scott interpretations 
are perhaps less a theoretical problem than an empirical issue: dissent may be less overtly 
expressed where repression is more intense or is calculated to be intense. Therefore, any 
study of participation at the grassroots needs to establish the extent to which dominant 
ideology constitutes an inhibiting factor and the content of peasant consciousness itself. 
However, perhaps it is more useful to identify what peasants know than whether they 
know they are repressed or not since only the former can provide the basis for effective 
political action (Gutmann, 1993).
The existence of these internal constraints means that the creation of new institutions 
or the removal of anti-participatory structures alone will not automatically evoke 
immediate and mass participation. Ways have to be found to equip the rural poor with 
abilities which enable them to influence the forces which control their livelihood and to 
assist people to identify and deal actively with their problems. To enable the 
disadvantaged to overcome what sponsors of various kinds perceive to be socio-cultural 
and psychological constraints which perpetuate their isolation and inactivity in 
development, consciousness-raising becomes an important dimension of participation and 
a preliminary step towards empowerment. Hence the emphasis on pedagogy: an aspect 
which has been most systematically conceptualised and implemented by Freire. Seeing
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the role of education as an essential ingredient to the development of radical self- 
awareness, Freire devised an educational method known as "education for liberation" or 
"conscientizacwn" which seeks to liberate individuals from the environment which 
constrains them. This facilitates a reflexive response and reinterpretation of life 
experiences which complements praxis and the experiences of active participation and 
assists the dominated in becoming aware of the illegitimate nature of the domination 
which they endure.
The concern to overcome internal constraints and develop consciousness also appears 
in the literature on community participation which assimilates the ideas of Freire and 
assigns community workers (the entrusted agents of community participation) to role of 
leading education programmes that seek to make the rural poor aware of their life 
situation. Such programmes aim to help the poor analyse why it is so and what 
alternatives they have in order to reinforce the capacity of the community to deal with its 
own problems by drawing on its own initiative and effort. The Latin American and 
Nicaraguan experiences of "participatory research" and "popular education" which 
incorporated reflexive methods have shown that these contribute to the development of 
political participation (Fais Borda, 1985).
Women encounter further obstacles in their efforts to incorporate themselves in 
development and political activities or gain more prominent roles in local activities. Here, 
cultural values which are generated by the predominant male-dominated culture and 
society assign to women prescribed roles and subordinate them to men (Oakley, 1991:13- 
14). In Nicaragua, as elsewhere in Latin America, this male dominance finds expression 
in machismo: a set of values which defines gender roles, generates explicit prejudice 
against women, prevents their attempts to gain greater access to development resources 
and creates hostility towards their full participation in public life. In fact, it is not uniform 
for all women and is differentiated according to class, ethnicity and race as well as in time 
(Stephens, 1993:33). The sexual division of labour within the domestic unit means that 
women have a double role as reproducer and producer. Where women are involved in 
community tasks in order to obtain access to basic services this becomes a triple role: a 
burden which renders their working days long and leaves women no "free" time. Also, 
psychological forces, perpetuated through cultural sanctioned norms, are mediated by the 
conscious or unconscious and can inhibit women’s own advance (Molyneux, 1982).
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Attempts to overcome the constraints on women are addressed within the two 
approaches embodied in "gender and development" planning. These are conceptualised 
by Molyneux (1986), who distinguishes between the "practical necessities of gender" and 
the "strategic necessities of gender". Policies relating to the practical necessities of gender 
treat women separately and aim to improve the concrete conditions imposed on women 
by their position in the sexual division of labour. These consequently focus on the home, 
reproduction, income generation and basic service provision. By contrast, strategic 
planning is oriented to overcome the broader structural and socio-cultural dimensions 
which subordinate women. Measures include, amongst others, the abolition of the sexual 
division of labour; the reduction of domestic roles; the elimination of institutional forms 
of discrimination (rights to property and credit); the establishment of legal-political 
equality between men and women; and rights of control of reproduction. Gender 
awareness becomes an integral part of either strategy since this can enable women to 
overcome their own feelings of inferiority.
II Evaluating the participatory process
Having established the importance of conceptualising participation as a process it becomes 
clear why I am concerned not with quantitative results but with qualitative processes. 
However, a means or technique by which to make a judgement about the type of 
participation which occurs at the grassroots has to be operationalised.
I ll  Participatory intensities
Paul (1987) can assist us here since he has made the most significant contribution to-date 
to the operationalisation of the concept by distinguishing between different observable 
activities of participation. Here we see that there are discrete participatory activities which 
vary in "intensity" according to the degree to which control or voice of intended 
beneficiaries are incorporated. There are four levels.
The first level of intensity is "information sharing", where administrators and 
managers share information with the group to facilitate the action of an individual or a 
group. This comprises a "low level" of intensity but may have an important impact on 
the outcome of popular participation to the extent that it can help to educate beneficiaries.
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In fact, for family planning or nutrition projects this information alone is crucial. A 
second level is "consultation", where beneficiaries are not only informed but are also 
consulted on key issues and have the opportunity to interact with and provide feedback 
to the corresponding sponsor. A third still higher level of intensity occurs when 
beneficiaries have a "decision-making" role and thereby have a greater degree of control 
or influence on the specific project or development process. Such decisions may be made 
exclusively by beneficiaries or jointly with others on specific issues or aspects relating to 
a project. The fourth intensity is when beneficiaries are able to take "initiative" in terms 
of action or decisions relating to a development project or scheme. This is where Paul 
considers intensity is at its peak because initiating action implies a proactive, decision­
making capacity and the ability to make a start on one’s own. In this respect it is 
qualitatively different from the other levels where decisions or tasks are proposed or 
assigned by others.
Given that these intensities correspond to incremental degrees of personal 
involvement, they can be conceived as integrally related to the objectives of participation. 
In such a way, if efficiency is the objective then information sharing may be all that is 
necessary. Similarly, if empowerment is the objective of participation then decision­
making or initiating action is most appropriate. At the same time, it is necessary to 
recognise that different intensities may co-exist in the same project, exist at different 
stages of its development and vary according to the nature of the development project. 
The intensity of participation may also be dependent on the capabilities of the 
beneficiaries themselves: for instance, they could well find it difficult to assume decision­
making responsibilities without prior experience of collective discussion and organisation. 
This schema is a useful evaluative tool for the researcher because it provides an 
operational instrument for distinguishing between the gamut of participatory activities, 
provides a hierarchy of participatory behaviours and indicates what type of participation 
may be achieved. For instance, where decision-making and initative activities occur it 
implies that high levels of empowerment can be achieved.
However, the quality of participation itself is not the only aspect which determines 
the outcome of a particular development project or programme but is merely one of 
several several since the location of a programme, its resource base and commercial 
prospects also influence its viability and success. Thus, a major issue in the examination
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of participatory processes arises from the problem of how to disentangle it from those 
other aspects which operate to determine its success or failure. This is particularly 
pertinent in cases of participation in productive projects, such as cooperatives. This is 
because their viability is also dependent on technical, production and market conditions 
and services. The influence of these other factors renders the direct link between 
participation and cooperative viability tenuous. These factors are dubbed 
"complementaries" by Paul (1987). For analytical purposes their influence on a project 
has to be identified so that the participatory processes alone are not attributed to determing 
overall cooperative performance.
112 Dimensions of empowerment
A particular consideration of empowerment is warranted on account of it being the most 
meaningful type of participation and one around which processes will most significantly 
be judged. Here Friedmann (1992) serves us excellently when modified to consider the 
particular circumstances of the peasantry, as the subjects of this thesis, by distinguishing 
three dimensions of the notion: social, political and psychological empowerment.
Social power can be conceived as being based on the access to elements of 
household production, including information and skills, social organisation and material 
resources. Where the household can increase its access to improve the basis of its 
production so can it be seen to lead to social empowerment. For women in particular, 
other aspects of social empowerment are gained from alleviation from household chores, 
through improved health care and expanded income opportunities. Thus for the peasantry 
we are concerned about the extent to which they have secured access to the means of 
production, to land and technical equipment and knowledge.
Political power is understood as resting on the household’s capacity to gain access 
to decision-making processes as they relate to those areas which directly affect the lives 
of household members not only through formal voting but also through increased power 
of voice and collective action. Thus, political empowerment increases as individual voices 
are channelled through political associations such as the party, trade union or cooperative 
movement. Here, emphasis is placed on the importance of "speech", as representing the 
consciously articulated political voice in order to distinguish situations which are more 
related to mere frustrations with a political situation or circumstances, such as spontaneous
47
eruptions of street violence.
While such organised and conscious forms of political action constitute Friedmann’s 
definition of political power, for the purposes of this thesis it will be expanded thanks to 
the observations provided by Scott (1985) to facilitate a more nuanced appreciation of the 
political action. For the analysis of subaltern groups it is important to examine those 
expressed in less overt oppositional practices or acts of resistance. Such actions may not 
cause dramatic political change but may be effective in preventing the domination of 
peasants by external agents, be it the landlord, mass organisation, party, government or 
state. They are also relevant because they may reduce the negative effects of policies and 
may led to further action. It will also include consideration of the subjective dimensions, 
namely the content of peasant consciousness because this is an important pre-condition to 
political action and empowerment.
The other dimension of empowerment, clearly reminiscent of Freire, relates to 
psychological dimensions and corresponds to situations where individuals begin to be able 
to express and assert themselves with confidence. This can be achieved either as a 
consequence of subjective inputs aimed at consciousness-raising or as an outcome of 
positive action in the social and political areas. Psychological empowerment for women 
occurs when they begin to question subordinate gender constructions which can enable 
them to overcome prejudices and their own fear of defying culturally sanctioned 
patriarchal norms. These barriers have to be conquered in order that they may be able 
successfully to translate their social power into political power such that the interests of 
their households can be defended by them in the public domain of wider political arenas.
According to Friedmann all three dimensions should be considered. He also states 
that they should be manifest through "socially and politically relevant actions" as 
expressed through collective action by the poor themselves because - in common with the 
advocates of popular participation - Friedmann emphasises the importance of collective 
action as a necessary component of the empowerment process. However, a less idealist 
and more subtle appreciation of politically significant action has to be developed in order 
to detect small steps which might suggest how peasants are qualitatively more empowered 
as political subjects.
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I ll Research approach: multi-level and actor perspective
The examination of participatory processes requires that analytical attention be focussed 
on the role played by individual action and consciousness. This is because it is at this 
level that participation is manifest: it is individuals and groups who participate and their 
beliefs, strategies and awareness translate into human action and shape the nature of the 
participatory process.
Enter the "actor", analytically promoted in the "actor-oriented" approach (Long and 
Long, 1992) which emphasises the importance of taking into account the role of "human 
agency". This notion, advanced by Giddens (1979), means recognising that individuals 
as social actors are "knowledgeable" and "capable" and that they attempt to understand and 
operate their life worlds cognitively, that is, on the basis of knowledge and consciousness 
and organisationally, in relation to their interaction with other people and groups. The 
meothodological implication of this theoretical emphasis is to give more attention to the 
role played by individual action and consciousness. It also provides a more dynamic 
approach to understanding participatory processes because it facilitates an appreciation of 
how individuals and groups interact with the system and shape the modes, processes and 
structural outcomes themselves. It also aims to provide an explanation of the processes 
by which external phenomena enter their life-worlds and are mediatated and transformed 
by these same actors. As Scott (1985) reminds us, "remote" social forces alter the 
behaviour of individuals through the moulding of daily life experiences and perceptions. 
Therefore, an actor perspective which places analytical focus on the strategies, actions and 
awareness developed and evolved by individuals and groups, enables us to identify the 
impact of external phenomena, policies and interventions on the local level (Long, 1988).
For the analysis of participation in this thesis it will be used to stress the interaction 
of forces and relationships which are "internal" and "external" to individuals and groups. 
By adopting this approach the researcher can account for variations because it emphasises 
how different actors will respond to the situations they encounter. Analytically, this 
entails detailed analysis firstly, of the life experiences, struggles and meanings that 
individuals and groups assign to their life-worlds; and secondly, of internal group 
dynamics as they relate to the mediation between structural and internal group dynamics.
While an actor perspective emphasises the importance of taking account of the role 
of "human agency" it is crucial at the same time to establish the conditions which
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constrain the individuals’ options, strategies and their potential for action since what an 
individual does cannot be explained without reference to the wider structures, processes 
and forces (Gledhill, 1994:134). Therefore, the actor perspective needs to be combined 
with an analysis of forces at different levels. This combination can then account for 
different responses to similar structural circumstances and is useful in identifying the 
influence of various forces, agents and institutions.
Hence the logic of the particular structure of this thesis which seeks to disaggregate 
the participatory processes by examining local level participation in cooperatives as well 
as the historical, structural and regional aspects of Nicaraguan development. This is 
because factors at all levels influence the life experiences of individuals, their 
consciousness and their action. As such, the thesis constitutes an attempt to combine a 
structural-historical and an actor perspective’^  in order to identify the key factors which 
operated to shape the development of local participation.
Conclusions
The concept of empowerment which includes gaining access to decision-making processes, 
control of resources and political awareness is crucial for authentic participation. 
However, participation is not just an outcome nor cannot it be assessed purely on the basis 
of decisions reached, rather it is a process of activity and encounters in which the social 
and political capabilities of the individuals involved develop and are transformed. The 
dynamic nature of participation enables it to progress towards higher level objectives as 
the people involved consolidate their organisations and gain operational skills and political 
awareness. The potential role of participation in rural development has been identified by 
rural inhabitants, their organisations, governments and NGOs alike Ideas differ about the 
relative importance of the various constraints which inhibit it, the potential roles of 
peasants and external agents in developing participatory activities and the mechanisms by 
which it can be achieved.
This thesis focuses on qualitative processes of participation and its evaluation is 
aided by the identification of various participatory activities which reflect different levels 
of "intensity" regarding individual commitment and involvement. These can be used to 
identify what type of participation might be achieved and to suggest whether
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empowerment in its social, political and psychological dimensions is occurring.
The analysis of participation is best achieved through the adoption of an actor- 
oriented approach which enables us to understand how external intervention influences 
participatory practices and how different responses emerge between individuals and groups 
whose experiences and actions shape the processes. This approach is complemented in 
this study with a multi-level analysis which incorporates other structural and historical 
aspects into the analysis and enables us to identify the respective role played by different 
forces and actors.
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Notes to Chapter 1
1.Evidence from the World Development Report 1983 indicates that investment was 
directed towards industrial areas and agricultural output remained stagnant. During the 
1965-82 period, which saw an average rate of increase in gross domestic production of 
between 2-8%, agricultural output remained stagnant (Hall, 1986:89).
2. See Scott’s seminal Weapons of the Weak (1985) for a discussion on the everyday forms 
of peasant resistance which indicates how the powerless struggle against exploitative 
conditions.
3.There are many matters around which the concept and operation of democracy are 
contended however, amongst them are these elements.
4.By praxis is meant an activity which is both practical and symbolic involving an action 
of change or reproduction of reality that contributes to the modification or reaffirmation 
of the consciousness of the participant.
5.Indeed, some commentators such as Marsden and Oakley (1984), believe the two sources 
to be irreconcilable.
6.The following sources provide comprehensive reviews of participation. A detailed and 
comprehensive analysis of the debates relating to political participation are found in 
Pateman (1970) and Fagence (1977). See Richardson (1983) in relation to participation 
and planning in the west; Oakley and Marsden (1984) for the role of participation in rural 
development; and Midgley et al (1986), in relation to the state.
7.Community participation has developed as an issue alongside the wider debate on 
popular participation and is differentiated in its focus on the direct involvement of 
ordinary people in local affairs and its concern with establishing local level institutions 
which create procedures for democratic decision-making. Its advocates consequently focus 
attention on effective institution building and to teach people how to use their own 
resourcefulness in dealing with those institutions beyond their communities.
8.As Streeten (1981) stressed:
"Such needs as health, education, safe water and sewerage can only, or 
more efficiently, be provided for through public effort.. The role of 
nonmaterial basic needs both as an ends in their own right and as a means 
to meeting material needs that reduces costs and improvea impact is a 
crucial aspect of the basic needs approach."
9.Pearse and Stiefel, 1979:80-108.
10.Other ingredients considered important in Marxism for participation include a 
understanding of political theory, an organisation capable of articulating the aspirations 
and preferences of its people and a commitment to work towards goal objectives.
ll.UNRJSD (1981) Dialogue about Participation (Geneva), No 1:3, quoted from Oakley 
and Marsden (1984:25).
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12.Comment made by Soon Young Yoon.
13.They have also been promoted in capitalist societies for distinct development 
objectives.
14.Such as Hall, 1986.
15.This was the objective of Long and Roberts (1984) in their study of the Peruvian 
peasantry.
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Chapter 2
NICARAGUAN HISTORY: RURAL RESISTANCE, OPPRESSION AND
REVOLUTION
This chapter contextualises the inquiry of this thesis by presenting an overview of 
Nicaraguan historical development, the economic and political conditions prevailing on 
the eve of the revolution and details about the "rural poor" as the subjects of this thesis. 
It also describes the emergence of the FSLN and the organisational relationship between 
it and the rural organisations. This relationship is key to the understanding of the nature 
and expression of participation as it developed during the period of the Sandinista 
Government.
It is of particular analytical relevance in this chapter to establish how political power 
was imposed during Somoza since this will provide an indication of the legacy of 
authoritarianism as it relates to the underdeveloped nature of civil society and prevalent 
political practices. In addition, we need also identify the nature of peasant resistance in 
order to understand the relationship between the FSLN and the peasantry and establish its 
limitations or potential for autonomous political action.
The first section of this chapter describes the economic development of Nicaragua 
which generated extreme conditions of poverty and a political system which itself 
reinforced social inequalities and excluded the majority from participation in the political 
process. The second section describes the political, ideological and organisational 
characteristics of peasant struggles which have characterised the Nicaraguan countryside. 
The factors which finally led to the integration of campesinos (peasants) into the war for 
liberation are also identified.
I Development of agrarian capitalism: land and labour
The particular conformation of agroexport capitalism as it developed in Nicaragua led to 
the retention of a sizeable peasant sector. It also generated the conditions of extreme 
socioeconomic deprivation.
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During the colonial period, raw materials from Nicaragua, initially cacao and later 
indigo not only supplied the conquerors of Spain but also European and the North 
American states (Black, 1981:10; Vilas, 1986:49; Wheelock, 1986:20). In this way, an 
irreversible process was set in motion which sealed Nicaragua’s fate as a primary export 
economy.
II Coffee: the "quiet revolution"
The introduction of coffee, cultivated extensively from about 1870 (later than other 
Central American states), is widely attributed to have marked Nicaragua’s entry into the 
capitalist world economy. Although commentators generally attribute the expansion of 
coffee cultivation to the measures implemented by the Liberals, coffee had become the 
principal export by 1890 (Booth, 1985:20) in response to the favourable conditions 
provided by his Conservative predecessors'. Coffee production had been encouraged 
through a series of financial incentives, credit and infrastructural development and 
guaranteed access to land through reforms which reduced the area of land under church 
control and eliminated Indian ejidos (communally owned and farmed lands).
Coffee continued its expansion during the presidency of Jose Santos Zelaya (1893- 
1909), who was inspired by a Liberal vision of transforming the national and regional 
economy into an export region of primary products and who aimed to overcome economic 
stagnation, consolidate regional integration and create a new social order in the form of 
an emergent agrarian bourgeoisie. Since coffee production could achieve these desired 
ends he built the appropriate infrastructure and in 1902 introduced measures to facilitate 
the reorganisation of land ownership to favour private property. Thus, large scale coffee 
production extended to incorporate the Pacific highlands (the departments of Granada, 
Managua, Masaya and Carazo) and to the North-Central highlands (the departments of 
Matagalpa, Jinotega, Nueva Sergovia and Esteli). Exports doubled in the first decade of 
Zelaya’s regime in response to expanding markets in Europe and the United States and 
they continued to expand between 1920-40 when coffee came to represented 50% of 
Nicaraguan export earnings (Black, 1981:10; Enriquez, 1991:28).
Coffee production transformed the Nicaraguan economy. It established the 
groundwork of an economy based on primary goods production and dominated by 
agroexport. The precariousness of this situation would become painfully evident during
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the Great Depression of the 1920s and 1930s when Nicaraguan exports were devalued 
dramatically (Wheelock, 1986:20). Coffee also marked the take-off of agricultural 
capitalism and induced profound social and political changes to the character of 
Nicaraguan society. Hence its qualification as a "quiet revolution" (Dore and Weeks, 
1992).
Zelaya’s Agrarian Reform Law, introduced to encourage coffee cultivation, put up 
for auction indigenous communal landholdings, removed public and church rights to land 
and expropriated the lands of those without official land titles. Landownership became 
more concentrated in an emergent agrarian bourgeoisie and the dispossessed sharecroppers, 
renters and independent peasants were forced to become a rural labour supply which had 
to seek work in order to survive. Vagrancy laws, labour draft and a coercive system of 
labour were enforced and compelled rural people to work on the latifundios during the 
harvest period (Enriquez, 1991:30; Dore and Weeks, 1992:11). Yet, coffee production did 
not eliminate non-capitalist relations of production nor did it result in the establishment 
of modem capitalist production in the countryside although it contributed to the growth 
and modernisation of the state.
However, the promised transformation of production in the countryside by the 
innovative developments of the new agrarian bourgeoisie were "tmncated" by a US 
invasion in 1912. Clearly, Zelaya’s liberal reforms had threatened the interests of US 
capital which was looking to constmct a pan-oceanic canal through Nicaragua and was 
antagonistic to the growth of vigorous independent national capitalist class in Nicaragua 
(Vanden, 1982:43). When the US marines intervened it was to ensure the resumption to 
power by the Conservatives whose social base lay primarily with the traditional livestock 
hacendados and latifundistas, that is landlords (Kaimowitz and Thome, 1985:224).
12 Cotton: consolidating agrarian capitalism
The transformation of Nicaragua’s economy to capitalism was hastened during the cotton 
boom of the 1950s, at a time when the demand for materials was stimulated by the Korean 
War (Kaimowitz and Thome, 1985:224). Cotton, which was concentrated around the 
Pacific coastal plain in departments of Leon, Chinandega and Masaya, increased 
production fivefold between 1950-51 to 1954-55. It became the central axis for the model 
of agroexport and accounted for 39% of export earning (compared with 35% for coffee
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during that period). At its maximum acreage it occupied 25% of the country’s cultivated 
lands (Enriquez, 1991:34).
As with coffee before it, cotton production dramatically changed the social structure 
of rural Nicaragua. Land tenure became more concentrated as land prices rose and small- 
scale grain producers were forcibly removed. Most of those displaced either became 
temporary wage labourers or moved out towards the agricultural frontier in the north and 
east regions of the country where lands were still in the public domain, while others 
moved into the urban areas (Vilas, 1986:50). Once relocated, those on the agricultural 
frontier led a precarious and marginalised existence without the security of land titles 
(Luciak, 1987a: 120). Cotton production had the effect of accelerating the transformation 
of the peasants into wage labourers. In those areas under its production, non-capitalist 
rental arrangements (found in share-cropping, tenancy and debt peonage), were largely - 
but not entirely - replaced by cash rental payments (Enriquez, 1991:34-40; Dore and 
Weeks, 1992:10). However, most of these workers were only seasonally employed since 
the progressive mechanisation of cotton cultivation during the 1950s meant manual 
labourers were required only during the harvest period^ (Gould, 1990:134).
Other export crops such as sugar, seafood, tobacco and bananas - produced 
increasingly after the 1950s - rendered agroexport a dynamic growth sector but 
exacerbated the spatial and social inequalities which had hitherto characterised the 
development of agrarian capitalism in Nicaragua. For example, beef production which 
became the fourth most important agroexport in the 1960s, displaced minifundistas who 
had already been pushed to the agricultural frontier during the cotton boom. These were 
campesinos who produced mainly for subsistence and extracted surplus with payment 
either in labour or kind to the hacendado. Moreover, sugar production only created a 
seasonal demand for work and thereby exacerbated the seasonal labour requirements since 
together with coffee and it was harvested in the period from December to March meaning 
that only part of the workforce was employed throughout the year. These agricultural 
products also increased the economy’s dependency on what amounted to highly vulnerable 
products and on volatile world markets, rendering the economy in the words of Jaime 
Wheelock, who became Minister of Agrarian Reform, "unable to sustain stability, lurching 
between years of plenty and crisis" (Wheelock, 1986).
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13 The persistent peasantry
While the extent of capitalist penetration in Nicaragua is both theoretically and empirically 
disputed, commentators agree that on the eve of the revolution the expansion of capitalist 
relations of production into the countryside was only partial since non-capitalist relations 
remained (Kaimowitz and Thome, 1985; Weeks and Dore, 1992). This co-existence of 
non-capitalist relations of production with a capitalist sector is described by de Janvry as 
"functional dualism", whereby the capitalist sector produces commodities on the basis of 
hired waged labour while the peasant sector produces use values and petty commodities 
on the basis of family labour and provides cheap labour to the capitalist sector (de Janvry, 
1981:80-84). The persistence of a large peasant or campesino sector of tenant farmers of 
various forms remained until 1979 and gave the Nicaraguan agrarian economy its unique 
characteristics.
Lets now take a brief look at the predominant characteristics of the different groups 
within the agrarian social structure in 1978, as illustrated in Table 1. The first group was 
the rural bourgeoisie, a group which can be differentiated on the basis of size of 
landholdings. Large bourgeoisie landowners, identified as those with over 500 manzanas 
(one manzana equals 0.7 hectares), typically specialised in export crop production and to 
a lesser extent in commercial food production^ and tended to occupy prime agricultural 
land. They comprised only 0.4% of the rural economically active population (EAP) but 
owned 36% of the land (Deere et al, 1985:77-78).
Medium-sized producers, those with between fifty and five hundred manzanas^ 
concentrated mainly on export production although they also grew crops for the domestic 
market. They were capable of organising and directing the productive process and hired 
seasonal workers. They occupied 16% of the land, but were more numerous than the 
large producers, representing 4.5% of the rural EAP.
The largest grouping of the rural class structure is the campesino sector. This group 
accounted for 58% of the rural EAP and occupied only 15% of agricultural land. It was 
very heterogeneous and can be divided between the rich and middle peasantry and the 
poor peasantry, according to landholding size. Although this is a simplistic criterion it 
serves to reflect general characterisations'*. The farms of the rich and middle peasantry 
were between ten and forty nine manzanas and produced most of the country’s 
commercial crop of basic grains. Some produced a limited amount of export crops,
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particularly coffee. Whereas the middle peasants were able to satisfy their basic 
necessities and as a result are also categorised as "subsistence peasants", the rich peasants 
typically employed workers.
Table 1. Structure of land tenure in Nicaragua 1978
Sector area mzs* %land
Agrarian bourgeoisie and 
landlords
farms over 500 mz 
farms 200-499 mz
2.920.000
1.311.000
36
16
Middle and petty bourgeoisie producers 
farms 50-199 mz
2,431,000 30
Subsistence peasants 
farms 10-49 mz 1,241,000 16
Poor peasants/ semi-proletarians 
farms less than 10 mz 170,000 2
Totals 8,073,000 100
* mz is an abbreviation for manzana, the most common measurement of land in 
Nicaragua. 1 manzana = 0.7 hectares = 1.75 acres.
Sources: derived from CIERA, 1989e:39.
The poor peasants are those rural households that farmed a small plot of land of less than 
ten manzanas which was inadequate land to meet basic family subsistence. This group 
was the largest peasant producer group, representing 36.4% of the total rural EAP^ (Deere 
et al, 1985:77-78). As a percentage of the rural EAP with access to land the group 
represented a total of 58% which farmed only 2% of the arable land (Dore, 1990:101). 
These poor peasants produced mainly for basic grain production with little or no surplus 
for commodity exchange and were forced to supplement income by selling their labour 
leading to their dependency on seasonal wage labour. They moved from the cotton, 
coffee, sugar cane plantations during the respective harvest and then either went back to 
their own peasant plot as parcelistas, worked on plots as paid colonos or as medieros 
(those who gained access to land in exchange for half the harvest) (Matus et el, 1990:79;
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Houtart and Lemercinier, 1992:22). Hence these peasants were transformed into what 
scholars have referred to as "semi-proletarians" or "peasant labourers".
The final group, which is not included in Table 1 because it did not have access to 
land, consists of the landless agricultural labourers and included permanent and seasonal 
workers who represented a total of 37% of the rural EAP. The latter were either rural- 
based or joined urban based semi-proletarians who returned to the city where they 
struggled for survival or remained unemployed (Nunez, 1981:10-11).
These pressures on the Nicaraguan peasantry towards temporary employment and 
peasantisation, gave its struggle a dual character as a struggle for both land and for better 
working conditions (CIERA, 1989c:35-6). Whether categorised as peasants who sold their 
labour power at harvest time in order to subsist or as rural proletarians who survived the 
rest of the year on a minifundio remains a subject of academic debate. However, aside 
from semantics, the definition was crucial and was ultimately wrongly conceived by the 
Sandinista Government for the purposes of the agrarian reform policies and as it related 
to the cooperative movement in particular.
Although the centrality of the family-household had been diminished by the 
emergence of new forms of dependency on the local landlord during the twentieth century, 
in 1979 it was still an important social and economic unit of production and the base of 
everyday life^. The absence of stable salaried work secured the fusion between the unit 
of production and the family unit and the low grade of monétarisation led to the 
establishment of highly personalised solutions as a way to secure the basic necessities of 
life. These were sought either through the family or other social networks (Faune et al, 
1990; Houtart y Lemercinier, 1992).
14 Social inequalities and deprivation
The economic development Nicaragua created distinct regional differences in rural social 
structures. The north Pacific region, dominated by tobacco and sugar mills, was 
characterised by a concentration of salaried workers. Other areas within the Pacific region 
(including those of the two cases studies of this thesis) and the poor lands of the northern 
interior were characterised by the prevalence of peasant labourers or semi-proletarians who 
retained access to small plots of land. By contrast, the eastern agricultural frontier and 
interior were predominated by medium and rich peasant production (CIERA, 1989c:35).
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Other inequalities typified the agroexport model. The export sector not only had prime 
lands but also received most governmental assistance, including infrastructural and 
financial assistance, as indicated by the 1973 figures which showed that 70% of the area 
under cotton production was financed with credit by the national bank compared with only 
5% for maize (Nunez, 1987:53). Domestic food production became concentrated in hands 
of small producers who lacked resources to produce capital-intensive export crops or to 
modernise their production. This remained in extreme backwardness, relying on 
traditional tools and methods: in fact, 75% of basic grain production was carried out with 
a handspike. These producers were pushed onto the poorest lands and onto the 
agricultural frontier where they remained isolated from roads and lacked access to drinking 
water and electricity (Kaimowitz and Thome, 1982:225).
Nicaragua’s agroexport system lacked modem technology and instead operated on 
the super-exploitation of labour as the basis of its competition in the world market 
(Kaimowitz and Thome, 1985:225), meaning that poor peasant producers shared with 
other seasonal labourers extremely low salaries. Conditions for the seasonal workers and 
poor peasants were worse because they were condemned to search for work in migratory 
movements during the harvest calendar, entailing an existence of hardship and insecurity. 
Women were exploited even more than their male contemporaries. Their unequal 
incorporation into productive tasks, with a marked sexual division of labour, contributed 
towards ensuring a cheap labour force for the agroexport economy^. Women’s names did 
not even appear on the payroll: they were paid instead via their male partners as were 
their children. Consistent with patriarchal ideological which devalues women’s productive 
work, theirs was depicted as "assistance" to the men and they were paid less than their 
male counterparts (CIERA, 1989d: 18-28). This was legitimised by the purported notion 
that men "maintain" their families despite the reality that in 1970, a total of 50% of 
households were headed by women^
Consequently, rural social structures were characterised by a highly skewed 
distribution of assets and income: in 1961 the richest producers, representing 1% total 
producers, received US$18,000 while the poorest 65% earned around US$400. By 1971, 
the poorest were earning as little as one hundredth less than their patrons. The extent to 
which they were "submitted to misery and poverty" (Wheelock, 1986:20) is evident from 
the social indices. In 1979, the national the expectancy of life was 55.2 years and infant
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mortality was 130 per 1,000 live births. Without sex education or access to family 
planning, women became pregnant from an early age and continued reproducing until late: 
average fertility rates were 7.8 children and were higher for rural women. Rates of 
spontaneous abortion were also high. Only 3% of the population received electricity and 
94% of the rural population lacked drinking water. The national average illiteracy rate 
was 70% and was greater in the countryside where as many as 90% of the women were 
illiterate (Wheelock, 1986:22; Nunez, 1987:55). The statistics indicate that Nicaragua - 
even compared with its neighbours - was a wretched place. Such were objective 
conditions against which the peasants themselves had struggled in different ways for 
centuries as the following section illustrates.
II Resistance and rural organisation
As in other Central American countries, the development of capitalist agriculture was 
resisted by Nicaragua’s peasants whose central motive for protest was the defence of land.
I ll Rebellions against agro-capitalist expansion
Indian revolts against the Spanish and creole class of large landowners occurred 
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Local insurrections, associated with 
extreme exploitation, also took place during the 1800s when Indians armed with sticks and 
machetes attacked Spanish outposts in Masaya, Leon, Granada and Rivas. Although 
Indian-European racial mixing occurred extensively during colonial Nicaragua, the 
remaining Indian populations (settled mainly in Masaya and in Subtiava, Leon) were at 
the bottom of the economic and status system (Black, 1981:15; Booth, 1985:13-14). With 
the secession of Spanish and British colonial control over the Pacific and Atlantic regions, 
Nicaragua rapidly moved under the influence of the increasingly assertive and newly 
independent North American states who issued a warning to European colonial powers to 
keep their hands off the American continent in the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 (LaFeber, 
1984:23). The particular interests of the US government in Nicaragua were not primarily 
economic but were geo-political since it offered a potential location of an isthmian canal 
to link the two oceans.
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Nicaragua, as with the rest of Central America, also became the target of private and 
professional adventurers who aimed to claim the small states for their own personal gain 
and to extend the slave states. It was against one such filibusterer, William Walker (the 
US citizen who invaded Nicaragua in 1856 with territorial aspirations and proclaimed 
himself its president), that peasant insurrections also took place in and around Ometepe. 
Subsequent waves of indigenous uprisings occurred in response to the expropriation of 
traditional farmlands from peasants which were taken to facilitate the expansion of coffee. 
Notably, there was a prolonged offensive by peasants in Matagalpa in 1881 after which 
five thousand dispossessed campesinos were massacred ((Black, 1981:15; Collins, 
1986:16). These brutal responses to peasant rebellions became a characteristic of the next 
hundred years as successive Nicaraguan governments acted to protect the interests of the 
oligarchy and growing bourgeoisie.
Insurrections and armed uprisings increased during the US military occupation 
between 1912 and 1933 when the marines arrived to bolster the Conservative regime. 
This intervention had been facilitated by the fragmentation of the propertied classes (a 
feature which continues to the present day), who vied for support from external power in 
order to serve their ovm interests (Dore and Weeks, 1992). The first engagement of the 
US forces was a confrontation with "£'/ Indio'' Zeledon who fiercely opposed the 
subordination of Nicaraguan sovereignty to the US and was fighting at the time against 
the Conservative oligarchs and Diaz, their president, who had been installed by 
Washington. The coalition of social forces constituting Zeledon’s followers, which 
included patriotic peasants and poor artisans, suggests that this was an incipient expression 
of popular resistance. Zeledon and alongside his followers were massacred by US forces 
who subsequently responded to the ten uprisings against Conservative rule which took 
place between 1913 and 1924 by imposing martial law (Black, 1981:9-16).
During the 1920s, the peasant struggle became increasingly aimed at the invading 
Yankees and the bourgeoisie landowners. This period saw the emergence of Sandino, the 
Hero of the Sergovias, as a serious threat to the elites. Sandino, the son of a mechanic, 
was bom in Carazo in 1895. He had worked for Standard Fmit and US-owned mines 
throughout Central America (LaFeber, 1990:66): experiences which, together with the 
witnessing of the defiled public display of Zeledon’s dead body, fuelled an anti-US 
sentiment within him. He had stayed in Mexico, where he joined the working class
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movement, participated in strikes and trained as a spiritualist and mystic (Gilbert, 
1988:20). Sandino fought successfully with his Army for the Defence of National 
Sovereignty against the US marines from 1927 until they were forced to withdraw in 
1933. He was based in the remote mountains of Las Segovias: an area affected by 
expansion of coffee cultivation.
His army was composed mainly of peasants and relied on widespread collaboration 
of thousands of other campesinos who operated as an "irregular" army, providing crucial 
logistical support networks and intimate knowledge of vital terrain. At its peak this 
peasant army comprised 21 columns and 6,000 soldiers (Selser, 1981) and operated 
throughout ten of Nicaragua’s sixteen departments: Zelaya, Chontales, Matagalpa, 
Jinotega, Nueva Sergovia, Esteli, Managua, Leon, Chinandega and Rivas (Black, 1981:22). 
Although there was extensive popular sympathy for the Sandino throughout Nicaragua that 
support did not translate into organisational solidarity or rebel recruitment elsewhere in 
the country (Gould, 1990:36). The inclusion of miners who had taken part in the major 
strikes against US mining companies, agricultural workers and artisans created a popular 
force and gave the army its distinct class character. It meant that this war was the closest 
thing to a class war that Central America had ever seen and the US was allied to the class 
that was under siege (Ramirez, 1981:431; LaFeber, 1984:67).
Consistent with the general tendency of scholars to focus on the occasions of overt 
peasant resistance^, Nicaraguan historiography characterised in the work of Vilas (1986b) 
and Ruchwarger( 1987), has emphasised the dramatic confrontations between peasants and 
the state. This perspective is fuelled by the lack of information on the period and 
consequently, we know little beyond the details of General Sandino’s leadership qualities 
which enabled him to recruit supporters against all objective odds and his strategic 
combination of well planned political and organisational work^°. There is no information 
concerning the peasant perspective at this time.
The issue of land was central to Sandino’s notion of social justice but this is less 
evident from what he wrote - since Sandino was no political theorist (Ramirez, 1981:433- 
4) - than from the organisation of the areas controlled by his army. This area extended 
from the Honduran border to the north. Lake Nicaragua to the south, Puerto Cabezas on 
the Atlantic eastern board and Chichigalpa in the west. Here, land was redistributed for 
the first time in the country and was given to peasants whose farms had been expropriated
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during the expansion of coffee. Also, agricultural cooperatives were formed and taxes 
were levied on landowner’^ This project of Sandino’s conflicted with the interests of the 
bourgeoisie. Sandino was assassinated in 1933 by the National Guard, a constabulary 
created by the US State Department during the 1920s as a way to accomplish for less cost 
what the Marines had been trying to do, namely pacify the country and protect private 
property (LaFeber, 1984:66). Prior to the departure of the US forces, Anastacio Somoza 
Garcia was made the National Guard’s first Nicaraguan commander. The day after 
Sandino’s murder, the National Guard slaughtered 300 of Sandino’s unarmed followers 
and their families in his base camp in Wiwili (Selser, 1981). Somoza then ordered the 
systematic destruction of crops, farms and cooperatives in a savage attempt to eliminate 
Sandino’s legacy. Over the next few years the remnants of the guerilla movement were 
wiped out and the latifundio system was restored (Black, 1981:24).
This brutality contributed to ensuring that for decades no peasant protest would be 
overty expressed although other factors also impeded peasant rebellions. Peasants were 
physically dispersed, were divided by conflicting local interests and by traditional political 
parties and their leaders were coopted by the Somoza regime. Nonetheless, new forms 
of campesino resistance emerged in the decades prior to the revolutionary insurrection. 
These took place within the parameters of existing jurisdiction and were expressed through 
indigenous authorities, unions or cooperatives. Typically, violence occurred when 
repression was employed by landlords and National Guards or on occasions when peasants 
responded angrily to unfavourable outcomes which subjected them to worsening economic 
conditions (Serra, 1991:45-50).
During the 1960s peasant struggles were concentrated again in the north, in 
Matagalpa and Jinotega, where the first outbreaks of union organisation and peasant 
associations had opposed the second cycle of expropriations of peasant lands for the coffee 
latifundio and the brutal exploitation of plantation workers. The basis of these incipient 
organisations had been established by the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN), a Moscow- 
line party which was formed in 1944. Through these initial organisational activities the 
PSN, although unable to provide effective opposition to Somoza, created conditions that 
would serve the FSLN guerilla who themselves later operated in the area (CIERA, 
1989c:48). Significantly, the communities which were renowned for their actions of 
resistance were indigenous communities whose collective identity and culture was rooted
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in communally shared resources, including those in Mozonte y Teplaneca in Las Segovias, 
in Uluce in Matagalpa and in Jinotega (Serra, 1991:46). During the 1950s, in response 
to the expansion of cotton, the Subtiavas of Leon launched protests against local 
hacendados concerning claims over land which the Indians had customarily used. They 
employed direct action against newly imposed land boundaries known as pique de alambre 
(wire-fence cutting) which came to symbolise campesino resistance against agrarian elite. 
Other groups in Chinandega and Leon expressed their resistance to expropriations by 
seizing plantations, thereby contributing to the total of 240 land invasions which were 
recorded in these areas between 1964-73 (Collins, 1986:22; Gould, 1990). Although rural 
resistance until the mid-1970s remained essentially local and sporadic it was clear that 
extensive agro-export expansion in western Nicaragua had generated powerful 
contradictions and had created social forces which were represented by new forms of 
organisation.
Before examining the factors which stimulated the peasants’ organisational and 
political consolidation and their ultimate incorporation into the war of liberation, the 
following section describes the nature of repression and hegemonic control in the 
countryside. This will also serve to inform us of the political experiences of peasants 
before the insurrection.
112 Somozan repression
Since Sandino, the peasantry was the most repressed sector of Nicaraguan society. It 
suffered systematic brutality imposed by the National Guard which operated to protect the 
interests of the Somozan dictatorship (1936-1979)’^  against its opponents. The first 
dictator, Anastacio Somoza Garcia, came to power in what was the first major violation 
of the Nicaraguan Constitution: a coup which established him as president. He ensured 
his absolute power over the state and military by rewriting parts of the Constitution to 
enable him to decree laws single-handedly*^. His control over the electoral legislative 
machinery provided conditions for a permanent dictatorship and denied all possibilities of 
alternative parties coming to office via the electoral box (Black, 1981).
While essentially a repressive apparatus, the Somozan dictatorship was able to 
consolidate its power through the weakness of the state he had inherited and the division 
between the bourgeoisie (Black, 1981:4). The selective adoption of popularist policies and
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cooptation also proved powerful instruments with which to ameliorate opposition. In 1945 
he made an official accord with the incipient labour movement by granting a Labour Code 
which created the conditions for Somozan sponsored unions. That this agreement was 
made in the context of ongoing Conservative opposition and was abandoned once the 1950 
Pact of the Generals was agreed, indicates that it was aimed less at real concessions than 
to ameliorate the socioeconomic contradictions generated by the dictatorship at a time 
when the party was threatened by the Conservatives. The Pact of the Generals signed 
between Somoza Garcia and the Conservative leader, Emiliano Chamorro, secured internal 
unity between the two parties and Somozan hegemony within it. From this time onwards 
popular demands were managed most typically with repressive methods (Vilas, 1986b:86).
Anastacio Somoza Garcia was killed (or "justificado", that is brought to justice, as 
Nicaraguans say) from shots fired by a poet and type-setter, Rigoberto Lopez Perez, in 
Leon, Nicaragua. He subsequently died despite the efforts of the best US surgeons who 
were flown to Nicaragua by Eisenhower to save him (Smith, 1993:112). According to the 
Sandinista military strategist Humberto Ortega, his death was politically significant 
because it succeeded in showing that the dictatorship was neither as omnipotent or eternal 
as the myth it had perpetuated implied. His murder also symbolised the beginning of the 
loss of Somozan control over the popular masses (Ortega, 1978:81).
Somoza's elder son Luis Somoza replaced him and ruled between 1958-64. 
Although attributed by some observers to be a relatively moderate dictator, this 
moderation extended only to his decree of press freedoms and reduction of the military 
budget. He also resorted to occasional populist tendencies: peasant demands were 
sometimes acceded and on occasions land disputes were resolved favourably for the 
peasants. This policy served to coopt peasant leadership, thereby dividing it as a social 
force (Gould, 1990:96).
The dictatorship of Luis Somoza coincided with Washington’s new strategy for 
permanent counter-revolution, launched in the context of post-Batista Cuba. Nicaragua 
became a test-case for a new US policy which combined social reform with counter­
insurgency and was considered necessary since the country’s increasing rural agitations 
implied that potential conditions for a "Castroite subversion" existed (Black, 1981:42). 
In conjunction with the US Alliance for Progress, operating during the 1960s and 
comprising economic investment and aid conditioned on political and social reform.
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Somoza passed an agrarian reform in 1963. The aim was to reduce the negative economic 
impacts of agroexportation and to partially appease socioeconomic demands^" .^ Between 
1964-1976, under the auspices of the reform agency Nicaraguan Agrarian Institute (IAN), 
itself financed by US Agency for International Development (USAID), displaced 
campesinos were relocated from the populated Pacific region; peasants on the eastern 
frontier were granted land titles; and squatter-proprietor conflicts were legally resolved. 
The agrarian reform also stated in its Article 19 that all lands of more than 300 hectares 
were subject to expropriation where land hunger existed.
In reality little land was redistributed (Gould, 1990:249). However, these essentially 
non-distributive policies reduced pressure on land in the Pacific region and temporarily 
appeased class tensions. In addition, the divisive technique of crediting peasants with 
more than ten manzanas was effective in neutralising the struggle of the peasantry as a 
whole group (CIERA, 1989c:36). Yet, despite the obvious shortcomings of Somoza's 
agrarian reform it was not necessarily rejected by potential beneficiaries. Evidence from 
western Nicaragua suggests that the sectors of the rural population initially believed in it 
to the extent that they gave Somoza their support. This was less the consequence of their 
uncritical acceptance of Somoza, but rather because at that time, they calculated that their 
interests could best be served by supporting him (Gould, 1990).
In 1975, Anastacio Somoza Debayle, who was the second son of the first Somoza, 
commander-in-chief of the National Guard and president between 1967-79, created the 
Institute for Peasants Welfare (INVIERNO). This was also financed by the USAID and 
was directed toward integrated rural development. It offered low interest credit for basic 
grain production as well as training and technical assistance. In reality it benefitted the 
medium and rich peasants and ultimately most of the foreign funds were deposited in 
private banks which financed the agrarian bourgeoisie (Vilas, 1986:85b).
Whereas the USAID had appealed to Luis Somoza before him, the institutional 
preference of this anti-reformist and militaristic brother was Central American Defence 
Council (CONDECA) which was created by the Pentagon as a regional defence system 
against internal insurgency. With the failure of INVIERNO - evident from the rural 
masses’ ever closer movement towards the emergent FSLN guerilla movement - Anastacio 
Somoza Debayle unleashed to the full the counter-revolutionary terror of the National 
Guard to confront protest and popular activism (Black, 1981:42-8)’^  The brutality of the
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National Guard was most intense during the 1974-77 state of siege. On counter­
insurgency operations in the north the Guard were permitted to rob peasants, confiscate 
the homes of peasant suspects and were given bonus payments on the basis of a head­
count of those killed: making it adept at massacring campesinos. Napalm and defoliants 
were also used in search and destroy missions of the Nicaraguan Air Force. During this 
period the National Guard slaughtered 3,000 people in suspected guerilla zones (Black, 
1981:50-58). As it became increasingly nervous of the civilian population during the 
1970s, any man beyond the age of twelve or fourteen (depending on his size) was likely 
to be killed on the spot on the mere suspicion of being an FSLN sympathiser: actions 
which led to Somoza being declared the worst human rights violator in the western 
hemisphere in 1976'^. However, contrary to achieving its objectives, the repression was 
instrumental in integrating more campesinos and urban residents into the liberation 
movement (CIERA, 1989c:37-38).
Political control in the rural areas was also maintained by the dictatorship by local 
networks of collaborators who were linked to the National Guard. These included the 
Capitan de Canada, usually a prominent landlord and the Jueces de Mesta, who operated 
to keep local peace as part local magistrate and part informant. They were nominated by 
political powers in the departments’ capital town although not all undertook their tasks in 
a repressive manner (Houtart y Lemercinier, 1992:24*^). Local detachments of the Guard, 
private guards of local landowners and various armed collaborators also protected the 
property and the interests of bourgeoisie and state (CIERA, 1989c:37).
Under the dictatorship the state became a politico-economic agent of capital and an 
instrument of enrichment and accumulation for the Somozas and their loyal allies, amongst 
whom were an extended network of families and high ranking guard officers. They used 
public resources, foreign financial aid and technical assistance for their own benefit and 
accumulated spectacular wealth (Vilas, 1986b:87). Even following the 1972 earthquake 
which devastated Managua and caused an estimated 20,000 casualties, foreign aid and 
assistance were appropriated by Somoza and construction contracts restricted to the 
dictator’s own companies. In 1979, Newsweek quoted US government sources as placing 
the personal fortune of the last fleeing Somoza at US$900 million (Black, 1981). The 
illegal activities and blatant abuse of power, led even the US State Department to privately
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castigate the dictatorship for its "negligible consideration of economic and social 
problems" (LaFeber, 1984:103).
The Somozas exercised exclusive state power, controlled the National Guard and the 
Liberal Party. The authoritative political system offered no possibility for alternation of 
parties in office nor legal means by which to satisfy the interests of the popular sectors. 
Even the discussion of politics was a politically curtailed activity: until the 1960s it was 
the privilege of only the elites, professional classes and students (Gould, 1991:9). 
Somozan Nicaragua was internationally notorious for its brutal suppression of human 
freedoms (Midgley, 1986:40). Despite knowledge of corruption and human rights crimes, 
the dictatorship maintained friendship with a succession of US presidents and ambassadors 
and enjoyed economic support and military assistance. Such support guaranteed Nicaragua 
as a loyal political ally: Luis Somoza offered troops to send to Korea and granted the US 
use of territory from which to launch the 1961 Bay of Pigs attack on Cuba (LaFeber, 
1984:226). Somozan loyalty also proved lucrative for private US interests whose 
companies were granted tax free concessions to exploit the country’s mineral and forestry 
resources.
113 Ideological hegemony
Although the system under Somoza rested upon coercion, the political hegemony of the 
ruling elite was also maintained through a network of patron-client social relations. These 
were manifest in certain rights and duties and symbolically expressed through personal 
relationships such as those of compadrazgo (godfatherhood), amiguismo (friend favouring) 
and protectorado (guardianship). These established a system of reciprocal obligations and 
rights between campesinos and hacendados, reproducing the exploitative nature of 
relations of exploitation which subordinated the poor to their patrons. That peasants came 
to view the hacendados or latifundistas as generous benefactors reflects how such social 
ideologies served to fulfil landowners interests in engineering consent for their rule. 
Nicaraguan landlords also used the term campesino as synonomous with other derogatory 
terms such as indio, bruto, ignorante, vago and atrasado (respectively, Indian, rough, 
ignorant, stupid and backward) (Serra, 1988:45,48), thereby inculcating in campesinos 
negative images of themselves as worthless as noted by Freire (1972) elsewhere. This 
reinforced the idea that existing social relations were a natural and unchangeable order.
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The Nicaraguan Church, influential on account of being rooted amongst the popular 
classes, also contributed to ideological repression in the countryside. With the exception 
of some young priests. Catholic leaders either collaborated with the governing elite or by 
inaction tolerated its excesses. This was noted by the US Catholic Press Association in 
1962, which reported that priests were the least prepared in the continent, were "blind 
about social problems" and aligned with a government which was "hated by the people" 
(Dodson and Montgomery, 1982:162). The Christianity these priests spread was one of 
submission to the temporal order. It presented the dictatorial power as a product of divine 
will and so by definition efforts to dissent or rebel represented insubordination to God 
(Vilas, 1986b:86-87). The Evangelical Churches were scarcely different although, unlike 
the Catholic’s explicit alignment with the regime, they tended to be "apolitical" (Dodson 
and Montgomery, 1982:162).
Despite the inability of the Catholic church to provide ministry to the rural areas 
because of its insufficient number of clergy, religion pervaded popular culture. Religious 
notions informed the campesinos ’ cosmology and their interpretations of the natural life 
and social reality (Palma, 1978). Religious concepts also provided the symbols for the 
mystification of the social order: perceptions of the diabolic sources of accumulation of 
wealth and the identification of wage labour with bestiality were common (Gould, 
1990:28-29). Whether this suggests that the religious order legitimised exploitative 
capitalist relations or was a classic expression of daily forms of resistance (Scott, 1985) 
in a context of repression remains unclear. The point is that these interpretations did not 
provide ideological scope for social change.
Patriarchy and the sexual division of labour comprised an integral part of social 
ideology in Nicaragua as elsewhere in Latin America. It operated to legitimize the double 
exploitation of women at the hands of both capital and men (within the family and in 
society at large). The sexual division of labour and its embodiment in the ideology of 
machismo subordinated the status of women within the familial hierarchy. Whereas 
women were relegated to the domestic sphere to fulfil the reproduction tasks of looking 
after children and home and the husband/partner, the responsibility of the man was 
identified as obtaining the means to maintain the home. The man was granted maximum 
authority in the decisions which affect the household and he alone planned productive 
tasks, authorised children’s migration and decided if the woman should seek work. Before
71
the community it is traditionally the man who represented the authority of the family 
(CIERA, 1989d; 40).
The sexual division of labour takes form in the man-woman relationship and 
manifests itself in the unequal relationship within the home, production, institutions and 
political activities and maintains the separation between public and private (Perez, 
1990:74). In Nicaragua it restricted women in their opportunities for social and personal 
development and political participation. Men and women alike saw the domestic roles of 
women as a "natural" and integral part of womanhood and as the "inevitable" role they 
should assume. That is, the notion of women’s inferiority was reproduced within the 
family and was generated as much by women themselves as men.
The idea of women’s inferiority to men was incorporated into the work code in the 
agroexport sector in Nicaragua during Somoza. As described previously, only the man- 
worker had the right to be registered on the payroll. He received the salary of his 
"woman" and children and decided for himself the destiny of the combined salaries 
(CIERA, 1989d:19). The incorporation of women into productive work in the fields did 
nothing to alter the mutually held perception: it was considered as "support" and labelled 
"secondary production" (CIERA, 1989f:170). Beyond the agroexport sector inequalities 
were also evident. Inheritance was not equally divided between children of different 
sexes: it was in favour of the male offspring. Despite the high rates of abandonment, 
economic security for females was perceived to be derived from their husbands (CIERA, 
1989d:43-45).
Such ideologies legitimized the social order and the social and gender inequalities 
it perpetuated. The following indicates how, aided by the contradictions of the repression^* 
and the "vicious exploitation of the rural masses" this symbolic miasma was broken.
114 The FSLN as an alternative movement
The sporadic protests of the popular sectors against the state since Sandino were limited 
in their potential to resist or effectively oppose Somoza, although some represented 
sustained confrontations with the state. This includes the important struggles during the 
late 1950s and 1960s in the rural areas of western Nicaragua and the intermittent strikes 
of industrial workers which were widespread throughout the period. That these 
movements were essentially local in focus and reactive or economistic in their demands
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did not make them stupid nor lacking in awareness about their oppression or class 
conscious. However, they were unable to articulate their wider interests or generate a 
national movement to represent their sector. Until the emergence of the FSLN there was 
no force which could direct the disparate and spontaneous struggles present a coherent 
political programme nor offer an alternative vision of society.
The general population was limited by its lack of political organisation in either 
opposition parties or unions. Existing political parties were either co-opted or 
unrepresentative. The Conservative Party, with whom the Liberal Party had been in 
constant state of civil war since Central American independence in 1821, had effectively 
been bought off by Anastacio Somoza in 1940'^ and was co-opted by Somoza in 1967 
with the offer of 40% share of government power. In fact, ideological distinctions 
between the two parties had been eliminated in the late nineteenth century when the 
Conservatives adopted tenets of economic liberalism. After this, party allegiance had 
become based on regionalism, socioeconomic power structures and family networks 
(Black, 1981:32; Booth, 1985:98-100).
Opposition forces, albeit ineffective, did exist in Nicaragua and increased during the 
1970s. The Democratic Union of Liberation (UDEL) was founded by a disaffected 
conservative, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro. It brought together in a loose political coalition 
Conservative and Liberal party dissidents, the Independent Liberal Party and the Social 
Christian Party. It had no agreed political programme nor designs to create a new society 
(Black, 2981:65-66). Nor did the Moscow-line Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN) offer 
a militant challenge to the regime: its Soviet orthodoxy taught that revolutionary action 
could not proceed before the historical conditions had matured sufficiently to produce the 
militant proletariat that Marx had predicted (Gilbert, 1988:19). The PSN had even 
declared its support for the Somoza Government when it was founded in 1944 and was 
later coopted during Somoza’s popularist period. It joined the UDEL coalition in 1974 
but did so proposing a progressive demand for labour reform. Nonetheless, it failed to 
provide effective political leadership to the working people it purportedly represented 
(Ruchwarger, 1987:44).
The absence of effective opposition in the form of political parties was mirrored in 
the lack of popular organisations, whose development had been stymied by several factors. 
The country’s historically low level of industrialisation and urbanisation meant that not
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only was the industrial sector small, it also had the most poorly organised urban proletariat 
in all Latin America: less than 6% of all workers being members of trade unions and their 
demands were typically economistic in nature (Ruchwarger, 1987). Moreover, these 
unions were also fragmented into five main confederations including the PSN-led General 
Confederation of Workers-Independent and one under the direct control of the Somoza 
dictatorship^®. Autonomous institutions within civil society were absent and political 
organisations in particular.
Moreover, the National Guard’s brutal repression of strikers prevented union 
organisation and the widescale massacres of peasants had deterred efforts to organise in 
the countryside. Exacerbating these factors was high illiteracy and low levels of political 
consciousness. Hence, Coraggio’s (1985) characterisation of the Nicaraguan people during 
this period as "masses", was an appropriate reflection of how unstructured and unorganised 
these people were. The consequence of all this was that the activities of an avaricious and 
repressive dictatorship went unchecked.
The FSLN was founded in 1961 by a group of students: Carlos Fonseca (the main 
theorist and once member of the PSN), Silvio Mayorga and Tomas Borge. Only Borge 
survived to become a major figure in the new regime. From the beginning, the FSLN 
rejected the traditional methods of opposition to the dynasty. Instead it recognised that 
a political initiative ought be built from below. It favoured a popularly based guerilla 
struggle. The FSLN took inspiration from the example and thoughts of the anti­
imperialist national hero General Sandino, who provided the new Sandinistas with the 
central components in its struggle against Somoza. This included Sandino’s perception 
that the people of Nicaragua were oppressed as a consequence of the coincidence of 
political interests of the national elites and the US. The close association between the 
Somozas and US political interests meant that the anti-dictatorial struggle the FSLN aimed 
to conduct was integrally bound to the struggle for liberation from foreign domination. 
The FSLN also inherited Sandino’s recognition that an alliance of classes was necessary 
to overcome the dictatorship and that only the urban proletariat and peasants were the 
dependable new forces. Like Sandino, they shared a nationalism which was distinctly 
anti-US. It was the suggestion of Carlos Fonseca, who fervently studied Sandino’s 
manifestos, that the liberation movement take the General’s name.
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Although most of these early Sandinistas had studied Marxism at university, their 
initial socialist inspiration came from the 1959 Cuban revolution and from its guerilla hero 
Che Guevara. According to Borge, this dramatic Cuban event was like "the lifting of 
innumerable curtains, a flash of light" (Gilbert, 1988:5). Although the Sandinista 
Government would later studiously avoid identifying itself as Marxist, Marxism was an 
integral component of Sandinismo. For the Sandinistas, Marxism was treated less as a 
fixed theory than as a scientific method of analysis of the specific conditions of the 
Nicaraguan reality. Indeed, Foncesa repeatedly stressed that "sterile dogmatism" ought be 
avoided and went as far as to suggest that it was better if Nicaraguan radicals knew little 
about formal political theory (Gilbert, 1988:23). Other components, including 
Sandinismo’s essentially Christian ethics, would develop during and after the struggle for 
national liberation, as the next chapter indicates.
The initial FSLN strategy of foquismo centred on guerilla warfare and consisted of 
units operating from the mountainous regions^’. During this period the guerilla built up 
support from the campesinos in areas where Sandino had operated and where a lingering 
sympathy remained. The FSLN encountered limited success in organising the peasantry 
and so the strategy was later abandoned in preference for consolidating its relationship 
with the general population: with the students, Christians, women, agricultural workers and 
the peasantry. With the exception of the FSLN’s victorious battle of Zinica in 1970, 
which was conducted by an army composed exclusively of peasants, few peasants 
participated in these early years as combatants, although they were later incorporated more 
successfully into the armed struggle from 1976 onwards (Ruchwarger, 1987:38). At this 
stage the FSLN asserted itself as a politico-military organisation whose objective was to 
take political power. Since issuing its 1969 Historic Programme, the FSLN identified its 
role as the leader of the "Nicaraguan people" which would lead the popular sectors to the 
victory of the Sandinista Popular Revolution through guerilla combat (FSLN, 1969). This 
notion was developed more systematically in the 1977 Plataforma General where the 
FSLN explicitly identified itself with "the Marxist-Leninist cause" and as the vanguard 
which must direct the revolution and organisation of the masses given "their backward 
nature" (DN-FSLN, 1977).
The dynamic between the political movement and popular sectors was specific to 
each and consequently the FSLN interacted with the different social sectors in different
75
ways^^. In the case of the student movement - generally attributed to have emerged after 
university students from Leon were attacked by the National Guard during a demonstration 
in 1959 - it essentially developed in parallel to the FSLN. In 1966, the PER 
(Revolutionary Student Front), which was most closely identified with the FSLN, emerged 
as a strong force within the student movement and led the first student-led strike to protest 
against the corruption of Nicaraguan party politics. This was joined by the Christian 
Youth Movement which grew independently from the Christian student protests against 
human rights abuse in 1970. Through study circles in which Sandinista documents were 
read, common principles and social goals were established and the movement increasingly 
identified itself with, and eventually came under the leadership of the FSLN. Its networks 
within youth clubs and base groups developed by the Christian communities in the barrios 
(suburbs or quarters) of Managua provided indispensable support. The involvement of 
Christians, who participated in grassroots and within leadership positions, rendered 
Christianity an organic component of the FSLN: not just a tactical or strategic ally (Lowy, 
1993:37)
The Association of Women Confronting the National Problem (AMPRONAC) was 
a radical political front which formed spontaneously by predominantly middle class 
women follo^ving the 1972 earthquake. It maintained a militant and visible profile: 
protesting at National Guard atrocities committed against women and children and 
conducted investigations on cases of torture and disappeared persons (Black, 1981:101; 
Ruchwarger, 1987:45). Its demands also reflected incipient gender concerns such as 
pronouncements against prostitution, despite the fact that ideas about women’s liberation 
had only just begun to diffuse as in the rest of the Latin American continent (Clivera et 
al, 1990:60). Only later did the women’s movement develop a Sandinista character, 
following internal divisions in 1979 and its rebirth as the Luisa Amanda Espinosa 
Nicaraguan Association for Women (AMNLAE). For the purposes of this thesis a 
description of the FSLN’s organisational relationship with the peasants warrants greater 
detail.
115 Towards revolution in the countryside^^
After its first attempt at guerilla warfare in Pancasan, when the FSLN was forced to 
acknowledge that the alliance of the peasantry was not automatic^"*, it began to place
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greater emphasis on the organisation and political work with peasants. This task was 
facilitated by the important work of Christian groups. Theological developments occurring 
within the Catholic Church, following the 1968 Medellin Conference of Latin American 
Bishops, resulted in a fundamental shift within church doctrine. This was approved by 
the Council of Vatican II which subsequently called the church to defend the rights of the 
oppressed and "to make preferential option for the poor", thereby authorising bishops, 
priests and sisters to seek new pastoral methods. In Nicaragua, new Christian practices 
generated by this emerging "liberation theology" were initiated by the Jesuit Fathers who 
founded Educational Centre for Agrarian Advancement (CEPA) in 1968. Its initial 
activities were oriented to training campesinos in appropriate agricultural techniques and, 
within the context of Christian readings, to develop an awareness of the social and 
political implications of the Christian gospel for those who worked the land. With so few 
priests in Nicaragua the Catholic Church also sought to train lay persons to conduct 
religious functions in rural areas. These people were called "Delegates of the Word" and 
they formed Christian "base communities" in which campesinos and landless workers 
discussed their problems in the light of the readings from the Bible (Collins, 1986:23-25).
With the recognition that there were structural origins to poverty and that only 
organised collective political action could improve their conditions, these delegates, base 
communities and CEP A activists became radicalised. They also became effective at 
stimulating an indignation amongst the peasantry of the injustice of the political svstem 
(Montgomery and Dodson, 1982:17). They also promoted notions of the peasant as an 
active subject of his and her own destiny and they began organising peasants to ameliorate 
their impoverished living conditions. CEP A also published a comic book, "Cristo, 
Campesino", whose message within was "You have the right to land". Thousands of 
copies were distributed throughout the rural areas (Perez, 1990:111). The potential threat 
of this socially interpreted gospel was not lost on Somoza, who branded the Delegates 
"subversives", banned their activities and ordered the National Guard to murder some 
(Collins, 1986:24-25). Thus, through its work with the peasants, the radicalised church 
instilled a social conscience in the campesinos, matured the nature of its struggle and 
provided a "common language" which bridged peasant aspirations to the Sandinistas’ 
political message (Gould, 1990). The resultant organisational structures the church also 
created favourable conditions in which the FSLN could work (CIERA, 1989c:47-48).
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Other processes effectively sapped the legitimacy of Somocismo and made evident 
the limitations of Liberalism as a political ideology in which peasants traditionally 
expressed themselves. Also, campesinos and rural workers who had embarked on 
legislative processes as a way to claim land under Somoza’s Agrarian Reform, found 
themselves repeatedly deceived through their numerous confrontations with landlords, 
reform institutions, officials, politicians and the National Guard. Thus, the rural poor, as 
noted by Gould in western Nicaragua, came to identify the limitations of Somozan reforms 
and the inability of the dictatorship to represent their interests (Gould, 1990:270-291).
In 1975, the Sandinistas, informed by a conception of this rural workforce as a mass 
of semi-proletarians with homogeneous interests and political demands (an interpretation 
over-emphasised the proletarianised nature of the semiproletarians^^), started to work with 
plantation workers and began to organise them into Committees of Agricultural Workers 
(Kaimowitz, 1986:102; Ruchwarger, 1987:30-40). At first these incipient committees 
which formed in Carazo and Masaya organised protests and strikes to demand better 
working and living conditions and to renounce National Guard repression. Studying in 
groups at night, members also learnt about the history of Nicaragua and how it related to 
the conditions they endured. Thus, the campesinos’ subjective and critical reflection on 
their condition was nurtured and given a national context (CIERA, 1989c:57-8).
Despite the National Guard’s attempts to destroy these organisations by torturing, 
killing and imprisoning members, the committees multiplied. With the aim of uniting 
around demands for improved living conditions, they extended to encompass the 
Department of Rivas to the south and Chinandega to the north: areas dominated by coffee, 
cotton and sugar estates. By 1977 there were sufficient committees to form a national 
organisation and following a major strike at the San Antonio sugar refinery, the 
Association of Rural Workers (ATC) was created. It grew immediately in both strength 
and militancy, incorporating semi-proletarianised peasants and agricultural workers 
(Ruchwarger, 1987:40). Inspired with the displays of support from other national political 
organisations the ATC was propelled into political alliance with the FSLN: reflecting its 
recognition that its struggle was essentially political and that fulfilment of economic 
demands could only occur with the defeat of dominant political power, namely Somocismo 
(CIERA, 1989c:60).
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Although the FSLN was unequivocal in the view that revolution had to be rooted 
in a worker-peasant alliance, the issue of organising the rural poor was a major debate 
within it. Whereas the Proletarian Tendency (FT), led by Jaime Wheelock who later 
became Minister of Agrarian Reform, placed emphasis on organising the agricultural and 
industrial workers as the leading class of the revolution, the Prolonged Popular War (GPP) 
faction stressed the need to work with the peasant sector. The Tercistas, or Third Way, 
represented a call for broadening the base of the revolutionary movement (Gilbert, 
1988:29-30). These differences, perhaps more strategic and tactical than ideological, were 
sufficient to cause the FSLN to split in 1977, although it finally reunited as a Front in 
1979 prior to the final insurrection. Nonetheless, its 1977 General Platform is 
characterised by the view that the rural worker was an advance over the peasant 
smallholder:
"The working class because of its direct involvement in capitalist production 
has acquired the collective habits, working discipline, manual and mental 
ability and other traits which put them (sic) in the vanguard of the 
organisation and leadership of the masses." (DN-FSLN, 1977:39)^^
Rural women also resisted Somoza, even though written history has not done justice to
their contribution. Here, the testimony of the prominent national peasant leader Benigna
Mendiola is revealing:
"We began to work in the union, in the first union in La Palma in 1962.
After this union, others formed. We struggled for the demands of the 
agricultural workers: better salaries, work-free Sundays and public holidays. 
Whereas the workers were paid five cordobas, with the union struggle we 
succeeded in getting ten. I liked working in the union because it meant 
fighting to help the poor class and I represented the men as much as the 
women. I was treasurer and had an identity card. In that same union there 
was an organisation of democratic women^^. Later the group of women from 
the union joined the guerilla movement., men and women integrated into the 
files of the FSLN."'*
Essentially, the involvement of women in the struggle represented a natural extension of 
their role as protector of family, as wife and mother (Molyneux, 1987). It took them 
beyond the domestic realm: they became Christian representatives of syndicates or 
associations or integrated into the guerilla forces and contributed to the high proportion 
of women in the movement (30% were women). Few peasant women stood to the fore 
of the mass organisations since, as Benigna Mendiola again recalls, few were prepared for 
such organisational tasks. Many supported the struggle in traditional roles by cooking or
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maintaining security houses. Although this contribution has typically been defined as 
"supportive" not "political", women were integral to the development of rural organisations 
(Perez, 1990:32). In whatever capacity women incorporated themselves into the liberation 
movement, it involved them in extreme personal hardship. The tasks they assumed were 
undertaken on top of their normal productive and domestic responsibilities and they also 
had to endure criticism in the face of prejudice (Perez, 1990:30-34).
Peasants were convinced by the FSLN that their demands would be represented by 
it. Since 1969, the promise of agrarian reform was recurrent in the proclamations of the 
FSLN and its cry of "Land to whoever works it!", assured the support of the campesinos 
and rural workers in the overthrow of the dictator.
Ill Overthrowing Somoza
A brief overview of the events leading to the final insurrection is appropriate here, since 
this further illuminates the relationship between the FSLN and the popular sectors. From 
1970, the task of strengthening its relationship with the popular sectors was particularly 
difficult for the FSLN because it had to go underground. Clandestinely, it was able to 
build base-support by directing its activities mainly to recruiting factory workers and 
university students. Nonetheless, this amounted to an accumulation of forces which 
resulted in increased urban militancy as expressed by the mounting numbers of 
demonstrations and hunger strikes against trade union harassment, the treatment of 
political prisoners, working and living conditions and costs of consumables (Black, 
1981:90). In 1977, as a result of international pressure - notably from the Carter 
Administration which shifted its human rights policies - Somoza lifted the state of siege 
he had imposed in 1974. An explosion of popular protest resulted, including widespread 
demonstrations, mass meetings, seizures of churches and schools, armed confrontation with 
National Guard and the destruction of Somoza-owned property. This presented the FSLN 
with the opportunity to harness the spontaneous protests and promote the participation of 
the people in new forms of broad based organisations. By late 1977, the mass movement 
had gained momentum and in mid-1978 twenty popular organisations, including political 
parties, trade union federations and grassroots organisations founded the United People’s 
Movement (MPU) as a national political organisation equivalent to a left-wing political
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coalition and mass insurrection front (Black, 1981: 120). Following clear indications from 
autonomous mass action that the popular sectors throughout the country were ready for 
an all-out confrontation, the FSLN called for an insurrection in 1978. The result - a 
military defeat for the popular forces - left no question that the FSLN was at the 
leadership of the Nicaraguan Revolution. It also highlighted the need to increase the 
political, organisational and military capacity of popular sectors. FSLN attempts to 
consolidate base support were intensified.
Urban neighbourhood organisations^^ were organised and were strategically crucial 
since the structures of Somozan power were in the urban areas, making control of the 
cities crucial to the FSLN. The formation of these organisations was initiated by the 
newly created MPU, whose representatives began to visit the barrios in order to organise 
Committees of Civil Defence (CDC) by residential block. The CDCs organised around 
practical tasks of securing water supplies, paving streets, building schools and made social 
demands concerning the construction of medical centres and reduction of prices. The 
CDCs also organised for the "defence of life"^°: gave instructions on how to deal with the 
National Guard (since residents were being murdered indiscriminately); stored medical 
supplies; and trained residents in first aid skills. They set up "Sandinista dining rooms" 
where combatants could eat during fighting and established "security houses" where FSLN 
leaders could meet. The progressive pauperization of the popular classes which began in 
the second half of the 1970s, may well have contributed to swell the ranks of these 
popular organisations (Vilas 1986b:97).
Through their activities the CDCs created a clandestine civilian and political force 
which spread throughout the country from January 1979. Some formed popular militias 
to oppose the National Guard and others played a major role in running those cities which 
were briefly liberated. They were particularly advanced in Leon where they undertook 
military preparations and developed a real parallel power structure, organising food 
distribution and health provisions (Black, 1981:137; interviews with residents of Leon, 
1989-1991)^\ In this way, it can be seen that while the FSLN promoted the popular 
organisations during the struggle against the dictatorship for specific military and 
organisational objectives, the impetus for civilians to participate within the CDCs or other 
popular organisations came from the popular sectors themselves. As such, these popular 
organisations can be seen to have emerged from below, with the dual function of
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searching for solutions to practical problems of social life and expressing anti-Somoza 
sentiments. This expression of participation was less popular than revolutionary. 
Similarly, the FSLN’s organisational input served to consolidate the strength of these 
organisations and provided a political objective and cohesion to their demands: creating 
an organic relationship between the FSLN and the popular sectors. This suggests, as 
Vilas points out, that the history of the FSLN has to be seen as a history of peasant and 
worker organisation as much as armed confrontations (1986b: 126).
As regards the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie, from mid-1977 the FSLN defined a strategy 
to incorporate its democratic sectors - found predominantly from the middle sectors, not 
the large capitalists - who would play a secondary role in the popular struggle. Their 
disputes with Somoza were not political but related to the issue of "disloyal competition" 
caused by Somoza’s privileged use of international credit, monopoly in construction and 
government corruption earthquake (Vilas, 1986b: 128-129). One outcome of the FSLN’s 
approach to the business and middle classes was the Group of Twelve which formed in 
1977. This was comprised of intellectuals, professionals, priests and businessmen, some 
of whom had already collaborated with the FSLN or had family members within it. Its 
aim was to extend support for the FSLN internationally and forge links between the FSLN 
and the official opposition in Nicaragua. The Group of Twelve denounced the repression 
of Somoza, voiced the desire for a new form of democracy and called for the broad 
coalition of anti-Somoza forces, making it the first time that these sectors had openly 
declared support for the revolutionary aims of the FSLN (Vilas, 1986b: 135; Gilbert, 
1988:9). Then in 1978, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, leader of the UDEL opposition 
coalition, was assassinated by the National Guard. His murder proved instrumental in 
bringing the country’s business organisations into direct confrontation with the National 
Guard, giving the liberation forces its multi-class character and stimulating widespread 
demonstrations and riots (Gilbert, 1988:9).
The insurrections of September 1978 and June 1979 were mainly urban affairs but 
combatants in some parts of the countryside also played a significant role^ .^ Here, ATC 
peasants and farmworkers organised in popular militias united with the FSLN and were 
able to mobilise and barricade main roads throughout the country to impede the 
movements of Somoza’s troops (Black, 1981:129). In these situations their participation 
was essentially military. The rapid development of a revolutionary situation meant that
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there was still a low level of revolutionary consciousness amongst the popular sectors. 
Their visible expression of extreme frustration with the political situation was not 
necessarily matched with political "speech" which as Arendt (1965) reminds, is a 
prerequisite for involvement in the political process.
Nonetheless, the widespread involvement of the population in these and other 
popular organisations was a notable characteristic of the overthrow of the dictator^^ and 
their role in defeating the National Guard surpassed even the FSLN’s expectations. 
Indeed, as stated by Humberto Ortega, a member of the party’s National Directorate and 
later Nicaragua’s Defence Minister, contrary to their idea of receiving logistical support 
by the masses, the FSLN guerillas on numerous occasions found themselves providing 
tactical support to the people. The spontaneous armed uprising of the indigenous barrios 
of Monimbo and Subtiava are classic illustrations of this (Ruchwarger, 1987). It was only 
the unity of popular organisations - incorporating tens of thousands - with the FSLN 
which created an effective counterweight to the highly trained and well-equipped National 
Guard and was able to achieve victory "^ .^
On 19 July 1979, the arrival of the triumphant guerillas aboard captured military 
tanks in Managua’s main plaza heralded the disintegration of the Somozan state. Victory 
had been secured with enormous human losses: an estimated 35,000 people were killed 
in the year leading to the victory (Burbach and Draimin, 1980:7). However, the personal 
sacrifice and loss of human life during the insurrectional struggle were also instrumental 
in consolidating the support and commitment of members of the popular organisations to 
the FSLN and its programme of liberation (Serra, 1988). Also, the FSLN’s two decades 
of struggle through those who had incorporated themselves into its armed and political 
fronts legitimised it before the population and as a force in the aftermath of the overthrow 
of Somoza.
Conclusions
Under Somoza the rural population was marginalised and exploited by the deformed type 
of agrarian capitalism which had developed in the country. The dictatorship ruled through 
coercion and maintained political hegemony through monopolisation of power, cooptation 
and ideological domination. Social relations between social groups were hierarchical and
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were linked vertically through various socio-cultural institutions which disguised relations 
of subordination.
The history of peasant protests attest to their knowledge of the injustice of the 
system and their oppression: that aspect is not in question. However, while not devoid 
of ideas about resistance as the FSLN has tended to portray, neither were peasants on the 
eve of the Sandinista Revolution calculating individuals capable of directing a concerted 
national movement. They lacked an alternative ideology or discourse and the 
organisational capacity and networks.
Against this historical context the FSLN emerged as a political alternative which 
gave peasants an opportunity to overthrow an authoritarian political system and to end the 
conditions of subordination. The FSLN directed political and organisational efforts at the 
incipient rural organisations, informed by a theoretical interpretation which underestimated 
the producer aspirations of poor peasants and saw the peasantry as backward.
The incorporation of peasants into the liberation movement gave their demands a 
national political coherence. Alongside the urban based popular sectors, groups of 
organised peasants in some parts of the country contributed to the defeat of Somoza. 
Clearly, the FSLN was the key agent of the revolutionary upsurge and its leadership was 
legitimised by its commitment and struggle. While the dictatorship remained as the 
common enemy of the diverse groups incorporated within the revolutionary movement 
there were no apparent contradictions between their specific sectorial and class interests. 
This would change as we shall see, once the FSLN were established in power.
84
Notes to Chapter 2
1. Whose social base lay among the traditional livestock hacendados.
2.1n western Nicaragua seasonal labourers increased from representing a fraction of the 
rural labour population in 1940, to over 90% of the agricultural labour force in 1960.
3.Their proportionately low production outputs compared with the high concentration of 
land in their hands, suggests that there was a high degree of idleness and absenteeism 
amongst the large landowners (Vilas, 1986:76).
4.There is an absence of systematic data relating to other factors such as land quality, 
access to water and control of the means of production which also determine difference 
between strata of peasantry (Dore, 1990:101).
5.These figures vary, for example Matus (1990:83), states that at the time of the triumph 
the peasant sector in total constituted 66% of the economically active population and 
claims that it produced 80% of the production for internal consumption.
6.Of course, these family units should not be seen as "traditional" family, since the 
penetration of capitalist economy into Nicaragua was not a recent phenomenon.
7.In addition to their temporary employment alongside their male partners, women were 
also employed on a permanent basis as cooks and caretakers for the workforce and young 
women were employed as servants in haciendas or the towns.
8. A situation created by temporary but regular absence of the male partner and typically 
becoming a reality when he abandons his partner (CIERA, 1989d:28).
9.1t was this academic emphasis that was influential in informing Scott to write in 
Weapons of the Weak about "everyday forms of resistance".
10.Such as that described in Vanden, 1982:50.
11 .A provisional government operated with an independent currency and a communication 
system was also established.
12. Which ruled for all but two years of this period.
13.Through major redrafts he extended the presidency by two years to a six year term and 
empowered the president to decree laws concerning the National Guard without consulting 
congress. See Black (1981) and Booth (1982) for more details of the political, economic 
and social conditions under the dynasty.
14.Conforming to the conditions imposed by USAID as founders of the agrarian reform, 
the dictatorship assumed a civilian facade of during the Schick administration. Schick was 
a Liberal president who served between 1963-67.
15.It is logical to conclude that it was devised for counter- insurgency since it took no part 
in international conflict in the region, such as the 1969 El Salvador - Honduras "Soccer
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War", and its operations concentrated in Nicaragua and Guatemala, which both had the 
strongest guerilla movements (Black, 1981:48).
16.For specific details of its human rights investigation in Nicaragua see Amnesty 
International, 1978 Republica de Nicaragua: Informe incluvendo las recomendaciones de 
una mision enviada a Nicaragua entre el 10 v el 14 de mavo 1976. Amnesty International, 
London.
17.This is supported by evidence from my fieldwork, during which residents of Sanchez 
II, in Tola, Rivas, claimed that Don Espinoza, the Juez at the time of the insurrection, 
never reported the activities of the FSLN as it passed through the rural communities.
18. Vilas (1986b:87), for example states that not even this form of repression could contain 
the contradictions embodied in agroexport model.
19. With the offer of certain economic safeguards for political allegiance to Somoza.
20. The others included Council of Trade Union Unification (CUS) linked to the American 
Institute of Free Labor Development; Workers’ Federation of Nicaragua (CTN), linked 
to the Social Christian Party; Federation of Trade Union Action and Unity (CAUS), loyal 
to the Nicaraguan Communist Party; and the General Confederation of Workers-Official 
(CFT-0), which was loyal to the Somoza regime. See Ruchwarger (1987:44-45), also 
Booth (1985) for full account of labour unions.
21.This strategy was an important phase and successful in ending the ideological silence 
that stifled Nicaragua.
22.Details of the formation of mass organisations are found in Ruchwarger (1987).
23.This sub-heading has been taken from a chapter in Gould (1990).
24. Some interpretations, such as those expressed in Vilas (1986b) and CIERA (1989c:59) 
tend to present this alliance as an unproblematic and logical development of the peasant 
struggle.
25.This was consistent with capitalist agroexport model, an interpretation of Nicaraguan 
historical development which emphasised the extent to which agricultural capitalism had 
penetrated and transformed rural social relations and emphasised the extent to which poor 
peasants had become wage labourers.
26.This was issued by the FSLN’s Tercerista Faction in mid-1977, and was apparently 
authored by Humberto Ortega (Gilbert and Block, 1990:viii).
27.1n this period the first women’s organisation emerged, the Organisation of Democratic 
Women of Nicaragua, which was initiated by the PSN but only lasted one year.
28.Quoted in Perez (1990:29-30), my translation.
29.Preliminary efforts to organise the neighbourhoods prior to insurrection took place in 
1972 and involved students who organised committees in marginal neighbourhoods, and
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priests and other religious groups who worked with the poor and homeless following the 
earthquake. They achieved only a limited and localised success (in Managua and Leon).
30.The distinction between these two fold functions was made by Leticia Herrera, personal 
interview, Managua, January 1991.
31.Herrera also made the interesting observation that this history of the CDCs differs 
significantly from the Revolutionary Defense Committees in Cuba which formed after the 
Cuban Revolution and were created from a top-down initiative.
32.For detailed accounts of the insurrection see Black (1981); Chavarria (1982); Booth 
(1985).
33.For more information see Booth (1985); Black (1981); Vilas (1986b).
34.Those who did not fight directly as combatants organised supply lines; constructed 
barricades to halt the movements of the National Guard, ambushed and harassed them 
when they penetrated the communities and provided sanctuaries for the guerilla (Burbach 
and Draimin, 1980:6-7).
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Chapter 3
AN FSLN PROJECT: PROMOTING DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION
A description of the national political characteristics is necessary for this thesis because 
the analysis of the processes of popular participation at the local level - the focus of this 
thesis - requires an appreciation of the political context which defines its parameters. 
Consequently, this chapter explores the characteristics of the national political system 
created by the Sandinista Government once it was estabished in power because it 
influenced the nature of local political and participatory processes but was not immediately 
observable at the micro-level.
The chapter examines Sandinista theories and practices of democracy as they 
developed during the period in the context of its global political objectives. This is 
because the FSLN’s own political project: its political models of vanguardism and 
pluralism; its relationship to the state and the popular organisations; and its class alliances 
established the political framework within which popular participation could develop. The 
examination of the dynamic between the FSLN, state and mass organisations also serves 
subsequent analysis by establishing the concommitant power relationships created between 
these entities and ultimately contextualises the development of the peasant cooperative 
sector.
More specifically, the chapter also identifies the role assigned to participation within 
the context of these wider political objectives and commitments and examines the nature 
of the emergent channels of participation which were created to promote the active 
involvement of hitherto marginalised sectors of society into the political process. Finally, 
based on observations of the fate of popular participation at the structural level, the 
chapter identifies the various political developments (within the party and its multi-class 
alliance, the state and mass organisations) and military and economic factors which 
ultimately restricted the opportunities for participation and the political space it was 
afforded.
I Democracy and participation: FSLN theory 
The tasks the Sandinista Government faced on taking power were enormous \  The most 
immediate were to reactivate the economy and to construct a new state structure, including 
government, legal apparatus, civil service and military to enable it to fulfil the FSLN 
Historic Programme and to construct a new democratic and just society. The FSLN was 
explicit in identifying who these transformations were intended to benefit. In the words 
of Daniel Ortega, the FSLN National Directorate member who became President of the 
Republic, this would be for:
"the vast majority, for the workers and peasants who produce all the country’s
wealth"^.
Before learning more about the features and nature of this democracy, the role assigned 
to participation and the political practices which developed we need to know more about 
the theoretical components of the FSLN’s ideology.
II  Ideological composition of Sandinismo
There are several identifiable components to the ideology of the FSLN, Sandinismo, which 
evolved with the development of the armed and political movement itself. From the 
foundation of the FSLN in 1961, there was a strong association with Sandino and his 
struggle. His national and anti-imperialist stance was inherited by the FSLN who 
recognised, as Sandino had done before, that economic deprivation and political 
oppression faced by the majority of Nicaraguans was the result of a political system 
created and supported by an external power: the US. The original founders also gained 
inspiration from Sandino’s adoption of armed struggle as a means to defend his cause and 
from his national pride in asserting the right to fight for self-determination. Sandino also 
provided a symbolic link between the FSLN and native traditions of popular rebellion, an 
association which was strengthened by the FSLN’s personal links to his movement^ The 
identification with Sandino was manifested by the incorporation of many symbols of this 
hero into party propaganda and slogans, including the adoption of his red-and-black flag 
and the mottos "Fatherland and Liberty" and "Patria Libre a Morir" (Free Country or 
Die). This assimilation of the thoughts of Sandino and the strategies of his struggle 
provided an inherently national dimension to the early FSLN movement and grounded it
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firmly in the specific conditions of Nicaragua. In the words of Humberto Ortega,
Sandinismo for the FSLN:
"..is the concrete expression of the development of struggle in Nicaragua.."
While this element may have prevented the FSLN from adopting crude dogmatic
Marxism, Marxist thought was the basic component of Sandinismo. Marx’s class-based
notion of history Avith class conflict as the motor of change and progress provided the
FSLN with a crucial revolutionary theory. Humberto Ortega’s following statement
illustrates how the two traditions were synthesised:
"Some Marxist-Leninists would love us to drop Sandino because he was not 
a Communist. But in Nicaragua one cannot be a revolutionary without being 
a Sandinista. The same as it is necessary to refer to Jose Marti to be a 
Communist in Cuba, or Lenin in the USSR ... In this sense the scientific 
doctrine of Marxism guides us. But from the historical point of view we 
nurture our own traditions. To put it another way: the impetus of the current 
struggle gives us own living experience in Nicaragua, after more than a 
century of struggle for independence and for a free country. It doesn’t 
provide a fixed doctrine. The political constituent of our ideology is the 
programme for national liberation.
This blend of Marxism and revolutionary nationalism was the essence of Sandinista
thought.
From Fonseca onwards, the leadership of the FSLN also recognised that the specific
features of Nicaragua’s economic and political system - its distorted capitalism - did not
fit the classical Marxist theory of history since its development had been derailed by
imperialism. Their analysis of the development of Nicaragua under its domination as a
dependent and underdeveloped state, with a backward proletariat and a bourgeoisie
incapable of fulfilling its historical role, led them to identify the need for a vanguard to
advance the country through historical change. The central role assigned to the vanguard
would be to represent the interests of the workers and peasants through a strong state
apparatus that would be able to conduct the structural transformations that it saw
necessary. In reference to itself as the revolutionary vanguard, the FSLN accord in 1979
(marking the reunification of the three tendencies) declared that:
"Marxist-Leninism is the distinct feature of the revolutionary activities of the 
FSLN." (DN-FSLN, 1979).
Explicitly within most party documents, implicitly within others, the FSLN subsequently
identified itself as the "leader in the class struggle".
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Christianity was another ingredient of the ideology that inspired the revolution and 
provided many of the images of Sandinista culture. Christianity is most evident in the 
strong ethical content that permeated the revolution and although Christianity has no 
monopoly on ethical concerns, the frequency of explicit references to Christ, the Gospel 
and the Bible reflect a Christian presence. Christians also assumed an active part in the 
war of liberation and occupied key positions in the new revolutionary government.
The practice of the FSLN was also influenced by Christian ideals: the Popular 
Sandinista Revolution became the first modern revolutionary movement since 1789 not 
to execute opponents after its triumph. Rather, it adopted the principle proclaimed by the 
only remaining founding member, Tomas Borge: "Our vengeance will be our forgiveness". 
While the convergence between Cliristianity and Marxism is clearly not without its 
contradictions, the concern for the liberation of the oppressed providee a sufficient 
theoretical and practical coincidence of interests between revolutionary Christians and 
atheist FSLN members (Lowy, 1993:39-40).
Party documents written since Fonseca authored the 1969 Historic Programme and 
including the 1979 reunification document, identified that "socialism" was the ultimate 
goal of the Sandinista Popular Revolution. This objective was reiterated in speeches 
delivered between 1983 and 1986 by members of the FSLN National Directorate: Tirado, 
Wheelock and Arce, each a representative of the three factions (Gilbert, 1988:38). The 
characteristics of the form their proclaimed "socialism" took are described below with 
particular reference to its components of democracy and the notion and practice of 
participation.
12 Socioeconomic and political democracy
The FSLN endorsed a socialist concept of democracy and considered the primacy of
socioeconomic equality as the basis of real democracy as the following statement from the
party’s national directorate (DN) shows:
"Democracy is initiated in the economic order, when social inequalities begin 
to weaken, when the workers and peasants begin to improve their standard of 
living.".(DN-FSLN 1980)
Accordingly, the primary task in the creation of democracy was the elimination of material
deprivation to benefit the popular sectors who were defined by the FSLN as the "popular
majority" which comprised of the peasantry, agricultural and industrial workers, artisans
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and urban poor. To ensure that economic development served the popular needs the state 
controlled the financial system, foreign trade, key industries and created state farms from 
properties abandoned by fleeing Somocistas. In such a way, social control over surplus 
production was achieved through state monopoly over the financial system and foreign 
markets and not through large scale expropriation of the means of production, as 
characterised previous socialist experiments. Measures were immediately implemented to 
eliminate the relations of exploitation and redistribute state resources. In the rural areas 
the land tenure system was radically transformed through the agrarian reform with the 
objective of providing poor and landless peasants with access to land; land rents for tenant 
producers were reduced; rural credit was made available to small producers; the working 
day was reduced and salaries for industrial and agricultural workers were increased, as was 
the security for squatters.
Literacy and health campaigns were also launched, social welfare services provided 
and schools were built to provide a free and national coverage of popular education. 
Freire’s pedagogy of critical and participatory learning was adopted as the method for the 
national literacy campaign although limited resources meant that in practice this was 
abandoned for less effective learning methods. Together, these social and economic 
transformations established the basis of what the social scientist Coraggio (1985) haa 
referred to as a "substantive democracy".
The FSLN also announced its intent to promote the rights of women to economic, 
political and cultural equality with respect to men. It proclaimed a two-pronged attack to 
address the practical and strategic gender interests of women to improve their conditions 
(Molyneux, 1986). It claimed it would promote programmes to improve women’s 
training, political and cultural opportunities. It created integrated institutional assistance 
for women and children, including childcare centres and health services. Since women 
take the main responsibility for maternity and the care of children they were the main 
beneficiaries of these social programmes. The FSLN also implemented a series of anti- 
discriminatory laws and formed national institutions to provide legal advice concerning 
abuse, divorce and childcare (Olivera et al, 1990:60:61).
If the Nicaraguan case was a deviation from orthodox theories of socialist transitions 
on account of the reduced significance of state ownership of the means of production as 
a defining feature of it economy, so too was it unprecedented in its notion of political
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democracy. Here, the predominant western interpretation of democracy as restricted to 
the political domain or to holding of elections was rejected outright by the Sandinistas 
(DN-FSLN, 1980):
"For the Sandinista Front democracy is not measured only in the political 
terrain and is not reduced to the participation of the people in elections." (my 
translation).
While the FSLN at this stage opposed the notion of representative democracy as the 
definition of democracy, it was explicit in its commitment to the notion of political 
pluralism. Pluralism emerged from the objective and subjective conditions of the FSLN’s 
struggle against Somoza and its theory and practices of pluralism evolved during its years 
in governmental office. Given the effects of political pluralism within the FSLN, the 
state, the popular sectors and mass organisations on the development and processes of 
popular participation, the concept warrants closer inspection.
Commentators have advanced various interpretations to account for the FSLN’s 
predisposition to pluralism. Some such as Nolan (1984), point to the internal 
characteristics of the FSLN as being the source of its commitment to the principle. They 
state that it originated from the "ideologieal pluralism" of Sandinismo itself, being derived 
from a combination of anti-imperialism and military strategy inspired by Sandino; political 
theory from Marx and the spiritual infiuenee of Christian Liberation Theology. Others, 
including Gilbert (1988) and Jonas and Stein (1990) emphasise the practices of the FSLN 
which is composed of a coalition of three politieal tendeneies whieh united formally in 
1979 and had a collective form of leadership which reached decisions through consensus. 
Others still, including Coraggio and Irvin (1985:33) and Vilas (1986b), consider that the 
FSLN learnt that a plurality of forces was crueial in order to engage in suecessful political 
practice.
As identified in Chapter 2, the FSLN repeatedly emphasised that these tendencies 
represented strategic not ideological differences and rejected the notion of internal 
"ideological pluralism" within the party (Arce, 1980). However, differences within the 
movement were significantly great that its insurrectional unity was assured only once a 
collective leadership had been agreed which incorporated three members of each tendency: 
itself a pluralist resolution of previous conflicts.
Following the triumph, the unity between the tendeneies was formally secured 'within 
the leadership by each being allocated direction of one of the three key ministries. As a
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result, the Terceristas came to head the national military, the GPP was assigned internal 
security and the TP was made responsible for the ministry overseeing agrarian reform. 
While the particular implications of the prevalence of the TP perspective on agrarian and 
cooperative policies are examined in detail in Chapter 4, the point here is merely to note 
that agrarian reform was marked with the indelible signs of it.
The first FSLN reference to the concept of pluralism appears in the 1977 General 
Platform, a document written by the Terceristas which called for "a common front of 
national unity" (FSLN, 1977). This referred not just to those organisations of the left but 
also to the "democratic sectors of the bourgeoisie" who opposed Somoza. This reflected 
the FSLN’s recognition that a plurality of forces was crucial in order to achieve victory 
for the liberation movement (Coraggio and Irvin, 1985:33). Early FSLN documents 
identify that political pluralism would be manifest in the "freedom of thought" and the 
"right to organise" (FSLN, 1969). These principles were later reiterated as they related 
to all organised social groups except for the armed opposition^ and specifically to the 
popular sectors (including workers, peasants, youth, students and women).
Although the FSLN asserted itself as the vanguard which would represent the class 
interests of the worker and peasant sector, it emphasisedthat an integral part of this 
pluralism was that:
"(they)., ought be able to express autonomously the demands of the social
sector they represent" (Nunez, 1980).
In order to ensure this, party members were urged to use criticism and self-criticism 
within the party when this autonomy was being threatened (Borge, 1980). Here, the 
meaning of pluralism, coupled with the FSLN emphasis on popular participation which 
is described below, implies a recognition that pluralism entails the representation of 
different interest groups within civil society and through a complex structure of political 
inputs.
Since the importance of maintaining a broad-based multi-class coalition was 
reaffirmed in the post-triumph era when national recovery became the goal, the FSLN 
sought a policy of national unity in order to commit these sectors to the general principles 
of development of the economy and the country’s national independence (Harris and Vilas, 
1985:232). National unity meant an alliance to enlist all sectors of society in support of 
the new relations of production and as such sought to incorporate those large capitalists
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who had not liquidated their assets and abandoned the country, as other had done. The 
importance of alliance with these sectors was manifest from the beginning manifest in the 
membership of the Government of National Reconstruction (JGRN), which was led by 
Daniel Ortega of the FSLN and throughout its existence (1979-1984) included 
representatives of middle class and business interests^ and as responsible for developing 
the legislative base for the new state during the first year of the revolution.
In its broadest possible expression, pluralism was also manifest in the creation of 
a mixed economy: a feature which represented a significant departure from traditionally 
orthodox socialist principles and practices. A mixed economy served as a recognition of 
the alliances of class and, as a transitional strategy, gave those social classes who wanted 
to maintain their economic privileges an opportunity to participate while speaking of 
reform. It also overcame the problem presented by the complexities of economic 
management and enabled the newly established government to harness the administrative 
capacity of the middle classes while avoiding the loss of productive capacity (Fitzgerald, 
1991:237).
Given the economic participation of these sectors in the restructuring of the 
country’s economy, the policy of national unity also required that the Sandinistas remain 
accountable to these constituent social forces and necessitated a political practice which 
ensured that they also be responsive to them. According to the FSLN, the party would 
ensure the interests of the popular sectors while the wealthy middle classes needed their 
own parties to represent them, as is indicated by the following statement by Bayardo Arce, 
the member of the FSLN National Directorate responsible for the political affairs of the 
party:
"The Sandinista Front knows that it cannot represent all sectors of the country 
equally because we prefer (privilegimos) the worker, labourer, campesino 
sector. In a society such as ours which is based on political pluralism and a 
mixed economy, we know that there have to be other interests that need 
political expression." (Invernizzi et al, 1986:90)
Pluralism became enshrined as a principle in the New Constitution (Article 5), where 
rights were established to political participation, universal suffrage and the organisation 
and functioning of political parties without ideological discrimination. These concepts 
were given concrete form in 1981 when a co-legislative body, the Council of State, was 
extended to include representatives of different interest groups from all social, political
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and economic sectors including mass organisations, business groups and political parties.
Assuming executive functions, the Council served as an initiator of national legislation and
together with the JGRN, it ensured that the initial direction of the new state would reflect
the multi-class alliance.
Having destroyed the old structures of the Somozan state, a new state was created
in order to execute the socioeconomic transformations and fulfil the unprecedented
functions to which it was assigned including planning, services and structural reforms.
This necessarily required an extensive state apparatus and although employees from the
previous regime were retained at middle and lower levels, numerous new posts were
created. The FSLN claimed that it would not "substitute the state" nor become its
executive but would orientate it through its team within the JGRN. It would ensured a
Sandinista influence (in order to negate that of the "ideology of the petty bourgeoisie and
Somocismo") by forming party base committees for employees throughout the state
apparatus (Wheelock, 1981).
Sandinista control of the army was strict in relation to the Revolutionary Popular
Army. Indeed, in a statement which attracted unwanted attention at a politically sensitve
time, Defence Minister Humberto Ortega said that a fundamental concern for the army
forces was its ideological unity and political commitment to the FSLN’s National
Directorate (Ortega, 1981). By contrast, the popular militias which formed were
essentially pluralist forces and were open to all.
From 1984, pluralism with Sandinista discourse became increasingly synonymous
with formal institutional guarantees such as constitutional provisions and competitive party
politics. This shift reflected the creation in 1984 of a multi-party political system of
parliament, following the implementation of a new Electoral Law and the Constitution of
Political Parties. This established for the first time in Nicaraguan history the right of
opposition parties to compete - not just cooperate - with the government (Jonas and Stein,
1990:15). The adoption of western style elections might have earned the Sandinistas
legitimacy both nationally and internationally, but they were not just a tactical ploy or a
compromise to western critics. According to Carlos Fernando Chamorro, editor of the
FSLN newspaper Barricada, it was entirely consistent with Sandinista logic:
"If we have a mixed economy, we must have a political system that 
corresponds to that, .. we want to institutionalise dissent and opposition."^
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Elections were also considered within the FSLN leadership as a useful mechanism to 
enrich revolutionary debate and consolidate revolutionary power through the building of 
consensus and recourse to dialogue (Coraggio, 1984). They also served as a "healthy 
correcting force", providing useful constraints to abuses of power (Lobel, 1988; Marchetti, 
1986:320) and their institutionalisation demonstrated that the Sandinistas had avoided the 
error of believing that middle and upper class opposition or bourgeois ideology disappears 
after a revolutionary triumph or can be destroyed by suppression.
Representative-electoral democracy came to dominate importance above direct 
democracy and the following statement illustrates its increasing significance within the 
FSLN’s discourse on democracy and pluralism. The party’s 1990 electoral platform stated 
that:
"(w)e will continue to consolidate the democratic process to secure the 
implementation of political pluralism won by the Revolution, based on the 
right to vote and the freedom of political parties to operate.."^
This was the culmination of the Sandinista Government’s response to the internal
contradictions, external pressures and alliances and a costly, prolonged and bloody war
that had become a major obstacle to economic and social development. The following
statement by Daniel Ortega, conceding the UNO victory after his party’s defeat at the
elections on 25 February 1990, indicated that the desire to end the war - and the peace and
opportunities it would bring to stabilise the economy had become the greatest priority:
"From the moment when we defended this pluralist project, we accepted the 
challenge to put into practice the exercise of popular will through the vote of 
the people in periodic elections, which are duly ratified in the Constitution of 
the Republic. We went to these elections on the 25 February 1990 convinced 
that this battle in the electoral field had to determine the end of the war and 
secure the arrival of peace, stability and tranquility for the Nicaraguan 
people." ^
Under conditions of external tlireats the FSLN did not abandon pluralism within the 
political system, rather the meaning of political pluralism became synonymous with 
competitive party politics and opposition parties continued to function. However, as we 
shall see later, these modified meanings and practices also meant that expressions of 
pluralism which would have allowed for a diversity of views to enrich political and social 
practices within the mass organisations and the party became restricted. Before examining 
this we need to consider in more detail the importance of participation in the FSLN’s 
conception of democracy and socialist transition.
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13 Popular participation to guarantee popular interests
There are few specific references to the notion of popular participation within official
FSLN documents. The concept first appears in the Historic Programme of 1969, where
the FSLN stated that on coming to power the revolutionary government would implement:
"..a structure which facilitates the full participation of all the people at the 
national level and local level.." (FSLN-DN, 1989)
The historic exclusion of the general population from the political processes guaranteed
that participation was a priority issue for the Sandinista vision of a new society and it was
perceived as a central component to the creation on a democratic and just society. Indeed,
here it appeared as the first in a series of measures that would be adopted.
After the triumph of the revolution Sandinista ideas about participation had
developed in response to the involvement of the population in the struggle against
Somoza. Participation became conflated with the definition of democracy itself. The
government’s first proclamation states:
"Democracy ...means participation of the people in political, economic, social 
and cultural affairs. The more people who take part in this the more 
democracy there is., in a more advanced phase, democracy will mean the 
participation of the workers in directing factories, farms, cooperatives, the 
cultural centres. In synthesis, democracy is the intervention of the masses in 
all aspects of social life."’®
One year later, participation was also identified as a crucial component to secure
political democracy, as is demonstrated by the following statement from Sergio Ramirez,
Vice-President of the Republic during the Sandinista Government:
"..the effectiveness of a political model depends on its capacity to resolve the 
problems of democracy and justice. Effective democracy, like we intend to 
practice in Nicaragua, consists of ample popular participation; a permanent 
dynamic of the people’s participation in a variety of political and social 
tasks.."”
This emphasis on widespread and ongoing citizen participation is evocative of the 
democratic traditions found in Rousseau and Mills, who argued that public participation 
in all aspects of public life was a fundamental component in the creation and maintenance 
of democratic society (Fagence, 1977). The FSLN’s view of democracy as popular 
participation within governmental affairs was later reflected in the Nicaraguan 
Constitution. Article 2, states:
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"The people exercise democracy by freely choosing on and participating in the 
construction of the economic, political and social system"
and its Article 48 commits the state "to remove obstacles that impede effective
participation". The problems of relinquishing power to the various popular sectors and
of reconciling this with the notions of vanguardism become clearer later.
While operating within a framework of pluralism and a policy of national unity, the
objectives of the Sandinista Revolution remained to restructure the socioeconomic and
political conditions for the so-called "popular majority". This was to be achieved by the
control of these popular classes over the political system and was expressed in the notion
of "popular hegemony", which occupied a central role in Sandinista theory’^ . This differs
from the Marxist-Leninist concept of "dictatorship of the proletariat" in that it does not
refer to the predominance of one class over another but to the predominance of the
interests of the popular majority’^  over those of the privileged minority who had benefitted
from the exploitation and oppression of the Somoza dictatorship (Harris, 1985:6).
The concept of hegemony works in explaining how particular classes or social
groups function within social orders beyond those relating to formal state power in the
context of social, ideological and political relations. Seen this way, control by the
dominant class is exerted through "direct rule" which maintains the dominant relations of
production as well as through civil society, a notion identified in Chapter 1 as referring
to the various sophisticated channels of social and cultural influence (Gramsci, 1991). By
controlling civil society, Gramsci explains, the dominant class is furnished with the
possibility of defining the parameters of social and political action: in capitalist systems
hegemony is exercised by the dominant economic groups, the bourgeois class; in socialist
systems hegemony is maintained by the working classes.
So, while the FSLN adopted representative forms of democracy it did not ignore the
ways in which the governing elite use formal democratic institutions to serve its own class
interests. For the Sandinistas, representative forms alone were unable to guarantee
democratic and popular involvement in the hegemonic project because of the limited
opportunities available to the majority for replacing that elite and because the relations of
exploitation and domination had permeated the institutions of civil society as much as in
state institutions. The FSLN also recognised that the structures of power are reproduced
not only in and from the state apparatus but also in the interior of civil society, including
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schools, businesses, the church and the family. Thus, a key to their revolutionary project 
was the démocratisation of civil society tlirough the creation of popular organisations in 
order to prevent the institutions of representative democracy from becoming an instrument 
of political domination for the large property owners.
To achieve these ends the FSLN envisaged a process of raising the political 
awareness of the popular sectors in order to enable them to identify, express and protect 
their own interests against other social sectors. This required a profound transformation 
or development of consciousness of the popular sectors who had been influenced through 
time and custom by values and ideologies which subordinated them. However, when 
applied to the peasantry in particular who the FSLN considered in need of "modernising", 
this meant ignoring their own aspirations and values (Coraggio, 1985). The praxis of 
popular participation was perceived as important to enable the masses to develop as 
political subjects of the revolution and society and to prevent political and economic elites 
and the masses from "accepting the blandishments of anti-democratic ideologues" (Booth, 
1989:16).
Education was an essential component to assist this process, the underlying
assumption being that literacy confers on learners the ability to identify social reality and
assists them in becoming agents of social change. Commenting in 1979, Fernando
Cardenal, the national coordinator of the Literacy Crusade, presented the official view of
the link between literacy and participation:
"Literacy is fundamental to achieving progress and it is essential to the 
building of a democratic society where people can participate consciously and 
critically in national decision-making. You have to read and write so you can 
identify the reality in which you live, so that you can become a protagonist 
of history rather than a spectator.
Also, the popular sectors had to be organised because the ground rules in a pluralist 
system are that no-one wins all of the time and those who are best organised have the 
better chance of obtaining favourable results. Consequently, the least privileged sectors 
of the old system had to be organised if they were to become full participants in the new 
system (Wright, 1990:48). It was important that if ordinary people were to be given the 
opportunity to build their own representative institutions and practices within society to 
be more effective in negotiating their demands within the formal political institutions of
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the state, they needed time to consolidate their organisations. As a result, the government 
decided in 1980 not to hold elections until 1985’^ .
In addition to the intrinsic political value of popular participation, the FSLN 
recognised the potential contribution of the participation of local people in order to 
mobilise local resources, save on costs and increase efficiency of socioeconomic projects. 
Participation was thus an integral dimension of its development model. On reaching 
power the new Government of Reconstruction, in the section of economic organisation in 
its First Proclamation, called for popular initiatives to seek collective solutions to 
socioeconomic problems and to substitute these for "traditional paternalistic principles" of 
government (DN-FSLN, 1989). In the face of a weak state which lacked the 
administrative capacity and scarce resources, popular participation provided an important 
instrument by which the basic needs of the popular sectors could be met because it 
mobilised local resources and surplus labour and was economically logical because it 
reduced the burden of the foreign exchange commitment (Fitzgerald, 1991:239).
According to the FSLN popular participation was a key to revolutionary change, to 
the creation of a new political system and to national development. It was also inherently 
problematic because of the contradictions this presented concerning the role of the 
vanguard party endowed as it was by the FSLN with the historic task of leading the 
marginalised groups through transition. Using the classifications identified in Chapter 1, 
it would seem that the objective of popular participation for the FSLN was as an "end" 
to achieve empowerment and to develop the beneficiary capacity of those previously 
marginalised sectors of society in order to transform them into active political subjects of 
the revolution. It was also seen as a "means" by which predetermined national political 
and economic development goals could be achieved. However, while popular participation 
was a central notion in Sandinista discourse it remained theoretically and semantically ill- 
defined and was not distinguished qualitatively from political mobilisation under the 
direction of the FSLN.
The following section describes the creation of mechanisms for channeling 
participation in various political, military, economic and social functions and identifies the 
different intensities of the activities involved.
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II Emergent participatory channels
The emergence of popular organisations in Nicaragua in the pre-revolutionary struggle was 
important in creating the foundations for new participatory political practices in Nicaragua 
and marked a new era for the people of Nicaragua because they provided an 
unprecedented channel for responding to individuals’ interests. Their involvement in the 
struggle against Somoza also suggested that these embryonic associations were prepared 
to assume a role in the revolutionary process and earned them a political space in the post­
triumph scenario. They became the main vehicle for the promotion of popular 
participation.
On coming to power the FSLN repeatedly emphasised the importance of mass 
organisations. Within days of victory the official party organ Barricada, called on 
Nicaraguans to:
"Mobilise yourselves politically, educate yourselves to overcome your political
and cultural deficiencies and cultivate revolutionary values."’^
and an official call urged mass organisations to:
"..prepare themselves to run the state, through all the channels which the
Revolution is creating".’^
Yet, here there was a serious contradiction. Although the Nicaraguan masses had played 
a decisive role in the victory against Somoza, Nicaragua’s popular movement was 
backward: the low level of political consciousness and weak organisational base would not 
enable the popular sectors to consolidate their political position and compete with other 
social sectors (Burbach and Draimin, 1980:5-7). Thus, the FSLN’s resolve was to set 
about the task of organising "the masses" more systematically, a task facilitated in the 
euphoric atmosphere of a victorious insurrection. In many eases people rushed to organise 
themselves spontaneously in factory unions and communities. Most subsequently sought 
affiliation with the appropriate national organisation (Burbach and Draimin, 1980).
In response, mass organisations grew rapidly and most of these declared their 
support for the revolutionary "process" and recognised the FSLN as the legitimate leader 
of the social forces. The largest organisations included the Sandinista Defense 
Committees (CDS) which transformed from the pre-triumph CDC and by the end of 1980 
had a membership of 220,000; the ATC (Rural Workers Union) incorporated 106,000 
members, also by the end of 1980 (representing a third of the economically active rural 
population, including permanent and seasonal agricultural workers) and AMNLAE (which
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replaced AMPRONAC) grew to a membership of 25,000. Likewise with the trade unions, 
in July 1979 there was a total of 133 with 27,020 affiliates and by the end of 1983 this 
had increased to 1,103 unions with a registered membership of 207,391, of which the 
Sandinista Workers Federation (CST) was the largest (Serra, 1985:66). Later, as we shall 
see in Chapter 4, LTNAG emerged from the ATC in 1981 to represent rural producers - 
including large scale producers - and was the only revolutionary organisation to be 
founded after the triumph. These popular organisations assumed various functions in areas 
of political, socioeconomic and military activities which involved different types and 
intensities of participation.
On several occasions during the early years the mass organisations asserted their 
independence from the FSLN. Amongst the oft cited cases is that of the ATC, which in 
1980 organised a demonstration in Managua when an estimated 30,000 peasants and 
landless rural workers converged on the streets to demand that confiscated land not be 
returned to their owners but be transferred to the APP. Another relates to the conflict 
which arose during the drafting of the law establishing compulsory national conscription. 
Until 1984 this had been voluntary but AMNLAE demanded the right that women be 
included in order to recognise their contribution to the struggle against Somoza, since they 
had accounted for between 33%-50% of the voluntary militia and 30% of the reserve 
battalions (Ruchwarger, 1987).
The incorporation of mass organisations into the Council of State provided them 
with direct participation in the national decision-making process. This was established in 
May 1980 and, as we have seen, was a co-legislative body of national policy. It operated 
until 1984 when it was replaced by the National Assembly. It embodied the convergence 
of popular interests - represented through the mass organisations - and the machinery of 
government**. The Council of State had fifty one members who represented twenty nine 
institutions, including eight political parties, ten trade unions and other mass organisations 
and eleven other professional associations and organisations. Mass organisations held 47% 
of all members. As the largest popular organisations the CDS had nine representatives, 
ATC and CST both had three (CIERA, 1983:96) which gave them a built-in majority over 
political parties and professional organisations. Importantly, it gave the popular 
organisations an opportunity to articulate - autonomously from the political parties and
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from the FSLN in particular - their particular sectorial interests. Of the bills introduced
by mass organisations 83% became law after modification (Serra, 1985:67).
Mass organisations also influenced national policy through their consultative inputs
on advisory councils established in the different sections of the large state machinery. In
each ministry these delegates were able to contribute to planning social projects and draw
attention to the ministries’ shortcomings. In Education, the National Advisory Council
on Education was established in which students, teachers, the teachers union ANDEN,
CST, ATC, UNAG and the Sandinista Youth (JS de 19 Julio) were represented (CIERA,
1983:82). In 1981, these and other mass organisations were involved (together with
political parties, parents associations, unions and business groups) in a process of national
consultation concerning the goals and objectives of the New Education system. They
played a key role in devising the national curriculum and structuring the New Education
System (Vilas, 1986:219-221)’^
In agriculture, the Agrarian Reform Council was created as a consultative body
responsible for organising the Agrarian Reform. At both national and regional levels it
included UNAG and ATC representatives and was coordinated by INRA (later, the
Ministry of Agrarian Reform, MIDINRA). As is suggested by the following statement
made to an assembly of the ATC by Jaime Wheelock, minister of MIDINRA, popular
organisations enjoyed a degree of moral authority:
"The ATC has a permanent position in INRA on its Council. And you are a 
power there. For us, what you say in INRA is practically law.."^°
Other structures were also formed to facilitate a participatory input of less intensity and
included the creation of national, regional and local production commissions of all the
major products as part of the structure of what became the MIDINRA. In these, workers
and producers representatives elaborated agricultural policies (CIERA, 1983), thereby
fulfilling the objectives of making production plans more efficient and effective.
Mass organisations and members of the general public also had the opportunity to
participate in the process of creating the National Constitution. The first draft, initially
prepared by the appointed Constitutional Commission and composed of twelve FSLN
members and ten opposition parties, was then discussed throughout the country during
1985 in meetings and forums with twenty four political parties, religious groups and with
labour and professional unions. This was followed by twelve televised debates and
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seventy three town meetings incorporating 100,000 citizens. Resulting changes were 
significant on substantive issues and were often resolved in favour of opposition proposals. 
Similarly, the Autonomy Statute was also the result of an extensive and prolonged process 
of consultation and debate which began in 1984 and involved representatives and 
communities of the Atlantic Coast region. As an outcome the final statute - incorporated 
into the New Constitution in 1987 - was internationally ackowledged as an unprecedented 
recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples for autonomy within their region (Jonas 
and Stein, 1990:20).
Mass organisations also operated as informal channels of participation through open 
forums such as "Dg Cara al Pueblo", a televised public meeting in which a member of 
the FSLN leadership met individuals from specific sectors in different locations of the 
country; in "Los Cabildos Abiertos" public meetings where the leadership met local 
communities. On the radio "Linea Directa" served as an outlet which provided a two way 
exchange between the authorities and the public and enabled them to express sectorial 
problems directly to governmental representatives and resolve some collective problems 
immediately. The absense of a systematic or institutionalised follow-up to the agreements 
reached through these channels rendered their function essentially one of a communicative 
vehicle for information sharing between the bases of the organisations and the government 
(Serra, 1985). This is perhaps reflective of a popularist form of participation.
Popular participation was also channelled via the popular organisations to implement 
tasks of socioeconomic development in the areas of health, social welfare and education. 
Indeed, many of the projects of the JGRN and the FSLN, including the national literacy 
and health campaigns of 1980 and 1981, were dependent on the voluntary inputs of 
intended beneficiaries and the active involvement of the mass organisations. Their 
participation fulfilled a various instrumental objectives, including efficiency, cost-sharing 
and effectiveness. The Literacy Crusade, which involved 65,000 youth, mostly volunteers 
and other professionals, was able to reduce the illiteracy rate from 50.35% of the 
population over the age of ten to approximately 23% in a period of five months. This 
contributed to liberating the rural populations from their previous isolation^'. In addition, 
mass organisations promoted production and guaranteed the supply of basic goods, 
providing a voluntary workforce organised in coffee brigades in the conflict zones which 
compensated for the loss of workforce^^. They also provided recruits for the defence of
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the revolution and became the prime actors as defenders of national sovereignty and 
against the counterrevolution.
The involvement of mass organisations in the national education and health 
campaigns, while fulfilling national objectives and meeting some of the basic needs of 
their own sectors, also served to strengthen their own organisations. In particular it 
enabled them to penetrate most of the populated areas with the exception of the Atlantic 
Coast and to enlarge their membership. During the literacy campaign, the ATC unionised 
workers and organised landless and peasant farmers into cooperatives while the teachers 
union (ANDEN) and the Sandinista Youth (JS de 19 Julio) increased their membership 
and enhanced their militancy. Popular organisations also benefited to the extent that they 
were able to demonstrate the power of local popular organisation, their capacity to 
mobilise and the willingness of the people to confront the problems inherited from the 
dictatorship (CIERA, 1983). By promoting sectorial interests, identifying ways of 
articulating these with the state and FSLN and developing methods of participation they 
developed abilities in management and organisation thereby enhancing their own 
beneficiary capacity (Coraggio, 1986:43).
Beyond popular organisations, new opportunities for participation were also 
institutionalised through the creation of management, administration and production 
committees in the workplace, including factories and agricultural enterprises within the 
nationalised sector of the economy, the APP. In some cases, workers had begun to 
control enterprises even during the insurrection. Here, self-managerial adminstration was 
encouraged by the guerilla columns and in over a dozen plants continued to be controlled 
by workers for several months after the FSLN took power. They were able to increase 
production as much as 66% (Burbach and Draimin, 1980:27). On other properties where 
there was no previous union organisation, unions were hastily formed to enable workers 
to begin coordinating production but decisions ultimately rested with the administrators: 
workers’ participation was restricted to the participatory activities of consultation and 
implementation. The creation of cooperatives, described in detail in the following chapter, 
was also encouraged by the government with the dual function of democratising 
production according to its own theoretical model and to incorporate producers into the 
local decision-making processs, management and administration.
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Ill From participation to mobilisation
In practice popular participation developed in response to the new challenges faced by the 
reconstruction of the country with a devastated economy, in the context of a policy of 
national class alliance and from 1981 onwards, while confronting a war of aggression. 
The effects of these interrelated economic, political and military factors, internal and 
external to the FSLN, operated to diminish the opportunities for authentic "bottom-up" 
participation and constrain participatory initiatives.
n il Bureaucratic tendencies
The first few years of Sandinista rule in government not only saw the expansion of the 
FSLN as a political party (evolving from a politico-military movement) and the mass 
organisations but also the state apparatus. Under the prevailing conditions of Nicaragua, 
as with other small peripheral Third World countries (as noted in Chapter 1), the lack of 
resources and the absence of democratic traditions objectively exerted a pressure towards 
bureaucratisation. The new functionaries, administrators and managers came to 
monopolise planning and power and became a powerful technobureaucracy which blocked 
the realisation of participatory ideals in Nicaragua. Added to this was the effect of the 
retention in some spheres - in the absence of trained substitutes - of former Somocista 
managers who brought with them the authoritative and exploitative attitudes towards 
workers which was most evident in the area of service and production. The following 
illustrates the types of problems which evolved in this case involving the State Productive 
Units (UPEs). Here the ATC found that its efforts to increase the workers’ control of the 
units and defend production of the APP brought it into direct conflict with state appointed 
directors and technicians, some of whom were employees under Somoza. Even for the 
new administrative personnel, work in an office was an attractive alternative to the main 
revolutionary tasks of the ideological struggle, the promotion of popular participation 
through base-level programmes and life in the neighbourhood or countryside. These state 
officers became inherently averse to radical changes and reproduced through through 
habitus their example the styles of leadership of the past system of alienation and 
exploitation (Lowy, 1986).
In this way, a bureaucratic layer began to form as a social category removed from 
the interests of the popular sectors, a tendency recognised by Bourdieu (1991), and which
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had exclusive access to material resources. This process also took place within the party 
and mass organisations where professional politicos and activists consolidated positions 
through their direct management of resources. The party’s policy of recruiting new cadres 
from state functionaries^^ served to increase the bureaucratisation of the party, rendering 
both it and the state resistant to change. Material privileges to leaders of the party and 
state and political cadres were provided either directly through their salary or indirectly 
through their access to cars, housing and special shops and consolidated the tendency 
towards bureaucraitsation. In effect, these individuals developed as a social category with 
interests which were different from those of the workers and peasants, who the state and 
vanguard purportedly served (Lowy, 1986:273-277).
The onset of the war had several political effects, one of which was to exacerbate 
bureaucratisation. The war against Nicaragua was unleashed with the arrival of President 
Reagan to the White House in 1981. It was conducted by the counterrevolutionaries, the 
Contras, whose leadership was eomprised of ex-National Guards. The Contras operated 
from bases in Honduras and Costa Rica, were funded by US Congress, trained in the US 
and fought a war of attrition that was ruled illegal by the World Court in 1987. Their 
primary targets included agricultural cooperatives, health workers and teachers because 
these represented the revolutionary government’s programmes of social and welfare 
reform. Between 1980-89 there were over 50,000 human casualties including people 
killed, maimed and abducted. Material and infrastructural damage during the ten year 
period was formally estimated by Nicaraguan government to be US$18 billion. 
Production in the war zones was severely affected and between 1982 and 1985 a third of 
the harvests were lost, alongside fishing, mining and forestry activities. The defence of 
national sovereignty meant that increasing resources had to be directed to the war effort 
and by 1988, 50% of the national budget was destined to defence (Perez, 1990:46-47). 
The war worsened the fiscal deficit and contributed to the disequilibrium which was to 
characterise the country’s economy from 1982 onwards. The economic embargo imposed 
by the US in 1985 exacerbated the economic crisis through its effects on markets and the 
increased costs on import and export transport '^ .^
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III2 Subordination of mass organisation to FSLN
The relative autonomy of the mass organisations was an important aspect of the
effectiveness of popular participation in Sandinista Nicaragua. To commentators, such as
Vilas, it was the determinant by which to access the "healthiness" of popular participation.
The FSLN were aware of this and in 1980 its leadership expressed concern that the mass
organisations might end-up carrying out a "top-down" revolution and appealed to them not
to become transformed into mere appendages of the FSLN. Reflecting on the party’s
understanding of its relationship to the mass organisations, Carlos Nunez, a member of the
National Directorate, said in April 1980:
"I ask myself the following question: When the mass organisations are being 
ignored, when all doors have been closed on them and when no replies have 
been given, ought they resort to their own forms of expression and 
mobilisation? We think that they ought." (Nunez, 1980:18)
The fact that the revolution was in power did not mean that unions could stop defending
their class interests, rather it was necessary for them to defend themselves not just against
both the middle class whose alliance the FSLN sought within the policy of national unity,
but also against the state bureaucracy.
However, there was increasing evidence of the tendency for the popular
organisations to be subordinated to the interests of the FSLN. From 1982 onwards,
observers noted that a process had began whereby the mass organisations had moved from
being popular decision-making bodies to operational (decision-implementing) organs for
the FSLN/state (Robinson and Norsworthy, 1988:44). For example, organised producers
were required to hand over produce at low prices to the government and workers were
requested to meet production goals while postponing their demands for better conditions
(Serra, 1985; Gilbert, 1988:33).
The relationship between the FSLN and the mass organisations was at the root of
this problem. The FSLN as a cadre party was comprised of members selected because
of their proven activism within the popular organisations: hence the dual character of the
mass organisations as "seed beds of the vanguard" and later "suppliers of combatants" and
political cadres in the state and army on the one hand; and on the other hand organisations
representing the sectorial interests of members (Marchetti, 1986:322). Once incorporated
into the party fold an individual had to fulfil the functions of both representative of the
109
"bases" and party militant. This might appear unproblematic in theory but in reality it 
presented serious contradictions.
The lack of operational guidelines about how to translate popular participation into 
practice or how to distinguish it from the notion of mobilisation denied activists the 
appropriate political skills. It meant that each individual was burdened with the 
contradictions between the specific sectorial demands of their organisation and the national 
political project of the party^^ Since the FSLN required greater discipline from its 
militants than the mass organisations, the interests of the party gained political priority. 
The party’s practice of rotating its party cadres within organisational positions undermined 
the organisational strength of the mass organisations in the longer term because mass 
organisations were constantly losing their most experienced leaders for FSLN functions 
(Serra, 1988). Moreover, the relationship perpetuated the subordination of the mass 
organisations through the clientalist political system it engendered. The organisations 
created were recognised by the FSLN as the sole representatives of the sector and were 
offered material and symbolic goods and resources in exchange for the political loyalty 
of their leaders and membership (Serra, 1993:40).
The dissolution of the Council of State in 1984 effectively denied mass organisations 
their direct representation to national legislative power and access to their most significant 
input to the decision-making process. It also meant that their specific sectorial demands 
had to be articulated through the logic of political parties although in an attempt to redress 
this problem the FSLN selected some of its parliamentary candidates from non-FSLN 
representatives within mass organisations. With this change, a conception of the 
legislative branch of government as the source of "popular sovereignty", supplanted the 
emphasis on "popular power" rooted in the mass organisations (FSLN, 1984; FSLN, 
1990a).
The prioritisation of the defence effort exacerbated the irreconcilable class 
contradictions embodied within national unity and ultimately robbed mass organisations 
of their political space. The increasing necessity to maintain production levels gave the 
bourgeoisie producers a political lever, accommodated by the FSLN’s "populist ideology" 
which lacked a coherent class content (Dore and Weeks, 1992) and which effectively 
enabled them to obtain favourable economic concessions from the government. 
Meanwhile, the tasks of the mass organisations became increasingly oriented to the major
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contradictions facing them, namely the defence of the Revolution in political, economic 
and military spheres (Perez, 1990). Their sacrifice was constantly being requested since 
the state had no other resources on which to rely (Marchetti, 1986:309). This secured the 
defence of national sovereignty but had a political cost.
Members deserted the organisations and so from 1985 attempts were made by the 
FSLN and the organisations themselves to maintain a greater belligerence in their demands 
and to improve their internal democracy. National assemblies, internal elections and the 
emergence of new styles of leadership went some way to readdress the problems and to 
make them more responsive to their membership. Nonetheless, under no condition is war 
ever conducive to the development of democracy or the freedom of expression. More 
specifically as Vilas reminds us, war prevents all those necessary conditions for 
participatory democracy, namely "decentralisation, spontaneity, testing and 
experimentation" (Vilas, 1986a:23). In Nicaragua, the circumstances of foreign aggression 
made trusting "bottom-up" responses increasingly impossible. Granting political space to 
domestic opposition - any opposition - could have jeopardised the revolutionary project 
itself. Consequently, the political space for criticism, discussion and dissent was closed 
within the popular organisations and without, because as Serra (1988) observes, "criticism 
was interpreted as counter-revolutionary" and so was not tolerated. If the war was 
detrimental to the general environment for political discussion, it also affected the 
development of the FSLN as the leading party. In particular, the war reduced its capacity 
for self-criticism and the "imperialist enemy and its lackeys" provided a tempting 
scapegoat for the errors it committed (Marchetti, 1986).
III3 The weight of history 
While the political practices of the FSLN and the political system it established created 
an obstacle to popular participation, its political and democratic project was also subject 
to the limitations of historical circumstances and the underdeveloped nature of Nicaraguan 
society in general. If the organisations were not responding to their sectorial demands 
because they lacked internal democracy, this was also because these political organisations 
and the procedures they were developing constituted new and unprecedented experiences. 
Authoritarianism had been the predominant of political characteristic of pre-revolutionary
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Nicaragua and the principles of consent were innovative yet crucial for the success of the 
FSLN’s project.
The historical significance of these experiences as well as the obstacles they 
presented, cannot be underestimated in the development of democratic practices in 
Nicaragua and was one of the problems of creating a revolution in the context of a barely 
developed civil society (Coraggio, 1985). Nor could this process towards new forms of 
representation come about by formal decree since it was the result of a social process 
which had its own rhythm and was dependent on the development of the sectors 
themselves (Burbach and Draimin, 1980:21-22).
Apart from the historical legacies of authoritarianism, in the context of external 
aggression in Nicaragua the task of developing new political practices was profoundly 
distorted. As the conflict intensified it became the army not the factory which provided 
the primary school of socialist politics. Under these circumstances the second generation 
of leaders and the voluntary and conscripted youth had:
".. as their principle tutor the war effort against imperialist aggression".
(Marchetti, 1986:316)
This meant that the military had a key role in influencing the models of organisation and 
ideology, both of which would influence the levels of popular participation. While the 
Sandinista Popular Army (EPS) directed its most talented cadres to the tasks of creating 
consciousness amongst the rank and file of the military, the threat of a US invasion made 
urgent the requirement that the military expand its forces rapidly making it difficult for 
the army to adopt less conventional military organisation (Marchetti, 1986:316). Thus, 
the social mobilisation of the population was translated into organisational methods within 
the popular organisations in which the military logic of vertical command, strict discipline 
and obedience to one’s superiors were reproduced (Serra, 1993:26). In recognition that 
the organisational methods of the FSLN had become permeated by militaristic 
characteristics, the FSLN in its post-electoral party conference cited the problems as:
"Authoritarianism. Lack of sensitivity to the problems put forward by the
grassroots. The absence of self-criticism. Bureaucratic forms of leadership
and the imposition of leaders and organisational structures." (FSLN, 1990b).
The campesinos were amongst the most affected by the war and the economic crisis. 
Social services, childcare, health and education programmes were progressively limited 
not only in the war zones where state employees were attacked, but nationally as the
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economic crisis deepened (Perez, 1990). This had the effect of worsening living and 
health conditions and was particularly detrimental to women. Moreover, limited state 
resources and cuts in the budgets of the mass organisations reduced the education and 
technical training opportunities that could have helped prepare women for organisational 
and leadership roles. The effects of this on their participation will be examined later.
Conclusions
The Sandinista’s combination of socialist democracy and political pluralism was its 
solution to accommodate the interests of different and competing social groups within its 
broad alliance and represented its unique attempt to transform historically diverging views 
and practices of democracy. Thus, the objectives of improving the socioeconomic 
conditions of the majority poor were ensured through structural transformations and the 
extension of services directed by the state. Private ownership was retained within the 
mixed economy in order to maintain productive levels. In the political sphere 
representative features of democracy were implemented as part of the policy of national 
unity and mechanisms for participatory democracy were created because they were central 
to the notion of popular hegemony and facilitated the involvement of the popular sectors 
in social, economic and political activities.
According to the FSLN, popular participation - which developed within its political 
agenda in response to the practices evolving during the insurrection - aimed to incorporate 
the masses into the political process in order to empower the hitherto excluded popular 
sectors, develop and strengthen civil society and fulfil development tasks. Their autonomy 
from the FSLN was crucial for them to retain their function as representatives of their 
sectors. The resultant participatory activities involved a range of intensities of 
participation and included tasks involving decision-making processes at the national and 
local levels, consultation, information sharing and the implementation of governmental 
policies.
After the initial years of the revolution, participatory initiatives became increasingly 
restricted by a tendency towards bureaucratisation of the state, party and mass 
organisations. Popular organisations became increasingly subordinated to the party/state 
apparatus and their role as representatives of their sectors was replaced by their role of
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operationalising FSLN policy. In such a way "participation" was reduced to 
"mobilisation" and became a mechanism by which the party communicated its ideas to the 
people. These tendencies were exacerbated by an economic crisis and externally imposed 
aggression. The defence of sovereignty became the priority issue, opportunities for 
criticism were closed and the demands of sectors were suspended as production and state 
resources were diverted to maintain war effort. Thus, we can see that although the FSLN 
accepted pluralism in the political system, it was less tolerated within the party itself or 
within the popular organisations. As a vanguard the FSLN had aimed to liberate and 
empower the oppressed but once the old regime had been defeated and political power had 
been assumed it came to control them.
Details about how the campesino sector, and specifically those organised within 
cooperatives, were affected by FSLN’s political project and - importantly - how they 
responded to it are presented in the following chapter.
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Notes for Chapter 3
1 .Aerial bombing of major cities by the National Guard had devastated most cities causing 
infrastructural damage estimated at US$481 million; the loss of productive capacity 
estimated at US$1,246 million and capital flight representing US$518 million. The 
Sandinistas also inherited a US$1.6 billion foreign debt (Wheelock, 1986:27).
2.1n October, 1979 (Burbach and Draimin, 1980:3).
3.The father of the Ortega brothers (Camilo, Daniel and Humberto) fought with Sandino.
4.1nterview with Humberto Ortega in Solidarité Internationale. October, 1987:27. Quoted 
from Smith (1993:137), Smith’s translation.
5.A common feature of western systems such as the US excludes the Communist Party 
from government office. This issue is examined by Petras and Fitzgerald (1988), who 
identify that all political systems have boundaries which exclude those who attempt to 
overthrow the system. The establishment of a new social system following a revolution 
necessitates that a boundary be established between those included in the project and those 
opposing it.
6.0ther representatives within the JGRN included Sergio Ramirez of the Group of Twelve 
and Rafael Cordoba Rivas of the Democratic Conservative Party. It had previously 
included Violeta Chamorro, the widow of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro (who was assassinated 
by the National Guard) and Alfonso Robelo of the right wing Nicaraguan Democratic 
Movement, both of whom resigned.
7.Quoted in Lobel (1988:841).
8.FSLN (1990a:6-7).
9.Daniel Ortega "Discurso", in Barricada. 26 February 1990.
10.The first national government proclamation in 1979 (DN-FSLN, 1989).
11.Quoted from Ruchwarger (1987:4).
12.The concept of hegemony which is associated with the work of Gramsci, appears in 
Sandinista political discourse without any direct reference to his thought (Wright, 1990:38- 
39).
13.In Nicaragua the political subjects of the revolution were not just the workers as 
identified by Gramsci, nor the workers and peasants who have comprised the subjects of 
other third world revolutions. They were the multi-class popular majority composed of 
the peasantry, agricultural and industrial workers, the urban poor, ethnic and social 
movements, middle-class intellectuals and those sectors of the petty bourgeoisie and 
bourgeoisie who supported the revolution. Given the composition of popular sectors the 
FSLN’s definition of political behaviour as being hegemonic and not dictatorial is 
particularly significant and indicated that it "ha(d) not confused reality with revolutionary 
ideology" and was an explicit recognition that the impetus for change can come from this
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"third force".
H.Quoted in Robert van Niekerk (1991:158).
15.Which were brought forward to 1984.
16.Barricada. 3 August 1979. Quoted in Gilbert, 1988:37.
17. Jaime Wheelock of the National Directorate and Minister of Agrarian Reform, quoted 
in Black (1981:231).
18.The Council of State also represented an iimovative institutional response to the process 
still to be resolved in Europe: namely the articulation between political parties and social 
movements.
19.See Vilas (1986) for the centrality of popular education in the revolutionary 
transformation and for details of participation of the popular sectors in the new system.
20.Quoted in NACLA (1980:29), Vol XIV, Number 3, May-June.
21.Between 23 March and 23 August 1980 a total of 406,056 Nicaraguans had leamt to 
read and write (Amove, 1986:28).
22.The revolution and Contra War discouraged Salvadorean and Honduran workers from 
migrating to Nicaragua for the harvest.
23.This was particularly marked in its mass "Second Promotion" where party activities 
largely from the state sector received their party card as a recognition of their status as 
fully-fledged militants.
24. Increased transport costs were the consequence of Nicaragua’s success in diversifying 
its trade to non-traditional partners to include Canada, West Europe and Japan which were 
further away (Smith’, 1993:255).
25. Serra points out that analysis of discussion with leaders reveals an unresolved confusion 
between their respective roles as party militants and as leaders of social sectors.
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Chapter 4
THE COOPERATIVE MOVEMENT: PATRONAGE AND DEVELOPMENT
This chapter describes how cooperatives developed during the Sandinista Government and 
to identify the role of various external agents including the peasantry in cooperative 
development. The aim is to identify how the FSLN’s practices and theoretical conceptions 
applied to the peasantry and how the peasantry responded organisationally and politically. 
Since cooperatives are the meeting ground between external forces and the peasants who 
have their own agendas and motives, the chapter identifies the precise nature of external 
intervention as well as the interaction between the state, FSLN, UNAG and the grassroots 
cooperative movement. It also describes the organisational characteristics of the emergent 
cooperative movement. As such, the chapter examines the nature of the cooperative 
movement in order to identify the extent to which it represented an authentic peasant 
movement and how it developed in response to FSLN and state intervention, the war and 
economic crisis.
Given the distinct phases in the development of the cooperative movement the 
chapter is organised chronologically in accordance the corresponding shifts in the priorities 
of the Sandinista Agrarian Reform (RAS). These occurred as a result of the ideological 
and political debates concerning agricultural development and socialist transformation 
which raged within the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MIDINRA); in response to 
economic, political and military circumstances; and to the increasing strength of the 
peasant organisations and cooperative movement.
I Agricultural cooperatives during Somoza
Before 19 July 1979 there had been few attempts to organise the peasantry. Although 
Nicaragua’s very first cooperatives emerged in the early 1900s and involved the tertiary 
sector, the first agricultural cooperatives for peasants were created by Sandino during the 
1920s and 1930s as part of his struggle against imperialism and to defend an alternative 
social project. These appeared in the zones liberated by his Army for the Defence for 
National Liberation deep in the mountains in Wiwili and incorporated agricultural workers 
and peasants. The cooperatives were then systematically destroyed on the assassination
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of Sandino and their members were slaughtered. Unlike previous cooperatives, these were 
clearly perceived by Somoza to have conflicted with the interest of the dominant class 
(Matus el al, 1990). As noted in Chapter 2, the level of repression that characterised the 
dictatorship subsequently inhibited the consolidation of the peasant movement and no 
further efforts were made to organise cooperatives.
Under the tutelage of the Somozan dictatorship and as part of the US Alliance for 
Progress policy, attempts of another kind were made to establish cooperatives in 1966 in 
the form of Nicaragua’s first service cooperatives. These were funded by the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the National Bank of 
Nicaragua and their formation was accommodated in the Law of Agrarian Reform (1963). 
In the context of extreme poverty and following the Cuban Revolution, the objectives of 
these cooperatives (as with efforts elsewhere in Latin America) were to pacify rural 
protest, prevent unrest and create a clientele of dependent producers (Young et al, 1982). 
Yet, by 1970 there were only twenty two cooperatives with 1,240 members. These were 
followed by what were known as "limited responsibility" cooperatives, created by non­
governmental organisations' and were dominated by large commercial producers although 
some poorer farmers also benefited from the services provided. In 1978, there were still 
only forty two cooperatives which incorporated a total of 9,270 members (Kaimowitz, 
1988:47; Matus et al, 1990), reflecting the limited impact of cooperativism on the general 
population.
However, during mid-1979 as the revolutionary insurrection escalated, a spontaneous 
upsurge of the cooperative movement appeared as peasants and agricultural workers 
occupied lands in informally created collectives, particularly in and around Leon where 
campesinos had been especially decisive in the struggle and had organised in operations 
directed by the FSLN leadership. These collectives became known as Sandinista 
Agricultural Communes (CAS) and acquired new forms of democratic direction 
(Kaimowitz, 1988:47). They maintained the production of agroexports and food crops and 
served as refuges for the revolutionary forces (Deere et al, 1985:78-79). As the 
insurrection and the Sandinistas advanced, poor groups spontaneously occupied land in an 
expression of their struggle for access to lands which had been lost by their ancestors in 
the expansion of agrocapitalism. In other cases guerilla forces which had occupied farms
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owned by Somocistas turned them over to local groups (Matus et al, 1990:128). They 
adopted heterogeneous forms of organisation (CIERA, 1985).
The FSLN’s commitment to cooperatives first appeared in the Sandinista Historic 
Programme of 1969 and was declared in the first proclamation of the Sandinista-led 
Government of National Reconstruction (JGRN). However, the Sandinista notion of a 
mixed economy also foresaw economic development based on different modes of 
production, including the maintenance of private production alongside a state and 
cooperative sector (Fitzgerald, 1989:29-30). This placed conflicting political and 
economic issues on the agenda. After the initial months of the revolution when the FSLN 
began implementing policies as acts of state - rather than expressing policy preferences 
as a guerilla movement - it demanded that land be handed back. The ambivalent, if not 
contradictory attitude of the FSLN towards the peasantry and cooperativisation became 
apparent.
II Creating a state sector (1979-811
The economic significance of the agricultural sector rendered it a primary focus of the 
Sandinista’s post-triumph objectives to reactivate and transform the national economy and 
society. This meant that developments in the countryside were central to the political and 
economic project of the FSLN. The Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MIDINRA) was 
created to execute new agricultural policy^ and Jaime Wheelock, a member of the FSLN’s 
National Directorate and one-time leader of the Proletariat Tendency, became its minister.
The initial phase of the agrarian reform occurred between 1979-81. It was 
characterised by the creation of a state sector from properties confiscated immediately 
from the Somozan family and its cohorts, authorised in Decrees No 3 (30.7.1979), No 38 
(8.9.1979) and later in Decree 329 (29.2.1980). This facilitated the transfer to the state 
sector of the equivalent of a quarter of the country’s cultivatable land from approximately 
two thousand farms and ranches in which capital intensive agroindustrial complexes were 
concentrated (Collins, 1986:31; Baumeister, 1985:18). This newly created state sector, 
named the Area of People’s Property (APP) was also privileged by preferential terms of 
credit, public services and assistance. During this initial phase only eight percent of the
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expropriated land was distributed to the non-state sector. Recipients included some of the 
peasants and workers who had struggled for the land.
Adhering to the land policy of non-redistribution for the interests of creating a state 
sector and in order to calm the middle classes required the Sandinistas to convince those 
land-hungry peasants and rural workers to hand back lands which had belonged to the 
Somocistas and necessitated that they call restraint to limit further takeovers. Expelled 
groups were either relocated on other lands or accepted the prospect of becoming workers 
on production units administered by the state. Others successfully resisted attempts to 
remove them, thereby indicating that cooperative organisation was perceived by the 
peasantry as an effective collective defence of access to land (Serra, 1991:100). They 
were subsequently loaned or provisionally ceded use of the land by the state (CIERA, 
1989c:63-67). The demand for a return of occupied land also made it clear that the 
agrarian reform would not be based on the organisation of peasants in cooperatives. It 
caused a serious setback to the nascent cooperative movement, excluded the campesinos 
from a role in the agrarian reform and reduced the peasant movement’s possibilities of 
fomenting class struggle in the countryside (CIERA, 1985:15; Envio, 1987:19). It also 
meant that the FSLN had reneged on its insurrectionary call to the campesinos of "Land 
to those who work it" and was a policy which carried a heavy political cost since it led 
many peasants, particularly in Leon and Chinandega, to accuse the Sandinistas of having 
deceived them (Matus et al, 1990:134).
The prioritisation of the state sector and the emphasis on capital-intensive 
technology was based on the notion that progress and development can only take place 
with the replacement of peasant production by capitalist or state forms of production and 
with the adoption of advanced technology. The dominant view within MIDINRA was that 
socialism was synonymous with modern large-scale production. According to this 
interpretation, the peasantry was seen as being trapped in an economy of consumption, as 
backward and incapable of understanding the transformations required to facilitate the 
ascendancy of the new popular power. They were thought to lack the organisational and 
productive capacity to manage the confiscated lands. The Sandinista Government feared 
that the redistribution of properties to individuals or cooperatives would reduce production 
levels and create a shortage of labour for the harvesting of agroexports: a suspicion 
supported by evidence which indicated that once permanent access to land was gained by
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agricultural labourers, they withdrew from paid employment (Baumeister, 1985:20-21). 
As far as MIDINRA was concerned campesinos could destroy the carefully planned 
process of transformation in which the state enterprises occupied a central axis of the new 
model of development (Ortega, 1989:202). Redistribution was also undesirable for 
political objectives since it was feared that a rural elite would emerge and that it would 
encourage further land takeovers which would ultimately endanger the class alliance 
(CIERA, 1989c:63-67).
Despite state policy, the peasantry was prepared to defend a model of organised 
production through the Rural Workers’ Union (ATC). Following the triumph, the ATC 
represented the cooperative sector, alongside a diversity of interests of permanent and 
seasonal workers, peasant labourers and peasants who employed labour. By 1979 it had 
a membership of 100,000, out of a total of 350,000 of the economically active population 
in the agricultural sector, rendering it one of the largest mass organisations at the time 
(Kaimowitz, 1986:102,110). In December 1979, the ATC announced the existence of 
392 production cooperatives, incorporating 13,202 members; eighteen credit and service 
cooperatives with 629 affiliated members for whom, in its 1980 Plan of Struggle, it 
demanded credit provision. In February 1980, the ATC also led a massive demonstration 
in Managua to oppose government policy and to demand: "Not one more inch of land 
back". Supporters rallied under the slogan:
"We’re not birds who live from the air nor fishes who live from the sea, but
men who live off the land."
They also demanded the legalisation of several land takeovers of non-Somozan farms and 
improved land rent arrangements for poor and landless peasants. Their protest served as 
a clear expression of the campesinos" primary demand for land and for the agrarian reform 
to resolve the problems of rural poverty, unemployment and basic grain production (Deere 
et al, 1985:82).
The government responded. It permitted the survival of the cooperatives already 
established and implemented measures which did not depend on land distribution, 
including the reduction of ground rent tariffs, improvement in tenant security and 
elimination of sharecropping and the colonato system of payment for use of land through 
work (Baumeister, 1985:26). Also, the national institute Products for Peasants 
(PROCAMPO) was established to provide assistance particularly for small producers
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(Wattel et al, 1989:168-169). Although the state was reluctant to redistribute land for the 
formation of cooperatives at this stage of the agrarian reform, it encouraged the 
organisation of cooperatives formed by peasants with their own land. This included what 
became known as Service and Credit Cooperatives (CCS), where peasants organised 
around access to services and another model of cooperative, the Sandinista Agricultural 
Cooperatives which shared with the insurrectional collective the acronym CAS. Here 
productive activities were carried out collectively.
As in other countries in Latin America and elsewhere in the Third World, the FSLN 
expressed a preference for cooperative organisation for a series of economic and political 
objectives (Verhagen, 1980). Consistent with a Marxist perspective, cooperative 
development was seen as a way of democratising productive relations in agriculture and 
offered the opportunity of modernising peasant production via state attention and inputs 
of technology. The FSLN also considered collectivisation important in order to haul the 
peasantry from their backwardness, incorporate them into the instances of revolutionary 
power at the local level and provide structures to facilitate their participation in the 
economic management of production (CIERA, 1989b:37; Ortega 1989:205; Matus et al, 
1990:37). Consequently, collectivised production, as represented by the CAS model was 
favoured by Sandinistas. The CCS were thought to be inferior because they maintained 
the isolation and individualism of the peasantry and purportedly exacerbated the 
socioeconomic inequalities amongst the peasantry organised within them. They were seen 
as important as a "transitional" stage. The preference for CAS was reflected in the credit 
facilities which offered them seven percent, eight percent for CCS compared with 
individual producers who received eleven percent (Deere et al, 1985:83). MIDINRA also 
provided training to all cooperatives, including courses relating to organisation and basic 
accounting which were attended by officers of the cooperatives.
By early 1980 there were 1,397 CCS cooperatives. There were also 584 CAS, of 
which about two-thirds had been formed by campesinos collectivizing their own lands 
(Kaimowitz, 1988:48). These became known extra-officially in agrarian reform circles 
as "real CAS" to distinguish them from those production cooperatives which were later 
formed on redistributed land and became known as "false CAS" (Ortega, 1989:206-211). 
These early CAS were relatively small, exhibited heterogeneous forms of organisation.
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were based around kinship structures and produced mainly basic food (Kaimowitz, 
1988:48).
However, this growing peasant movement was not well represented within its union, 
the ATC, since this was dominated by agricultural workers. Although the union 
reorganised itself in an attempt to accommodate the needs of its disparate membership, 
this proved impossible and the peasants within the ATC began to call for their own 
organisation. This coincided with the interests of the FSLN which had been concerned 
about the lack of a Sandinista organisation for producers since medium and large peasants 
- who were a significant sector in the central areas of the country - were being 
successfully recruited by a non-Sandinista association: Union of Nicaraguan Agricultural 
Producers (UPANIC). This led to the creation of UNAG in 1981, to which the ATC 
yielded its campesino membership.
Appearing under the banner "Patria, Unidad, Produccion", UNAG proclaimed its 
commitment to the principles of national unity, internal democracy, anti-imperialism, 
respect for "traditional cultures" and recognised the FSLN as the "people’s vanguard". It 
identified its objectives as to: protect efficient production; defend the interests of the 
producers, including the rural bourgeoisie on the condition that it did not work actively 
for the counterrevolution; strengthen the revolutionary process; and participate in the tasks 
required to secure peace and national sovereignty (UNAG, 1981). Its membership was 
composed mainly of small and medium producers and later included large "patriotic" 
landowners: a heterogeneous representation which embodied the FSLN’s policy of national 
unity and which also carried within it the resulting contradictions (Luciak, 1987a). It 
would evolve to become the most influential grassroots’ organisation in Nicaragua.
Ill Cooperative institutionalisation (1981-84)
This second phase of cooperative development is marked by the proclamation in 1981 of 
the Agrarian Reform Law and the Law of Cooperatives which together provided a 
systematic framework for the development of cooperatives. The laws comprised the legal 
instruments for the transformation of agrarian structures; defined the role of cooperatives 
within agricultural development; identified the rights for cooperative creation and 
operations; and identified that land would be redistributed to poor campesinos who were
123
collectively organised (Deere et al, 1985:92). Both laws were created in consultation with 
the representatives - not rank and file membership - of the ATC and UN AG.
The laws also established the legal pre-conditions for incorporating rural women into 
production and granted women equal rights to land. The Law of Cooperatives also stated 
that women should be fully integrated into cooperatives under the same conditions as men 
and ensured that men and women had equal rights and duties. It required that women’s 
incorporation be independent of their family status and not depend on them being heads 
of household or having adult male children, rendering these reforms unprecedented in 
Latin America (Padilla et al, 1987:129). This state policy would subsequently facilitate 
a higher proportion of women cooperative members in Nicaragua than in any other Latin 
American country which did not have an explicit policy favouring their incorporation. 
This was important in providing the basis for their participation in production and as we 
shall see later in decision-making processes (Deere and Leon, 1987:11).
The Agrarian Reform Law was intended to bring idle lands in the private sector into 
production, increase basic grain production and meet the peasant demand for access to 
land, thereby increasing their commitment to the revolution. It also aimed to "resolve" 
the land issue by allaying the fears of a nervous bourgeoisie. Its implicit tenet was a 
recognition that various land tenure patterns were appropriate for revolutionary Nicaragua, 
including state farms alongside independent peasant and entrepreneurial production and 
CAS and CCS cooperatives. The Agrarian Law also recognised mixed production 
arrangements which had emerged beyond the direct control of the state during the first two 
years (Deere et al, 1985:91).
At this stage the RAS facilitated the expropriation of land (which was compensated 
for) from owners who had remained in the country but whose farms were above five 
hundred manzanas and were idle; where property and crops had deteriorated or, in the 
case of ranches, where there was a low density of cattle; and where those with more than 
fifty manzanas were relying on the extraction of ground rent (Baumeister, 1985:21-22). 
Of the land captured only a small proportion was assigned to the state sector and to 
individuals, including combatants of the war of liberation and the families of the Heroes 
and Martyrs who had died (CIERA, 1989a:246). The main beneficiaries were the poor 
or landless campesinos and seasonal workers who had organised themselves into various 
associative forms of production. The emphasis on redistribution to the CAS model meant
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a prioritisation of semi-wage labour above the middle peasants and the CCS model. Given 
the geographical inequalities of the social structure in Nicaragua this meant that CAS came 
to characterise the Pacific region because of the concentration of rural poor and landless 
there. The CCS which were created from producers who owned land were more typical 
of the interior and north of the country. Other measures were also implemented to 
improve economic conditions and production levels, including improved prices and 
supplies and the issuing of property titles.
This shift in agrarian reform policy towards distributing land to production 
cooperatives from 1982 onwards had been devised previously in order to stimulate basic 
grain production for internal consumption and to overcome the shortcomings of the state 
sector (Fitzgerald, 1989:38). However, it coincided with increased pressure from rural 
organisations and from the military situation since throughout 1982 the country faced an 
escalation of Contra attacks.
From 1984 more CAS were created in the areas of conflict, incorporating more than 
10,000 peasants. For the state these concentrations of population facilitated the provision 
of social services. Settling people on the land also fulfilled the military requirement by 
strengthening the defence capacity of the war zones. At the same time, the creation of 
these defence cooperatives demonstrated the peasantry’s disposition to defend the 
revolutionary achievements as they related to access to land, technical assistance and 
credit. Under the constant threat of attack, self-defence reinforced social and ideological 
unity amongst the members (Chamorro and Fitzgerald, 1987).
Although the Law of Cooperatives facilitated the distribution of land to cooperatives 
it was a rigid guideline for cooperative development. It established only two types of 
cooperatives (CCS and CAS) and thereby imposed an organisational criterion on 
cooperatives independently of the will of the members. In effect, by making land 
distribution conditional MIDINRA was violating the golden principle of cooperative 
"voluntarism" and was in danger of creating "pseudo-cooperatives". Studies elsewhere 
have shown that where producers are not themselves convinced of the advantages and 
merits of cooperative organisation they have a high failure rate (Worsley, 1971 ; Verhagen, 
1980).
MIDINRA viewed cooperatives as entities to be subordinated to the logic of national 
planning and to be dependent on services offered by the state. This was also reflected in
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its instruction that PROCAMPO-MIDINRA be jointly responsible for the promotion, 
training, technical assistance and registration of cooperative members, MIDINRA stressed 
the importance of maintaining the economies of scale within cooperatives. It obliged 
agrarian reform beneficiaries to sow the crops it specified - prohibiting cultivations that 
were not integral to its technical plans - and to use the technology it deemed appropriate. 
MIDINRA’s control over cooperatives extended to the obligatory commercialisation and 
sale of produce at official prices through state channels, often at prices below those 
available on the parallel market (Ortega, 1989:200). In such a way the costs of the war 
and the state’s ambitious investment projects were passed on to the peasants, particularly 
those in the CAS, where control was more complete and surplus could more easily be 
recovered (Blokland, 1992:2).
From 1983, MIDINRA expanded its cooperative training programme by providing 
a new "Basic Course of CAS Cooperative Organisation". This was an eighty six hour 
course directed to benefit all cooperative members but was coordinated by the presidents 
of the cooperatives who were previously trained. These courses successfully reached 50% 
CAS. A similar course was provided for the CCS. The ministry also extended the cover 
of its courses on organisational, accounting management, planning, diagnosis and agro­
technology which were similarly provided to the leaders of the cooperatives. Apart from 
the immediate knowledge imparted from these courses it has been suggested elsewhere 
that they served to enhance the leaders’ ability to deal with the institutions of the state, 
to forge a new identity and to overcome the divisiveness arising from their allegiance to 
either the Liberals or Conservatives. Then in 1985, MIDINRA relinquished the 
responsibility of training to UNAG. The association subsequently organised a series of 
workshops relating to economic, political and organisational aspects of cooperatives with 
the assistance of funds from international sources (Serra, 1991:118). As with the courses 
before them, these were also directed at the leaders and, as the study demonstrates later, 
this inadvertently contributed to the concentration of power in a few individuals.
Although UNAG initially shared the view that collectivised production was the most 
advanced model, it opposed state conceptions of cooperative development. In a 1982 
document UNAG called for greater autonomy from the state and proposed that the state 
redefine its role as that of a "stimulator" of an independent cooperative movement, 
asserting that:
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"A cooperative is not just a production unit but a grassroots organisation of
the peasantry."^
It also called for the expansion of cooperativism to include agroexports as well as 
traditional basic grain production and for an integral economic policy which assigned 
cooperatives greater resources and investments.
Some of these concerns were subsequently incorporated by the government into the 
emergent Strategy for Cooperative Development in 1982 which aimed to intensify the 
process of cooperativisation. Its principle components were the Zones for Cooperative 
Development and the Centres of Cooperative Development which directed state investment 
to prioritised cooperatives. Of the total of two thousand five hundred CAS at the time, 
it selected five hundred to receive investments, including the Tola cooperative of this 
study. These cooperatives became integral to MIDINRA’s rural programme since they 
were used for experimenting new strains and promoting through diffusion, the use of 
agrochemicals (in keeping with the ministry’s emphasis on agrotechnology) (Serra, 
1991:93). Maintaining the concept of the superiority of the CAS, the Cooperative 
Strategy introduced limited measures to induce CCS to convert to CAS althoughh it also 
extended assistance to other types of cooperatives including the Dead Furrow Cooperatives 
(CSM), where individual families had responsibility for a particular plot but collectively 
conducted some tasks, such as ploughing. It also included Work Collectives (CT), run in 
a similar way to CAS by workers on land loaned from state farms to enable them to 
produce for self-sufficiency (Serra, 1991:106).
The effect of the Cooperative Strategy was to create more dependency on the state 
and prevent the consolidation of autonomous management of the cooperatives, suggesting 
that perhaps it aimed to gain control of a decentralised cooperative movement which had 
until then developed outside the auspices of state control. However, the prospects for 
cooperatives to achieve autonomy looked bleak in the context of the escalation of the war. 
This increased the state’s intervention in the economic and organisational aspects of 
cooperatives, particularly in those in the zones affected by military conflict. Here, state 
presence extended beyond technical attention and resource allocation to production 
planning. This represented a serious setback for the cooperative movement and the 
democratic organisation of affiliated members (Ortega, 1989:210).
127
As with other Third World cooperative movements which become heavily dependent 
on government backing and are subject to state intervention and direction (Young et al, 
1982:14), the Sandinista state was guilty of limiting the autonomy of the cooperative 
movement: another fundamental principle of cooperativism as recognised by the 
International Cooperative Alliance. Similarly, by insisting that hitherto individual 
producers or poor campesinos collectivise immediately also denied members the 
opportunity to advance on a gradual process of cooperativisation and prevented members 
from consolidating their organisational, productive and social experiences and their 
management skills (Matus et al, 1990).
The war affected cooperatives throughout the country in other ways. They became 
the most important bases of recruitment for the militia and comprised most of the war’s 
casualities: 61% of the deaths; 71% of the wounded and 77% of the kidnapped were 
cooperative members (Ortega, 1989:204). By 1989, a total of 5,177 cooperative members 
had been killed in military defence and an additional 3,086 members had been kidnapped 
(UNAG, 1989:8).
If the cooperative movement was weakened by state paternalism and the war, it was
also constrained by its ovm organisational limitations. The cooperative movement was
integrated into local instances of UNAG structure at municipal, departmental and national
levels, as were individual producers. Yet, although the sector numerically dominated
UNAG, it was under-represented: particularly within the higher levels of its leadership"^,
since UNAG’s leadership was dominated by rich peasant and middle bourgeoisie classes.
Here, attitudes concerning the poor peasantry could be as paternalistic as those which
gained prominence within MIDINRA, as the following statement of Juan Galan, UNAG
president of the IVth Region, demonstrates:
"It’s just that the campesino never understood that this imposition (of an 
organisational model of cooperative and production plans) was intended to 
benefit him. Since they didn’t understand, it had to be imposed.. From the 
beginning of the triumph the peasant sector was the most underdeveloped of 
all sectors in Nicaragua., which you can equate with a child who doesn’t 
know anything."^
Typically, cooperative leaders in the grassroots of UNAG were "natural leaders", 
namely those who volunteered to present the demands of the base (taken here to mean 
individual cooperatives) to the municipal structures of UNAG and transmit orientations 
and directions from higher levels: they were not elected. These individuals received
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training programmes directed to improve the organisational and productive capacity of the 
cooperatives as well as the ability to deal with state institutions. However, the critical and 
participative teaching methods on which these workshops were based were contradicted 
by the vertical styles cultivated within the FSLN and were ultimately abandoned for less 
reflexive, more explicit and agitational forms of activism.
Leaders at intermediate levels were generally nominated from within the ranks of 
the FSLN and national leaders were selected by the National Directorate of the FSLN. 
During the first years, UNAG promoters - subordinating specific sectorial demands to 
those of the FSLN - executed government policies alongside state technical specialists. 
Given the confusion of individuals concerning their dual function as leaders of a rural 
organisation and as party militants (as noted in Chapter 3) frequently meant that UNAG 
personnel placed greater emphasis on conducting tasks of the party and not on those 
activities relating to the promotion of the sectorial interests of the union (Serra, 1991:104- 
118). As social militarisation increased with the war effort, war-related tasks took priority 
and rural military recruitment drives were conducted by UNAG personnel who sometimes 
resorted to coercion in instances where individuals attempted to evade military service or 
militia mobilisations (Serra, 1993:26). Changes at the national level, namely the 
aforementioned abolition of the Council of State in 1984, also restricted the opportunities 
of the cooperative sector to assert its demands autonomously from the party.
Nevertheless, a significant step towards the cooperative movement’s economic 
independence was achieved in 1984 when UNAG formed the Nicaraguan Enterprise for 
Storage (ECODEPA). This had a chain of retain outlets called Tienda Campesina, which 
operated as consumer cooperatives to affiliated producers. They provided products 
acquired from international solidarity and distributed basic consumer products and 
agricultural inputs (UNAG, 1990). Between 1985-90 ECODEPA had channelled to 
peasants the value of US$30 million (Blokland, 1992). This represented a challenge to 
state-controlled trade and was criticised by officials at the time (Hernandez Pico, 1989:70).
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IV Responding to the peasantry (1985-88)
The third stage of the agrarian reform is characterised by a radical change towards an 
increased distribution of land to individual producers, mainly small and medium sized, and 
the active role of organised peasants in the agrarian reform process.
By 1985, nearly three quarters of the country’s landless and land poor families had 
still not received land (Kaimowitz, 1988:50). Under the conditions of inflation during the 
mid-1980s the value of agricultural salaries on which these families depended was eroded 
and there was a deterioration in the countryside-city terms of exchange and supply of 
goods to rural zones. The demand for subsistence plots increased (Wattel et al, 1989:174- 
180). Moreover, peasants were deeply - some irreparably - dissatisfied. Marginalised 
producers had not been placated with the receipt of land titles alone and landless and poor 
families resented the policy of distributing land only to collective organisations. Although 
CAS provided members with higher incomes than those of poor rural families, they were 
not meeting other important household needs (CIERA, 1985). Unlike the tenure model 
of CCS, which was more in accord with campesino reality because it incorporated family 
members into production, CAS had no facility for utilising family labour. Also, the 
absence of land titles meant that there was no clear provision for inheritance or guarantees 
of membership for members’ offspring. Many individuals organised within the 
cooperatives also resented the imposition by the state on what they could produce and the 
obligation to participate in the militia (Chamorro and Fitzgerald, 1987).
Peasants registered their disaffection in several ways. In November 1984, in the 
country’s first-ever free elections, peasants, particularly those in the north and interior of 
the country, voted against the FSLN expressing the political empowerment that formal 
electoral democracy had endowed them with. This included some historic collaborators, 
reflecting the extent to which those who had not benefited from the RAS felt betrayed by 
the new government (Luciak, 1987b). The vacuum created by the distrust of the 
Sandinistas was filled by the Contra. Peasants also expressed their resentment through 
opting for armed opposition and the Nicaraguan Democratic Front (FDN) was successfully 
recruiting medium and rich peasants, whose support provided a strategic link between the 
political project of the US Administration and the mass or poor campesinos who 
subsequently joined (Bendana, 1991). In other expressions of overt political protest 
peasants also demonstrated against the government. In 1985, hundreds of land hungry
130
peasants took to the streets in Masaya to demand that they be given land as individual 
farmers. Afterwards, armed peasants seized several private properties and state farms. 
They were led by Juan Galan, who subsequently lost his party militancy although this was 
later revoked*.
The government yielded to these pressures. It immediately increased the 
unconditional redistribution of land in Masaya and in northern regions of the country. It 
was also forced to reassess the direction of the agrarian reform: the outcome of which was 
a more pro-peasant policy in which land would be distributed without requiring 
benefactors to join cooperatives. Thus, for the first time since the Sandinistas came to 
power, land was distributed to producers irrespective of their organisational preference 
(see Table 2 for the pattern of land distribution as it developed over the years). These 
lands were obtained from the state sector, from large landowners (following negotiated 
agreements) and from the wider application of legal expropriations concerning 
underexploited lands (Kaimowitz, 1988:51). Other measures were implemented to reduce 
administrative controls in the countryside and benefit sectors other than the cooperative 
sector. Markets for food were freed; credit and prices were reduced to favour small 
producers; and the services of state firms were widened to include assistance, support and 
investments for small producers (Harris and Vilas, 1985:3; Fitzgerald, 1989:37-38).
Beyond these issues, UNAG, whose political influence was increasing largely as a 
product of the increasing economic significance of its affiliated producers, challenged the 
state’s collectivised model of cooperatives and its heavy-handed intervention in 
cooperative affairs. It proposed that collectivisation be determined by the campesinos 
themselves and not by the politico-ideological interests of the state or FSLN (Ortega, 
1989:214-215). These points of difference, expressed increasingly from within the 
cooperative movement, represented a counter-argument in the debate about the direction 
of cooperativism. It was not resisted by the state: on the contrary, it was perceived as an 
essential dimension of a cooperative movement.
In March 1987, a process was initiated which involved the principal technical staff 
and cadres from MIDINRA, FSLN and UNAG. It aimed to change the verticalist and 
paternalist nature of the state’s relationship with the cooperative movement and strengthen 
the organisational base of the movement. This comprised a series of seminars.
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Table 2
Basic data of cooperative movement, years 1982, 1986, 1988, 1989
Type CAS CCS CSM CT Other Total
1982
No coop 
No socio 
Area (mz)
512
7,276
117,517
1,616
52,711
895,762
12
208
4,476
643
AJ53
92,544
66
1,272
31,630
2,849
65,820
1,141,929
1986
No coop 
No socio 
Area (mz)
1,093
22,035
615,602
1,487
47,055
828,257
104
2,459
30,560
344
2,638
59,094
nd
nd
nd
3,028
74,187
1,533,513
1988
No coop 
No socio 
Area (mz)
1,170
23,083
650,432
1,509
45,443
760,009
85
2,496
41,823
330
3,893
92,882
57
1,800
31,079
3,151
76,715
1,576,224
1989*
No coop 
No socio 
Area (mz)
1,221
25,044
589,796
1,528
54,125
917,461
112
2,967
39,776
391
3,471
46,201
111
2,478
29,329
3J63
88,085
1,622,564
K)
Sources: CIERA, 1989e; *UNAG, 1989. 
nd = No data available; mz = manzanas
a. Socio is member;
b. Years 1982, 1986 and 1988 do not include cooperatives from the Special Zones 1 and 11.
c. Numbers of socios (members) and area totals for year 1989 do not include Special Zone III.
discussions and analysis of the role that each institution had assumed in cooperative
development, in order to clarify and differentiate between the various roles of UNAG, the
party and the state. Here, specific mention of the notion of cooperative autonomv was
heard for the first time (Envio, 1987). During the final national conference, Jaime
Wheelock of MIDINRA called on participants to prepare a plan:
".. which takes into account the suggestions and concerns of the campesinos.
This plan should respect the campesinos as our main source of solutions to the 
problems of agrarian reform, abandoning any type of bureaucratic, highly 
administrative approaches."^
In response, MIDINRA relaxed its criterion on cooperative models. Subsequently, 
intermediate forms of cooperative organisations multiplied, including the CSM and CT 
models. The government also increased support for the CCS and enabled producers to 
create alternative marketing and processing cooperatives with government support 
(CIERA, 1989b; Matus et al 1990). In addition, UNAG’s role in the agrarian reform was 
increased and throughout the country its leaders were granted greater influence in 
assigning land and titles.
Despite these developments, MIDINRA’s own report of 1987 acknowledged that the 
state continued to intervene in cooperatives by: filling the membership quotas of the CAS; 
imposing work rules; elaborating production plans; and imposing organisational models. 
The state-cooperative relationship was still characterised as "verticalist, paternalist, 
bureaucratic" (DGRA, 1987). Evidently, the "flexibilization" of the state’s verticalist 
approach had amounted merely to its acceptance of different land tenure.
However, during this period new peasant organisations emerged which responded 
to the needs of campesinos and cooperative members. One such organisation was the 
Union of Agricultural Cooperatives (UCA). These were organised to increase efficiency 
of production territorially by MIDINRA and UNAG, together with other relevant state 
institutions involved in cooperative production (Espinoza and Plantinga, 1990). They were 
seen as a way to resolve the problems of supply and to help cooperatives improve their 
services. In many cases, these UCAs were imposed from above and excluded ordinary 
cooperative members from involvement in the preparatory discussions, as was the case in 
the San Marcos cooperative of this study.
This period also saw the strengthening of the ECODEPA’s Tiendas Campesinas 
(TC). By 1988, there was a total of 197 TC outlets with a membership of 50,300, many
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of whom were cooperativists. Another peasant organisation to emerge was the 
Community Committee (CC), which was initiated by the FSLN in 1985 and was later 
organised by UNAG. These emerged as new forms of local power in the countryside and 
occupied the space left vacant by the dissolution of the insurrectional CDCs (Matus, 
1990:158). They organised and carried out local development projects, distributed seeds 
to producers and typically incorporated teachers, nurses and doctors and cooperative 
members.
The cooperative movement was also incorporated into other participatory channels, 
providing it with organisational experiences. This included the "De Cara al Pueblo" 
meetings, mentioned in Chapter 3, which gave it direct access to national leaders (CIERA, 
1989b) and the "Cabildos Abiertos", the public meetings organised to discuss the draft of 
the National Constitution during its public consultation stage (Lobel, 1988).
Despite the legal redefinition established for the incorporation of women into the 
new social relations of production, few women joined cooperatives. Between 1982-88, 
the membership of women rose from 6% of the total national cooperative membership to 
9%, although a 1989 census indicated that in CAS the proportion of women rose to 12% 
(UNAG, 1989). Less than half the cooperatives had women although there were regional 
differences. In the war zones women’s incorporation was greatest in all forms of 
cooperatives since defence activities - in which women also participated - increased the 
necessity and opportunities for women to integrate into production in order to support 
their families. Women were also better represented within the CCS because of the high 
incidence of women-headed households with small property and because they were able 
to join cooperatives and recruit a male family member to assist in productive tasks. By 
contrast, the CAS incorporated fewer women because they were unable to recruit family 
labour to assist in production since as members only they were permitted to appear for 
productive work (UNAG, 1989; CIERA, 1989d:127). The absence of infrastructural 
support to reduce the burden of women’s domestic responsibilities and childcare prevented 
women from joining the cooperatives (Padilla, 1987).
Those cooperatives which had a significant proportion of women members provided 
greater opportunities for them to occupy leadership positions: elsewhere they did not fill 
officers’ posts. By 1989, a total of 1,200 women managed to occupy leadership positions 
in the grassroots and this led to their greater representation within the leadership structure
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of UNAG at regional and national levels. This increased representation of women was 
largely a response to the Women’s Section of UNAG which formed in 1987 and insisted 
that more women be incorporated into leadership structures in the base as well as the 
regional councils. The Women’s Section also initiated a series of projects including 
training workshops and provided credit in order to incorporate women into productive 
activities and to improve the technical capabilities of existing women members*. These 
projects were funded from external sources. In 1989 it organised the First Assembly of 
Peasant Women to provide a national forum for women to discuss the problems they 
faced, share experiences and seek collective solutions (CIERA, 1989d).
By 1988, the cooperative movement under the leadership of UNAG had grown to 
incorporate 77,000 members (representing 61% of campesinos families); occupied 22% 
of the cultivable land and produced 21% of national agricultural production (see Table 2 
for data on the cooperative movement). Although it had increased in demographic and 
economic weight, it lacked the corresponding political representation. Consequently, 
initiatives were taken by the cooperative leadership within UNAG to promote a process 
which would strengthen the movement at the grassroots to enable it to overcome some of 
the problems it confronted. Plans were made to form a national commission to promote 
the cooperative movement.
The political context of the last phase of cooperative development under the auspices 
of the Sandinista Government was defined by the agreements between Central American 
presidents in Esquipulas (October 1987) and the ceasefire agreed between the FDN and 
the Sandinista Government in Sapoa (March 1988). The subsequent reduction of military 
activities encouraged expectations that conditions for the peasantry would improve, 
especially for the cooperative members who would now be able to put down their arms 
and dedicate themselves to production.
V Strengthening the cooperative movement (1988-90)
This period is marked by the implementation of Economic Reform. This occurred in 
response to the economic crisis which was rooted in the enormous fiscal deficit caused by 
the adoption of expansive economic policies of the Sandinista Government which had 
made credit and subsidies widely available and had distorted prices. The solution was
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sought in February 1988 (when inflation reached 13,000%) by the implementation of a 
monetary reform which devalued the Cordoba in order to stem hyperinflation and correct 
relative prices. This was followed by a drastic policy of adjustment and stabilisations 
(June) which resembled an IMF structural adjustment except without the availability of 
external funds. These fiscal and economic measures devalued the Cordoba’s exchange 
rates and restricted credits, salaries and state expenditures.
These measures had an profound impact on cooperatives and particularly on 
agroexport producers. The restricted credit policy resulted in a process of decapitalisation 
as cooperatives tried to meet increased production costs. For coffee and cattle producers, 
especially in the CAS sector, this led to a rationalisation of resources and became manifest 
in the reduced use of inputs and increased use of labour intensive methods (Mendoza, 
1991:26-29). Production decreased as smaller areas were sown and fewer machines and 
agrochemical used. Cattle stocks deteriorated for lack of veterinary attention. The result 
of these measures, which castigated inefficient producers and favoured traditional 
campesino production, rendered those small and medium producers who were able to 
adapt the most efficient users of inputs. Their survival depended on how they were able 
to adjust to the new costs of production (Stabler-Sholk, 1988; Blokland, 1992). The 
policies also reduced the liquidity of cooperative funds available for its "payroll" to 
members: there was a fall in family income (Spoor et al, 1989:339) and the period was 
initially characterised by high desertion rates (Rodriquez, 1991:36). The effects were 
exacerbated by the impact of hurricane Juana which tore across southern Nicaragua in 
October 1988, even though those producers who had been affected were granted some 
credit assistance.
During this final stage of the Agrarian Reform, the only land that was captured for 
redistribution was that which had been underutilised by the state or cooperatives or had 
been recuperated from areas under Contra control. After more than ten years of 
Sandinista rule a fundamental change in the structure of land tenure in the countryside had 
effectively eradicated latifundistas as a social sector from the agrarian structure (see Table 
3 for changes in land tenure). However, there was a strata of poor campesinos whose 
hopes for obtaining access to land remained frustrated. Increased unemployment 
exacerbated land hunger and in 1989 land invasions began to take place in the zones of 
high population density, such as Regions II and IV (Serra, 1991:82). In 1989 there were
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approximately 60,000 campesinos without guarantees of permanent access to land (Ruben, 
1989). Data obtained for September 1990 also indicates that in Region IV alone there was 
a demand for land from 1,558 heads of family (Rodney, 1990:8).
Table 3
Structure of land tenure (1978-1988)
Sector 1978 1988
area % area %
Private farms
2,920,000 36.2 514,633
>500 mz 1,311,000 16.2 725,505 6.4
200-500 mz 2,431,000 30.1 1,401,591 9.0
50-200 mz 1,241,000 15.4 929,361 17.4
10-50 mz 170,000 2.1 137,404 11.5
<10 mz 1.7
8.073.000 100.00 3.708.496
subtotal 45.9
Reformed Sector
State enterprise 948,230 11.7
Cooperatives* 1,115,680 13.8
Individual allocation 209,974 2.6
Special titling 1,459,996 18.1
Titling to indigenous communities 170,914 2.1
subtotal 3.904.794 48.4
Abandoned areas 459,710 5.7
TOTAL 8,073.000 100.0 8.073,000 100.0
Sources: CIERA (1989e).
*This includes only those areas surrended by the Agrarian Reform.
a.The table does not indicate where subsistence peasants joined CCS cooperatives. They 
remain included in the category of subsistence peasants.
b.Ivan Gutierrez (1989) gives cooperatives as 22% of land area, of which CAS occupied 
12% and CCS 10%; UNAG (1989) states that 20% total agricultural land was under 
cooperatives.
c.There are discrepancies found in the figures from other sources. The Boletin mensual 
del CIERA of September 1989, gives the 1978 total area as 7,068,304.
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Instead of redistributing land measures were taken to consolidate the cooperative 
movement. Coordinated efforts between MIDINRA and UNAG were made to fill their 
membership quotas and, in the context of a reduced state budget, a new scheme was 
implemented to replace MIDINRA offices with Centres of Peasant Development (CDC). 
These aimed to improve the attention directed to the peasantry; coordinate between 
producers and the state; and promote forms of peasant organisation and cooperativisation 
(Matus et al, 1990:169).
Despite the UNAG’s insistence that its representatives from the Cooperative 
Councils and Associations be elected to be incorporated into the appropriate commissions, 
the MIDINRA minister rejected the proposal. This reflected the priorities of the CDC, 
which proved less concerned about the direct participation of producers and cooperativists 
in the management of its services and more interested in directing economic resources to 
the sector. As such it awakened bitter memories of the imposing behaviour of state 
functionaries. In response, peasants and cooperative members rejected the CDC. In their 
assemblies, cooperative councils and "De Cara al Pueblo" they denounced the CDC, 
lamented their exclusion from its management and claimed that it failed to respond to their 
needs as a sector (Hernandez Pico, 1989:64).
Then in 1989 came UNAG’s most comprehensive challenge to the state’s 
development model yet, in the form of a proposal for an alternative peasant model of 
agricultural development. This stressed the importance of devising an integral 
development policy which did not depend on expensive agricultural inputs and technology. 
Its key elements were the involvement of campesinos in economic decisions and the 
recovery of traditional peasant knowledge and technology (Serra, 1991:126). In support 
of these recommendations, UNAG presented the government with documentation of the 
discussions and analysis which had taken place between the cooperative bases and UNAG 
leaders. In an immediate response the government granted important credit concessions 
for producers (Blokland, 1989:73-96).
The UNAG also stressed the importance of strengthening the cooperative movement 
at all levels in order to be able to confront the new challenges presented by the economic 
conditions. This coincided with MIDINRA’s suggestion that the peasant cooperative 
movement have its own identity distinct from UNAG. Although this proposal was 
initially rejected by the association as an attempt by the state to increase its control over
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the movement it was agreed that a national assembly process should be organised (Serra, 
1991:149). This began in April 1989 with the objectives of generating discussion at the 
grassroots level of the cooperative experience and to improve an understanding of 
cooperative reality. It was anticipated that this experience would enable the cooperative 
movement to elaborate a diagnostic of its own history, problems and economic 
significance within the national economy and outline proposals and solutions for a 
programme for the development of the cooperative movement.
The assembly process, documented in detail by Serra (1991), was intended to 
generate discussion within the bases^. Initially it involved trained municipal and regional 
commissions who visited cooperatives to explain the principles of cooperativism, the 
cooperative movement and the objectives of the national assembly process itself. In fact, 
for various reasons including practical difficulties and the poor motivation of individuals 
concerned, few cooperatives were visited. However, this stage did serve to strengthen the 
critical analysis and participation of the cooperative leaders in discussions with the 
leadership of UNAG and within the Muncipal Councils (Serra, 1991). This process 
culminated on 12th and 13th September 1989 in a two day national conference in which 
the leaders of 875 cooperatives attended. The programme eventually adopted the 
"Platform for Struggle of the Cooperative Movement", which identified objectives for the 
consolidation of cooperatives as economic entities and for the development of a national 
organisation of the cooperative movement. It contained the following key components 
which were intended to provide guidelines to assist the Muncipal Cooperative Councils 
to devise appropriate action.
The Platform identified the main problems the sector faced, distinguishing between 
those of "external" and "internal" origin. The former included the war, the national 
economic crisis, the inadequate respect for the movement’s autonomy, the absence of 
integral policies directed at cooperative development and legal problems relating to the 
lack of definitive documentation concerning the legal constitution of land titles. The 
internal problems the assembly identified referred to the lack of prior cooperative 
experience, illiteracy, bad administration, weak democratic practices, lack of internal 
regulations and poor collaboration between cooperatives.
The Platform urged that the Law of Cooperatives be changed to facilitate the 
registration of all types of cooperatives, including the TC, as legal entities. With regard
139
to financing, the Assembly recommended that the government establish a fund for 
cooperative development; approve a special crediting system for its members; and establish 
a fund within the movement to be financed with contributions from national cooperatives 
and from the international cooperative movement. The Platform also urged that the 
cooperative movement contract its own agronomy technicians and implement technological 
services for use of its affiliates. It recommended a more efficient system to guarantee 
prices and commercialisation, the creation of mixed agroindustrial businesses (involving 
government and the cooperatives) and the formation of second level cooperatives to export 
and market locally produced agricultural products (FENACOOP, 1989).
The Platform stated that the cooperative movement should be united through a 
democratic process under the auspices of one organisation which would respect all types 
of existing cooperatives as well as the principle of autonomy. It subsequently elected a 
Cooperative Movement National Council to represent the different types of cooperatives. 
This Council included seventy six individuals, including only one woman and a high 
proportion of professional UNAG leaders (22%). The rest were cooperative leaders, many 
of whom were also members of the Municipal and Regional Councils.
The assembly process reflected the strength the cooperative movement had 
accumulated over the ten year period. Expressed within the Platform were assertions 
which attested to the cooperative movement’s demands for self-determination and a 
growing awareness of itself as a political subject. This was reflected in its awareness that 
amongst the challenges it faced was the need to strengthen internal organisation and 
develop a distinct identity as a sector with its own specific needs and problems. It 
strength was also evident from its explicit demands for increased autonomy from the state, 
FSLN and within UNAG itself. Its demands for greater control over decision-making 
processes, resource allocation and the management of production services and marketing 
as they related to its sector, suggest that its organisation had developed sufficiently to 
enable it challenge effectively, the interests of the state for more power. Over the ten 
years its political power had increased.
However, evidence from the pre-assembly and assembly processes suggests that the 
notion of participation was implemented for instrumental objectives. It was used as a 
"means" by which to obtain pre-established objectives namely a diagnostic, work plan, and 
election of a council and commission bodies. The disrespect for grassroots initiatives are
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detailed by Serra (1991:161), who observed that some of the themes which had been 
proposed from the cooperative bases were ultimately excluded from the final Platform. 
This included those relating to the interests of women members or partners of male 
members. Also, criticisms expressed towards the imposition of external agents, including 
the state, the FSLN and the UNAG leadership were modified for inclusion in the final 
document following the interventions of the (FSLN) Party Commission which was 
incorporated into the organising body of the National Commission of Cooperative 
Movement.
Evidently, state conceptions towards the cooperative movement had not shifted as
dramatically as the change of direction of state policy in 1985 might have suggested. In
his speech presented at the Assembly, the minister of MIDINRA stated that:
"..with cooperative development, the Nicaraguan peasantry was incorporated 
into the most modern and progressive of rural transformations.."
Here the notion of the peasantry as backward and resistant to change appears live and
well. Also, cooperatives were presented in the same discourse as "a pillar of the mixed
economy" which were "born at the trium ph"com m ents which effectively deny their
history as an expression of peasant struggle and their character as a political and social
movement. A process of restructuring UNAG was also underway during 1989-90 which
aimed to rejuvenate and democratise the association, which the association feared was
becoming moribund and increasingly perceived as irrelevant to its affiliates. In late 1989,
proposals to restructure the organisation were submitted by UNAG’s Organisational
Section to the national directive in a document which called for elections of leaders at all
levels of the structure. This allegedly caused acrimonious debate from within the national
leadership, themselves un-elected representatives".
Following consultations with the regional committees of the UNAG, representatives
decided to make Region IV a test case for organisational restructuring and elections
promptly took place for the UNAG promoters in the grassroots and for presidents of the
UNAG Municipal Councils. This endowed them with a sense of legitimacy hitherto
denied them, as Mariano Leal from Tola indicates:
"I’ve been president of UNAG Tola for four years and now I’m elected it 
feels good to know that I have the support of the people: before they 
nominated me with the finger. "
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These elected local leaders then formed municipal councils which could then elect regional 
and national councils. A parallel reorganisation took place within the various UNAG 
producers’ associations (UNAG, 1990:16).
With the arrival of the UNO Government of Violeta Chamorro, the future of 
cooperatives looked uncertain. This accelerated the creation of a national level entity. 
Back in September 1989, during the Cooperative Assembly in Managua, delegates had 
agreed that such an organisation ought exist, comprising elected representatives. Although 
no details of the structure had been agreed, the situation demanded a rapid response: in 
April 1990, the National Federation of Cooperatives (FENACOOP) was constitutionalised. 
This promotly affiliated to the Confederation of Cooperatives of the Caribbean and Central 
America (CCCCA), to which Daniel Nunez, National President of UNAG, had been 
elected as its first president (Blokland, 1989:77).
Conclusions
Despite the FSLN’s commitments to satisfy peasant demands on coming to power in 1979 
the Sandinista Government initially restricted the peasant cooperative movement as a 
spontaneous expression of peasant aspirations and struggle. Informed by a theoretical 
conceptualisation which denied the contribution of peasant production in the economy and 
saw them as objects to be transformed, MIDINRA gave priority to the creation of a state 
sector and sought to protect property of the rural bourgeoisie within its class alliance. 
This gave the cooperative movement its character as a campesino struggle against the 
interests of the state and bourgeoisie.
Legal provisions created in 1981 facilitated its systematic though contradictory 
development. It subsequently expanded in the context of a technobureaucratic state which 
perceived it as an object to control for national political and economic objectives. It 
struggled for resources in competition with other sectors and was weakened by the 
economic impact of the war and its poor representation within UNAG. Responding to the 
war, overt forms of national peasant political protest, and evidence that peasants were 
integrating into the armed opposition, Sandinista policy became less rigid and repressive. 
The government was forced to reassess its support for the peasantry and the cooperative
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movement in particular by meeting its demands and moving towards the notion of a more 
independent cooperative movement.
As the cooperative movement increased its economic weight and UNAG earned 
greater influence concerning economic and agrarian policy-making, the cooperative 
movement began a systematic process aimed to strengthen its base through a national 
consultation processes. By 1989, it had created a national organisation and - although not 
completely autonomous - had achieved greater levels of independence from external 
agents.
Sandinista intervention in cooperative development in its attempts to control 
campesino production amounted to a bureaucratisation of cooperatives whereby grassroots 
initiatives were restricted and their autonomy was disrespected. Nevertheless, the legal 
institutionalisation of cooperatives provided the conditions in which a peasant cooperative 
movement could develop and a positive state policy and an ideology of gender equality 
was necessary to ensure the incorporation of women into the social and productive 
processes. As the cooperative movement consolidated it organisation nationally and 
protested through political action, it was able to challenge state policy. The organisational 
weakness of the cooperative bases were precisely the manifestation of heavy handed 
intervention and led the UNAG leadership to reassess the state of its own organisational 
structure and search for a more representative organisation for cooperative members. We 
now turn to examine the processes of participation at the grassroots of the cooperative 
movement which were set in motion by the influence of the various agents and actors 
involved.
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Notes to Chapter 4
1. Including Evangelical Committee for Assistance and Development (CEPAD) and the 
Nicaraguan Institute for Human Promotion (INPHRU) and direcly by medium producers 
themselves.
2.MIDINRA was created in 1980 from a combination of existing institutions including the 
Ministry of Agricultural Development and the Nicaraguan Institute of Agrarian Reform, 
which had replaced the Somozan IAN and INVIERNO.
3.UNAG (1982) "Inquietudes y surgerencias de la UNAG en tomo a una defmicion de 
estrategia de desarrollo cooperative", mimeo, 24 abril, Managua. Quoted in Serra 
(1991:105).
4.Between 1981 and 1985, UNAG’s membership rose from 45,498 to 106,179. The entire 
cooperative sector represented 65% of this membership, of which the CCS represented 
44%. Yet, in the National Council of UNAG, only 23% were cooperativists (Luciak, 
1987b).
5.Juan Galan, personal interview, 2.11.90.
6.Calls for the withdrawal of his militancy were led by Frederico Lopez, the FSLN party 
official for the IVth Region, who was nicknamed "Stalin".
7.Quoted in Envio (1987:30).
8.Interview with Benigna Mendoza, National Co-ordinator of the Women’s Section of 
UNAG, 3.2.90.
9.It took place in seven of the country’s nine regions. The north and south Atlantic 
regions were excluded because of a weak cooperative movement there and poor 
communications.
10.Quoted in Serra (1991:158-160).
11.Wilfredo Barreto, Coordinator Organisation Section, UNAG, personal interview, 
Managua, February 1990.
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Chapter 5
SETTING THE SCENE: THE COOPERATIVES
This chapter serves to contextualise subsequent analysis by providing background 
information about the two case studies. It describes the location of the cooperatives which 
determines the nature agricultural activities and serves partially to explain the social 
experiences of constituent members. It also describes the cooperatives’s histories and is 
essentially concerned to establish the respective roles of the peasants themselves, the rural 
organisations, the FSLN and the state in facilitating their creation. This is important since 
cooperatives are not just the sum total of individuals but are collective histories which 
translate into different social experiences and are conserved through collective memory. 
How a cooperative forms also has a strong influence on its subsequent decision-making 
processes and responses to social, economic and political phenomena. The recording of 
histories is also important for what it reveals of the subjective meanings individuals attach 
to these social experiences.
The chapter also presents details about the cooperatives’ relationship to the local 
communities in order to identify the nature of intra-community relationships. This will 
also be useful as regards consideration of the wider implications and contradictions of the 
cooperative experience of participation.
I Cooperative German Pomares 
II Location
The cooperative German Pomares (OF) is located in the municipality of Tola, within the 
Department of Rivas. This has an extension of 2,159 km2, is south west of Nicaragua and 
its town, which bears the same name, lies 112km to the south of the country’s capital 
Managua. The PanAmerican Highway crosses the department connecting it with Costa 
Rica to the south. To the west of the department is the Pacific Ocean; to the east. Lake 
Nicaragua and to the north, the Department of Carazo (where the second cooperative case 
study is located). According to the last national census in 1971, the department had 
92,439 inhabitants, representing 4% of the national population. This total increased by 
6,595 following the 1972 earthquake.
145
The climate is typical of the Pacific zone of Nicaragua and is characterised by a 
rainy season of six months between May and October and a dry season with almost no 
rain between November and April. Annual rainfall in the department averages between 
1,000mm -2,000mm and the average annual temperature is 26.7C. The main economic 
activities of the region are agricultural, mainly cattle rearing, sugar cane and basic grain 
production. In 1980 land use was dominated by pastures which occupied 79% of the land 
surface; 7% was cultivated and 14% was forested. Since then greater areas have been 
converted to the cultivation of perennials and annuals. The principle products are basic 
grains, sorghum and plantains (CIERA/ MIDINRA, 1980b).
Tola is the largest of the ten constituent municipalities of Rivas and covers 454 km2, 
representing 21% of the department’s area. At the time of research it had a total 
population of 20,505 dispersed throughout 42 comarcas (communities)\ The population 
is predominantly rural with 17,130 rural inhabitants and an urban population of 2,375 
concentrated around Tola and Nancimi, the latter being the second largest town (FSLN 
Tola, 1988). Women comprised 52% of the population although there is no 
comprehensive data concerning their occupations.
Although the department of Rivas is predominantly flat, a series of hills, the Pacific 
Range, transects Tola from north to south rendering the municipality’s land surface 
broken and irregular. It averages 200 metres altitude. Roads within Tola were diabolical 
and it was notorious for having the worst infrastructure of all the municipalities in Rivas 
(CIERA/ MIDINRA, 1980b). Except for a few hundred yards in the town of Tola itself, 
all the roads were unpaved including the 13 kilometres which linked Tola to Rivas. Many 
routes connecting the rural communities within Tola were defined only by the course of 
rivers or streams and could only be transversed by ox and cart in the dry season, 
prohibiting the use of lorries for transport. During the rainy season routes to 32 of these 
communities became impassable and road maintenance was a priority concern for most 
producers.
A frequent bus service connected Tola with Rivas and brought the three national 
newspapers Barricada, Nuevo Diario and La Prensa .^ The National Telephone 
Communication Corporation (TELCOR) operated in a small room off the main square 
with access to only two public telephone lines. These were shared by TELCOR with the 
only direct telephone lines in Tola, all of which were situated on the town’s square
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including the townhall, the FSLN party office, National Development Bank (BND) and 
in the house of Ever Herrera (a council delegate).
What had been an illiteracy rate in the municipality during Somoza of 60% 
(representing 38% of the urban population and 63% rural) which was greater than the 35% 
average for the Pacific zone, the Sandinista Government had reduced by 1988 to 17% 
illiteracy (8% urban and 18% rural), which was more impressive than the national average 
of 23%. (CIERA/ MIDINRA, 1980b; MED Tola, 1988). Since 1979, thirty nine primary 
schools had been built throughout the municipality giving universal education coverage. 
There was a secondary school in Tola; two pre-schools funded by the Ministry of 
Education (MED); nine popular centres for pre-school provision; a technical Rural 
Working Schoof and two schools operated Adult Literacy Programmes which gave 
priority to cooperative members. The town of Tola had a health centre and health posts 
in Nancimi, San Ignacio and Las Canas, which were open a couple of times a week. The 
municipality’s medical personnel included two doctors, a dentist, an auxiliary dentist, ten 
nurses, an auxiliary nurse and twelve trained midwives'*. The nearest hospital was in 
Rivas but Tola had no ambulance.
Branches of state institutions in Tola included the "popular shops" of Nicaraguan 
Enterprise for Storage (ENABAS) which sold a range of sixteen basic goods at the 
cheapest prices; an ENABAS "popular agricultural deposit" to which producers sold their 
produce^; Agricultural Products (PROAGRO), which supplied producers with seed, 
fertilizers and insecticides and finally the National Development Bank (BND). The 
nearest office of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MIDINRA) was in Rivas, although a 
representative of the Cooperative Development Centre (CDC) visited once a week to 
attend to related matters. There was also a "Tienda Campesina", run by Cooperative 
Enterprise for Agricultural Producers (ECODEPA), located in Nancimi.
Rivas did not have an historically entrenched political identity as either Conservative 
or Liberal: both groups co-existed and had prospered with the expansion of cattle and then 
sugar production. Nonetheless, during the Somozan dictatorship the Liberals dominated 
when as, locals describe, power in Tola "was in the hands of latifundistas who were 
supported by the Somoza regime". However, from the mid-1970s Christian base 
communities and Delgados de la Palabra (Delegates of the Word) began to operate in the 
municipality. Their organisational networks were forged and strengthened by the arrival
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to Tola of a Spanish priest, Caspar Garcia Liviana, in 1974. Padre Caspar had a
profound influence on the rural communities and - through his own actions - put Tola on
the political map of Nicaragua, gaining it a special place in national history.
Padre Caspar took the popular church to the rural communities, encouraged the
formation of Christian base communities and Delegates of the Word and introduced the
local residents to the ideas embodied in the new liberation theology. He also organised
the communities to build schools and successfully harnessed the popularist tendency of the
dictatorship in order to secure the access of rural residents to electricity. He was
remembered affectionately by rural inhabitants because of his identification with the poor
which was manifested in his practice of arriving by foot to the remotest of communities
to give Sunday Mass: an effort that not one local priest before or since has even
attempted. Above all. Padre Caspar was revered locally and nationally because he
sacrificed his life for his adopted country. In 1976 he left Tola to join the guerilla for
reasons he outlined in a letter written in 1978:
"My faith...forces me to take an active part in the revolutionary process with 
the FSLN, since the liberation of an oppressed people is an integral part of the 
full redemption of Christ,"^
He became a Comandante of the Southern Front and was killed by the National Guard
later that same year.
In the absence of other mass organisations during the insurrection (the ATC 
organised in Rivas but was not present in Tola until after the triumph) Caspar had a 
politicising influence. Local residents, reflecting on the impact of his ministry, comment 
that, "Caspar’s people had been radicalised." Although there had not been widespread 
militant support for the FSLN during the civil war in the immediate locality, there had 
been a handful of collaborators. They provided support to the guerillas as they passed 
through Tola along the strategic "corridor" on which it lay between Rivas and the southern 
frontier.
During the Somozan years. Tola had the highest concentration of land of all the 
municipalities in Rivas. Out of a total of 407 producers, some 187 (representing 46% of 
the total producers) had less than 10 manzanas (mzs)^ and occupied only 0.78% of the 
total productive land area. By contrast, the 23 largest producers with over 500 mzs 
(representing 6% of producers) held 83% of the productive land (CIERA/ MIDINRA 
(1980b:67). The high level of land exploitation in the municipality eliminated the
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possibility of expanding the area under production. Consequently, as elsewhere in 
Nicaragua, poor peasants were forced to sell their labour at harvest time to local landlords 
or worked seasonally on plantations. Here, they joined the landless who also migrated 
seasonally - some of them permanently - to the banana plantations in Liberia, Costa Rica, 
or to those areas within Nicaragua oriented to agroexport production such as Chinandega 
and Leon. The sugar refinery in Rivas (named Benjamin Zeledon after the insurrection) 
had provided a local source of employment until 1989 when the international price of 
sugar fell. Between 1979 and 1988, the Sandinista Agrarian Reform (SAR) distributed 
and formally legalised 13,914 manzanas in the municipality. Poor and landless peasants 
who had organised into cooperatives were the main beneficiaries, although ten individual 
producers had received titles. A further 1,000 manzanas were also distributed but these 
still lacked official titles in 1989 (FSLN Tola, 1988). Tola was no exception in that the 
Agrarian Reform dramatically altered its social structure and at the time of research the 
cooperative sector dominated all other sectors in terms of agricultural production and 
occupation of people.
In 1989 the economically active population® of the municipality was approximately 
8,000. Of these 1,700 were cooperative members; approximately 250 subsistence 
producers; 30 middle producers and 4 large scale producers. There were also 400 
employees in the state owned enterprise Caspar Garcia (dedicated to the rearing, 
development and fattening of cattle) and an equine project; approximately 600 salaried 
agricultural workers and a few hundred poor peasants. The only industrial activity in Tola 
was a salt project (commercialised regionally and in Costa Rica), formed by a group of 
six cooperatives. Other activities in the municipality included fishing, which involved 
three cooperatives^ and accounted for 35% of the regional fishing production. The 
cooperative sector also dominated agricultural production within the municipality. Within 
the cooperatives there were 3,600 head of cattle (compared with the 1,380 animals under 
individual ownership) and the sector produced marginally more sorghum, rice and com 
than individual producers. There was a total of 36 cooperatives in Tola (including 32 
CAS) which incorporated 621 members, including 21 women. Combined, their area 
covered 16,912 manzanas and included 13 tractors, two harvesters and two irrigation 
systems (one of which was in GP). The five lorries which belonged to the municipality 
were lent to UNAG affiliated producers (UNAG Tola, 1988; BND Tola, 1989).
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The GP cooperative was located some four kilometres from the hot dusty town of 
Tola and was reached along a windy, dry and open road that passed the school and the 
silos of the ENABAS storage depot. The entrance of the track for the cooperative was 
at a dip in the road which once taken gave immediate and welcome relief from the 
scorching heat because it offered a fresh shade and a cool breeze was created by the 
woods. The track crossed a stream, whose bed in 1989 was still moist even in the dry 
season, indicating the density of the vegetation. Innocuous as the, stream appeared in 1987, 
when Hurricane Juana devastated the Atlantic Coast region of the country, it had flooded 
vast areas and had destroyed several houses. The main river which passed along the 
outskirts of Tola had risen 30 feet and had killed five residents, including two children of 
one of the cooperative’s members.
Figure 2: Cooperative buildings m clearing
After the river the track opened up to the beginning of the cooperative’s cultivatable 
land: an extensive field filled with sorghum, beans or cows, depending on the season. The 
first house encountered was simple and evidently in the process o f construction. This
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belonged to Santos Nicoya, who was the cooperative’s current president. His former 
house had been destroyed in the hurricane and he now lived on higher ground. Two years 
later the house was completed and looked a model humble house, complete with shutters 
at the spaces called windows. Santos’ wife was always in the vicinity of the house, 
fulfilling the labour intensive domestic duties which befall Nicaraguan women. In her 
case this involved caring for their three children; cooking, cleaning dishes, washing clothes 
in the stream which ran behind the house and attending the pig and chickens and crops 
in the small surrounding plot, which included maize and vegetables. As with other wives 
o f the members, Maria was rarely seen in the cooperative buildings and she knew little 
about how it operated.
Further up, the track passed through a tunnel of trees and then opened into a 
clearing which contained the buildings of the cooperative (see Figure 2). This had also 
been expropriated from the previous owners. Here, was the main house: a square, single-
Figure 3: Original hacienda, GP
Storey wooden building with a pyramidal roof which overhung to provide shade for the
151
palisade-less veranda. This is where meetings took place (see Figure 3). At the front, 
wide stairs spanned the width of the building and were used by members to sit on and talk 
in the cooler afternoons. Members reached the hacienda by striding onto the veranda at 
the side of the building where it was only a couple of feet high from the ground and was 
nearer to where they tied their horses. The house had deteriorated but still served 
perfectly and its three rooms provided a water-tight storeroom for grain, an office and a 
home for the family of one of the members. The kitchen, a concrete square enclosed by 
wooden slats and lined with bench seats, was set aside from the main hacienda, connected 
by a roof. Inside, the fire was enclosed by bricks which formed the cooking area. In a 
comer an enormous gourd stood. This stored clean drinking water which was consumed 
throughout the day by thirsty socios (members) as they came and went.
Amongst the other buildings grouped in the clearing there was a low lying open 
outhouse which housed another family, that of Santos’ brother, but which was also used 
to store dry grain. Another structure, a long supported zinc roof, protected the tractors 
from the elements and the bam behind the hacienda was used to store other large 
equipment. In the middle of the clearing there was a tall wind pump which provided 
resident families with water: after being drawn, water was sloshed into the accompanying 
trough. To the right of the hacienda were two large corrals alongside which ran a parallel 
fence, creating a narrow corridor leading to the cow dip. This was a deep concrete trough 
where animals were de-ticked twice annually.
Although the cooperative was located on the Pacific Range, the land was flat 
between the hacienda buildings and the neighbouring communities of San Jose de la 
Montana and Panama (see Figure 4). However, the land rose approximately 150 metres 
in the direction of the Los Sanchez communities - the collective name given for Sanchez 
I and Sanchez II - which bordered the cooperative at its westem border. To the north of 
GP lay another cooperative, the Comandante Ezquiel. The other perimeter was delineated 
by streams which were overhung by trees but became increasingly parched during 
subsequent seasons as a consequence of effects deforestation (see Figure 5). The 
population of each these surrounding communities was less than that of Sanchez II which 
had 742 residents (FSLN Tola, 1988).
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Figure 4: View from cooperative, GP
Figure 5: Sanchez, stream with children playing
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12 The creation of German Pomares
The original finca or farm on which GP was created was known as "Cuacuajoche". In 
1989 it was believed that its area was 2,539 manzanas^^ although this was not correct 
since its boundaries had been subject to confusion and dispute since the last century. 
Corresponding to the fluctuations in national Conservative and Liberal power, local 
landlords had either annexed adjacent lands of their political rivals to their own or yielded 
it to others'^
At the time of research, official MIDINRA records indicated that "Cuacuajoche" had 
been divided for use in the following way: GP was designated a total of 876 manzanas^^ 
for which a Land Reform Title was issued in July 1983; the communities of Sanchez I and 
II were designated the use of 600 manzanas (not titled) and the neighbouring cooperative, 
the Comandante Ezquiel, was titled with 250 manzanas. Contrary to this official 
allocation, the leaders of GP and local officials alike, including the BND, quoted the 
cooperative’s area as being 1,834 mzs (BND Tola, 1989). This included the area which 
had been assigned for use by the Los Sanchez community creating a situation where the 
cooperative assumed exclusive rights of access to an area beyond that which it had been 
originally assigned. Whether this was a genuine error on the part of the cooperative and 
revolutionary authorities remains unsubstantiated but the community was never clear about 
the legality of this. It was not until 1991 that the community contended the legal basis 
of the cooperative’s right to the land they had been assigned.
The estate formerly belonged to a very rich landowner, Adolfo Pastora Molina’^  (an 
absentee landlord) and was managed by an administrator. It had produced banana and 
cattle and seasonally employed poor campesino men from the adjacent communities, who 
constituted a fixed workforce, selling their wage labour to the hacendado while seasonally 
renting land from him. After the triumph of the revolution the Rural Workers Association 
(ATC) visited the communities surrounding the finca in order to organise residents to take 
the land. The receptiveness of residents to the organisation’s radical message is attributed 
locally to the preparatory work of the Christian base communities. Delegates of the Word 
and Padre Gaspar. The ATC initially organised fifty nine men to take the land. However, 
as founders explain, some proved "shy about taking the owner’s land" in the face of this 
radical action against the patron. Clearly not all local residents had the same level of 
consciousness or were equally prepared to struggle for access to land.
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In the event only twenty seven men, all ex-workers of Pastora, organised into five 
discrete groups from the different adjacent communities to occupy the land. They started 
to produce basic grains for family consumption. Initially the land occupation was not 
confrontational: on the contrary, during the first season of the occupying peasants wrote 
to Pastora to state their intention:
"..not to jeopardise the productivity of the land, only to work it."
They even paid Pastora the corresponding rent. They also requested permission from him 
in order to be able to sow on more than the small amount of land they had initially 
occupied. At this point a legal battle began after which Pastora’s attempts to evict the 
nucleus of campesinos failed because, in the words of members:
"the tide of history was against him and the revolution was in power."
This element of struggle entailed in the cooperative’s creation was a major factor which 
influenced members’ identification with the land, as we shall see later. The campesinos 
direct struggle against the landlord also gave it its character as an intemallv derived 
initiative and expression of their struggle.
Before continuing with the chronological documentation of the establishment of the 
cooperative it is worth noting that embodied within the references of members to the 
reluctance of neighbours to renounce loyalty to Pastora in order to occupy the land, their 
struggle for the land and the confrontation between the founders and the owner, was an 
awareness of the opposition between peasant and landlord. These were the experiences 
from which a relational class-based discourse of themselves as campesino (Smith, 1987) 
emerged. The recounting of this history by cooperative members - either as a group or 
individual - indicated that members had reconstructed their past with an emphasis on their 
collective history and with an acute awareness of the class antagonism between themselves 
and their former landlords. Although it has been noted elsewhere, that this was a new 
historical phenomenon in the Nicaragua and was observed elsewhere in the countryside 
(Houtart and Lemercinier, 1992), it is wrong to think that the peasants were unaware of 
their suppression beforehand. What perhaps changed is that they were able to articulate 
it in these explicit terms. Years later, this tension remained between some of the 
cooperative members and other local producers for whom the socios had previously 
worked. During the research period there as an outright brawl in town in day between 
one member Pedro and his ex-employee: interestingly, both were FSLN militants. It is
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relevant to our inquiry because when individuals start to understand their collective 
history, the process of delegitimation of the old system begins, at which point individuals 
begin to become aware of their subordinated condition. This brings us to the important 
point, as emphasised by Freire (1972), whereby peasants can overcome the psychological 
constraints which inhibit their political action.
Returning now to the cooperative’s emergence, in 1981 the entire estate was 
confiscated (the first in the IVth Region) under Decree 329 and Pastora left for Costa 
Rica. Given the shift in state policy towards the distribution of land, the local MIDINRA 
made plans to distribute the land in order to benefit the poor and landless residents in the 
vicinity of the estate. It granted usufruct to the five incipient cooperatives which 
corresponded to the communities surrounding the finca, each of which was named after 
local heroes who had been killed in the insurrection. The newly emergent UNAG then 
began the process of uniting the five groups into one cooperatives in order to 
accommodate a greater number of peasants given the maldistribution of quality lands 
within the finca. Unification was strongly opposed at the time by the groups. Although 
informants attributed this euphemistically to the "different ideology and sets of leadership" 
which distinguished each unit, the history of the respective communities suggests that their 
resistance was related to the longstanding family feuds which in the past had even been 
resolved with the use of machetes and guns. Evidence of these conflicts within the 
communities concerning intra-family feuds, arguments with neighbours and intra- 
community suspicion are reminiscent of those observed by Lewis (1966) in Mexico and 
clearly contradicts the view of harmonious community life. It also provides the historical 
context from which to appreciate subsequent cooperative/ community animosity.
The united cooperative then adopted the name of German Pomares, nicknamed "E/ 
Dante", who was a prominent FSLN guerilla and national hero who fell in battle against 
the National Guard in June 1979 in Jinotega. This was important in establishing a new 
identity for the cooperative which attached it to the national struggle.
An integral part of the official procedure for creating the cooperative was the 
establishment of its terms of reference and regulations for productive, economic and social 
organisation. These were drawn up by the cooperative’s first leadership group, alongside 
officers from the UNAG and MIDINRA. In essence, these regulations were based on 
principles established in the Cooperative Law but were subsequently approved by the
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assembly and were modified over time in response to specific social and organisational 
problems which arose. The regulations committed the cooperative to the principles of 
open membership for men and women, democratic control by its members, relative 
equality of share capital and a return to socios proportionate to work done. The minimum 
age was seventeen years, except where individuals already had dependents. If younger 
than twenty five the men had first to complete their Patriotic Military Service and 
otherwise be available for reserve army duties when called up (except for those over 
forty): a factor which proved a major deterrent to those considering joining. These 
regulations embodied the internationally recognised "irreducible characteristics of 
cooperatives", enshrining the principles of equality and democratic rights between 
members. Each potential member had to read and agree to these before they were granted 
full membership.
Founders recounted the difficulties associated with the initial years which involved 
sustained and strenuous work. This coincided with the 1980-83 period which was 
characterised by the lack of state patronage and meant that they faced extreme hardship. 
Yet, this served to cohere members by forcing them to overcome obstacles collectively 
and, motivated by the opportunity to create a new productive project, they worked long 
and hard’"*. Founders and subsequent members were required to attend courses on 
cooperative organisation provided by MIDINRA. In the words of the members 
themselves, this training complemented their practical experience and constituted an 
important process whereby:
"..we had to unlearn being salaried workers and leam how to be members of
a collective."
New members were admitted after submitting a letter requesting to join, together with a 
recommendation from UNAG and one existing member and following approval by the 
cooperative’s assembly, to which all members attended. Within the first few years 
membership of GP rose to 84, although by 1989 it had a membership of 69, including two 
women.
During the initial years there had been as many as ten women members or socias^^. 
Several socios simply accounted for this by stating that women "didn’t like collective 
work", however, the fact remained that women’s incorporation into extra-domestic 
productive activities of the cooperative meant an obligation of a double working day:
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factors which effectively inhibited women from accepting full-time productive work. 
Moreover, the observation of one man that "men don’t like women to work" was 
reinforced by a woman ex-member who explained that they had been forced to leave 
because of intimidation, fights and sexual jealousies which had erupted between respective 
partners. Despite the formal and legal frameworks to facilitate the incorporation of 
women, ideological factors remained a serious impediment to rural women’s incorporation.
The cooperative was characterised by a high degree of familial relatedness, mirroring 
the interconnected family structures of the small surrounding communities. Amongst its 
membership were fathers and sons and in one case a daughter, as well as brothers, cousins 
and uncles. The presence of family networks within the cooperative constituted one of 
the bases of social cohesion amongst members.
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The cooperative’s membership was stable: in 1989 there were a core of 46% members 
who were original founders and the average length of integration was six years five 
months. Most members originated from the immediate locality although over the years 
others from beyond Tola had subsequently joined the cooperative. This is illustrated in
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Figure 6 which shows the geographical origins of the members.
Reflecting their solidarity, members used not only the revolutionary terminology of
companero and compahera (companion or comrade) when talking with each other but also
kinship terms amongst themselves independently of whether they were related or not.
While it is consistent with rural culture for campesinos to refer to each other as cunado
(brother-in-law) and tie (uncle) as they did in the cooperative, members also used other
kinship terms including herrnano (brother). They also appropriated the terms compadre
(co-father) meaning godfather, as a term of endearment even where the formal relationship
did not exist. In some cases friendships between members were reinforced with the
system of compadrazgo (godfatherhood) whereby members selected their compadres from
amongst other members. Reflecting on this tendency Wilfredo noted:
"Now you generally select a best friend, someone on whom who can rely, 
whereas before it was someone who had money."
In the context of such poverty the obligations of a godfather could only be fulfilled by the
intermittent gift of food following an abundant harvest. Such an application of
compadrazgo represents a dramatic departure from the previous custom of selecting
compadres from amongst the privileged classes with the clear objective of securing
material benefit for the offspring’^ .
All members identified themselves as campesino. Of the thirty two interviewed, the
majority (twenty three), were poor peasants who had rented land and worked seasonally
either for Pastora, other local landlords or the local sugar refinery. Only two of these
reported that they had access to a small plot of family land, the others rented. A further
four previously worked by assisting their parents on their own plots, including one of the
women; four worked as agricultural workers, including the other woman, who had worked
as a seasonal wage worker; one members had been an industrial worker from Managua
before joining although he too had previously worked as an agricultural labourer; finally,
one had worked as a teacher.
13 Community Foes
With the creation of GP, local peasants who had worked on the hacienda and who did not 
join the cooperative lost their source of temporary employment and access to land. They 
also lost access to the extraction or use of other resources from the finca such as plantains
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and wood and grazing, practices which the patron overlooked by way of ensuring the 
reproduction of his workforce. With establishment of the cooperative, unless permission 
was sought, local residents were denied access to wood for domestic fires or land for 
grazing their animals. As we shall see later in this chapter, joining the cooperative which 
many in the communities had done at some time, was not a solution which suited them 
all.
During the initial years of the cooperative’s formation it was constantly being 
invaded by other local peasants who took the FSLN’s insurrection motto of "Land to those 
who work it" in good faith. Amongst the members themselves there was a clear 
recognition of:
"..the genuine demand for land in the community and that it is the cause of 
social and political tension..
One member, Adan, recounted the dilemma they faced:
"We were afraid to tell them to go because there was little land available to 
work."’*
The contradiction of having to evict poor and landless neighbours who pleaded "that they
had nowhere to sow", was painfully obvious to them. Recourse to the authorities provided
an immediate solution whereby MIDINRA and the police came to evict them and a
medium term response was also sought. According to Adan this comprised of:
"..doing political work with the community to prevent the emerging conflict.
This meant explaining that the land had been assigned to the cooperative for 
the purposes of a large scale project of national importance and benefit."’^
This experience of concerted organisational action, necessary in order for them to secure
their access to the land and prevent land invasions, was perhaps another factor reinforcing
mutual solidarity between members. Yet, within the cooperative there were differences
in opinion about how to resolve the problem. Some, including Adan, were:
"..always in favour of giving the land to those who would work it and where 
there was genuine need."
Others, such as Santos the current president, were reluctant to relinquish control of the
land. Finally, a compromise solution was found in granting local residents from the
surrounding communities seasonal access to land. By 1989, some 400 manzanas of
pasture were "loaned" to individuals in the community. In exchange beneficiaries were
requested to clear 300 yards of ditch: the equivalent of one full day’s work and the failure
to do so jeopardised their possibility to renew "permission". The loan restricted sowing
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to the wet season because the land was required for grazing in the dry season and meant
that these peasants were unable to grow plantains or graze animals throughout the year.
There was one exception to this policy. Jose Dolores and his mother, Dona Maria
Rivera, had been granted in 1987 a five year loan of a plot of cooperative land because,
in the words of Santos:
"Jose Dolores has always behaved well and so we make a special case for 
him".
This would suggest that the cooperative was rewarding those local residents who remained 
friendly to it. By implication this declaration reflects a practice which was criticised by 
a long-serving regional MIDINRA official who stated that the "cooperative had become 
a political instrument"^®, granting land for the purposes of political leverage.
Yet, the cooperative permitted villages access to the land in other ways. It had 
agreed to allow forty villagers to build houses on the periphery land of the cooperative 
and villagers were allowed to collect dead firewood on condition that they sought prior 
permission. Although local residents, particularly from Los Sanchez, demanded land from 
the cooperative the legal basis of the cooperative’s use of the land was not contested until 
1991 when INRA^* intervened to resolve once and for all the conflict between the 
community and the cooperative concerning access to land^ .^
At the beginning of the election campaign the issue of land exploded as a cause of 
local conflict. Even Adan who was no stranger to the community’s animosity to the 
cooperative was surprised at the level of discontent he encountered during the election 
campaign:
"..some just don’t see what the government has done for them and speak as 
if it’s against them".
Initially, grievances were expressed in complaints and acts of non-compliance: those 
sowing on a plot of the cooperative’s land increasingly complained that "they make us 
work" or "pay" for the use of the land. They nostalgically referred to the days when 
Pastora was landlord and they were given "access to good land". Some refused to clear 
the ditches, wouldn’t repay the seed loaned to them by the cooperative and put their 
animals to graze on the cooperative’s crops. The land increasingly became the issue 
which ignited local drunken brawls.
The socioeconomic development of the cooperative with its privileged access to state 
resources was resented amongst the landless, poor and medium peasants who increasingly
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accused the cooperativistas of being "land thieves". Although it has been well 
documented how CAS cooperatives in the war zones became identified as enemies and 
prime targets of the counter-revolution precisely because of their association with the 
revolutionary authorities (CIERA, 1985), so it seems that cooperatives had become objects 
of grievances elsewhere in the country particularly where land hunger had not been 
satisfied. Some "favoured" local residents attributed this animosity between the members 
and non-members to jealousies since they themselves were victim of petty theft of produce 
from their own plots. However, the strategy of theft amongst the poor is also rooted in 
material need.
Although the success of the politico-ideological work and influence of the FSLN and 
the mass organisations in the municipality was manifest in a local victory for the party in 
the first national elections in 1984, the town of Nancimi eight kilometres from Tola 
remained a bastion of political opposition to Sandinismo. It was won by the Independent 
Liberal Party (PLI) as a reflection of the political affiliation of the latifundistas who had 
remained after 1979. The FSLN gained second place and the National Christian 
Democratic Party (PGDN) gained third place (FSLN Tola, 1988). The telephone operator 
in Tola confirmed that since the overthrow of Somoza these landlords maintained frequent 
contact with those abroad including Pastora, whose extensive lands had been confiscated. 
Consistent with the national coalition these local parties had affiliated within the UNO for 
the 1990 electoral contest. Locally they unleashed a strong propaganda campaign to elicit 
support from - amongst other social sectors - the poor peasants who remained land hungry 
and other subsistence producers who were dissatisfied that the state and CAS cooperative 
sectors were prioritised to their detriment^^. The conflict between GP and the poor 
peasants in the cooperative’s vicinity provided a fertile recruiting ground for the UNO 
during its election campaign and through local campaigning, it was able to harness local 
sentiment for its own political objectives: economic grievances became translated into 
political opposition. The most fervent UNO activist in Los Sanchez was Nicholas 
Espinoza (the cousin of Wilfredo and Gilberto Espinoza) who rallied support for the UNO 
alliance on the anti-cooperative card. On one occasion Nicholas goaded Gilberto, who 
subsequently hit him and as a result was imprisoned for two weeks. Afterwards, reflecting 
on the political contradictions created by the cooperative, Wilfredo Espinoza, noted that:
"As a political project the cooperative failed, although we did manage to
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resolve the problem of land for a few." '^^
For some cooperative members the contradictions created deep divisiond within their 
families. For José, a cooperative member who lived with his extended family and his 
brothers who were all agricultural labourers, the tension became intolerable. Since the 
cooperative was sympathetic to the personal suffering of members who had to endure the 
cooperative/ community contradictions in the daily experience of family life - and that no 
quarrel is as bitter as a family quarrel - it agreed to assist José build a home. Similarly, 
two brothers Wilfredo and Gilberto were at loggerheads with another brother, who was 
an original founder of the cooperative but had voluntarily left and was active in the anti­
cooperative campaign led by their cousin: the aforementioned Nicholas. Evidently, 
cooperative membership forced a hard choice for members faced with a split of loyalty 
between their extended family or the cooperative. This contradiction was also the basis 
for other notions of collective identity, forged amongst the members and in opposition to 
the community. In such a way members referred to themselves as cooperados or, in a 
more politically charged self-reference, as organisados (organised).
Animosity between the cooperative and community was not ameliorated until INRA 
intervened and an agreement was made to cede land to the community. Although Sanchez 
II was marginally won by the Sandinistas, the other communities were won by the UNO 
and overall within the municipality residences registered their disaffection with the 
Sandinistas: Tola elected an UNO municipal council. By the end of 1990 tensions were 
acute and the cooperative came under military threat from 200 armed Contra arrived in 
Tola to forcibly evict the cooperativistas. This period was characterised by members as 
a time of fear, when they were afraid to leave their houses in case of attack from other 
villagers. The evident strength of the cooperative’s own military capability was perhaps 
a successful deterrent to the cooperative actually being attacked, although ultimately 
tensions only abated once the UNO Government announced that the Sandinista Agrarian 
Reform would be respected^^.
Despite these antagonistic contradictions, through its efforts and concrete practices 
in forging links with the poor and subsistence members of their communities, the 
cooperative also contributed to resolving some of its needs and operated as an important 
agent of local development and welfare. For instance, GP contributed to the 
municipality’s pre-school milk programme by donating liquid milk to be distributed with
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the powdered milk. It used its lorry and loaned members’ horses to transport nurses to
vaccinate children in the remotest communities. The cooperative also gave funds, donated
material and contributed the workforce for the construction of water pumps, schools and
a community centre. It also sold cheaply or donated agricultural produce to villagers
when they faced particularly hard times and at the time of research a recently widowed
woman was assured a regular supply of plantains. The cooperative also acted on behalf
of UNAG in a seed scheme directed at providing grain for poor producers who would
return the equivalent amount following their harvest. These initiatives were not state
imposed policies but represent the cooperative’s own efforts to help their local
communities. Whereas a Machiavellian interpretation might suggest that the interest to
assist was motivated by a concern to ameliorate tensions, most members were personally
committed to assist their communities.
Cooperative assistance to the communities was directed through the Community
Committees (CC). These were rural, predominantly Sandinista mass organisations,
coordinated by UNAG and linked to the municipal government and had the responsibility
to implement local projects, arbitrate in local conflicts and channel local demands. Half
the interviewees of GP had been involved in the activities of the CCs, either by
occasionally "helping out" in construction or, as in the case of four interviewees who also
held leadership roles within the cooperative, were their elected coordinators. One of them,
Wilfredo, expressed his interest in the CC:
"I do all these things in the community because I want to, because my family 
lives there too, although in my mind there is always a political objective, that
is, to show the people that the FSLN is a good force."
The GP dominated the leadership of adjacent CCs and brought to them their organisational
and political skills as well as some of the resources available to them.
The cooperative was also a significant actor in the organisation of local cultural
events. In particular, it supported patron saint festivals by donating money, material and
sometimes contributed animals for the feasts. Once during the research period it even
hosted a Fiesta de Toros (a traditional bull festival), to which an estimated 1,500 residents
from the municipality came and were provided by this and other cooperatives (who had
contributed) with food and fruit squash. Cooperative members also integrated into the
social, cultural and religious activities of the community. Several members played in the
community’s baseball team and one was the guitarist in a popular band which played at
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all local political and cultural events. Another man, Auscension, who was a veteran 
Delegate of the Word and had worked alongside Padre Gaspar, still spent his Sunday 
afternoons walking the communities to talk about Christianity and its potential as a 
liberating force for the campesinos. The cooperative’s high local profile was also asserted 
through the integration of some of its members into the rural police force whose mandate 
was to maintain public order, intercept in private grievances, report thefts of property and 
illegal activities such as felling of live trees. Of those interviewed 12, including the older 
members and those unfit for defence duties, were active volunteers in this force.
II Cooperative Pedro Joaquin 
III Location
The cooperative Pedro Joaquin Chamorro (PJCh) was located in the municipality of San 
Marcos, one of the eight municipalities comprising the Department of Carazo which lies 
between Rivas and Managua and the Pacific Ocean to the west and the department of 
Masaya to the north east. It measured 1,032 kilometres square, representing 2.0% of the 
national land area (CIERA/ MIDINRA, 1980a). The municipality of San Marcos covered 
113 square kilometres and had a total of 35,000 inhabitants, 18,565 of whom lived in the 
urban area concentrated around San Marcos the town and 16,435 distributed throughout 
28 rural communities. The town of San Marcos lies 45 km south of Managua and is one 
of the hill towns of the region known as La Meseta (FSLN San Marcos, 1986).
San Marcos lies between 320 metres and 850 metres above sea level and receives 
approximately 1,500 mm rainfall. Temperatures oscillate between 18C during the wet 
period and 37C during the hot dry period, with an average of 24C. It is cooler and 
fresher than Rivas. It has fertile soils and at the time of research agriculture occupied 
48% of its total land surface. The climate renders it particulary suitable for coffee, the 
principle agricultural product in the municipality which also had the highest coffee 
production in Region IV. Basic grains were also produced. Citrus fruits and cabbages 
were cultivated in the areas of the municipality affected by the gases from the volcano 
Santiago (in the neighbouring department of Masaya) which produce favourable acidic 
soils. Agriculture, hunting and fishing were the principle economic activities (CIERA/ 
MIDINRA, 1980a; FSLN San Marcos, 1992).
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In 1979 land distribution in Carazo was classified as "medium concentration" with 
62.9% of its producers working plots of under 10 manzanas and occupying only 5.8% of 
the land; 21.7% of producers worked on plots between 10-50 manzanas and occupied 
16.1% of the land; 14/% of producers worked between 50-500 manzanas which occupied 
62.6% of the land and finally 0.7% of producers worked on more than 500 manzanas and 
occupied 15.5% of the land. Those with less than 10 manzanas also worked as 
agricultural labourers, employed in the seasonal work of coffee picking. San Marcos was 
the birth place of Anastacio Somoza Garcia, whose family on the eve of the revolution 
owned some 2,000 manzanas in the municipality alone. It was also where the ATC had 
been active after 1978 organising the mass of poor salaried coffee workers and in 
neighbouring Diriamba it had also organised the historic "Marcha de Hambre" (Hunger 
March) in the same year. During the insurrection. Civilian Defense Committees (CDC) 
had been created in La Concepcion and San Marcos^^.
The beneficiaries of the Agrarian Reform in the Meseta were predominantly from 
the neighbouring department of Masaya and 30% originated from the municipality of La 
Concepcion alone, which lies on the Masaya border and is adjacent to San Marcos. 
Before the revolution Masaya had an even lower average area of exploitation than Carazo: 
85% of its producers had less than ten manzanas and occupied only 27% of the total land 
exploited. This a high number of small producers gave Masaya one of the lowest average 
areas of production in the country. This was ten manzanas, compared with the national 
average of sixty six manzanas but in fact these plots were rendered unsustainable because 
the pervasive volcanic gases reduced soil fertility.
Before the revolution illiteracy in Masaya was higher than the national average at 
47% (65% rural and 35% urban) and compared unfavourably with the situation in Carazo 
which at the time had one of the lowest illiteracy rates of 41% (65% rural and 25% urban) 
although in both areas rural literacy was equally low. Since the revolution the creation 
of schools provided an estimated 95% coverage throughout the municipality had reduced 
illiteracy according to national trends (MED San Marcos, 1990). The institutional state 
presence in San Marcos included the Nicaraguan Institute of Water and Aquaducts 
(INAA), Nicaraguan Energy Institute (INE), Ministry of Health (MINSA), Ministry of 
Education (MED), Ministry of Work (MITRAB), BND, TELCOR, MIDINRA, ENCAFE, 
a Centre for Nursery Development (CDI) and the National Police. It had one health
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centre in the town and three health posts, five doctors and twelve nurses.
The cooperative PJCh had two sites, including the fincas which were originally 
called Santa Maxima and San Jorge. These names had been retained in order to 
distinguish between the two areas. Santa Maxima was the main and largest site in the 
comarca of La Chona and was located on the extreme edge of the municipality some 
twelve kilometres from the town of San Marcos and near the border of the Department 
of Managua. San Jorge was situated five kilometres away, closer to the town of San 
Marcos.
Santa Maxima was located on the slopes of a massive escarpment which faced west, 
overlooking the Pacific Ocean. The coast was visible from the cooperative thirty 
kilometres away. It was three kilometres from the main PanAmerican Highway in the 
comarca of La Chona, which had a population of 372. The cooperative shared its borders 
with small producers and twoother cooperatives. The cooperative was reached by turning 
off the main road on to a narrow sandy, dirt track. After a hundred yards the track passed 
a humble brick and wooden house which was the home of the family of the oldest 
member of the cooperative. This house currently belonged to the municipality and had 
been donated during the Sandinista Government for use of the cooperative^^. The track 
then descended, passing through a sparsely forested area (see Figure 7). Following heavy 
rainfall, the track became a slippery slope and the runoff created gullies, rendering transit 
difficult and presenting a serious transportation problem for the cooperative. The route 
could be dangerous from another point of view: a year before one of the women had been 
raped there during daylight hours. Since then women avoided walking the path alone.
Further down, the track passed through a sturdy wooden gate, marking the entrance 
to the cooperative. Here was the original warden’s house and although now inhabited by 
two other founding members and their families, it maintained its strategic importance in 
controlling access to the cooperative. The house was made of stone and concrete with 
rough solid wooden doors and window shutters. The occupants included Juan aged 65 and 
his wife Marlena aged 36 and who also a member. They lived with their four young 
children as well as with Don Juan’s eldest son by a previous union. This was Lorenzo, 
the cooperative’s president who lived with Maritza, his newly acquired partner who had 
come as a teacher to the cooperative the previous year and had recently had his baby.
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*Figure 7: Descending towards PJCh
From then on the track was lined with yucca plants, through which the coffee 
plantations could be seen falling away at either side from the path and extending into the 
dense vegetation. Enormous trees and intermittent plantains created a fresh and dark 
shade. The main and former hacienda building was still further down the track: a simple, 
modest building now in disrepair (Figure 8). The house was occupied by two other 
founding members: a couple, Rosa and Jeronimo and their offspring. Two of Rosa’s 
daughters from a previous union had coupled with the other adult sons o f Juan and they 
lived in separate rooms of the house each with their own young families. One o f her 
daughters Karla, was also a member as were Dona Rosa’s two sons. The house also 
served as a storeroom for sacks o f coffee and basic grains and one small room was used 
as an office.
To the back of the hacienda was the cooperative’s underground water tank which 
was visited frequently throughout the day by women and children who came to draw 
water through the small square hole in the enclosing slab. The original water pump used 
by the previous owners lay in disrepair in the storeroom. The tank would be refilled 
weekly with fresh water transported in a portable tank by tractor from the town of
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Diriamba, ten kilometres away. After the change of government, when credit was 
restricted and transport costs became prohibitive, residents had to resort to drinking filthy 
water"^ Also behind the house there were well maintained wooden latrines and even a 
cubicle which served as a bathroom. Such facilities rendered the house the best place on 
the cooperative in which to live. That these families lived on higher ground than others 
in Santa Maxima, led them to be referred to collectively as "ellos encima" (those up 
above), a term which - as we shall see later - was symbolic of the control they had 
previously exercised over the cooperative.
Figure 8: Original hacienda, PJCh
In front of the hacienda a couple of old trees created a delightful shade and the 
presence o f the trailer frequently left there made it an ideal place to meet, chat and for the 
children to play. It was also where the cooperative congregated before and following the 
day’s work. Opposite and visible through the mango tress outstretched two large flat 
patios, enclosed by a foot-high wall. Here, newly picked coffee was spread to dry during 
the harvest when it became the object of night vigilance to prevent theft o f the precious
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beans. Below the hacienda, where the land flattened out for a few hundred metres was 
the so-called "encampment". It was a twenty-year old construction which offered the most 
primitive of housing, consisting of three low, wooden blocks roofed with zinc and divided 
into tiny individual units which backed onto each other (see Figure 9).
Figure 9: Fidelia and daughters in cooperative encampment
Inside there was room only for the double platform frame which served as beds for the 
resident families. Just over half the cooperative membership lived in the encampment here 
with their families.
A long thin wooden structure with a zinc roof alongside two sides of the encampment 
provided each woman with an individual cooking area. These were later abandoned 
because the women who cooked here at night were vulnerable to attack by drunken male 
colleagues. The latrines were located behind and consisted o f a series of concrete seats 
set on concrete slates. The dilapidated remains of wooden doors hung uselessly. Nearby 
were two vast deep concrete water collectors, which resembled swimming pools, open to 
collect rainwater (see Figure 10). The water was reached using buckets attached to ropes
170
which were dropped down the fifteen feet into the murky green liquid.
Figure 10: Pedro and Miguel against watercollectors
Those resident in the Santa Maxima shared not only a common workplace but 
also lived in proximity, factors which reinforced mutual solidarity. Not all members lived 
on Santa Maxima and walked daily to cooperative from their houses. Every other 
weekend half o f those who were resident on Santa Maxima took turns to visit the places 
of their origin. For security reasons half were required to remain to ensure that the 
hacienda and its equipment were not left unattended.
The oX\\Qx finca, San Jorge, was situated near the PanAmerican Highway (about 150 
metres for the road), in the comarca o f Marvin Corrales. Immediately after leaving the 
main road there were three small solid concrete houses belonging to the cooperative and 
which were home to the families of four other cooperative members. A few other 
cooperative members lived elsewhere within Marvin Corrales. On San Jorge the land was 
flat and the coffee bushes, in neat pristine rows, lay in the sparse shadow of short trees. 
Those members who lived on or near San Jorge were saved the journey to Santa Maxima 
on the two days a week that the cooperative worked on the San Jorge site. On the other 
days they were collected by the lorry and trailer or occasionally had to make their way
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on foot to Santa Maxima: a journey that took more than an hour and a half.
112 The creation of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Cooperative
In 1981 Santa Maxima was expropriated by the Decree 329 of the Agrarian Reform Law 
because its owner, Elba Gonzalez, had failed to invest in the land, workforce and 
infrastructure. It produced coffee and employed a permanent workforce of thirty men who 
lived in the encampment and a seasonal workforce of several hundred during the harvest. 
At first the finca was administered by MIDINRA while the original employees continued 
as salaried workers. During the same year a group of thirty agricultural labourers arrived 
from La Concepcion (just over the departmental border in Masaya), who had been 
organised by the ATC and had agreed to leave their family homes in pursuit of access to 
land offered them by the Agrarian Reform. This history gives the cooperative its 
character as an external initiative. Unlike GP, this cooperative was created to benefit poor 
and landless peasants from areas beyond the immediate vicinity of the hacienda. On 
arrival to Santa Maxima they were organised by UNAG into a CAS, which was named 
after the national figure and Conservative opponent to Somoza who had lived in Carazo 
and was assassinated by the National Guards in 1978^ .^ The notion of collective 
production as a model of cooperative was opposed by the original workers, who all 
subsequently left, with the exception of two who remained as members. Nonetheless, for 
the founders of the GP, the cooperative’s creation did represent a continuation of their 
struggle for improved conditions and access to land and this was reflected in their strong 
identification with the land, which as we shall see, was based on this element of struggle.
In 1982, PJCh was designated 274 manzanas of land which was legally constituted 
and titled in 1984. The departing agricultural workers were replaced during the first years 
by a further twenty to thirty people who came from within the department of Carazo 
itself, including Diriamba and Ninquinomo or from the neighbouring communities of La 
Chona, San Pedro de las Molinas and Dulce Nombre, that is outside the original target 
area^°. The origin of the members in 1989 as shown in Figure 6 presented earlier.
As with GP, this cooperative had to survive during the years of relative state neglect 
of the cooperative sector. During this period individuals endured physical deprivation 
while working intensively for long hours to establish and renovate cooperative lands. For 
the first five weeks founders had to work without any financial assistance or payment at
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all:
"..until the credit came through from the BND, but we continued working 
nonetheless."
The positive aspects of this shared experience of hardship was not lost on the members
themselves, as Juan’s comments suggest:
"It was a way of recognising who was really conscientious amongst the group 
and was a good way to test who of us was really committed to the project."
As with GP, the regulations of PJCh established the economic, political and social rights
of members. Each member had the right to: access to profits in accordance with the days
worked; be able to produce crops for self-sufficiency; have voice and vote; elect and be
elected for the posts of the leadership directive; receive economic and production reports
by the leadership; receive support from the cooperative in cases of emergency; and receive
training on cooperative organisation. The regulations also specifically guaranteed the
incorporation of women on the basis of non-discrimination and pre- and post-natal
economic assistance. The age limit was sixteen, less than in GP, and was less in cases
where individuals already had dependents. Also, as in the case of GP, male applicants had
to show evidence of having completed their Patriotic Military Service and be available for
military duties when called upon.
In 1984, a request for more land was made to MIDINRA and in 1986 the
cooperative received a further 86 manzanas from the San Jorge finca, an estate that had
been confiscated from a badly managed cooperative. In 1986, the cooperative also
petitioned - for the first of many times - a request to the authorities to allow it to convert
into CCS but was repeatedly refused by MIDINRA and UNAG. It would not be until
after the elections that the cooperative was able to organise in the form its members
deemed most desirable. In the same year, the cooperative affiliated to the "Eddy Guzman"
Union de Cooperativas de Area (UCA). This is a second level of cooperative association
based in San Marcos covering the La Meseta zone. As with other UCAs in Nicaragua,
the "Eddy Guzman" was created by a group of relevant state institutions represented
within the Zonal Council for Development and Assistance for the Agrarian Reform
(CZDARA) with the objective of organising agricultural production territorially to increase
the efficiency. In the case of "Eddy Guzman" the BND, PROAGRO, ENABAS and
ENCAFE were incorporated into the CZDARA. UNAG was also included and had
promoted the creation of the UCA by initiating the process with an assembly in which
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twenty CAS cooperatives were represented (CAPRI, 1991). During this preliminary 
meeting, when the formation of an UCA was proposed, the advantages of belonging to the 
UCA were outlined and included: access to credit, supply of inputs, machine services, 
technical and administrative assistance and training, although not all these objectives were 
fulfilled^ \
The UCA was formally constituted in June 1986 as a supply and service cooperative. 
In 1989 it had increased in size to incorporate thirty two cooperatives within the zone and 
covered an area of approximately twenty two square kilometres. It contained seventy five 
fincas, 3,064 manzanas and had 700 members (representing 652 families) and supported 
a total of 3,079 dependents. It was predominantly a coffee producer, coffee covering 42% 
of the land of its affiliated cooperatives, basic grains accounted for 28% and forest 15% 
(CAPRI, 1991). However, the efforts of the UCA to expand its service provision on 
behalf of the affiliated cooperatives and their members, took it into direct conflict with 
the state over its proposal to have direct access to state resources, instead of them being 
channelled through other state agencies. It requested control of a retail outlet for produce 
which had hitherto been sold by the state monopoly PROAGRO but the proposal had been 
rejected by local MIDINRA officials. They expressed concern that relinquishing control 
of the state monopoly to the UCA would diminish the role of MIDINRA in the region: 
thereby illustrating the bureaucratic tendency of a ministry which blocked the initiative 
of this producer-run organisation. This was understood by cooperative leaders who saw 
that local officials were concerned to "protect their own personal interests": a suspicion 
fuelled by class and sectorial mistrust since local MIDINRA officers were educated 
urbanites whose distance from campesino reality was symbolically manifest by their smart 
clothing. Eventually, the issue of the UCA’s control over the products of the state 
monopoly was resolved in their favour when the national leadership of MIDINRA 
intervened. From then on disgruntled local leaders distinguished between local and 
national MIDINRA and its representatives. Whereas local officers were seen to block the 
producers’ democratic aspirations to control their own retail outlet, national leaders were 
identified as being supportive of the campesino cause.
Until 1984, Rosa had been the only female member of PJCh. Her duties at that time 
were confined to cooking for the male members who then ate communally at the 
hacienda. In 1986, other women who joined as members to participate in agricultural
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production. Since then there was a stable number of women, totalling between twelve and 
fifteen. Although the membership in PJCh had risen to as many as sixty in previous 
years, in 1989 there was a total of fifty two, including fifteen women. As with GP, new 
members were admitted once they had made a written request to join, together with a 
recommendation from UNAG and following a vote in the cooperative’s general assembly. 
As with GP and other CAS cooperatives, men under twenty five had also to have 
completed their military service and agree to be available for reserve duties. A three 
month trial period proceeded the granting of full membership. Once one member of the 
family had joined others tended to follow.
A characteristic of this cooperative was that a proportion of the membership was 
unstable, a factor which lowered the average length of time incorporated into the 
cooperative which was three years, seven months. Amongst the interviewees, only seven 
founding members (26%) still remained (of whom two were original employees of the 
estate). Since they had subsequently been joined by their respective offspring, this group 
represented more. According to UCA records there were approximately twenty members 
who came and went annually from the cooperative (UNAG San Marcos, 1989), although 
for the year corresponding to the research period this had reduced to a departure of only 
ten. This meant that a total of 45% of the members had been integrated for less than two 
years although amongst this group four members (representing 11%) had established stable 
relationships with residents who had been there for longer. Nonetheless, there were 
expressions of social solidarity between members who also typically referred to each other 
with the use of the term companero and companera and friendships between longer-term 
members (as in GP) were also reinforced by the system of compadrazgo.
While cooperative analysts have advanced various theories to account for desertions 
from cooperatives in Nicaragua, there are contradictory interpretations. Some^^ explained 
that individuals who have become habitualised wage earners go from one cooperative to 
another with the objective of maximising their income, that is in search of a better 
"salary". Others stressed that the experiences during the insurrection and immediately 
afterwards, thereby suggesting that it was precisely those individuals who were the most 
suitable for collective production (CIERA, 1985). Perhaps this causal link is misplaced 
since other objective and subjective factors interacted and influenceed the extent to which 
members came to feel that the cooperative was theirs, thereby determining the extent to
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which they were prepared to invest their energies into such a collective enterprise. In fact, 
of the twelve members who left the cooperative during 1989-90 period, only three left 
voluntarily, the rest were expelled for indiscipline. The most obvious causal link 
concerning desertions may be related to the extent to which the individual felt that the 
land belonged to them. This is supported in the case of one of those intervieweed who 
left stating that he did not feel the owner of the land. However, he was also the most 
educated member of the cooperative and subsequently left to train in accountancy, 
suggesting that the problem was also an occupational one. Similarly, it is appropriate to 
note that the three in GP who stated that they did not feel owner of the land had been 
members for three, five and nine years respectively, a finding which would suggest that 
this was not the only factor.
As with GP, all members in PJCh had peasant backgrounds with the exception of 
two. Of the sixteen men, ten (62%) had previously worked as agricultural labourers, of 
whom two had transferred from other cooperatives which had formed after the triumph, 
having heard that "PJCh was better organised". Four had previously been employed as 
permanent agricultural workers, one came directly from working as a professional soldier 
in the national military (EPS) and another one had come directly from school although 
both these latter ones had also helped their parents on their plot of land. As with GP, a 
few members had changed occupations: amongst those interviewed, one had also been a 
permanent agricultural worker, one agricultural worker had also worked as an industrial 
worker and one had been studying for his priesthood. Of the women, four had not 
previously worked outside the home but had helped their parents attend their small plots; 
three had finished school to start productive work alongside their parents in the 
cooperative; two had been employed as domestics and one had worked as a seasonal wage 
earner.
113 Amongst strangers
In common with GP, disgruntled poor, subsistence and medium peasants resented the 
cooperative because of its privileged access to state resources, a feature which qualified 
it in their eyes as a "Sandinista project". They complained that the establishment of the 
cooperative meant that they could no longer take plantains and wood from the hacienda, 
since these practices were stopped by the cooperative by guarding its perimeters vigilantly.
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Similarly, they and local medium peasants complained about others coming from beyond 
the area and that:
"..they robbed the land and it’s not really theirs, they have no right to work
it."
The assertion by several cooperative members that "we are the new patrons", referring to 
their access to the means of production was perhaps an ironically reflection of their new 
role as employers of a local seasonal labour force (for the coffee harvest). This may have 
fuelled local resentment^^. Animosity towards the cooperative was less evident in the 
immediate comarca of La Chona than in Dulce Nombre, a small town which was also an 
UNO stronghold. During the electoral campaign the contradictions created by the 
cooperative also became condensed and local UNO supporters stressed the injustices 
manifest from the availability of resources for the "land-robbers" but were less concerned 
that the land be divided to benefit poor campesinos, than that the previous order be 
restituted^'^. Also, members originating from Dulce Nombre reported how their own 
extended families constantly criticised them and following the elections they did not return 
home for fear of harassment or attack.
The cooperative had fewer social links with community than GP and this was mainly 
because its membership largely originated from beyond the adjacent communities. 
However, the cooperative did contribute to several local development projects directed by 
the CC by donating funds and materials for the construction of a drinking water system 
and school in La Chona and San Pedro de los Molinas. Unlike in GP, here only seven 
interviewees had assisted by providing labour. The cooperative had also supported the 
wider community by surrendering one of the houses on the San Jorge finca, together with 
its accompanying plot of land to MINS A for the purposes of a health centre. During 
traditional patron saint festivals the cooperative donated cash or products towards the 
festivities. A few individual members, mainly the young men from the cooperative "who 
like to get up to no good", as their partners stated, would join these activities and 
invariably return home drunk. The founder members from La Concepcion preferred to 
return to participate in celebrations of their home town. Limited social contacts with the 
residents in the neighbouring community occurred through the church, to which three 
interviewees reported going regularly and through sport since three of the men in the
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cooperative played in the basketball team of San Pedro de los Molinas and had games 
every weekend.
Conclusions
The two cases, both located in the Pacific zone had memberships dominated by labouring 
peasants who in common with others elsewhere in the zone had worked on small plots and 
been employed seasonally. The histories of the cooperatives were different. GP was 
created as a product of a prolonged period of struggle for the land which involved the 
campesinos' in direct confrontation with the patron. Founders had benefitted from the 
support of both ATC and MIDINRA which had intervened ultimately to resolve the issue 
of the land in their favour, a factor which - as we shall see later - led to a strong 
identification with the revolutionary authorities. By contrast, the founders of PJCh had 
been organised around a proposal of the Agrarian Reform to distribute the land. Although 
founders had previously been involved in the activities of the ATC, there was no element 
of struggle over access to this particular piece of the land. This external initiative meant 
that the state was able to impose a specific organisational model against the wishes of the 
membership. While it is clear that the conditions of the insurrection and revolution 
created the opportunities for the founders to gain access to land and fulfil their demand 
for work, it is also obvious that peasants responded differently to these circumstances. 
Evidence of different consciousness amongst peasants in the same community and sharing 
similar economic circumstances is provided from the history of GP where some 
campesinos were prepared to invade the patrons lands while others were not. The 
willingness of those who occupied land also suggests that they were well advanced in their 
understanding of resistance strategies. Similarly with PJCh, a few original founders stayed 
while others left at the beginning, demonstrating that despite confronting the same material 
circumstances, individuals opted for different strategies.
The GP cooperative had formed to benefit poor and landless peasants in the 
immediate locality of the hacienda while the PJCh was founded to benefit those from 
another area. Yet both cooperatives, as beneficiaries of the Agrarian Reform, encountered 
degrees of hostility from amongst other sectors of the communities. This became 
expressed as an antagonistic political contradiction between the cooperative and the
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community and reinforced the identify of the cooperatives as essentially political entities.
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Notes to Chapter 5
1.An administrative division coinciding with the local rural community 
divisions.
2.Barricada. was the official organ of the FSLN; Nuevo Diario. the country’s 
only independent daily and La Prensa belonged to the Chamorro family, the 
incoming president was its Director.
3.This was partially financed by the Swiss Support Committee for the People 
of Central America, who initially donated US$5,500.
4.There were also an administrator, one laboratory technician, one popular 
educator, two dispensing chemists, seven hygienists and thirty six health 
workers (MINSA Tola, 1989).
5.Sale to the state agency had been obligatory, but this changed during the 
research, when the market was liberated and producers were then able to sell 
on the open market if they were able to find buyers.
6.Quoted in Lowy (1993:38).
7.1 manzana = 0.7 hectares.
8.Defined as between sixteen and fifty years old.
9.These included twenty eigth members and eigthy four individuals. The 
production of the cooperatives reportedly increased following a donation of a 
motorboat from OXFAM Canada.
10.Public Registry, Rivas, 7.10.1991, in reference to property number 4,890.
11.This ambiguity about the precise extension of the lands and the location of 
its boundaries remained until 1991 when INRA arranged for it to be measured 
by a topographer.
12.Public Registry Rivas, relating to Property Number 4.890.
13.Pastora owned a phenomenal total of 4,424 manzanas in the Tola, according 
to the Public Register Rivas, relating to property number 4,890.
14.This period of relative independence from the state has been identified by 
Kaimowitz (1988), as an important factor in securing the long-term viability 
of a cooperative.
1 5 .H e re  I am  using  the Spanish fe m a le  te rm  fo r  m em b er.
16.As such it represents a profound cultural change: a finding which 
complements the comparative study of Houtart and Lemercinier (1992) 
between producers of different forms of social organisation. Here, the authors
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conclude that evidence of cultural transformation and the acquisition of social 
values was most likely amongst individuals incorporated into CAS 
cooperatives.
IT.Wilfredo Rivera, personal interview, German Pomares, January 1990.
18.Luis Rivera, personal interview, November 1989.
19.Adan Bega, personal interview. Tola, December 1989.
20.INRA official, personal interview, July 1990, Granada.
21.MIDINRA was renamed INRA again following the change to the UNO Government.
22.The resulting agreement reiterated the original allocations and an end was put to the 
historical ambiguity of the respective land areas by establishing and fixing boundaries.
23.Based on interviews with local residents and in discussions during an assembly meeting 
in a CCS cooperative in Nancimi.
24.Wilfredo Espinoza, personal interview, Sanchez II, July 1992.
25.The extremity of the political polarity was manifest in the immediate aftermath of the 
elections when local activities, including the marketplace and schooling, became physically 
divided between Sandinistas and UNO supporters and was accompanied by violent 
confrontations. As an indication of their severity, such incidents reached national news 
coverage. Conflict was experienced in every aspect of life: the women who had at one 
time grouped together to sell cooked food on Tola’s central park divided and went to 
opposite corners of Tola’s central square: and UNO teachers and students withdrew from 
the education institute to establish their own makeshift centre for learning. Sandinista 
teachers then went on strike to protest to the community at the situation and in a 
confrontation with UNO supporters one young teacher was attacked. The event was such 
concern with the government that a top minister came to Tola, in an attempt to reconcile 
the two fractious groups and the attacker was found guilty.
26.Ernesto Ortega, mayor of San Marcos, personal interview June 1992.
27.Following the change of government the authorities began to demand rent for the 
house, an issue which was still being contended in June 1992.
28.As an immediate consequence there was an increased incidence of intestinal infections 
and diarrhoea, from which, within four months, the two year old daughter of a cooperative 
member died.
29.He was the husband of the current President of Nicaragua, Violeta Chamorro.
SO.From personal interviews with MIDINRA personal, San Marcos and various founding 
members of the cooperative, February 1990 - June 1991.
31.Personal interview Agosto Espinoza, UCA president, San Marcos, March 1990.
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32.Juan Galan, president UNAG, IVth region, personal interview, March 1990.
33.Perhaps this constitutes a social dimension to the differentiation between cooperative 
members and poor peasants, defined by the social relations of production.
34.Based on interviews with UNO supporters from La Chona.
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Chapter 6
CORN, COWS AND COFFEE: 
COLLECTIVE PRODUCTION AND ECONOMY
The productive and economic activities of the cooperatives are the focus of this chapter. 
Their analysis is basic to our understanding of participation for several reasons. Firstly, 
they constitute the material basis of the cooperatives and as such must be explored since 
they represent factors other than participation which influence the viability of the 
cooperatives. That is, they are the complementarities of participation whose influence on 
the overall performance of the cooperative must be identified. Secondly, the examination 
of these aspects enables us to establish the material basis of membership and provides a 
basis from which to assess the role of subjective values and consciousness as a factor 
influencing membership. Thirdly, although the generalities of state intervention were 
noted in Chapter 4, here we need to identify the precise nature and extent of state 
intervention as it related to each cooperative case. This will serve to enhance our 
understanding the cooperative’s collective strategy towards external agents.
I German Pomares 
II Cooperative production and economy
As a CAS cooperative, the land in German Pomares (GP) was worked collectively by the 
members. Each member also had access to individual plots, the sizes of which were 
determined according to need and capacity to work them. GP produced for consumption, 
the domestic market and export. It produced beans, sorghum, plantains and cattle. 
Twenty manzanas^ were dedicated to sorghum production, approximately sixty manzanas 
for beans and fifty manzanas for plantain cultivation. The rest of the land was left as 
pasture to support four hundred head of cattle throughout the year, although during the 
summer months between three and four hundred manzanas of this land was seasonally 
"loaned" to the residents of the neighbouring communities for sowing.
As regards the cooperative’s agricultural equipment: it had five tractors, two lorries, 
one trailer, two ploughs and forty spray pumps. The larger items had been purchased 
during the early 1980s at a time of favourable credit and an irrigation system was bought
183
during the research period with money sent by a Puerto Rican solidarity brigade which 
had stayed on the cooperative for a couple of weeks the previous year. Other equipment 
or machinery which the cooperative required was lent or rented from local producers, such 
as the combine harvester loaned at discount rates from a large-scale Nancimi-based 
producer who in turn borrowed equipment from GP. The cooperative even had an 
exchange arrangement with this producer which provided a mutually beneficial solution 
to peak labour demands. Here, the members provided a workforce for him during the 
busy harvest period and likewise used his employees for their peak periods. Machinery 
and equipment were less often exchanged with the Union of Agricultural Cooperatives 
(UCA), within the municipality.
In 1982, one year after the cooperative was formed, GP had appealed to the state 
for support to produce cattle. The proposal was rejected by MIDINRA which at the time 
was promoting basic grain production within the cooperative sector. However, in 1984 
after the change in national policy and following a local feasibility study conducted by the 
ministry and UNAG, the cattle project was approved and financed. This experience of 
state intervention made the leadership wary of its advice and they saw officers as too 
remote from the local conditions of the cooperative.
Nonetheless, GP was a cooperative which had been prioritized by the state in the 
Cooperative Strategy, as described in Chapter 4, in order that it operate as a development 
pole to encourage the organisation of neighbouring producers into cooperatives and 
disseminate new production techniques. At the time of the study, the cooperative 
continued as a major recipient of technical attention from MIDINRA which maintained 
a regular weekly presence on the cooperative. For instance, when the cooperative reported 
evidence of disease amongst its plantain crop MIDINRA responded quickly and within 
days a group had arrived which included local officials and two Dutch agronomists from 
Managua who came to examine the plants and recommend remedial action. This technical 
team also brought a generator and projector in order to show an educational film about 
the benefits of reforestation, biological pest control and crop diversification. Within 
weeks, the team had initiated a pilot reforestation project on the cooperative with the 
objectives of improving soils and providing an alternative product for commercialisation. 
The MIDINRA also managed fifteen manzanas of the cooperative’s area which it had 
under an experimental bean project in which two strains were being compared. The
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ministry assumed the production costs and regularly monitored the crop while the
cooperative provided labour and retained the harvest.
Throughout the 1980s the cooperative had increased its financial independence. By
1991 it had reached complete independence, giving rise to a situation which amused
members. They laughed to consider the irony that at a time when other cooperatives were
being denied credit, the bank came:
"..knocking on the door to ask if we’d like to borrow money and to suggest 
things that we might need so as to borrow money because they know that we 
are excellent customers."^
This financial autonomy was to give the cooperative an enormous advantage in the context
of restricted loans and removed credit subsidies which characterised the first economic
policies of the incoming UNO Government of Violeta Chamorro.
During the research period, the cooperative’s produce was either sold, consumed or
sold to the state commercial monopolies. Cattle were sold to the state abattoir in Rivas
and, approximately two or three times a year when the cooperative obtained permission
from the state, a cow was slaughtered and the meat was divided between members.
Similarly, sorghum and beans were sold to ENABAS after members received a share of
the harvest. The effect of the liberated markets of post 1988 period made the plantains
a lucrative crop. In response, the area of the crop was expanded and the produce was sold
to local merchants or directly to Managua’s "Oriental or Eastern Market.
Milk - potentially the most lucrative product - was not commercialised. Instead, it
was distributed amongst the members who were each guaranteed a litre a day and was
sold to the community at half its commercial price. Members explained that this was
because "the cooperative wanted to help the community", a statement which implies that
the cooperative did not operate within a purely capitalistic logic. Although leaders
reported that any significant surplus was sold in Rivas this never occurred during the
research period. Instead, when a small quantity was left over it was sold to a local cheese
maker. However, this arrangement was halted abruptly once she had made public her
voting preference for the UNO.
In the absence of data concerning the relative productivity and economic efficiency
of the cooperative compared with other productive units, the observation of the Tola-based
BND officer who had an intimate knowledge of all the cooperatives in the municipality
is valuable:
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"The German Pomares capitalises too much of its profits and doesn’t distribute 
sufficient income to the members. The standard of living of the members is 
very poor compared with other cooperatives, even though its means of 
production are good."^
He also noted that GP had the best potential to be a successful capitalist enterprise of all
the cooperatives in the municipality but that because of its military, political and social
activities "its profitability was reduced." As we saw in relation to milk production, profit
maximisation was clearly not its primary objective.
The cooperative also occasionally bartered: in 1988, as part of the worker-peasant
alliance forged by the FSLN, the cooperative started to exchange beef and plantains for
soap and cooking oil which it obtained at reduced prices from the sea port at San Juan del
Sur. In addition, it exchanged plantains for cheap sugar with workers from the Benjamin
Zeledon sugar refinery near Rivas. The cooperative also sold cheaply or donated plantains
to the local teachers in the ANDEN union, to employees of MIDINRA and hospital
workers in Rivas as a concrete expression of its solidarity with local state employees. It
sold plantains cheaply or gave them to poor local families who faced particular difficult
circumstances.
Collective production in GP was carried out by five work commissions. Members 
were placed in a commission at the discretion of the production officer and, unless 
personal conflicts erupted or transference for other reasons was requested, these remained 
permanent groups. One of the women, Amanda, was incorporated into one of the 
production teams and fulfilled all the tasks except the most vigorous activity: slashing. 
One work group, the cattle commission, was different from the others because its sole task 
was to attend to and milk the animals. All other agricultural tasks were carried out by the 
other commissions. In addition, there were the following specific posts. One was 
occupied by a member who worked in a production commission but also served as the 
mechanic when the machines broke down. Also, the two eldest male members worked 
a full seven day week as guards patrolling the cooperative’s land and perimeter to prevent 
theft. The second woman, Auzena, was based in the hacienda where she cleaned it. This 
post had been created following a visit from the Ministry of Health (MINSA) which had 
insisted that the cooperative maintain the hacienda clean at all times.
At any one time during the research period between five and eleven men were 
temporarily absent on active reserve duty. This was not atypical, indeed from the mid-
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1980s onwards the cooperative had not operated with its full membership present. Since 
1984, during the escalation of incursions into Nicaragua by the Contra from bases in Costa 
Rica, there was a "militarisation of the cooperative". From then on until 1987 - which 
marked the end of the national state of emergency - as many as fifty members of the 
cooperative were mobilised in defence at any one time. This left only thirty (heavily 
armed) cooperativistas working in production together with local members of the 
Sandinista Youth mass organisation and individual producers who had been mobilised to 
substitute for the absent members. This zealous military commitment had earned the 
cooperative a reputation within the region as a "vanguard cooperative".
Not only did the military activities of the members hinder the economic 
consolidation of the cooperative during this period, there was also an accompanying FSLN 
takeover of the cooperative. The local party delegate described this as entailing:
".. a direct intervention in the cooperative, with orders coming only from
above."
Although this intervention was channelled via those socios who had already organised as 
Sandinistas into a party cell within the cooperative, local observers from different social 
sectors noted that it led to a "closing of the democratic space". The cooperative’s 
integration into the military and FSLN structures as the war effort intensified thwarted the 
development of its incipient democratic practices, restricted its autonomy and had a lasting 
impact on the nature of participation emerging there, as becomes clear in subsequent 
chapters.
Members working in production teams met at the hacienda at 6.00am. They came 
from all directions by horseback or on foot: some walking up to seven kilometres from 
their home. They wore loose cotton clothing (mostly army fatigues), carried long 
machetes and each had a plastic container full of water tied with rope to their makeshift 
or army provision belts. After role call they would set off in their respective commissions 
to embark on the tasks assigned them for the day. The cattle commission was different. 
Its members started their day at 4.30am when they started to round-up the animals for 
milking into one of the three corrals on the cooperative. Local people, mainly young 
children and women, arrived at between 5.30 - 6.00am to buy the milk, some having also 
walked up to seven kilometres distance.
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In general, everyone except those guarding the crops, finished work at 11.00am. 
They sometimes finished earlier but rarely worked until noon except during the harvest 
of beans, com and sorghum when members worked intensively, spending up to three 
continuous days at the cooperative. This was in order to bring in the crops before the 
weather changed and to reduce production costs, since the combine harvester they used 
was rented at a daily rate. Many attributed the short working which characterised all but 
these peak periods of intense labour, to the intolerable heat of the noon-day sun but 
founder members reported that the length of their working day had progressively 
decreased over the years. During the afternoons and Sundays, members were free to 
attend their individual plots.
12 Individual and family needs
At the time of research, each member was entitled to an individual plot on the 
cooperative’s land which he or she took according to need and capacity to work. Of those 
interviewed, the average area taken was three quarters of a manzana (the equivalent of one 
hectare) although a couple of members had two manzanas. Five interviewees had chosen 
not to have a plot of their own. Of these two were leaders who did not have the time to 
dedicate to it. The others who had not taken the opportunity to have a plot stated that it 
was because they did not have children old enough nor other family members who could 
help them attend it. Both women, Amanda (37, a single mother with six children) and 
Auzena (38 with four children and the partner of a current socio), had plots on which they 
worked in the afternoons, assisted by their eldest children and in the case of the latter, her 
partner.
Members selected plots near or adjacent to their homes for the obvious advantages 
accrued from proximity for working and keeping guard of the crops: invariably maize and 
beans. These plots were attended by their family, most typically their spouse, children or 
in some cases siblings or parents. To this extent, the plots facilitated the integration of 
family labour into the productive process, thereby overcoming one of the main problems 
associated with the totally collectivised model of cooperative. These plots accommodated 
greater flexibility regarding the different needs and circumstances of members’ families 
and even enabled those without immediate close family to arrange for extended family 
members to assist.
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At key points in the agricultural calendar, such as sowing and harvesting, individuals 
were granted permission to work for a few days on their own plots. This represented an 
attempt to manage the dual productive organisation within the cooperatives. It also 
necessitated serious application of the rules which stated that no member should dedicate 
time to individual production during the days and times allocated to collective production. 
However, nine months after the elections, GP de-collectivised an area of its land and its 
cattle, maintaining the plantains under collective production. In an affirmation of the 
significance of a cohesiveness between some of its members, a nucleus of eighteen 
members of the cooperative (including many of the founders) continued to work their 
basic grain productive as a collective.
Favourable weather and intensive labour inputs ensured a good harvest on these 
individual plots. Production was most remarkable for those who had attended technical 
courses on agricultural production. This produce was mainly used for family 
consumption, although eight interviewees claimed they were able to sell some of their 
produce in the local market. An impressive example was set by Gilberto who had recently 
been able to buy a television from the proceeds of an abundant harvest of com produced 
on the plot. Although Gilberto had been the cooperative’s president in previous years, 
there was no evidence nor rumours - even in the community typically rife with gossip and 
suspicion - to suggest that his takings were associated with corrupt dealings.
Cooperative members each received a weekly amount of cash, referred to as 
"economic assistance" which during the research period amounted to the equivalent of 
US$2 weekly. Proceeds from the sale of produce, once any outstanding debts to the bank 
had been cancelled, were also divided. The sale of cattle in 1989 meant that members 
received between US$50-150 and from the sale of grains from between US$20-50, 
according to their share. The research period coincided with the pregnancy of Auzena 
who continued to receive her economic assistance during her two months maternity leave: 
a rare situation according to other documentation which indicates that few cooperatives 
in Nicaragua were ever sufficiently economically established to provide women with 
support for pre- and post-natal leave (Paz et al, 1989).
The cooperative met other needs. Members were entitled to wood to constmct one 
house and to collect firewood for family cooking purposes. The cooperative had assisted 
flood victims to reconstruct their houses and, through assistance from UNAG, had
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obtained zinc roofing for them. Members’ medical expenses were also covered by the 
cooperative which on one occasion included a pair of glasses for one of them. Small 
monetary loans were also available to members who had unexpected problems. Collective 
transportation was also used to take family members for emergency medical attention and 
the cooperative paid the funeral expenses of deceased members and their immediate 
family. As such, the cooperative provided a collective solution to meeting individual and 
family needs which had previously been sought through traditional social networks such 
as families, friends and compadres.
II Pedro Joaquin Chamorro 
III Cooperative production and economy
The total land of PJCh was three hundred and eighty nine manzanas^, of which two 
hundred and forty nine were dedicated to coffee production, seventy were forested, fifty 
manzanas were used for pasture and twenty, for producing basic grains. Its equipment 
included a tractor, a lorry, a trailer and a portable tank, machetes and portable sprays. Its 
buildings included seven "houses", a bam and a shed. It also collectively owned four 
horses and four oxen (UNAG San Marcos, 1987). The lorry had been bought in 1987 by 
the members at the time who had pooled their annual profits. It had continued in use as 
the means of collective transport for the entire cooperative. In 1990 it was sold and the 
proceeds were divided between the original shareholders, including ex-members who 
returned to receive their share. A new lorry was then purchased using the cooperative’s 
capital. The eighty six manzanas located at the San Jorge site were under "technified" 
production, meaning that agrochemical fertilisers and pesticides were applied to boost 
yields. Another one hundred and sixty three manzanas were under "artisan" production 
at the Santa Maxima which depended on intensive labour and yielded less coffee per 
manzana.
Coffee production was financed by the BND. The bank provided credit, based on 
the estimated production costs, including the weekly "economic assistance" for the 
members and the labour costs for between two hundred and two hundred and fifty pickers 
who were contracted during the harvest. This debt was cancelled when the coffee was 
delivered to the state agency ENCAFE, for processing.
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Although the cooperative reported that 100% of its coffee production was sold to 
ENCAFE, once the debt to the BND had been cancelled, the surplus was sold for the best 
price: an unofficial practice since it encouraged speculation. During the research period 
145 sacks were sold to a local merchant, the father-in-law of Omar, the cooperative’s 
production officer. He offered double the state price: a price differential which led two 
of the leaders to complain that:
"As a coffee cooperative the government goes against us and robs us."
This grievance was based on the high proportion of value of the coffee appropriated by 
the state. It was exacerbated by the fact that the priorities of the San Marcos MIDINRA 
office were to promote non-traditional production in the zone (in conjunction with a 
massive EC-promoted project) made worse since cooperative leaders were convinced that 
their production levels would have increased had technical assistance been available to 
them. While it was not provided by MIDINRA neither could it be offered by the UCA 
since this had limited services and anyway was concentrating on accounting services 
during that stage of its development. However, towards the latter period of research the 
UCA began to offer processing services and provide producers with more favourable 
prices. In 1991 it purchased a processing plant and gained access to markets in Europe 
via the national cooperative council, FENACOOP^.
Other cooperative needs were also fulfilled through the UCA, not the state. Since 
1986 the UCA had secured affiliated cooperatives with the supply of basic products 
provided from ENABAS and in 1989, after a struggle with the UNAG national leadership 
over access to its products and the right to control the Tienda Campesina directly, it 
gained access to ECODEPA products. Furthermore, in March 1990, the UCA also became 
a retail outlet for agrochemicals and machinery when the state monopoly on PROAGRO 
was eventually surrendered. Thus UCA also provided transport but this was an 
underutilised and inappropriate service since many of the cooperatives - including PJCh - 
had their own transport or used that provided by ENCAFE.
As with GP, the PJCh also made collective use of other resources. Wood from its 
forest areas was collected and taken for sale in Masaya weekly. Legally this was 
supposed to comprise only "dead wood" but the cooperative had a history of over- 
exploiting its forestry resources. Several years previously it had been fined by IRENA, 
the state agency for natural resource management, for selling live wood (ironically, to the
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State tourist agency for the construction o f a coastal resort). This action had temporarily 
halted the extraction o f wood for construction.
Production in PJCh was also carried out on collectivized land, with a small amount 
allocated for individual plots for the production of basic grains. It was undertaken by four 
work commissions, three of which contained men while one was comprised of women 
only. Although work was organised in these separate brigades, women were totally 
integrated into the productive process, a factor facilitated by the nature of the labour 
processes involved in coffee production which together with basic grain production, was 
conducive to the incorporation of female labour (Paz et al, 1989).
Amongst the ten women members interviewed, there were two single and childless 
women who were both daughters of members; one was single with three children and who 
was also the daughter of members; seven had partners who were male socios, all of whom 
had children of varying ages, including some who were adult and also cooperative 
members. Those women with small children either left them with other children in the 
house or took them to the coffee where they were able to keep an eye on them while they 
worked.
A typical day can be described as follows. Members congregated at 6.00am at the 
Santa Maxima hacienda on the four mornings they worked there. The women would have 
risen at 4.00am in order to fulfil domestic duties, such as cook the breakfast, feed the 
children and prepare the evening meal. Those who lived beyond the finca were collected 
by trailer, although sometimes they would have to walk the one and a half hour journey. 
Then all the members went off in their corresponding commissions to the area or task 
assigned to them in accordance with the agreed production plan. A similar work routine 
was followed on the days when the members worked at the San Jorge site, the rendezvous 
then being one of the cooperative houses at the entrance to this finca to which residents 
from Santa Maxima arrived by lorry.
Members returned from working amongst the coffee to the hacienda between 12.00 
and 1.00pm for lunch. As with GP, founders reported that their days had become 
progressively shorter. Evidently, this was not because efficiency was increased but 
because members’ motivation was reduced and this was either because poor economic 
returns had hampered incentives or the unfavourable national economic context had made 
collectived production seem less logical. After the election, when some of the coffee area
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was de-collectivised, members all worked longer hours and said themselves that the 
division of the land had increased their incentive to work.
During the harvest, the tractor and trailer went to various towns within the 
municipality in order to collect seasonal workers. Ideally, they required between 200-250 
workers but in the context of improved access to land and rental arrangements and 
permanent employment on state farms the task of finding workers prepared to work 
became progressively more difficult and required that they go further afield. Some of 
these seasonal workers stayed in the vacant rooms of the encampment or compound for 
the duration of the harvest.
112 Individual and family needs
Until 1986, the cooperative had designated an area for basic grain production which was 
also worked collectively. This had since been divided into small individual plots for those 
members based in or near Santa Maxima. Here all members but Aura, the single mother, 
worked a plot. Meanwhile, those on or near San Jorge were entitled to a plot on that 
finca. Others, such as Benigno who lived at the first house near the main road, had made 
his own arrangement with his neighbours who had unconditionally permitted him access 
to a small plot on their own cooperative. On average, members had between a quarter and 
one manzana of land on which to produce maize and beans, depending on their capacity 
and need. These plots were small and were particularly unsatisfactory given the low 
productivity and unsuitability of the land for basic grain production. Nonetheless, as with 
GP, access to these plots enabled individual members to incorporate their family labour 
into the productive processes. As with GP, members were also given leave on request in 
order to attend their plots for the particularly important times during the agricultural 
calendar. In cases where both partners were members, they would alternate their work, 
attending each plot together. In the case of the three single women, either their fathers 
or brothers helped them or they paid a male colleague to work on it for them. Unusually, 
Calero, who had a plot on the San Jorge finca, occasionally paid for labourers to work his 
plot: a fact he vehemently denied (since plot size was defined according to the capacity 
to work it) but was also overlooked by the cooperative’s directive. However, no-one 
worked as hard on their plots as Omar, the production officer, whose daily input of
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approximately three hours rewarded him with the best crop of beans and maize. Two 
households, including Omar’s, kept chickens.
In addition to produce from individual plots, other resources from the cooperative 
fulfilled family needs. The plantains, grown to provide shade for the coffee, supplied fruit 
and the forests yielded a source of firewood. In the immediate post-election scenario 
when there was no credit available members began large-scale felling of live timber as 
their only source of income at the time^.
After the harvest, members received their share of the profits which amounted to 
between US$70-150 depending on work attendance. In addition, they received a small 
weekly income of "economic assistance" which was the equivalent of US$3 per week at 
the beginning of the research although this was subsequently reduced and then abandoned 
in the first months of the UNO Government. Clearly, this provision this small 
remuneration favoured situations where both partners were integrated. It enabled families 
to buy cheese and meat once a week. The right for women to receive two months 
maternity subsidy was established in the regulations although this was constantly being 
reviewed and was finally revoked in the aftermath of the elections. The family of the 
successful hunter might occasionally eat the meat and eggs of iguana or lizard from the 
forest although because of their increasing rarity, these became the products of hours of 
patience. The diet for those who had family outside the cooperative was varied by trips 
home: those with families in La Concepcion, Masaya, returned from visits with oranges 
and lemons and those from Dulce Nombre and Las Molinas, with meat and eggs.
At the beginning of the research period, the cooperative purchased collectively basic 
products for family consumption using their credit facility, through the UCA, namely soap, 
rice and oil. This practice was later abandoned since members agreed that it was 
preferable that each have direct control over their diminishing purchasing power and 
instead bought things from the local market. Clothes were rarely purchased but when they 
were it was from the market in Diriamba, not the UCA shop which had an inappropriate 
and relatively expensive selection.
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Ill The material basis of membership
As previously stated, questions relating to the material basis of membership have to be 
examined because they reveal the link between economic viability and participation.
n il Social empowerment
The extent to which these cooperatives met individual and family needs leads us to 
consider the dimension of empowerment which relates to social power as conceptualised 
in Chapter 1 and refers to the increased access of households to the bases of production, 
including material and information resources.
Essentially, the creation of these cooperatives meant that the new social relations of 
production had eliminated exploitation for the (fifty to sixty) families they supported. 
Through the cooperatives’ access to land, technology, basic grains, credit, loans and social 
assistance the cooperatives provided collective solutions to many of the needs of members. 
Also, the primary limitation of the CAS, as collectivised production which incorporated 
only individual members within a household into the productive process, was partially 
addressed by having individual plots on which family members could work. Not only did 
this arrangement secure them with access to land but also enabled them to benefit from 
other collective resources available to the cooperative, such as chemical inputs, equipment 
and transport which were readily available for their use on their individual plots. Also an 
individual was able to apply new techniques and knowledge acquired through cooperative 
membership to the benefit of production on his own plot, although the extent to which 
individuals were able to take advantage of these resources varied according to individual 
circumstance and ability. This could increase productivity and in some instances meant 
that produce could be marketed. Although individual plots in PJCh were not as 
productive as those in GP, family households where both partners were members had the 
benefit of a double income. As such, the cooperatives can be seen to have contributed 
towards the social empowerment of the household of members, although evidence suggests 
that under collectivised production members were not working, for whatever reason, to 
their maximum productivity.
Since the integration of women was not dependent on an individual being the head 
of household, married women (a term which is used loosely here since few were formally 
married) as well as the single women could integrate independently from and formally
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equal to men. This gave them year round access to the productive process rather than the 
seasonal labour in which the majority had previously been employed. For those who had 
not previously been working in social production it provided them with their first 
opportunity to integrate into paid work. Their incorporation into extra-domestic 
production on an equal basis to men gave them the possibilities for a better return for their 
work, access to basic grains and an ability to resolve the social problems of the family. 
This was particularly valuable for single women with children: Amanda in GP and Aura 
in PJCh. Women’s integration into production fulfilled one dimension of their practical 
needs, namely that of securing a material basis for subsistence independent from men. As 
such, it constitutes one element of their social empowerment. Also, in the case of PJCh, 
other practical needs were provided by the cooperative, such as access to drinking water 
and its collective transport secured women with access to medical treatment for their 
families.
However, given the sexual division of labour women’s incorporation into the 
productive process was not equal. Before and following a full day’s work they were faced 
with having to complete the domestic tasks which men refused to undertake or share. The 
absence of collective infrastructural support which could reduce the burden of their 
socially ascribed tasks - that of housework and child care - rendered their working day 
longer than that of the men. On average they worked for fifteen hours. According to 
Padilla et al (1987) the absence of such collective solutions to the socially ascribed tasks 
of women was a serious barrier to more women joining cooperatives. It is interesting 
to note that after the elections when parts of the coffee area of PJCh were de-collectivised, 
women whose partners were also members withdrew from productive activities and 
concentrated on the reproductive tasks of the home. These tasks had become more of a 
burden in the context of reduced credit availability. The cooperative had to restrict use of 
the collective transport and could not obtain drinking water so, where possible it was to 
be boiled, a process which was time consuming. The absence of clean water caused an 
increase in maternal and child illness and the closure of local medical centres and the 
exorbitant prices of medicine (following the UNO policies for reducing state expenditure) 
meant it went untreated. Those who relinquished their productive responsibilities were 
relieved that it meant their days was a little less exhausting. These points make clear the
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importance o f addressing the practical gender interests o f women in order to facilitate their 
incorporation into the productive process.
III2 Membership gains
In this section the relationship between economic viability and participation is examined 
in reference to individual membership motivation as it related to joining the cooperative 
as well as staying during periods of economic hardship.
The following refers to Figure 11 which shows the main reasons why members 
joined the cooperatives. There was no significant difference in responses between the two 
cooperatives.
Reasons for joining cooperative
(58 members)
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Figure 11
Here members could give more than one answer and most respondents gave access to 
"land" and "work" as the main reasons why they joined the cooperative (27% and 29% 
o f the responses respectively), thereby reflecting the dual nature o f the historical demands 
of the Nicaraguan peasantry. An additional 8% of responses (corresponding to the "other" 
category) claimed that they joined to secure a future for their children or because the
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cooperative gained them access to state support. As such, these are also economically 
motivated.
Although the primary motivation for men and women to join the cooperative was 
the need to resolve material problems, some joined the cooperatives for other reasons. 
Another 8% of respondents appearing in the "organisation" category stated that they joined 
because they liked organisational work. These peasants came to the cooperative with prior 
experience in social organisation within the CDC, ATC or other cooperatives. As 
indicated from the "family" category, where individuals had family members already 
integrated joining was made more attractive.
Although national documentation had indicated that the standard of living for 
cooperative members during the early and mid-1980s was better than poor individual 
peasant producers, there was little evidence at the time of research to distinguish 
cooperative members from their poor and landless contemporaries. Nonetheless, members 
themselves cited the receipt of the weekly economic assistance throughout the year as the 
most significant financial difference. They also pointed to that advantages of the "social 
salary" provided by the cooperatives such as productive technology, transportation, water 
and electricity. In GP, access to the materials to construct a house was another benefit. 
In PJCh, members could not build their own houses although they did use the existing 
buildings. Those families living in the original buildings of the hacienda were provided 
with relatively comfortable accommodation while the others in the encampment had poor 
housing which was too small to accommodate any more than a few family members. The 
size of households was significantly smaller in PJCh than in GP as a consequence. 
Members in GP also pointed to their improved access to a greater variety of food stuffs, 
in particular their daily quota of milk which improved the nutritional status of their 
families’ diet.
The high level of financial autonomy of GP, as well as its basis grain production, 
rendered its members relatively protected from the economic adjustment reforms. This 
was not so in PJCh which was a primary agroexport producer and, given the context of 
dramatic credit restrictions following adjustment measures, the standard of living for 
members fell. Nonetheless, the overall opinion that the cooperatives had improved the 
conditions of life prevailed and was intricately bound up with theological interpretations. 
Members from both cooperatives considered that God blessed their cooperatives because
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the conditions for campesinos had improved and because they believed he v^as ultimately 
concerned for their welfare^. It is also pertinent at this point to note the tendency 
observed by Houtart and Lemercinier (1992) for organised campesinos to transpose the 
notion of divine hierarchy onto the Sandinista Government because it had bestowed good 
on them. This interpretation gains some credibility in the light of the apparent loss of 
faith of two interviewees from OP following the electoral defeat of the FSLN. They had 
previously professed to being devout Catholics prior to the elections*.
Members also referred to the qualitative improvements associated with cooperative 
life and compared their situation under Somoza or with peasants who were not organised. 
Apart from the generalised human rights, political freedoms and access to education and 
health services, they specified that the year-round and guaranteed access to work and land 
had made a substantial difference to the quality of their lives. For those in PJCh in 
particular, joining the cooperative had meant an end to the physical drudgery of the 
constant search for work and the endless trek to it: many had previously had to walk 
single journeys of three hours. Founders in both cooperatives considered that not having 
"someone who bossed you around" was another appeal. This is a particularly interesting 
comment since it suggests that they did not perceive the state to be their new masters.
Members views on the material and organisational aspects of collective production 
became manifest when they were asked what they liked about it. These findings are 
presented in Figure 12, but must be treated with some caution since only one respondent 
was explicit in stating that he did not like collective production, despite the obvious 
preference of the majority for more individual forms of production given the rapid process 
of de-collectivisation after February 1990. Nonetheless, the findings reiterate those 
indicated above because they show that members perceived cooperatives as being more 
productive than individual production given the context of access to technology, training 
and preferential credit. Unpredictably, this reason was relatively more important for those 
in OP than in PJCh.
This reason was followed by the "mutual support" members considered the 
cooperative afforded them. This reason was particularly important (and statistically more 
significant) for women and is explicable since women face the unforeseen problems that 
motherhood brings which cooperative membership could assist in resolving. Women also 
stressed the supportiveness of solidarity from working in a group with other women
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although. Some men also valued the social advantages from collective production, such 
that:
"..when ill you can earn while you recover. Before there was just no pay"
Reasons for liking collective work
(57 members)
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Figure 12
Membership was valued for explicitly ideological and "political objectives" (see 
Figure 12) by those who had previously been involved in the struggle for the land, had 
been organised in the ATC or in other cooperatives before. These individuals stressed the 
importance o f cooperatives in relation to the movement of peasant liberation in 
unambiguous terms: "because they were in the plan of struggle." For these people - and 
not all were militants of the FSLN - the cooperatives represented an integral and 
continuous expression of the campesino 's historic struggle for land, credit and markets. 
Here, cooperatives were also seen to endow members with an organisational advantage 
which enhanced their own capacity to resolve problems and enabled them to defend their 
interests politically, as the following comment from Omar from PJCh indicates:
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"While the difference between our material standard of living is not so great 
we are more advanced in our ability to resolve problems which enables us to 
go forward and improve."
This reason (which complements the findings in Figure 11 where collective organisation
comprised a major motivation for people to join^) demonstrates an awareness of the
individuals themselves of the positive benefits and increased empowerment derived from
organisation.
These findings serve to indicate that while material factors were the motivating force
of membership, providing the "take-off for participation, cooperative membership was
not just about meeting economic needs: it was also social and ideological values. Yet,
these were not values shared by all campesinos in similar circumstances since other
peasants did not necessarily want to join. By contrast they calculated the "costs"
associated with membership which - as non-members and members alike were able to
agree - included the commitment to military action and to a full six-day week and regular
hours. It also included the necessity of deferring trust in fellow campesinos as is
suggested by the following comment of one ex-member who left after allegedly witnessing
another steal two sacks of grain during the harvest and:
"...decided that I couldn’t work with the constant suspicion that fellow socios 
were cheating me".
Other perceived costs related to the flip side of the "supportive" feature of collectivized 
production as perceived by its members. Whereas the cooperative was able to protect 
individuals during personal and family crises, it also enabled a few individuals to "free- 
ride" and reap its benefits. This was a negative aspect that members themselves conceded. 
This phenomenon was termed chineado (mollycoddled) in the colloquialism of both 
cooperatives and presented a repeated problem and potential area for conflict amongst 
members. For example in GP, members mentioned (in confidence) Miguel as one man 
in particular who they thought would be unable to eke a living without the cooperative’s 
support, given his compulsive smoking and drinking on which he notoriously squandered 
his money. Similarly, alcholism involving prolonged periods of absenteeism comprised 
a case of free-riding.
The influence of subjective factors in membership is further evident from the 
voluntary departure of some members throughout the history of the two cooperatives in
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response to the periods of particular economic hardship which had occurred throughout
the history of the cooperatives. Other members explained that:
the economic state of the cooperative meant that some aren’t prepared to 
work for so little.
Despite sharing similar economic circumstance other stayed to confront and endure the 
difficulties in the hope of a better future. In these situations perhaps other subjective 
meanings as they relate to the individuals identity with the land are influential.
Reasons for feeling land belongs
to members (54 members)
German Pomares Pedro J Chamorro
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Figure 13
Here, the findings shown in Figure 13 are useful since they reveal the different 
reasons and experiences which led individuals to feel that the land belonged to them. This 
is crucial since it is impossible to understand the decisions and behaviour of the 
Nicaraguan peasantry without recognising that these are rooted in reference to anticipated 
family needs of the future (CIERA, 1985:21). Although four members stated that they 
did not consider the land belonged to them (two were long-term members), the others felt
202
that it and a few qualified this with the proviso that this only applied "whilst working" on 
it. More interestingly, Figure 13 indicates that other factors and experiences generated this 
sense of belonging. Thus, the personal sacrifice and commitment entailed in the "struggle" 
for the land and to establish the cooperative was the primary reason why founders 
considered the land belonged to them. Others (most notably those in PJCh), asserting that 
the land was theirs because it was "our right" to have it, were either expressing peasant 
notions of the moral justice of what is rightly theirs (Knight, 1992) or were sufficiently 
versed with the principles of the agrarian reform and recognised the land theirs because 
the law established it as such. Finally, a smaller number considered that their contribution 
to the running and "management" of the cooperative made them feel the land was theirs.
While the data in Figure 13 is presented in this chapter because it provides 
complementary information concerning the relative significance of economic motivation 
or subjective values for membership, the extent to which peasants identified with the 
cooperative - and the reasons for that identification - also contributed to shaping the 
participatory process as the subsequent chapters indicate. The findings in Figure 13 are 
also pertinent to our subsequent discussion of empowerment since they indicate that these 
peasants saw the land as rightfully theirs and understood that these claims were legitimised 
by state policy.
Conclusions
Whereas the GP was almost self-sufficient, received good state technical assistance and 
could produce for subsistence, the PJCh increasingly relied on (second level) cooperative 
services and, as a primary agroexport producer, depended on credit from the bank for its 
coffee cultivation. Its high level of commodity exchange rendered members’ income 
vulnerable to shifts in macroeconomic and adjustment policies. These objective realities 
of production and the insertion of the cooperatives into the national economy comprised 
the material conditions of the members’ experiences. They also created the context in 
which individual and group behaviour developed and strategies were sought and in which 
opinions and meanings of their own campesino predicament, the government, state and the 
revolution evolved.
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Clearly, cooperative membership, while materially motivated, was also influenced 
by a range of subjective social and ideological values. This is important since it indicates 
the significance of life experiences other than economic ones which influenced the content 
and dimensions of the social consciousness of the peasantry. The theoretical implication 
of this finding is to eliminate the notion that the ideas of the peasantry are necessarily 
determined by external material circumstances or by external agents or forces. Rather, it 
indicates that they exist and change in complex relation to them (Gutmann, 1993:78). 
Thus, our actor-oriented analysis has so far indicated that the ideas, behaviour and 
consciousness of the subjects of this thesis should not be viewed as the product of an 
external imposition (by an agent or force) but as evolving and developing in response to 
external more distant social and political phenomena.
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Notes to Chapter 6
1.1 manzana = 0.7 hectares, 50 manzanas = 35 hectares.
.Wilfredo Espinoza, personal interview September 1990.
3.David Ruiz, personal interview, END Tola, December 1989.
4.Equivalent to 555 hectares.
5.Although an attractive price of US$125 was offered (instead of the US$60 previously 
received from ENCAFE) the harvest of this first year was the poorest for years, down 
approximately 20% of the production.
6.Confronted with the human tragedy of this reality, local UNAG representatives were 
personally reluctant to intervene despite their commitment to promote IRENA’s policies. 
However, seven months later the state agency was arriving on a weekly basis to inspect 
the state of the trees.
T.This interpretation applied to case of Francisco from PJCh who lamented the material 
situation profoundly. The following remark of Francisco indicates the level of his 
disillusionment:
"When I look at the situation in the life of the cooperatives I don’t and can’t 
believe in a God!"
8.This finding came about when I decided to repeat the questionnaire on two members 
after the elections to see whether responses differed. This found discrepancies only in this 
area of religious belief.
9.Here I believe some responded less out of personal commitment than because it was 
"official" CAS ideology and was the response that best conforms to what they perceived 
to be my expectations.
10.A point raised by members during an assembly in PJCh, February 1990.
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Chapter 7
COOPERATIVE ASSEMBLY: 
PARTICIPATION AND EMPOWERMENT
From here onwards the inquiry moves on to examine the participatory processes 
themselves and it is the function of this chapter to focus on the operational dimensions of 
the political practices and decision-making processes of the cooperative at an aggregate, 
unit level. Thus, it looks to the assembly where all members nominally participated even 
though, as becomes apparent later, it is analytically problematic to disentangle the 
developments occurring within this entity from the phenomenon of cooperative leadership. 
Nonetheless, it provides an opportunity to evaluate current participatory practices in 
relation to previous political experiences, to external intervention and cooperative 
leadership.
Analysis here requires that we attempt to identify the relative influence of various 
forces and agents in shaping participatory processes. This task is enhanced with reference 
to the initial conceptual framework which indicated that the absence of democratic 
traditions in the context of a post-authoritarian regime imposed particular obstacles to the 
development of new political practices. Consequently, here we need to consider how and 
in what way this legacy constrained participation as well as identify the impact of the new 
political agents in Nicaragua, of the mass organisations, FSLN party and state and the 
cooperative responses to them.
Finally, our evaluation of participation within the cooperatives will be undertaken 
in direct reference to the type of participation occurring: to the intensities of the activities 
underway within them and with attention to the degrees of autonomy and control.
I Authoritarianism and subordination: the antecedent
During the Somozan dictatorship (as already noted in Chapter 2) political domination was 
exerted through coercion and the violence of the National Guard - which particularly 
affected the countryside - and by the ideological hegemony of the dictatorship. Under 
such circumstances there were no civil organisations or associations within society or the 
countryside and overt forms of political dissent within Nicaragua were inhibited*. More
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than just anti-participatory, this political system was authoritarian and exclusive. 
Although there is little literature detailing the nature of local or regional power in pre­
revolutionary Nicaragua, the weakness of the Nicaraguan state apparatus during the 
Somozan era - as in other Latin American countries in an earlier period - meant that at 
the local level the hacendados (landlords) exercised their personal power over a region 
which corresponded to the area of influence of the hacienda^. Typically, hacendados 
protected their economic and political interests by upholding the economic, political and 
social order through the use of violence, imposed by private police or in collusion with 
the National Guard. The effect of this systematic use of violence was to silence vocal 
expressions of dissent or opposition as the following and typical comment from a peasant 
suggests:
"During Somoza we were afraid to speak, talk out, or discuss anything."^
Peasant acquiescence in this authoritarian political system (as elsewhere in Latin 
America) was also maintained through a matrix of hierarchical social relations emanating 
from the hacendado to include the direct dependents of the hacienda as well as other 
producers in semi-autonomous farms in the vicinity. As to whether these hacendados 
constituted either caudillos or caciques (the precise meaning of which is disputed in a 
discussion rife with definitions and counter-definitions), it would appear that they 
conformed to the caudillo-hacendados or "strong man", as identified by Wolf (1967). 
According to Wolf (1967) these caudillos, allegedly obsolete in other parts of Latin 
America since the advent of commercial and industrial capital and the expansion of the 
state apparatus, would have persisted in some areas of Nicaragua because of the 
retardation of these developments. In exchange for attempting to obtain benefits for their 
social base, in the form of schools, electricity lines or roads, caudillo-hacendados 
mobilised a mass of peasant support during elections or during factional conflicts against 
opponents. In such a way the hacendados served a political function as a type of mediator 
between the rural inhabitants, the municipal, departmental and national government and 
as such formed an integral part of state power'll a mediating position which gave their 
power its two-way characteristic of linking the state to the people and the people to the 
state via verticalist control.
The social relations between the hacendado and the peasants, his subordinates, were 
structured in patron-client relationships and were manifest in various socio-cultural
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institutions mcXud^ngpatronazgo (paternalism), clientelismo (clientalism) and compadrazgo 
(godfatherhood). These symbolic social relationships subordinated individuals to the 
patron and assured them a measure of material security (such as access to land or loans). 
They also established the basis of cooperation and protection against unforeseen 
circumstances in a violent environment (Bartra, 1975). Violence was commonly exercised 
by the caudillos, the patron or the National Guard against the peasant father who in turn 
used violence against the mother and children. This unilateral verticalist application of 
violence reinforced the social hierarchy and reproduced the notion of the family as one 
based on patriarchal authority. It socialised campesino children through habitus into 
learning the importance of subordination to paternal power and by extension, the necessity 
of obeying their superiors in other social spheres. In this way, peasants leamt not to take 
initiative without authorisation (Perez, 1990) and thus potential threats to the status quo 
were reduced.
In some areas of Nicaragua, perhaps limited to those where agrarian capitalism was 
most advanced^ there were also equivalents of the local popularist leader, the cacique, as 
identified in studies on post-revolutionary Mexico. By contrast to the caudillo-hacendado, 
the cacique can be defined as an essentially local male populist leader who is typically 
(but not essentially) a charismatic leader, has a following and is someone with whom both 
the state and the caudillo have to negotiate (de la Pefia, undated, 2-3). Defined in this 
way, caciquismo constitutes an axis in the structure of mediation between social classes 
since he is linked to the political patrons at a higher level and maintains his power by 
gaining resources from above for the communities he represents (Barta, 1975). There are 
as Lomnitz-Adler indicates (1992), different types of caciques with different kinds of 
power relations and who operate in different positions. In western Nicaragua, there is 
evidence that the leaders of peasant communities, agricultural unions and indigenous 
communities were such caciques who represented the popular classes and fulfilled the 
function of political mediation. This is documented by Gould (1990) who observes how 
they variously accepted, challenged or opposed the actions or policies of local landlords, 
mill owners, regional authorities and the state during the dictatorship. What they had in 
common with each other is that they mediated between the needs of the nation state (or 
private corporation) and the actual on-the-ground situation of the peasantry or workers and 
derived their power from this mediation (Lomnitz-Adler, 1992:296). It is thus significant
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that this area corresponds, as previously noted, to the region of Nicaragua 'where agrarian 
capitalism was most mature. Here the social contradictions were greatest and a political 
niche created for individuals who fulfilled this function. As with the caudillo-hacendado, 
the social relationship of the cacique and his followers were expressed through the vertical 
clientist relationships, such as compadrazgo.
Similarly, the dominant social order was perpetuated because campesinos would 
typically vote for the party to whom their landlord was loyal, thereby following the voting 
preference of their parents^. The presence of the National Guard at voting stations ensured 
that disapproval of the dictatorship could not be registered via the electoral process and 
in some areas meant that no votes were made against the Somoza (Serra, 1991:47).
Thus the traditional Liberal/ Conservative antagonisms which divided the peasantry 
were reproduced through generations, creating alliances and enemies between 
communities and villages. But if political loyalities split the peasantry, then other factors 
also served to maintain political hegemony through their effect of weakening the peasantry 
as a social sector. The lack of formal education provided to rural inhabitants denied them 
the basic tools of knowledge and self-improvement further debilitated them. They also 
lacked their own organisations which represented them.
Although there had been sporadic uprisings and protests in response to the 
expansionist demands of the landlords and the state the peasantry were restricted from 
developing into a regional movement by their "localist" consciousness. This refers to the 
political and social horizons of the peasants which are traditionally confined to the area 
corresponding to their communities or villages and the geographical scope of their 
economic activity (Lomnitz-Adler, 1992). Their knowledge of the nation or state in which 
they lived remained uncertain and patchy and as such they were unable to identify the 
relationship between their immediate microcosm and the macrocosm of the political 
system under which they resided. This inhibited them from developing effective political 
action (Hobsbawn, 1973:7-8).
In sum, there were no political mechanisms or social spaces where politics could be 
freely discussed and no alternative ideology with which to articulate effective opposition. 
Nor was there a legitimate organisation or party to represent the socioeconomic and 
political interests of the peasants. There was no democratic tradition of politics or notion 
of consensus and legitimacy as a basis of leadership or government, nor was there
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experience of exercising voice and vote or of selecting leaders.
Against this historical context, the emergence in Nicaragua of the Delegates of the 
Word and Christian base communities provided a forum where economic hardship, social 
problems and politics - framed within the context of religious interpretations - could be 
discussed. This was significant, as we saw in Chapter 2, in initiating a process amongst 
the poor of critical reflection on the reasons for their poverty. Also, in some areas where 
capitalist labour processes were most advanced, the political struggles of the peasantry 
functioned to sap the dictatorship of its ideological legitimacy (Gould, 1990). This was 
followed in some areas of Nicaragua by the work of the FSLN and the ATC in the 
insurrectional movement which provided campesinos with their first exposure to an 
alternative political ideology and an opportunity for co-ordinated and systematic 
involvement in organised political activity and ultimately military action.
Yet, even for those relatively few campesinos who were involved in the insurrection, 
participation was not accompanied automatically by an upsurge in revolutionary 
consciousness. The revolutionary discourse of the FSLN guerilla, whose political 
awareness had been forged through the years in the mountains, clandestine cells or popular 
organisations, could not - as if by a process of political osmosis - penetrate even the cities’ 
factories, least of all the remote rural areas. This meant that for peasants, participation 
within the cooperatives represented a new political experience in a double sense. It 
consisted of an encounter with revolutionary and national discourses and practices as well 
as unfamiliar organisational and decision-making practices. The extent to which these 
encounters and experiences served to empower them is our analytical point of departure.
II General assembly as a forum for participation
As collectivised production cooperatives, these CAS cooperatives required a degree of 
social organisation amongst their constituent membership in order to define how the 
cooperative should develop. This necessitates a mechanism by which the membership can 
propose, discuss and approve issues of collective interest. That forum was the general 
assembly which incorporated all cooperative members. It is therefore an important entity 
for analysis of the cooperative’s participatory processes since the range of participatory 
opportunities were defined within this operational decision-making structure.
210
I ll  Formal guarantees for participation
As previously described, the regulations of both cooperatives included the commitment 
to the principles of democratic control by members. The regulations established internal 
democracy as the rule of one member, one vote. Moreover, they established that the 
individual had both a right and a duty to participate in decision-making within the 
assembly and take office when elected and where qualified with appropriate skills. The 
regulations also established the organisational structures within the cooperatives: the 
general assembly, the directive or management body (henceforth, the leadership) and the 
work commissions. Of these, the general assembly was identified as the "maximum 
authority". Members were required to attend; indeed "participation" was established in the 
regulations as both a right and a duty of all members. This notion of participation, 
perhaps suggestive of a coercive approach, constituted a formal provision for participation 
of members but could only assure the physical presence of members at meetings. The 
assemblies in both cooperatives followed an agenda previously drawn up by the five 
management officers in the leadership who would meet a few hours or the day before. 
Members were free to raise any other issue. Partners of members were not invited to 
attend.
The offices of the leadership in both cooperatives were the same. Their 
responsibilities as defined in the regulations were the following. The president was the 
official representative of the cooperative, supervised all managerial and administrative 
tasks and ensured that everyone adhered to the rules. The vice-president assisted in 
general administration and assumed the role of the presidency in the absence of the 
president. The responsibilities of the production officer entailed planning and organising 
all the collective production tasks, including the work commissions, fertilisation, disease 
control and harvesting. The education officer was responsible for organising the training 
and education of the members. Finally, the task of the defence officer was to organise 
the defence of the cooperative and coordinate with the local battalion to ensure that the 
cooperative fulfilled its national military responsibilities.
These regulations provided a legal framework which guaranteed equality and 
democratic rights between members. However, the two cooperative case studies varied 
in the extent to which they adhered to these formal rules as a consequence of the lack of 
familiarity with these democratic notions as much because of the concentration of power
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within a few individuals.
112 Assembly practices and functions
The follo^ving general descriptions illustrate the nature of the participatory practices 
evolving within the cooperatives. We start first with a typical meeting in GP held on 10 
December 1990. Here, the assembly opened with Santos Nicoya, the president, informing 
the cooperative that an FSLN election campaign demonstration was to be held in Rivas 
later in the month. He and another member, Gilberto Espinoza (a previous president), 
both stressed that it was important for the cooperative to attend to show support for the 
FSLN since GP set an example as a "vanguard cooperative in the IV Region". Pedro 
Aguilar, the mechanic, intervened to reiterate that their political support should be 
expressed by their presence. No other comments were made concerning this issue.
This was followed by Carlos Tenerio, the production officer, who proposed that the 
area under plantain production should be increased and the work commissions reorganised. 
He consulted the assembly for members’ opinions. Since members were free to discuss 
all issues, in this case a generalised discussion ensued, involving eight interventions from 
other members, including ordinary members, who proposed alternative suggestions to 
modify Carlos’ proposal. A collective decision was reached, marked by the absence of 
any verbal objection to the final proposal. This topic marked the end of the agenda, after 
which members were able to raise any further points.
At this point two women, whose husbands were members mobilised in "the reserve" 
at the time, stood up and appealed to the cooperative to give them more food. They 
explained that their families were in a state of "permanent hunger". The assembly listened 
sympathetically but decided to refuse their request. Afterwards, the president then spoke 
to them in what amounted to a private conversation while the meeting broke down. He 
explained to the women the established arrangement for families of mobilised members: 
that they receive 50% of the economic assistance and annual profits. Then, without 
consulting the assembly, Santos promised them personally that they would be given more 
plantains. Family members were rarely present at assemblies since they were not, 
according to the regulations, formally recognised as having the right to the decision­
making processes. The meeting was then readjoumed by Santos. Luis Rivera, the current 
education officer, raised the issue of the MIDINRA-supported bean project and a lively
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debate followed concerning the relative advantages and disadvantages of the existing 
arrangements. Following contributions from four ordinary members, a consensus was 
reached to continue the project as it was until the following season.
Finally, Santos notified the assembly that the solidarity brigade from Puerto Rico, 
which had visited the cooperative the previous year, had sent a sum of US$1,000 to the 
cooperative. He invited the assembly to suggest what they should do with the funds. In 
the absence of any response, he announced that it would be used to buy an irrigation 
system. The meeting concluded with Wilfredo Espinoza, a fellow officer, reading the 
letter which had accompanied the cheque from their Puertorican friends.
We now turn to an assembly in PJCh held on 12 February 1990. This started with 
Lorenzo, the president, who opened the meeting by asking those assembled what should 
be done with the profits for that year: whether they should be invested or distributed 
between the socios. Other members of the leadership proposed that a large proportion be 
used to invest in the cooperative, but were strongly opposed and eventually outvoted - by 
a hand count - by ordinary members who decided that the money should be divided 
between members. A general discussion about the costs and value of the cooperative lorry 
followed. After numerous interventions about the merits of maintaining it, the assembly 
voted to use cooperative funds to buy a new battery. Next, a member requested from the 
cooperative a financial contribution towards the funeral of his niece and permission for 
two days leave so that he could make the necessary arrangements. This was unanimously 
agreed. The leadership then informed the assembly of the travel details which it had 
arranged for the cooperative’s planned visit to Masaya to attend a political rally.
Then Francisco Calero, the defence officer, reminded the men that they should take 
their night-guard duties very seriously and he warned that their recent laxity was a 
potential hazard to the cooperative’s security. In response, various ordinary members 
forwarded suggestions about how to improve the rota to overcome the problems caused 
by the fact that some of the men lived beyond the Santa Maxima finca. A decision was 
reached through consensus, about how to accommodate the duties of those who lived afar. 
Finally, a report was presented by the leadership on the progress of the cooperative’s legal 
documents currently being drawn up by MIDINRA. Since no further items were raised 
by members on invitation, the meeting then finished.
During other assemblies, additional topics included the issue of the cooperatives’
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personnel quotas for the national reserve army; contributions to local community project 
and the application of disciplinary measures. The assemblies also addressed welfare 
issues, such as whether to contribute towards purchasing spectacles for one member, or 
dealing with the sensitive task of responding to a socio, furious with a fellow member 
who he suspected had taken his wife as a lover. Members were never reluctant to attend 
and, as with the commitment to productive tasks, they accepted the rule that each person 
should attend meetings as they had originally agreed on integrating into the cooperative.
Before analysing more systematically the nature of the participatory processes 
occurring within these assemblies a brief mention must be made here of the fact that not 
everyone used the assembly as the forum for discussion, problem solving and decision­
making. Some sought informal alternatives. Consequently, leaders were repeatedly 
warning against the dangers of resorting to what they referred to as "gossiping in the hills" 
and stressed the importance of restricting the discussion of cooperative-related matters, 
including personal grievances, to the arena of the assembly. Members were told by the 
leaders that informal arguments threatened the very social fabric and stability of the 
cooperative. Here, the assembly was seen as "order" while "gossiping" was represented 
as anarchy. The regulations were unequivocal:
"Criticisms in the fields or any other place are forbidden, unless they are
constructive. They should take place only in the Assemblies."^
One interpretation of the problem of persuading individuals to confine discussion 
to the space of the assembly might be that the assembly represented a new and unfamiliar 
institution. However, analysis of the reasons why women were reluctant to use the 
assembly (undertaken in detail in Chapter 9) points to other factors such as feelings of 
inferiority before a large group. Although it was by no means only the women who 
discussed collective issues outside the assembly forum, this subjective element relating to 
negative self-images was a general determinant in influencing the individual participation.
A content analysis of two assemblies of the two cooperatives held between October 
1989 and February 1990 is represented in Figure 14 which indicates the relative time 
assigned to the main categories of issues discussed collectively. At this point in the 
analysis it serves the general purpose of indicating the areas of collective debate and 
together with the above observations demonstrates that the assembly was an arena in 
which the cooperative discussed and resolved problems relating to all the aspects of its
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existence and functioning.
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However, we also see that there are significant differences between the time spent 
on community, military and finance/economy- related issues between the two cooperatives 
for which there are different reasons. Community and military issues were rarely on the 
agenda in the meetings of PJCh because, unlike GP, it did not articulate closely with 
either. By contrast, the relatively small amount of time dedicated to financial and 
economic matters in GP is a product of them being debated and decided upon amongst 
the leadership, that is outside the Assembly arena.
Moving on from a general description of cooperative meetings, we can now start to 
analyse the nature o f the participation underway within them. Equipped with our 
conceptual framework of participation we can identify different participatory activities 
which are distinguished by their intensities. Thus, we can observe that within the
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assemblies the whole gamut of participation was occuring from information sharing and 
consultation, through to more intense participatory activities of decision-making and
Table 4
Primary functions of the Assembly according to members
Function
Cooperatives 
German Pomares Pedro J Chamorro
No % No %
Decision-making 29 73 32 78
Inform 7 17 4 10
Consultation 4 10 2 5
Other - - 3 7
Total* 40 100 41 100
* Individuals could give more than one response
initiating action. Although these are examined more critically below, it is relevant to note 
that as far as the majority of members themselves were concerned the primary function 
of the assemblies was "decision-making", as Table 4 indicates. The existence of these 
high intensity forms which involve greater levels of control of the participants, suggests 
that this participation was leading to empowerment. However, in this case we need to 
be more critical about the degree of control obtained by the assembly and the extent of 
its influence on various social, organisational and productive aspects of the cooperative. 
This, as the following demonstrates is influenced by two main factors: first, the 
cooperatives’ relationship to the external agents, including the revolutionary authorities 
and mass organisations and second, its interaction with cooperative leadership.
113 Autonomy and control
The purpose of this section is to establish the parameters which defined the extent of the 
autonomy and control of the assemblies and to identify the extent to which external agents 
and the leaders effected all four dimensions of participation, namely information sharing, 
consultation, decision-making and initiative taking.
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II3a Vis-a-vis the state
As outlined in a generalised description in Chapter 4, cooperative development in 
Nicaragua occurred in the context of a state which perceived them as objects to be 
subordinated to its directed planning. Despite the flexibilisation of state policies towards 
the peasantry and cooperatives after 1985, intervention still occurred in a few key aspects 
of cooperative organisation. By definition this limited the autonomy of their decision­
making capacity.
An organisational criteria had always been imposed by the state concerning the 
structure of the CAS (a collectivised model which was also upheld by UNAG) thereby 
violating one of the internationally recognised golden principles of cooperative 
organisation: namely, the voluntary definition of organisation structure (Matus, 1990:42). 
This is clear in both cooperatives where discussion about their organisational model was 
explicitly forbidden in the regulations where it was euphemistically referred to as 
"speaking out against the cooperative". This rule was informally upheld in meetings: open 
discussion about the relative merits of collective production or other cooperative models 
was absent.
Since organisational structure was excluded from the cooperatives’ decision-making 
agenda the assembly had to resolve and ameliorate the numerous "organisational" 
problems generated from the friction created from collective production. Most of these 
problems related to "free-riding" behaviour, such as work avoidance tactics which 
infuriated those who worked regularly and conscientiously. Dealing with the problem of 
alcoholism (a pervasive problem which had negative social and familial impacts) was a 
frequent issue for cooperative concern since the consequences of lost days in production 
were collectively borne by all members*.
Few members were familiar with other models of cooperative organisation and this 
reflected a low level of awareness of cooperativism. Only the leaders (past and present) 
and the cooperative founders who had received courses on basic cooperative organisation 
were clear about alternative cooperative models and could comment critically about their 
relative merits. Nonetheless, the fact that both cooperatives opted to de-collectivise some 
of the land once the Sandinista Government fell, demonstrates that this level of 
collectivisation was not a voluntarily upheld model.
As a reflection of its conceptions about cooperatives and according to its national
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political and economic objectives, MIDINRA imposed an organisational structure in both 
cooperatives thereby denying cooperative members’ miy participation or control over this 
important aspect of their lives. Considering that many were even unaware of alternative 
cooperative models, members were excluded from "information-sharing", "consultation", 
"decision-making" or "taking initiative" concerning this aspect of their cooperative. Thus, 
on this important aspect of their lives and organisational structure members’ participation 
was reduced to that of "implementing" national directives.
As regards state intervention in production, this was of a different nature in both 
cooperatives. In GP, state intervention had been greater in previous years when 
MIDINRA’s had repeatedly rejected its proposal to produce cattle. At the time of 
research, this had reduced dramatically and it had recovered greater degrees of control 
over its production although the cooperative was complying with MIDINRA’s production 
plans to produce sorghum for which it received credit. However, it was also co-operating 
with MIDINRA in an experiment with new strains of bean and maize and here, as we saw 
from the description of assembly activities, the cooperative exerted high levels of control 
over the project. It was not obligued to continue with the commitment if it so wished. 
This autonomy was largely a product of the cooperatives’ high level of financial 
independence and in some productive activities the cooperative even acted independently 
from state directives, sometimes against its recommendations. This was the case with its 
experimentation with the production of horticultural crops using its newly acquired 
irrigation system obtained through international solidarity. Translating this to the 
conceptualised framework of participation we can see that GP enjoyed a high degree of 
control over its productive activities and included consultation, decision-making and 
intiative taking.
The situation in the PJCh was different on account of the cooperative’s dependence 
on the availability of bank credit in order to sustain its high production costs throughout 
the year. Here, the National Development Bank (BND) was influential to the extent that 
it had to approve the cooperatives production plans before financing was granted. 
Although economically expedient, this involvement represented a loss of control of the 
cooperative over its production plans although leaders reported that this approval system 
consisted most usually of minor amendments to the assembly’s original plans^. Here the 
participatory activity of the cooperative involved consultation only.
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There was an economic activity over which the state had no control in PJCh and that 
relates to the cooperative’s exploitation of dried firewood which members collected from 
the cooperative to sell. However, as we saw previously, when the cooperative started 
felling live timber it came into direct confrontation with the state whose Institute of 
Natural Resources (IRENA) subsequently fined the cooperative for unlawful exploitation 
of its trees. IRENA again intervened to prevent further deforestation when, in the context 
of a tightening of credit facilities, the cooperative had again taken to selling its wood to 
supplement members’ income. This represents the most extreme form of state intervention 
where local initiative (in this case involving resource exploitation) was not only stopped 
but was castigated.
II3b The assembly/leadership dynamic
Apart from its relative autonomy from the state, the autonomy of the assembly was also 
defined in relation to the leadership. This differed dramatically with consequent 
implications for participation. The extent to which leadership affected cooperative 
participation is examined below.
Subordinated assembly of German Pomares
The most systematic way to understand how leadership affected participation within the 
cooperative is to examine its impact on each participatory activity. Firstly, in relation to 
information sharing. Although leadership officers were formally obliged to give regular 
reports to the cooperative, they often deprived the assembly of detailed information 
pertaining to matters of collective interest: a tendency acknowledged by two serving 
officers. In particular, ordinary members were deprived of the information on which 
decisions were based for the division of annual profits. They had no access to the records 
of work attendance, information which would have served as a mechanism of 
accountability of the leaders’ decisions.
However, contrary to my own observations, as many as 27 out of 32 respondants 
stated that they were satisfied that the assembly was informed about all pertinent activities, 
although five respondents were uneasy about being kept in the dark over issues of 
collective interests. Similarly, interviewees said they were satisfied that the leadership did 
consult the assembly where relevant. While this may have been a function of members’
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ignorance about leadership practices, this discrepancy can be accounted for as it relates
to the underdeveloped nature of civil society. In a political culture v^here the concepts
and practices of legitimacy and accountability of leaders were novel, members were
unaccostumed to demand greater transparency from their leaders. Here, the comments of
one are illustrative:
"Sometimes the leadership fails to tell us things, and we hear of them through 
other sources. The council (the FSLN base committee) also has things which 
it keeps to itself and in which we have no part... they do have this fault.
While aware of this tendency there was an apparent acceptance that that’s just the way 
things were with leaders.
Moving now to consider how leadership affected the decision-making functions of 
the assembly we see that decision-making was traditionally concentrated in the leadership 
in GP. Under the current presidency of Santos Nicoya, that tendency was concentrated 
even further. Despite the regulations specifying that assemblies be convened by the 
president once a month, longer periods elapsed between meetings (on one occasion this 
was for eight weeks). Of necessity this meant that the leadership was taking decisions 
without prior referral to the assembly for collective decision-making or consultation while 
by contrast, the leadership continued to meet every week.
The decision-making procedures established in the regulations were violated in other 
ways since major decisions about the cooperative’s functioning and development were not 
taken in the assembly but were reached unofficially in the "council". This was a non­
elected body which corresponded to the FSLN base committee and included all eighteen 
members of the cooperative’s FSLN militantes (fully fledged party members) and its 
aspirantes (those aspiring to membership). When they met, any elected officers of the 
leadership who were not party members were also invited. For the duration of the 
research this meant only Luis Rivera. Details of the production plans, capital investment 
projects and local community activities were discussed within the council before the issues 
were put before the assembly. Given the numerical significance of its members who held 
a united position, the council was able to swing the outcome of most assembly decisions 
to the policies it favoured.
The council was also where decisions about who should attend adult literacy classes 
were taken and at the time of research all those studying were council members. This 
practice so appalled a local teacher that he swore to thwart it by going directly to the
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members himself to inform them of their individual rights to have an education 
independently of the decision of cooperative^ \  Additionally, the council decided who 
amongst the members would be sent off to the reserve army. Their main criterion for 
selection was those who they defined as "going around a little disoriented", meaning those 
men who were behaving irresponsibly at work, getting too drunk too often or were not 
convinced Sandinista supporters. The council’s logic was that such individuals would 
benefit from a good dose of "patriotic service", alongside the accompanying discipline and 
fear, which they perceived would rectify their ways and ultimately strengthen the 
cooperative’s organisation. Nonetheless, members of the council themselves also 
volunteered to be mobilised and within the council were men who had spent the longest 
periods in combat: some for as long as five years on the front line.
As seriously, key economic decisions were made within the council. In particular, 
the amount of weekly economic assistance was established here. During one debate, the 
council decided to maintain it at a low level because if "they had more they’d spend it on 
booze"revealing  a paternalistic attitude towards other socios. Despite the establishment 
in the regulations of the principle of the proportional share of profits according to work 
done, the council alone established how much of the share of profits each member would 
receive. It had devised an informal schema of four categories of membership. This 
allocated founders a full 100% of their share of the profits; "old" members (of more than 
five years integration) with 75% and 50% for those who had been members for over a 
year. Newcomers had none: their share counting as their initial capital downpayment, 
although this principle was not embodied in the regulations. Yet, even these categories 
were flexibly interpreted and an additional and ambivalent criterion of "performance" was 
added to the equation. This arrangement clearly favoured the founding and older-serving 
members: as far as they were concerned it represented their just reward for their 
commitment and efforts invested in the development of the cooperative.
This unofficial division of profits was implemented year after year. As a general 
policy it went unchallenged, even though occasionally an ordinary member might question 
the basis of the decision as it related to his or her own particular case. While the lack 
of access to information on which the decision was based might have prevented a 
concerted challenge from non-council members there was also an acceptance that personal 
enrichment was an integral part of leadership.
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The distribution o f internal power as it related to the concentration o f decision­
making within the leadership was recognised by the members themselves, as Figure 15 
shows. This tendency worried local Sandinista friends o f the cooperative, who described 
ordinary members in the assembly as being "at the mercy of the ’others’", meaning the 
leadership'^ Yet, the members themselves were not necessarily perturbed by this.
Most important decision making body
according to members (58)
Pk 50
German Pomares Pedro J Chamorro
COOPERATIVE
directive r n  president g g  assembly
1 1 council p iiil don’t know
Figure 15
Given the leaders’ monopolisation of decision-making functions within this 
cooperative concerning important aspects of its viability and development, the 
opportunities for ordinary members to participate were reduced. Thus in these issues, the 
participation of ordinary members was restricted to lower intensity levels o f information- 
sharing and consultation. In other issues, including some production matters, the 
organisation o f work, welfare concerns and problems relating to the community, ordinary 
members enjoyed greater influence and control.
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The Pedro Joaquin Chamorro assembly overrules
By contrast to GP, the assembly in PJCh enjoyed greater power. The regulations, as rules 
regulating internal proceedings according to democratic principles, were also physically 
accessible to ordinary members to use as a basis of information concerning their rights and 
duties and as a general reference to cooperative rules and decision-making procedures. 
Unlike GP, the leaders in PJCh were transparent about information, a feature most 
pertinently illustrated in relation to division of annual profits. When this occurred, the 
leaders not only adhered religiously to the established rules and calculated it in strict 
accordance with the number of days worked throughout the agricultural year, but a chart 
was displayed at the Annual General Assembly, which showed what days had been 
recorded as days worked by every member. The system was fair and systematic and the 
information provided constituted a crucial system of accountability, since errors in 
recording did occasionally occur. Indeed, all members reported that they were satisfied 
that the leadership informed the assembly of all its activities and were similarly confident 
that they were sufficiently consulted by them.
As regards the decision-making functions of the cooperative, members were in no 
doubt that the assembly was the most important entity, as the above Figure 15 shows. 
This was partially facilitated by the regular and frequent assemblies held in PJCh (unlike 
in GP) every two weeks which lasted between two and three hours, the same duration as 
in GP. The authority and independent decision-making capacity of the assembly was also 
assured by the leaders’ respect for the regulations. On one occasion, officers referred to 
the guidelines for procedures about how to dismiss one member who had been constantly 
drunk for twenty days and had already received two warnings. Having consulted the 
regulations and faithfully followed them, the leaders then proposed before the entire 
assembly, that the man be dismissed. This was subsequently approved albeit reluctantly 
(because members were seriously concerned for the welfare of his family).
Here, the decision-making authority of the assembly was assured not just from the 
efforts of the leaders but because it was demanded by the ordinary members themselves. 
Ordinary members and leaders alike reprimanded anyone who failed to respect the 
assembly as the maximum authority. One example is illustrative. In the annual general 
meeting when the division of annual profits was being discussed, the assembly became 
divided. The leaders proposed investing the funds in improving the cooperative and the
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ordinary members proposed that they have immediate access to it for private use. When 
Jeronimo, the organisation officer, complained that the money would only disappear the 
next day through "bad use", a colleague retorted that it was the prerogative of each person 
to decide how to spend his/her money. He also pointed out that on this issue Jeronimo 
was democratically over-ruled, since the majority of ordinary members disagreed with 
him.
The most explicit indication that the assembly operated as the main decision-making 
body was that, unlike the situation in GP where decisions of the assembly mainly 
coincided with those proposed by the leadership, in PJCh it frequently defeated the 
leaders’ proposals. The disappointment felt by the officers was a reflection that indeed 
the assembly was the main decision-making forum and that genuine participatory 
democracy was operating. Contradictorily, the outcomes of the decisions of the assembly 
sometimes meant the rejection of socially progressive proposals relating to cooperative 
welfare and the socioeconomic status of women and demonstrates a contradiction of the 
practice of participation since equal participation in the decision-making process does not 
necessarily guarantee that socioeconomic equality will be achieved. Nonetheless, the 
relative lack of monopolisation of decision-making functions within the leadership 
endowed ordinary members within the assembly with the opportunity to participate in high 
intensity activities of decision-making and even initiating action.
Ill Towards cooperative empowerment
Having refined our analysis of the role of external agents and leadership in the scope and 
autonomy of the assembly as a decision-making forum, we are now in an informed 
position to evaluate the effects of these participatory processes in terms of the degrees and 
dimensions of participation that they entailed. Evidence for this is apparent in three 
inextricably related areas as they relate to the skills acquired, political consciousness and 
political action. Each will be examined in turn.
Through their incorporation into the cooperative, members gained formal access to 
the decision-making process and were given the opportunity to participate in and be 
responsible for managing the technical, financial, administrative and social aspects of their 
productive unit. Such decision-making opportunities were unprecedented for campesinos.
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Despite the monopolisation of decision-making within the leadership of GP, ordinary
members participated in decision-making in some areas of cooperative life, while ordinary
members within the assembly in PJCh had greater access to the decision-making process.
To this extent the political power of individuals, as defined by Friedmann (1991), was
increased since they gained access to decision-making processes which directly affected
their lives and in which they could influence using formal voting and collective action.
The experience of se lf management also endowed individuals with the technical
skills and knowledge which enabled them to take responsibility for the operational aspects
of cooperative management. This experience of se lf management developed the strength
which enabled them to deal with the appropriate government agencies: it enhanced their
capacity to operate. Commenting:
"A nosotros parecia loco poder llegar al banco a pedir prestamos cuando 
antes ni nos permitinan entrar",
(that it seemed incredible to be able to ask for credit from the bank when before we were
not even allowed to enter), it would seem that the experiences served to improve the
campesinos capacity to deal with the institutions of the state. Consequently, the outcome
of this process could therefore be identified as having strengthened the "capacity building"
of cooperative members. While significant in itself for its practical utility, these newly
acquired skills also endowed individuals with self-confidence, the implications of which
are examined in more detail below.
Through participation within the cooperative, members were also being exposed to
new organisational structures for the first time. Only two men from GP, as mentioned
earlier, were involved as combatants in the guerilla movement and only six in GP and four
from PJCh had been incorporated into the mass organisations before integrating into the
cooperative. Apart from these exceptions, most of the subjects of this thesis cited the
cooperative as their formative organisational and political experience. This itself was
significant since it brough members together with the potential for collective action.
Cooperative members were therefore initiated into direct and systematic participation
through their integration into the cooperative. Here, as the above description indicates,
the assemblies operated as workshops for the practice of free speech, the use of voice and
vote, collective reflection and the search for consensus amongst disparate positions. The
relevance of this was not lost on members who reflected on these freedoms of speech
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created by the revolution and operating within the cooperative. Members from both
cooperatives compared them to the oppression they knew under Somoza:
"Now the people are involved in making decisions and have the right to take 
action and everyone has the right to do what they want: not like before."
Similarly,
"For the first time in Nicaragua everyone can give their opinion and say 
exactly what they want to."
Members identified these freedoms as representing a qualitative improvement to their
lives: if their opposition before, under Somozan could only be expressed in "hidden" forms
for fear of retribution or violence, members acknowledged that they now had the
opportunity to express overtly their views. However, as we saw, not all were able to
maximize these political freedoms available to them: the legacy of Somozan political
culture weighed heavily.
In addition, working knowledge of the procedures and practices which were acquired
by members from their assemblies equipped them with knowledge of official FSLN
discourse. "Decision-making", "voting", "rights" and "duties" became more than abstract
terms but were in practice used. In PJCh, the terms were vehemently contended between
members and were used to prevent abuses by others: a situation which demonstrates the
extent to which these notions had been appropriated by individual and were used
effectively to protect their individual interests. As importantly, we see below that these
terms also equipped members with a discourse with which to challenge external agents.
In some cases members from both cooperatives had developed sophisticated appreciation
of the meanings of these terms, for example, "consensus" was understood by several
members as:
".. to arrive at an agreement and arrive there clear in your mind of what it 
means and of the implications."
Similarly, Jeronimo, a leader from PJCh, defined "democracy" in terms which reflected
an acute insight into the problems of developing democratic practices in the context of an
underdeveloped society such as Nicaragua by stating that he had come to know that it was
not a "thing" that could be implemented or developed quickly but rather was a "process".
This grassroots and direct experience of new political practices constituted the basis
for individuals’ to understand wider political practices. Members from both cooperatives
projected an appreciation of wider national developments from their own experience as
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the following indicates:
"There’s democracy in Nicaragua because we can organise ourselves if we 
wish."
and Luis Rivera, founder members of the GP:
"I still don’t know exactly what democracy is, but in all the meetings that we 
hold I do have the opportunity to speak and make suggestions during 
discussions, about any issue that I feel is important and this is definitely 
participation, so I’d say that there is democracy in Nicaragua."
This experience of participation within the cooperatives also informed members’ own
appreciation of the meaning of participation. Table 5, indicates that most considered it
was based on decision-making activities. Of particular interest here is the high proportion
of respondents from GP who considered it synonymous with decision-making: again this
can be explained as a function of their uncritical view and low expectations of leadership
practices.
Table 5
The definition of participation according 
to interviewees (58)
Definitions GP PJCh
Decision-making 22 11
Practical tasks 4 7
Mobilisation 5 4
Effect change 2 2
Don’t know 6 6
TOTAL* 39 30
* Interviewees could give more than one response.
In this way, the peasants’ understanding of their microcosm was extended to that of the 
macrocosm and formed the basis of their knowledge of national political system. The 
logic of this link was reinforced by the recognition that the changes in their local political 
environment were largely attributable to wider political forces. Thus, the assembly 
process equipped the members with knowledge of the wider political system and in such 
a way the "localism" of their consciousness was extended to a "nationalism" and and they
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developed an awareness of the wider political processes. This was significant since for
peasants to operate within a new revolutionary society and contend with the domination
of the external forces in the form of the state, they needed the corresponding terminology
and information about the new system to enable them successfully to make their demands
and protect their interests.
If individual members were developing appropriate political skills and knowledge
which could enable them to operate as more effective political actors, this was integrally
related to the processes of psychological empowerment which was enhanced through
cooperative membership. Through their combined experience of self-management and
participatory democracy, newly acquired skills and the recognition of their own capacity
to resolve some of the problems they confronted served to enhance their self-esteem and
strengthened members’ identity as peasants. This was not negated by contact with the
state because the objective circumstances (namely, the changes in relations of production)
meant that state resources, including credit, education and health care became available
to peasants and gave them specific rights. Also, officials did not scorn campesinos, indeed
it was common practice for local officials to be addressed as equals, with companero and
not senor, reflecting the absence of hierarchical social stratification. This enhanced self-
image and dignity was most movingly expressed by a woman cooperative member:
"Before I used to think that to have healthy children was a privilege only of 
the rich: when mine died I believed it to be "natural". Now I have leamt to 
expect my children to live and to realise that it is possible for us poor ones 
to be healthy too."
In effect, objective conditions and the experiences of self-management and participatory 
democracy facilitated the substitution of values such as the unquestionable authority of the 
patron, of the merchant, or technical specialist or official. These subjective developments 
were crucial in facilitating the recognition of their potential for assuming a proactive role.
Although the processes of psychological empowerment amongst the women was 
contradictory, as is described in detail in Chapter 9, many referred to how their lives had 
changed since they integrated into the cooperative, reflecting typically that:
"Me relaciono mas con las personas, me llevo mejor con la gente"
(I relate better now with other people), and:
"Ya, estoy mas clara de lo que esta pasando"
(Now, I understand more things about that happen). Their entry into the cooperative
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provided them with an unprecedented opportunity to gain access to public space, social 
life beyond the family and the opportunity to interact with others, all of which led to an 
enhanced self-esteem. Thus, active involvement in decision-making was conducive to a 
process of empowerment, whereby the old values were delegitimised. Moreover, 
members came to recognise their own potential to initiate action and seek collective 
solutions to the situations they faced. They frequently motivated each other when 
confronted with problems by reminding each other that "hay que superar" (we must 
overcome problems). These subjective aspects constitute important elements of 
empowerment and represent a step in the construction of campesinos as political subjects 
of the revolution.
Beyond these subjective developments in consciousness, knowledge of the political 
environment and increased political skills in the art of debate and voting, what evidence 
was there to suggest tangible political empowerment for the cooperative members? There 
were several indications. The most explicit expression of political empowerment is 
manifest in the cooperatives’ assertions of autonomy from external agents. In such a way, 
GP rejected MIDINRA’s intervention in its production plans, as one member stated 
during a meeting:
"They in Rivas may think they know what’s good for here, but we’re here and 
we are the ones who decide what works."
This represents an overt form of resistance to the bureaucratic tendencies of the state
which attempted to control the cooperative’s productive activities and subordinate it to its
national development objectives. It is also interesting to note that the above statement
was expressed in a language which appealed to the right to autonomy, itself a notion
introduced through FSLN discourse.
Another example of GP’s belligerence towards external intervention is apparent from
a conflict which arose between Mariano, the local UNAG promoter, after a member of the
cooperative refused to do his active service. Mariano had intervened in an attempt to
resolve the problem. Adan, cattle coordinator, explained:
"We had problems with UNAG because Mariano (sic) didn’t understand since 
he hasn’t been mobilised. I had to go to talk with him because he was being 
too flexible with certain people who were presenting "family problems" as a 
justification for not going. But these just weren’t relevant problems."*'*
This confrontation between the cooperative and UNAG is expressed here as a personal
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conflict since Mariano is identified as the object of scorn. However, this was because
members tended to equate UNAG with the local promoter since the organisation suffered
from a low profile in some areas because of its lack of projects aimed to educate members
about its work. Nonetheless, the above statement represents a rejection of the UNAG
concern for productive issues (established in its drive for autonomy from the FSLN) and
must be seen as an assertion of the cooperative’s priority to its military function. It is
important to note also from the above incident that the cooperative (mediated through its
leaders) was also challenging UNAG by asserting its right to participate in national
political tasks and to undertake non-productive tasks.
Similarly, in one incident in PJCh the assembly unanimously rejected what it
considered to be an attempt by UNAG to intervene in an issue they believed should be
resolved by themselves alone. Omar, the production officer, explains:
"Juan Galan (the president of UNAG of Region IV) sent a letter to the UCA 
telling us how much each cooperative should give him for his election 
campaign. But this cooperative is composed of members who have votes and 
the power to decide and other institutions can’t impose themselves on us. We 
thought, as did others in the UCA, that this was an imposition and so we 
decided that we’d determine ourselves how much to donate."
In the subsequent debate during the assembly members rejected the request because they
saw it as blatantly "undemocratic" and consequently intolerable. A decision was taken to
send instead, one fifth of the amount requested.
There are other instances to demonstrate the accummulated political power of the
cooperatives. The GP was more conscientious of the relative political power it enjoyed
vis-a-vis the revolutionary authorities. Here members emphatically rejected the notion of
themselves as passive beneficiaries of the FSLN and saw themselves as active political
subjects. They saw their relationship with the FSLN as being essentially two-way as
Wilfredo Espinoza, vice-president, explains:
"For years we have been the vanguard in this region and when they make their 
decisions they look to us to see how we are and what we think, and so when it 
comes to giving, they help us out."
The GP cooperative also had direct representation in a number of local instances of
revolutionary power. It had delegates represented in the Muncipal Council; in the UNAG
Municipal Council; in the Tienda Campesina; in various Community Committee and in
local battalions. To this extent GP enjoyed a high political profile. Its power depended
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precisely on its integration into revolutionary power. As we shall see in the following 
chpater, the leaders were key intermediaries in this vertical integration: the consequences 
for participation then become apparent.
By contrast, the political action of PJCh was quite different. It had on three 
previous occasions appealed directly to the government for assistance. On the first 
occasion, in the mid-1980s, the leaders had gone to Managua, the capital, to deliver to the 
office of the Vice-president a request for funds to reconstruct the roof of the hacienda. 
In this case the outcome had been fruitful: funds had been forthcoming and the repairs 
were made. A final unsuccessful attempt was made in 1989 to request one of the lorries 
due to arrive in the last Soviet consignment. This practice of appealing directly to central 
government was consistent with that seen within the UCA, to which PJCh was affiliated 
since. During the UCA’s struggle for control of Tienda Campesina, it had asked Jaime 
Wheelock as minister of MIDINRA to intervene personally in order to override the 
unfavourable decisions made by local MIDINRA officials. In the event, that is what he 
did. Here, national leadership was seen as the last opportunity for appeal and this 
indicates that they had developed a truly nationalist ideology. In this case, the national 
political system was seen as being able to restitute justices which peasants thought broken 
by local authorities. While this would not conform to Friedmann’s notion of "politically 
significant" collective action, it reflects an ability of the peasants to operate the national 
system.
That PJCh made requests to central government and not the municipality raises 
interesting questions, especially since GP only ever channelled its demands through the 
latter. However, whether this difference related to the cooperative’s perceptions of the 
legitimacy or effectiveness of different levels of government is not a concern of this 
thesis. What is relevant is that the cooperative was operating as a proactive political actor, 
able to operate within and manipulate its institutional milieu. That the cooperative 
solicited assistance from individuals within central government amounted to recourse to 
clientelistic methods which individuals saw as being politically effective solutions. The 
method was not innovative; but it was effective.
Although this represented one way by which the cooperative could resolve its 
political problems, it was also empowered through its formal affiliation to the UCA which 
represented its interests in the struggle with the state for access to resources. The
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objective outcome of this struggle was on the one hand the coopertive’s increased access 
to state resources and on the other, the establishment of a industrialisation process and 
marketing outlets which ultimately secured the cooperative’s future in the context of the 
UNO Government.
Conclusions
Against the historical background of political exclusion, subordination and manipulation, 
cooperative membership gave individuals unprecedented opportunities to participate at 
different intensities. While they did not have control of decision-making regarding the 
organisational model of the cooperative and only partial control in some of their 
production plans, in other issues the cooperatives enjoyed autonomy from external 
intervention and could exercise high levels of participation, in decision-making and even 
initiating action. Despite these differences, cooperative assemblies constituted the first 
political space in which Nicaraguan campesinos could exercise their right to voice and 
vote and develop skills associated with organised debate. The different participatory 
activities occuring within the cooperative assemblies were conducive to increased capacity 
building, political and psychological power. Yet notions of democracy were incipient and 
the practices of consensus and political legitimacy at their infancy. In the case of GP, this 
facilitated the concentration of power within the leadership.
Nonetheless, the objective conditions of revolutionary Nicaragua together with the 
members’ newfound self-confidence in their campesina identity enabled the cooperatives 
to assert their independence from the bureaucratic tendencies of the state which tried to 
control them. Similarly, the cooperatives were also able to resist the efforts of UNAG to 
impose its policies on the cooperatives. While these political actions represent new forms 
of empowerment for the peasantry, evidence of a old forms of clientelism were also 
evident and were shown to be an effective means by which to resolve political problems 
as in the case of PJCh. The following chapter demonstrates, in relation to the leadership, 
exactly how extensive these practices were.
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Notes for Chapter 7
1.At this point I wish to acknowledge the argument of Gould (1990), who stresses the 
extent to which rural inhabitants were co-opted by the Somozan state.
2.Here I wish only to acknowledge awareness of the debate which perceives caudillo- 
hacendados as either the product of the weakness of the state or whose continued 
existence inhibits the consolidation of the state.
3.1sias Rodriquez, German Pomares, personal interview January 1990.
4.This has been observed by Bartra (1975) and de la Pena (undated).
5.1 say perhaps, since there is no systematic data relating to the nature of local leadership 
prior to the revolutionary movement.
6. According the informants of this research they and their parents voted for the same party 
which was also that of their corresponding landlords.
7.Reglamentos Intemos. Cooperativa Pedro Joaquin Chamorro.
8.Typically, the men drank on Saturday nights and Sundays and some would remain 
continuously enebriated for weeks. Quite apart from the hardship on the respective family 
who would have to go without food and endure physical and sexual abuse, this meant the 
loss of production.
9.According to the END officer, San Marcos, personal interview, February, 1990.
10.Marciano Espinoza, personal interview German Pomares, December 1989.
11 .Jose Ada a secondary school teacher who also taught cooperative members including 
those from GP on the adult education schemes, was involved in the UNESCO project 
which was targeting rural literacy. Personal interview, education Institute, December 
1989.
12.Santos Nicoya, president of cooperative, German Pomares, November 1989.
13.Jose Ada, adult education teacher. Tola, November 1989.
14.Ada Bega, personal interview, Jalteva, Tola, November 1992.
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Chapter 8
COOPERATIVE LEADERSHIP: 
MEDIATING THE PARTICIPATORY PROCESS
While the empirical point of departure for an examination of the leadership phenomenon 
is its influence on the nature of internal decision-making and on the processes of 
participation, other dimensions of leadership also render it worthy of a more systematic 
examination.
Firstly, cooperative leadership fulfils the dual function of representing the 
membership and managing cooperative affairs, meaning that leaders not only influence 
aspects of the internal organisation of the cooperatives but also matters relating to the 
cooperatives’ economic efficiency. Both these dimensions influence participatory 
processes: the former directly, the latter because it relates to the viability of the 
cooperative unit itself. Secondly, while leadership can be conceptualised as influencing 
the practices of participation within the cooperative, it is also a product of participation. 
That is, cooperative leadership emerges in response to conditions and opportunities created 
by the revolution including - as we will see - its structures of political power. A third 
reason why we need to examine the leadership phenomenon, lies in the pivotal role leaders 
occupy between the cooperative membership and institutional environment in which the 
cooperative operates. Essentially, this qualifies them as intermediaries who link the 
cooperative (as well as the communities, given their prominant leadership role vis-a-vis 
the comarcas) to political patrons at higher levels (Wolf, 1967; Lomnitz-Adler, 1992). 
Consequently, leadership must be analysed as much in terms of internal group dynamics 
as in relation to how it articulates with the wider national or regional structures of 
revolutionary Nicaragua.
Our concern with the relationship between leadership and participatory processes 
therefore revolves around its function in relations to organisation, resource delivery and 
emergent revolutionary power. Consequently, the central questions which the chapter 
needs to address are: how does leadership influence participation; what are the wider 
implications of such leadership practices; to what extent can they be viewed as caciques 
and what factors determine leadership practices? Although for the purposes of this chapter 
we must keep our attention focused on the impact of leadership on the participatory
234
process, it is necessary to consider the nature of leadership as it relates to historical 
processes and the reproduction of political culture, the new political structures and the 
extent of its internal legitimacy from within the cooperative. The chapter starts with an 
apparently conventional description of the characteristics of leadership relating to its basis, 
election and internal accountability. This serves contributes to the evaluation of the extent 
to which it represents a new political practice. The predominant features of the leadership 
of both cooperatives are then described in more detail and are analysed in reference to 
their organisational implications, economic efficiency and the contradictions implicit in 
their distinct styles. Since leadership - most particularly in these cooperatives which were 
promoted by the state - cannot be understood in reference to internal group dynamics 
alone analysis is then directed on how the leaders articulated with external organisations 
and institutions.
II Basis of emergent leadership; continuity and change
This first section examines the characteristics of leadership in both cooperatives, the basis 
of its power and how it exerted its authority. This it then analysed in relation to previous 
political practices, the internal nature of legitimacy and external sources of power.
II Merit and accountability
Elections for officers of the cooperative leadership were held every year. All the 
interviewed members knew precisely the specific duties of each officer and, with the 
exception of those who had recently returned from being mobilised in the army, all knew 
who filled the offices at the time. Typically, individuals were proposed by a group of 
members or an out-going officer and then elected formally by majority vote in the 
assembly. The approval or support of the UNAG promoter or local FSLN leader had 
previously served to ratify or influence the cooperatives when divided about the selection.
The formal requisites for eligibility to leadership posts were: literacy; adherence to 
the internal regulations; to have been a member for at least a year; and to have earned the 
confidence of the members\ In practice, members were elected on the basis of above 
average schooling, productive or administrative experience, organisational skills and 
honesty. The social characteristics of the current leadership of both cooperatives is
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Table 6
Differences between leaders and 
ordinary members
Variable Leaders Ordinary
members
Age 31.93 38.05
No years schooling 6.36 1.68
No courses 3.29 .41
Years in cooperative Years in 6.07 4.95
defense 2.64 ).25
displayed in Table 6, where they are shown to be significantly different from ordinary 
members. On average, leaders were seven years younger and were distinguished markedly 
from the ordinary members by their greater number of years of schooling (see Figure 16 
for the range of schooling levels of all members). In addition, the leaders had attended 
school 3.7 times longer. In fact, current leaders in both cooperatives had received at least 
six years of education thanks to the educational opportunities created for the campesinado 
by the revolution.
Schooling of cooperative members
(58 members)
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That is, all had been schooled since the triumph. Carlos Tenerio from GP and Domingo 
Ampie from PJCh had been to school for the longest periods: both for nine years. 
Leaders had also attended significantly more courses. Once in leadership positions, 
leaders became recipients of training courses from the FSLN, MIDINRA and UNAG (as 
noted in Chapter 4). Limited financial resources excluded all but the leaders from 
attending. Thus, the technical and organisational skills the leaders acquired from such 
courses compounded the educational discrepancies between them and ordinary members.
With the exception of Karla Gonzalez, women were absent from leadership 
positions: both past and present. Karla was the daughter of founder member Rosa and, 
having received four years of primary education, was the most educated woman member. 
She had previously been organisation officer for nine months until she resigned because 
she was intimidated by the men. Women were amongst the lowest educated within the 
membership and had the least organisational skills because they lacked the experience: a 
situation which presented a serious obstacle to their opportunities for selection to 
cooperative leadership and - as becomes clear in the following chapter - a barrier to their 
greater participation in cooperative affairs.
There was no significant difference in the previous occupations of the leaders 
compared with ordinary members. All the leaders in GP had been peasant labourers 
before the revolution although Carlos had since worked as a teacher. The same applied 
to PJCh although since the revolution Francisco had been a professional soldier in the EPS 
and both Domingo and Sergio (who served in office for only a few months) had been 
studying at seminary school and had working for the ATC respectively. Most of the 
leadership officers in both cooperatives were also Sandinistas. In PJCh, two officers were 
FSLN militants while the other three defined themselves as sympathisers. In GP, all but 
one was a militant and he, Luis Rivera, was a sympathiser and founder member. Since 
the establishment of GP in the early 1980s, nearly all offices of the leadership had been 
filled by individuals from the council. This overlap of formal cooperative leadership with 
the council led to a conceptual blur between the two bodies: six months after the change 
of leadership, a couple of ordinary members mistakenly named as officers other council 
members. Officers of the leadership had also spent twice as long in the army as ordinary 
members. Leaders had also been members for longer (on average, 1.2 times) and many 
were the original founders. Thus in GP, leaders and council members were predominantly
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founder members.
Similarly, since the foundation of the PJCh cooperative, the two founding families 
(the Gonzalez and Ampie) had dominated leadership positions through the parents and 
offspring. At the beginning of research, three of the leadership offices were occupied by 
individuals from these two families: Lorenzo Ampie was president; his brother, Domingo 
Ampie was vice-president and Jeronimo Gonzalez was finance officer. The perpetual 
presence of the latter in the leadership led local officials to nickname the cooperative 
"Chombo’s Cooperative", (Chombo being an abbreviation for the name Jeronimo). The 
domination of these families was lamented by officers who were not founding members:
"The problem is that the two families from La Concepcion control the place
and only want to rotate the directivo (leadership) amongst themselves." (Pablo
Ruiz, finance officer.)
However, by 1989 fewer leadership positions were under the control of the two families: 
Omar Aleman was production officer and Francisco Calero was defence officer. The 
undisputed basis of their election was technical and organisational competence, 
respectively. Moreover, when Domingo Ampie left the cooperative he was immediately 
replaced by Pablo Ruiz: a situation which reflected a shift of power away from the two 
strong families and coincided with the departure of older members and their replacement 
by new members.
In only a few exceptional cases did officers not fulfil the formal eligibility criteria. 
In particular, Carlos Tenerio, who was the production officer of GP had only been nine 
months in the cooperative before being elected. However, he had joined the cooperative 
two years previously when he had been sent immediately by MIDINRA to study 
agronomy in Hungary. This gained him a technical expertise that was undisputed by the 
cooperative on his return. More seriously, considering the shortcoming it posed to 
effective leadership, Juan from PJCh had served as president and vice-president despite 
being illiterate. In his case he had reached this position on account of his experience as 
a founder and by virtue of the competence of his sons (Lorenzo and Domingo). It is 
significant that he only held office for short periods.
Theoretically, elected leaders from both cooperatives were made accountable to 
members by the obligation to report back and inform the assembly of their actions. 
However, the extent to which the mechanisms of accountability were used varied between 
the cooperatives. In GP, the leadership was never seriously called to account by ordinary
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members. Here, the few efforts made emanated from within the council itself, that is 
from the more articulate, experienced and confident men. At the time of research, they 
forced Santos to renegotiate with the municipal council the unauthorised offer he had 
made to lend it the cooperative’s equipment. In addition, they made him repay the money 
he had donated to the townhall on another occasion: again, something he had done without 
the assembly’s authorisation. It was also from within the council that the current officers 
were accused of amiguismo (friend-favouring). Council members complained that the 
officers were using their positions to grant favours to their friends within the cooperative 
or their respective communities. Yet, ultimately leaders in GP could be and were ousted 
through elections as occurred after the national electoral defeat of the FSLN, when 
ordinary members replaced Santos by voting Isidrio as president. He was a non-council, 
illiterate and ordinary but founder member. Interestingly, within six months he was 
replaced through elections by Santos because members recognised that he was not 
sufficiently prepared for the post.
By contrast, officers in PJCh were constantly being called by ordinary members to 
account for their activities and to justify the expenses of their trips. One incident is 
illustrative. After two officers had spent two days unsuccessfully trying to obtain the legal 
deed of the cooperative and had returned empty-handed because of the numerous 
bureaucratic problems they had encountered, they were required by the assembly to 
explain all that they done and the money that they had spent, only to be accused 
subsequently of having wasted time and the cooperative’s resources. As far as the leaders 
were concerned this "anarchy in the base" was a consequence of ordinary members "just 
wanting to run themselves". They considered that ordinary members were ignorant about 
the importance of leadership, as Lorenzo’s complaint about them makes clear:
"They are a thankless lot: they have no appreciation of what leadership
involves, the time, the energy, for all that I do, even without having eaten at
night!
In the light of the effective mechanisms of accountability which rendered its leadership 
transparent, it would seem that these calls for accountability were not based on an 
objective concern with leadership dealings. A better explanation is provided by the 
recognition that the leadership lacked legitimacy: in the eyes of ordinary members officers 
were failing to deliver resources from external sources and, as far as they were concerned, 
leaders were wasting unnecessary time on UCA activities. In a context of their lack of
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participation in the UCA’s development, ordinary members did not believe that the UCA
was a satisfactory alternative to state support.
While these calls for accountability, so manifest in PJCh, represented the healthiness
of this new form of "institutionalised suspicion" (Worsley, 1971), they created a crisis of
legitimacy for the leadership. Officers frequently resigned because of the constant and
unsubstantiated allegations made against them and these changes created an unstable
leadership. As a result, UNAG had considered it necessary to intervene twice the previous
year in order to oversee the re-election of a new officers.
By contrast to PJCh, where all the leaders were elected, in GP they were not. Here,
as we saw from Chapter 7, the council - although nominally concerned with activities of
the party - assumed a key decision-making role in the cooperative. This was an FSLN
base committee and as such was a product of the new structures of revolutionary political
power. Although in previous years the council had been more of a direct instrument
through which external intervention was channelled, ordinary members still viewed it as
being subject to vertically imposed policies. It was in reference to this that several older-
serving members who were not FSLN militants defined a council member as a persona
callada (silenced person), to express their apparent unquestioning compliance with the
lineas desde arriba (policies from above). In effect, the council represented an imposition
on cooperative organisation and violated the autonomy of the assembly.
Although entirely unaccountable to the cooperative members, several factors
legitimized the council’s involvement in cooperative affairs from within the cooperative.
Members considered that the presence of Sandinista militants contributed positively to
cooperative management (60% stated that their presence strengthened cooperative
organisation and production). Since many members also considered that:
"..the changes the Frente made were a victory for the peasants and have made 
a difference to our lives"
the council as the party base was legitimized because the FSLN was seen as having
benefltted the peasantry. This view was held by the majority of members who considered
that the government had peasants at heart and that it had encouraged cooperatives "for the
good of the campesinos", although ultimately three members of the entire cooperative
voted for the UNO. These factors engendered a tolerance towards it and its abuses of
power, as is implicit in a remark by Luis, cooperative secretary and non-party member:
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"Most of their (council) meetings are in the mornings when we have to work 
but we don’t deny them that and let them get on with it."
The council was also endowed with a degree of moral authority since amongst its
members were men who had been mobilised the most times and for the longest periods.
All the socios were aware, through their own mobilisations, of what sacrifice this entailed.
Moreover, within the cooperative there was a collective commitment to support the
military since there was a strong association between the members’ access to the land and
armed struggle to defend that right: an assocation deriving largely from the cooperative’s
own history. One ex-combatant explained:
"We’ve suffered to obtain this land, it cost the blood of our heroes and we are 
still defending it: we have members at present in the defence forces."
Similarly, the particular commitment of the council to defence duties was the basis of the
cooperative’s reputation as a unit which gained it political and social prestige in the
region.
The admission of fear expressed below is significant for its implicit reference to the
sense of duty and responsiblity that these volunteers felt about the prospect of going to
fight. Wilfredo’s comments are interesting not only for what they reveal about himself,
but also his attitude to those who tried to avoid mobilisations:
"They were afraid. They constantly presented excuses not to go, that their 
wife or children were ill. But we were all afraid too, well I certainly was, but 
it’s just something that we had to do."
The prestige accompanying service on reserve duties was the basis for one of the self-
identifying categories: that of self-sacrificing conscientes (conscious people) which
referred to their socially responsible behaviour. Its use was also extended as a dichotomy
conscientes: inconscientes to mean cooperative: community.
Besides the council there was another unelected post in GP which was approved by
all members for a very different logic. This refers to the co-ordinator of the cattle
commission which had been occupied by Adan Bega for four consecutive years. This
situation had arisen as a consequence of an incident on the cooperative when Santos
Nicoya, in this post at the time, inadvertently caused the death of ten head of cattle
through his incompetence. Adan Bega replaced him because he had warned Santos against
his planned course of action and had been ignored. Under Adan’s management the stock
had flourished. The decision not to rotate the post of cattle co-ordinator had stimulated
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a heated and extensive debate at the time. Members were concerned that the concentration 
of experience in one member and the concomitant dependence that entailed, could easily 
lead to an abuse of his authority. However, because he had contributed to the 
cooperative’s economic consolidation through the use of his knowledge (accumulated 
through practice and training over the years) and because he enjoyed according to 
members the "respect and trust of all the cooperative", the assembly had decided to retain 
him as the person in charge. This is significant because it illustrates how the contradiction 
between the democratic principle of revolving leadership posts and achieving economic 
efficiency was resolved in this case on the side of profitability.
The above has shown that the educational opportunities provided by the revolution 
in general and for the cooperative sector in particular, facilitated the emergence of 
cooperative leadership from the landless or poor campesino sector: a socioeconomic group 
previously excluded from holding any form of leadership position before the triumph. 
That leaders were either party militants or sympathisers indicates that - having 
circumvented traditional leadership sources of the previous system - the FSLN was 
reaching the cooperative bases through a new cadre of leader which it had created from 
its own political structures. Moreover, the selection and election of leadership was based 
according to merit and competence rather than ascriptive or particularistic criteria and 
mechanisms of accountability operated (extensively in PJCh and to a limited extent by 
members of the council in GP). This provides evidence to suggest that new practices of 
leadership were evolving in which the legitimacy of leaders was derived from within the 
cooperative and was based on some rationalised democratic principles. While legitimacy 
may have derived from "below" this is not to say that external factors did not operate to 
determine leadership practices and styles.
12 Monopolisation of leadership
Although legitimate in terms of their educational and organisational skills and merits, the 
leaders of both cooperatives monopolised their positions. In GP, challengers were 
effectively discouraged by officers and council members who constantly stressed their own 
long-serving membership, their experience of cooperativism and organisation and their 
better educational and technical skills.
Similarly, in PJCh, the Gonzalez/Ampie family attempted to exclude contenders by
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always referring to and exaggerating their superior educational attainments. They also 
imposed an additional criterion for the selection of leaders, namely that eligible candidates 
must live on the Santa Maxima fmca, and they repeatedly warned of the potential dangers 
to the security of the hacienda of not having a president resident on site. These efforts 
were designed to exclude the Calero family from leadership, Calero senior had joined the 
cooperative four years ago, followed soon after by three of his sons who had reached third 
and fourth grades and who were good workers, well educated and had served their 
national service. All three were Sandinistas: one a militant, the others members of the 
Sandinista Youth. They lived in Marvin Corrales, the comarca of the San Jorge site. 
Two years before, Noel Calero, aged 20 and who had the unique and much coveted skill 
of being able to drive, had persistently requested the job as driver of the lorry. This was 
used for collective use although it legally belonged to individuals who had been members 
at the time of purchase some four years previously. The efforts of Noel were constantly 
frustrated by the founding families and so he had left: a case which seems to imply that 
this monopolisation was a discentive to cooperative membership. A non-member had 
subsequently been recruited solely to drive the lorry which was a solution enabling the 
families to retain control of transport and thereby ensured that they were able to make the 
fortnightly trip to their home town in the relative comfort of the collective transport.
As regards accompanying corruption here in PJCh, there was no evidence of it. 
There was a rumour which claimed that two of the Gonzalez men had mis-appropriated 
petrol funds but this remained unsubstantiated. This low degree of material corruption in 
cooperative leadership attests to a high degree of "ideological motivation", found only in 
cooperative movements of a radical nature (Carroll, 1971). The case of GP was slightly 
different. Here, the leaders and council members implemented an official policy which 
rewarded themselves (founders and longer-serving members) a greater proportion of the 
annual profits. This policy certainly constituted material differentiation but can perhaps 
be distinguished from outright corruption since it was a publically-known policy. 
Negating this benefit to leaders was the fact that several of the current officers had not 
obtained a plot of land for individual production because the fulfilment of their duties 
prevented them from being able to work an individual plot. In GP, the only reports of 
outright theft involved ordinary members who had stolen cash when delegated to purchase 
or sell a product on behalf of the cooperative and not covert operations of leadership.
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Although there was a monopolisation of leadership in both cooperatives, it is wrong 
to base an assessment of the cooperatives’ practices purely on the formal criteria of 
rotation and selection of leaders as the ultimate determinants of democracy (Ortega, 1989). 
In fact, the leaders through formal training in production and management and their 
assimilated experience and acquired knowledge about how to operate local, regional and 
national institutions, had also benefited collective interests. In effect, the rotation of 
leadership amongst those with most training and experience had facilitated the 
consolidation - in a relatively short time - of a new form of production and one that had 
supported the constituent members. In other words, when considering the impact of 
leadership on the nascent participatory processes we need to consider the socioeconomic 
contexts.
II Leaders as power brokers
Evidence from the cooperatives suggests that there were new forms and practices of 
leadership common to both. However, there were also great differences between the 
leadership styles and some of these features indicate that a continuity of political culture.
I ll  Fostering clientelism and flaunting authoritarianism: GP
Although the practice of amiguismo was apparent in both cooperatives it was endemic in 
GP. Here, officers and council members used their influence to favour their personal 
friends and thereby consolidated their positions by creating a group of loyal followers 
from amongst the membership. Amiguismo was also evident in the arbitrary application 
of sanctions which were reduced or wavered completely when it involved one of their 
group. The most extreme example of flagrant favouritism involved Alberto Palma, the 
brother-in-law of our now infamous Santos. Alberto had been continually drunk for three 
weeks during which time he did not work a single day yet, instead of being sanctioned 
as the rules dictated, he was selected as one of three to take two weeks leave from 
productive work in order to campaign for the FSLN. As ordinary members complained, 
this effectively rewarded him for such behaviour. Similarly, amiguismo appeared when 
fellow council members were given permission to study if they wanted to or were invited 
to accompany leaders on their trips away from the cooperative. By contrast, others not
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deemed in favour with the leadership were marginalised by the officers. When the three 
year old daughter of Miguel died, the leadership even failed to send a representative to 
the funeral. This not only showed an extreme absence of fraternal solidarity but also 
violated the rules which stated that in such circumstances a representive of the cooperative 
should attend. Miguel was an ordinary member, and the poorest, and had a visual 
disablity.
Other clientelistic practices extended from the leadership of GP to the surrounding 
communities, as indicated in Chapter 5, where we saw that the officers exercised 
favouritism in granting permission for temporary usufruct of land to poor and landless 
campesinos who lived on the cooperative’s perimeter. Declared or suspected "enemies" 
of the cooperative were not allocated a plot. Other residents of Tola knew about this 
practice and some, including other Sandinista militants, were concerned enough to attempt 
to draw the assembly’s attention to it. The following observation by a local teacher is 
typical:
"German Pomares is in danger of converting to a patronage system again, with
its imposition of authority and its patronage-like relationships".
In fact, the particular issue was contended within the cooperative leadership itself where 
some, including Adan, had for years suggested that this land be relinquished for permanent 
use by individuals in the communities. Other manifestations of clientelism occurred when 
leaders used their influence within the cooperative to direct resources to specific 
development projects within their respective communities, thereby gaining them prestige 
within the communities.
As such the influence of the leaders can be understood to have extended beyond the 
immediate influence of the cooperative itself. Their position, one where they could 
provide material and other resources which were available to the cooperative sector, also 
implies that they occupied an intermediate role between the rural communities/ 
cooperatives and the state. Moreover, recourse to such clientelistic practices is associated 
with personalised forms of power as seen in the caciques: evidently this was flourishing 
in GP under the conditions created by the revolutionary authorities, whereby the resources 
available to the cooperative (particularly as a prioritised cooperative) in the form of means 
of production (collective land and transport) as well as access to other resources, including 
education and training became manipulated by the leadership.
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If the structural articulation of the cooperative with the revolutionary authorities 
encouraged personalised forms of leadership within the leadership and council of GP, the 
presence of Santos as president exacerbated this tendency because he had personal access 
to municipal power. At the time of research, Santos was a delegate on the Festival 
Commission in the municipal council in Tola and was standing as an FSLN candidate for 
the elections^ His influence in municipal affairs, evident during the research in his ability 
to secure an agreement to install an electricity line and a television for the cooperative, 
enabled him to extend his own power base. He maintained his power within the 
cooperative by gaining resources from above for the members.
This power facilitated Santos with the space in which to exert his authority in ways 
which would otherwise have been unacceptable. Most benignly, it was used in order to 
avoid physical work in the fields: a tendency which gained the leadership a local 
reputation to which a local farmer alluded by noting that:
"They strut around the hacienda with their pretty clothes, not prepared to set
an example of hard work to the members.'"^
This did not apply to all officers since other were conscientious about their positions 
including Carlos Tenerio, the production officer, who adopted a deliberate policy to spend 
as little time as possible away from the fields in order, he said, "to set the ordinary 
members a good example". By contrast, Santos even skived, making frequent visits to 
Rivas in the lorry driven by his brother, Ronald, and occasionally accompanied by other 
officers or council members. He would justify a trip away from the cooperative stating 
that an administrative task required his "immediate attention in town", when in fact it was 
not urgent. On one occasion he even made a trip round town in the lorry in search of the 
day’s newspaper! Sometimes Santos went too far in ignoring consensual procedures as 
when he had offered to loan large amounts of the cooperative’s wire to the municipal 
council and bought it large amounts of nails and screws without prior consultation with 
his fellow officers or the assembly. As we saw previously, both incidents led the council 
to demand that he return the goods: clearly, there were limits to the extent it would 
tolerate his abuses.
He was also extremely authoritarian in his personal manner and conducted 
assemblies in a way which can only be described as intimidating. He used all the classic 
techniques to enhance an air of authority: he’d place a desk between himself and the
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assembly, establishing himself firmly behind it; would perch upon it to tower over the
mainly seated assembly; or stride impatiently up and down while ordinary members spoke.
He also interrupted other people’s interventions and contributions, causing ordinary
members to complain privately that:
"He tells people what to do, does not invite the opinions of others nor attempt 
to include other members in the decisions of the cooperatives."
Moreover, he had a distinct image of what the cooperative ought to be and saw his
mission and mandate for election as being "to keep it in (ideological) line". Nowhere was
this attitude more succintly epitomised than his response to the issue of raising the amount
of economic assistance paid to members:
"If we raised the amount, they’d only drink it and besides, the cooperative’s 
not about getting notes (billetes), it’s about raising consciousness."
It is therefore unsurprising to learn that when I asked Santos about the primary function
of the assembly, he replied that it was "to inform" the cooperative of developments.
The effect of his authority and superiority was disempowering on ordinary members
and fellow council members alike. It exacerbated the inhibitions felt by the (relatively)
new and shy members in the assemblies, who anyway believed that "a new member
against an old can’t do anything". Even fellow council members confided that they
thought Santos too authoritarian. One admitted that:
"He doesn’t consult us either and if anyone raises a question or opposes his 
decisions he says, "Well, tough, the decision’s been made!" "
In this respect, his personal style of leadership which monopolised decision-making
powers and intimidated members had a direct bearing on the participation of others.
However, the centralization of power within GP’s leadership and the notoriously
authoritarian presidency of Santos may not have been challenged systematically by
ordinary members precisely because it had proved effective in delivering resources to the
cooperative. Nor did members believe, not being versed in the delicacies of
representation, that leaders could be otherwise.
In concrete terms the articulation of the leadership with state institutions, the FSLN
and UNAG had hitherto served to consolidate the means of production. It had also served
to ensure an accumulation of the means of production and ultimately to obtain financial
independence from the bank which would ensure some degree of security in the future
economic environment of the UNO government. It is therefore interesting to note that
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while the legitimacy of these leaders was rhetorically based on the discourse of democracy 
- as defined formally in the cooperative rules - in practice it was based more on the 
strategic ability of leaders to benefit their followers through their external contacts.
This situation echoes the corporatist system as prevalent elsewhere in Latin America 
and most notably researched in Mexico, whereby material goods and symbolism are 
exchanged in return for control of leaders and loyalty of the cooperative members which 
are reproduced through clientalist relations between leaders and organisations who had 
power to distribute the goods (Cordova, 1972; Warman, 1976). The persistence of such 
caciquismo has been explained by Lomnitz-Adler (1992) who arged that it reflects a 
dialectic in which caciques provide initial avenues for the state to penetrate local peasant 
cultures and to establish in time a bureaucratised institional structure for their 
management. The caciques become incorporated into the bureaucratic apparatus and form 
a personal link between local people and the state. The relevance of the Mexican studies 
to the Nicaraguan case is that they serve to explain how the post-revolutionary state 
related to the people in whose name it ruled, through such local and regional power 
brokers. In this way, caciques in Nicaragua became an instrument for the consolidating 
the post-revolutionary "mass-incorporating" national state in much the same way as in 
Mexico, as observed by Gledhill (1994:108). Thus the instances of leadership in GP 
including the officers and council members, emerged as a rural leadership to form part of 
the wider structures of power within revolutionary Nicaragua and operated as "political 
intermediaries" (Wolf, 1967) at the "interface" of local sphere and municipal level, able 
to exploit their abilities and social bases in order to relate to both spheres and convert 
themselves into representatives of both.
While cooperative leaders in GP were incorporated into a bureaucratic structure an 
examination of their wider function shows that they also operated as representatives of the 
peasant movement and advanced the interests of the peasant sector. As we saw earlier, 
the presidents formed the Municipal Cooperative Council (MCC) which met monthly to 
seek solutions to the common problems affecting the cooperative sector and met with the 
UNAG Municipal Leadership Junta for information, orientation and to elaborate economic 
programmes. Cooperative leaders were also delegates managing the Tienda Campesina 
and carried out UNAG’s rural development tasks in the comarcas: distributing seed and 
stimulating CCs. In this respect, cooperative leadership projected the organised peasant
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movement into the rural communities, thereby promoting the peasant movement.
The impact of leadership and the particular personal styles of some of the officers 
on shaping the participatory process emphasises the importance of an actor-oriented model 
of analysis because it shows the variability of outcomes according to the idiosyncratic 
circumstances of local conditions. The dual feature of centralised leadership based on 
manipulation of resources obtained from the revolutionary authorities together with 
restricted participatory opportunities for ordinary members that this entailed also raises the 
question of the relative empowerment of individuals within GP.
112 Primitive communism and leadership crisis: PJCh
By contrast to GP, the leadership of PJCh was not structurally articulated with the FSLN.
It was characterised by a conscientious adherence to formal cooperative regulations and
was subordinated to the authority of the assembly. Moreover, personalised forms of
power such as amiguismo although present were confined to the manipulation of control
over collective transport. Members not close "pals" with the leaders complained that,
unlike those in favour, the lorry was not used to take their sick children to hospital.
Those who supported the two dominant families were other co-founders: a situation
which had given rise to a division between old and new members. Pablo Ruiz who
became the secretary, considered that this situation was changing in relation to the
numerical significance of the two groups:
"Before the new ones had no rights to make demands, because we were not 
founders and the old members always looked how to exploit new ones. They 
would threaten to run us out. So we all shut up because we were in the 
minority and so had no vote. When in 1988 some of the older ones began to 
leave then us new ones, we became a majority."
This shift was reflected in the composition of the leadership, as previously indicated in
Chapter 7, which then became open to new contenders: a situation which led to a
stabilisation of the leadership, rendering it more effective, in Pablo’s words:
"it works much better now, there’s no conflicts".
The generally more transparent form of leadership assured that members could 
employ all available mechanisms of accountability to keep leaders in check. This was 
matched as we see below by the open personal style of some of its leaders. Despite this, 
officers lacked credibility: a situation which is perhaps explained by the examining the
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case of Lorenzo who was the person most subject to scrutiny. Not only was Lorenzo
president of the cooperative but he was also organisation secretary for the UCA, the
second level cooperative association to which PJCh was affiliated. This dual role raised
expectations that he would be able to secure greater access to external resources for the
cooperative or improve the material basis of the cooperative. In the current economic
context, which was particularly prejudicial to this cooperative as a coffee producer, neither
he nor the UCA (with which he was so intimately associated) were able to deliver.
Ordinary members claimed that Lorenzo spent too much time unnecessarily outside the
cooperative fulfilling his secretarial duties of the UCA. They increasingly complained that
the cooperative had to reimburse his travel expenses and the corresponding economic
assistance owed to him. Aware that his personal credibility was intimately bound-up with
the ordinary members’ perception of the UCA, Lorenzo repeatedly appealed to me to tell
the assembly of its virtues and to reassure members of the benefits that the UCA would
endow on the cooperative in future.
Although it was clear to Lorenzo and the other officers (who attended the meetings
and workshops relating to the development of the UCA) that affiliation to the UCA was
the only way to advance the cooperative and secure its future economic security, such
faith was not shared by ordinary members within PJCh. Unlike the cooperative leaders,
they knew little about it. Indeed, only 27% of the interviewees reported that they
belonged to it when asked to identify the organisations to which they were affiliated. This
in turn reflects the poor projection of the UCA in the cooperative bases: itself a situation
which arose because the UCA had been imposed on the cooperatives without the direct
participation of ordinary members. This presented a real dilemma to Lorenzo and his
statement below reveals his acute awareness of his dual role as a leader in the cooperative
as a representive of the members as well as a resource manager. He was clearly reluctant
to shift in favour of the latter:
"If you ’lose’ a day’s productive work doing administrative work, according 
to "the people" you’re working badly yet, if you do what the people want the 
cooperative would collapse. If you’re managing the cooperative then of 
course you have to spend days on adminstrative matters. I started out trying 
to balance what the people wanted and what needed to be done but it just 
didn’t work out and I had to try to ignore their criticisms."
As we see, he resolved the problem by prioritising the efficiencv of the cooperative as a
productive unit, above his role in determining a more democratically accountable model.
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The UCA represented the main vehicle for furthering the campesino struggle and 
provided an organisational basis from which advances had been made. Lorenzo’s 
participation in its leadership was impressive and he had been elected as secretary from 
an assembly comprised of all the officers of the thirty three constitutent cooperatives: an 
accolade to his administrative skills. As such, his own work as a leader in the UCA 
project including the Tienda Campesina should be seen as contributing to the wider 
peasant movement. In this respect, the leadership of PJCh is understood less as a political 
mediator between the cooperative and municipality (as in the case of GP) since it was 
involved in an organisation which was challenging state power. It can best be described 
as an intermediary between the national cooperative movement and the cooperative base 
to the extent that it was able to relate to these spheres while representing both of them. 
Nonetheless and contradictorily, the imposition the UCA on the affiliated cooperative 
represented the state’s bureaucratisation of the movement.
That the assembly was in danger of jeopardizing the cooperative’s participation in 
the UCA is clear. In a similar way, its over-ruling authority had negative implications for 
the social development of the cooperative. The assembly rejected a number of the 
officers’ proposals which were informed by higher educational levels and a more 
progressive gender insight concerning the importance of maintaining maternity payments 
and organised childcare arrangements. The assembly also outvoted the leaders’ proposal 
that the cooperative find another teacher, thereby denying the children a formal education. 
As seriously, ignorant about the health dangers posed by the insanitary conditions of the 
encampment, the assembly outvoted the president’s proposal to improve hygiene, although 
months later he was able to convince them. The problems generated by maximum 
authority of the assembly raise two important issues. First, it indicates that the ultimate 
practice of participation under a situation of majority rule was no guarantee to democracy 
or social equality - democratic processes can have undesirable outcomes. Second, it 
emphasises the importance of leadership in such circumstances of underdevelopment in 
order to enable the peasant movement to consolidate its economic base and compete with 
other sectors in society.
A comparison of individual styles amongst the leadership of PJCh reveals another 
important influence on the nature of participation. In dramatic contrast to his GP 
counterpart, Lorenzo had a distinct style which was conducive to the participation of all
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members (a dramatic contrast to his GP counterpart). He always solicited the opinions
of members who would otherwise have remained silent and would actively seek consensus
between members. At the cooperative’s annual general assembly (AGM), when new
affiliates were present for the first time, he stressed that all members had:
"..the right to express their opinions and participate without fear. Here we try 
to create an atmosphere where we can discuss what we agree and disagree.
The directivo does not make the decisions: it makes proposals for the approval 
of the assembly. And all members should take part in the assembly and assist 
in controlling the faults even of the old members."
Although Lorenzo’s attempts to harness the participation of women proved hopelessly
inappropriate (as Chapter 9 describes), his efforts at being a facilitator of discussion and
participation within the assembly were generally successful. This was a role that both
Omar and Pablo also fulfilled since they too sought opinions and appealed to ordinary
members for support in their proposals.
By contrast, Jeronimo and Francisco, who were both Sandinista militants, typically
lectured the cooperative about the way it should resolve its problems; paid scant attention
to democratic procedures; and consistently failed to understand why others saw things
differently to themselves while expecting others to support their views. For example,
during one of the leaders’ meetings prior to the AGM, Jeronimo began referring to the
"new" officers as if the posts had already been elected. He had to be reminded by Omar
that the role of the present leadership was only to nominate members and that ultimately
it was the assembly which decided. Similarly, Francisco would stand up to give his
opinion in an authoritative manner. He had assimilated the dominant state conception of
the campesinado as backward and held them in a degree of contempt:
"You can be talking and explaining something, while the members start to talk 
or play about. Thev don’t recognize or understand the importance of things."
Here in PJCh, the absence of control of power within the leadership facilitated the
assembly with greater opportunities for high intensities of participation in all key areas of
cooperative life and development. As with GP, the analysis of leadership in PJCh reveals
the importance of local dynamics in shaping the nature of participatory processes.
This finding, as it relates to the different leadership styles of Sandinista and non-
Sandinista officers in PJCh, suggests that our enquiry should now pursue a systematic
examination of what external factors shaped their particular styles. The following attempts
to do just that and the task becomes more important since the issue of internal legitimacy
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and accountability of the leadership has also indicated that external factors have to be 
placed on the analytical agenda in order to understand the leadership phenomenon.
Ill Priorities, political visions and verticalism
One way of identifying what other external factors might influence leadership practices 
and styles, is by referring to and comparing individuals’ perceptual worldviews of the 
institutional milieu in which the cooperative was located. Consequently, I asked leaders 
from both cooperatives to depict by drawing, how they thought their cooperative 
articulated with other organisations and institutions of society\ This exercise was based 
on the assumption that the diagrams would ultimately represent a combination of the 
objective reality of their own cooperative’s institutional links and their own interpretation 
about which were most significant: a subjectivity itself a product of the individuals’ 
interests and priorities. Used in conjunction with supportive evidence of their known 
extra-cooperative activities this methodological approach is instrumental in indicating the 
potential sources of an individual’s social, political or economic resources.
Here, the diagrams are interpreted purely in relation to their overall structure, 
geographical scope and the nature of the relationships (whether economic, political or 
social, hierarchical or mutual). What must be clear from the outset is that while 
individual personalities ultimately influence how individuals act, these diagrams suggest 
that there is a social and political explanation for leadership styles and practices. Each is 
briefly described before concluding generalisations are drawn.
The first diagram presented is that drawn by the demagogic Santos, the current 
president of GP (see Figure 17). In it, Santos placed the cooperative in the centre of the 
lower-middle of his hierarchical diagram, above the surrounding communities and beneath 
the structures of the FSLN and government. Arrows indicate a "top-down" direction of 
political input from the FSLN to the cooperative and from the cooperative to the 
communities, suggesting that Santos perceived the cooperative as an intermediary between 
the party and the community and as an object at which policies were directed.
His diagram is confined to the depiction of the political functions of the cooperative 
to the exclusion of other aspects of cooperative existence, reflecting Santos’ view that the 
cooperative was a predominantly political entity. It is also consistent with his own
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Figure 17: Organogram, Santos, president GP
political interest, since he was a Sandinista militant (he had joined in 1983), was an FSLN 
substitute candidate in the municipal elections and a current delegate of the Municipal 
Council on the Festival Committee. Through this political incorporation, Santos is able 
to conceive of the national government (the diagram is national in scope) a feature which 
reveals that his post-revolutionary experiences had gained him a truly nationalist ideology.
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Nonetheless, some institutions of the state (MIDINRA, ENABAS and EPS) are present 
in Santos’ conceptual worldview and these deal with the productive, supply and marketing 
aspects and military commitments of cooperative political economy. The location of these 
state institutions on the same hierarchical level as the FSLN implies a conceptual unity 
between these entities and reflects the extent to which the FSLN, had through its 
bureaucratic tendency, had become synonymous with the state. Essentially, Santos’ 
diagram serves to indicate in an explicit way the resource base and the political influences 
which informed his leadership style. They confirm our view that his recourse to external 
resources consolidated his leadership and that his authoritarian style of leadership derived 
from a verticalist concept reproduced from previous authoritarian practices and based on 
the FSLN political model.
Wilfredo constructed a rather different diagram (see Figure 18). He was the 
production officer in GP and had previously held posts in the cooperative as finance 
officer, production officer, mechanic and was president between 1988-89. Instead of 
illustrating the interrelationship of the various organisations and institutions, Wilfredo 
elected to represent the relative significance of the various organisations by placing them 
at corresponding distances from the cooperative. His own community, Sanchez, is 
represented as the entity closest to the cooperative, supporting his own explicit references 
to the community as his main interest. The proximity and relative significance of the 
community is also consistent with his source of social prestige or resources: he was not 
immune to the practice of amiguismo, of trying to advance the interests of his own 
community through use of cooperative resources, such as transport, etc. Again, it seems 
that it is the cooperative which links the community to the rest of the diagrammatic 
structure suggesting that he also perceived the cooperative as a political or cultural 
intermediary between new revolutionary power and the rural communities.
Unlike Santos, the components Wilfredo included in his diagram incorporate the 
economic, political and social functions of the cooperative and geographical scope of 
Wilfredo’s diagram is local, yet his acknowledgement of other social sectors, including 
those linked to the cooperative through the peasant-worker alliance, indicate his awareness 
of their alliance with the peasantry. The presence of these functions reflects the diversity 
of Wilfredo’s own extra-cooperative activities. These included being a Sandinista militant 
(since 1984); a CC activist (as the coordinator of Sanchez II); representative for MCC and
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representative on the commission of the Tienda Campesina. He had also been mobilised 
for two years but the EPS appears not to feature in his worldview. Unlike Santos, 
Wilfredo placed the FSLN alongside UNAG: a symbol o f his view that the producers’ 
association was equally significant to cooperative affairs although the FSLN occupies the 
largest box in the diagram.
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lugure 18: Organogram, Wilfredo, vice-president GP
Then come the institutions o f the state (MIDINRA, BND and ENABAS) and they 
are situated below the cooperative, suggesting that Wilfredo did not see the cooperative
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as being an object to be subordinated to state institutions. Finally, Wilfredo noted the 
other social sectors with which the cooperative had limited relations of mutual exchange 
(including the workers in the ports) and finally the merchants (to whom the cooperative 
had begun to sell plantains) are relegated to the bottom diagram in a box not linked to the 
main structure as a retlection of their status as an as-yet insignificant economic agent.
Figure 19: Organogram, Luis, education officer GP
Luis Rivera, the author o f  the third diagram (see Figure 19), is the education o t t ic e r  
o f  GP and w as its very first president. He was neither a party m em ber nor an U N A G
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representative and did not participate in any other mass organisation although he 
occasionally volunteered on CC projects because he "doesn’t have the time", nor had he 
been mobilised. Reflecting this, Luis’ diagram has neither FSLN, UNAG nor other 
cooperatives or social sectors^.
Significantly, his diagram has a circular format which distinguishes it from the 
previous two. The cooperative is located in the centre around which revolve the state, 
government and communities worthy of his note. The only state institutions noted are the 
BND and MIDINRA and the municipality and town hall in Rivas are represented as 
instances of government. The geographical boundary of his perceptual universe extends 
only as far as Rivas, the Department’s capital, and imply that his worldview was an 
essentially localist one. Essentially, he remained within his peasant microcosm. As with 
Wilfredo, Luis described the relationships between the cooperatives and the other 
institutions. He clearly portrays these relationships as two-way and they are represented 
by double-ended arrows. His accompanying remarks emphasise the cooperative’s 
relationship with the community as being one of "exchange" and mutual benefit. Its 
relationship with MIDINRA, is described by Luis supporting the cooperative with advisory 
and technical assistance while the cooperative supplied plantains to its employees and 
information about crop projects. The relationship with the Municipal Council is also 
portrayed as being mutual whereby the cooperative paid its 10% tax on sales and provided 
transport for municipal activities while the Municipal Council responded with "flexibility" 
regarding the demands of the cooperative. The mutuality of these relationships is strongly 
suggestive of Luis’ perception of the cooperative as a proactive political agent in relations 
of exchange with the institutions around it.
All three diagrams from GP include the local government and strongly imply that 
it existed as a political reality for the cooperative for both the non-Sandinista and 
Sandinista authors alike. The diagrams are also common in having designated a place for 
MIDINRA since it directed considerable technical attention to the cooperative’s 
development.
We now turn to the drawings of leaders of PJCh. We start with that of Lorenzo the 
president, who had previously held this office and that of finance officer (see Figure 20). 
He came originally from La Concepcion, had joined UNAG in 1983 when he entered the 
cooperative and had joined the UCA in 1986 when it first formed, and became its
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secretary. He had also been in the military for two years and although not a militant, he 
was one of those who identified himself as "soy Sandinista" (I’m a Sandinista)^. Apart 
from having participated in the occasional construction projects in the local communities, 
Lorenzo had no formal or social connections with the surrounding communities. In fact, 
he never visited them.
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Figure 20: O rganogram , Lorenzo, president PJCh
Lorenzo positioned the cooperative in the middle o f  the diagram amidst other institutions, 
organisations and the communities. The boxes are positioned at d ifferent d is tances  from
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the cooperative, with the FSLN, UNAG and the UCA the closest to it, suggesting their 
equal importance to the cooperative’s existence (when asked which organisations were the 
most important to him, he gave the FSLN and UNAG as equals). Here, double-ended 
arrows indicate two-way relationships between a triad encompassing the cooperative, 
UNAG and UCA. The components which are the furthest away are the comarcas: La 
Chona ,the name of the comarca in which the cooperative itself is located; San Pedro de 
los Molinas, to the west; Marvin Corales, adjacent to the San Jorge site; and Dulce 
Nombre, which was the furthest placed on the diagram and was a town five kilometres 
to the south and was relevant only insofar as it was the origin of a few socios and was an 
UNO stronghold.
The components included in Lorenzo’s diagram encompass functions which relate 
to the productive viability of the cooperative. The BND and PROAGRO, as state 
institutions, are presented with lines emanating from the centre. Double-ended arrows 
indicate a mutual relationship of assistance, money or products going from and coming 
to the cooperative. Significantly, the relationship with ENCAFE, the state coffee 
processing plant, is portrayed as being one way whereby the cooperative surrendered its 
coffee. Political relations are merely implied through the presence of the FSLN but this 
is connected to the cooperative with an arrowless line, perhaps reflective of the ambiguous 
influence and intervention of the different levels of the revolutionary authorities. There 
is no municipal government in his schema.
The author of the second organogram from PJCh was produced by Jeronimo (see 
Figure 21) who was a Sandinista militant and activist in the electoral campaign in San 
Pedro and occasionally in the CC of La Chona. His diagram is significantly different 
from those of his co-leader, sharing the more structured diagram that typifies the 
Sandinista authors from GP. Here, the cooperative is depicted as having two distinct 
associative relationships; one in a triad with the FSLN and community, comprising a 
political relationship, the other with the UCA and UNAG which defines its union 
association. Interestingly, Jeronimo indicated UNAG to be the single most important 
organisation. Given his militancy this was an unexpected response but this is perhaps a 
product of the decisive role of UNAG on behalf of the cooperative in the UCA struggle 
with the state over control of resources. All instances of the state and government are 
absent from his schema since they are not seen as political sources for assistance, support
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or the solution o f  political problems.
f  igure 21: Organogram,  Jeronimo,  vice-president PJCh
The final organogram was drawn by Omar ,  the production officer, who had been 
president in 1988, vice-president in 1987 and production officer in 1985 and 1986 (see 
f' igurc 22). In his capacity as a leader, he frequent ly attended local UN AC; and UCA 
meetings. Omar ,  was not a Sandinista al though he also identified with the party. His 
original home was in the neighbouring communi ty ,  San Pedro de los .Molinas. As with 
Lorenzo’s, O m a r ’s schema has the cooperat ive in the centre o f  the diagram but he placed
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his cooperative above UNAG (which he identified as the single most important 
organisation), the FSLN and the UCA. A circle encloses these components, in a symbolic 
unification to represent their common role as either providing an organisational input to 
the cooperative or as revolutionary organisations. Other components in the diagram 
include: individual local producers; ENCAFE, the only state agency mentioned; and the 
community from where he originates. Like his fellow officers, Omar represented neither 
local or central government.
The fact that none of the diagrams from PJCh include government in either local, 
regional or central instance is a manifestation of either the inefficiency of local 
government in resolving the problems of the cooperative or the unpopular economic 
policies. Whatever the reason, it reiterates our appreciation that government and state 
institutions were not a source of power for these leaders, indeed, our knowledge of the 
basis of their leadership indicates that their leadership was largely based on internal 
legitimacy. The common components of all three PJCh diagrams are the UNAG, UCA 
and FSLN party and the authors’ accompanying descriptions of the diagrams identify these 
as the most significant for the organisation, economic viability and political representation 
of the cooperative. This reinforces the earlier characterisation of the cooperative as 
"horizontally integrated" since it was allied with the organisations which represented the 
organised peasant sector, namely the UNAG and UCA. It did not integrate vertically with 
the government or state institutions.
Beyond the mention of the cooperatives, the only other component common to all 
six of the diagrams was the "community", described variously as serving the cooperative 
as home, as an object for receiving FSLN policies, a supplier of workforce or market for 
produce. Whereas the diagrams of the non-Sandinistas were generally concentrically 
organised and were characterised by the centred location of the cooperative within the 
authors’ conceptual universe, those of the Sandinistas were more structured and had 
evident hierarchical levels. These typically emphasised (to varying degrees) the political 
function of the cooperative in its relationship with the FSLN and the local communities. 
This commonal feature of the Sandinistas’ diagrams suggests that organisational models 
were internalised by militants. This highlights the impact at the local level of the FSLN 
political model: the dialogical methods of teaching, promoted initially by the literacy 
campaign and by UNAG were clearly not effective in negating these verticalist
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conceptions.
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C on c lu s io ns
lcrc, ihc actor perspective has revealed that leaders are key agents  which give local
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circumstances their particular participatory character. This is because the extent of their 
power over the assembly determined the range of issues and participatory intensities in 
which ordinary members could participate in the decision-making process. Leaders also 
influenced participation indirectly through their role as resource managers, the success of 
which had implications for the viability of the cooperatives.
They were also an important element to consider in the inquiry into participation 
because they were the products of the participatory and political processes. This became 
evident from our inquiry since leadership could not be understood solely in terms of 
internal group dynamics but in reference to the nature of their articulation with external 
agents. The leaders in GP emerged with the hallmarks of caciques and assumed a 
leadership role within the countryside by providing a link between cooperative members 
and the rural communities. It would seem they fulfilled an important political function 
which arose in response to the circumstances at the time of the triumph when the 
administrative structure of the Sandinista state was weak. In such a way the leaders can 
be conceptually identified as constituting another medium by which macro-level 
phenomena influenced the nature of local level participatory practices.
Although the leaders effectively extended the state bureaucracy into the rural areas, 
they served another important role: those from GP and PJCh were significant in 
contributing towards the development a national peasant movement. With their education, 
training, organisational skills and experience they consolidated the economic base of the 
cooperatives and through their activities in local UNAG, CC and UCA contributed towards 
strengthening the organisational base of the movement.
The examination of the internal nature of the legitimacy of the leaders reveals 
evidence of new - albeit uneven - political practices. These were most significant in PJCh 
as a consequence of two factors. First, members were effective in challenging the leaders 
and thereby securing a more representative form of leadership and second, deprived of the 
ability to gain resources from above, the power of the leaders became based purely on 
their internal legitimacy. By contrast, in GP, members did not demand a more 
representative and accountable leadership and the power of these officers was more 
heavily weighted on their ability to secure material resources. Yet, even here there were 
limits to the leaders’ domination, beyond which they could not go without being usurped 
by members who used new democratic processes to replace them.
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This examination of the external linkage of leaders with the state shows that they 
were another type of caciques. Moreover, their recourse to forms of clientelism 
demonstrates the prevalence of personalised forms of power and reveals the continuity and 
reproduction of a political culture which preceded the revolution.
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Notes to Chapter 8
1.Estatutos de la Cooperativa German Pomares, Tola.
2.Lorenzo Ample, personal interview, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, March 1990.
3.He was removed from the list following the decision to reduce the number 
of FSLN candidates, after the UNO contended their estimations of the 
country’s population, on which numbers of candidates was based.
4.Ever Herrera, personal interview Tola, December 1990.
5.This had an added methodological advantage of reducing the ideological bias 
associated with straight forward verbal communication. All the informants 
attempted to modify their initial drawing but were prevented by the researcher 
to ensure methodological consistency.
6.It is interesting to compare Luis’ accompanying verbal expression about how 
the cooperative articulates with external agencies:
'The cooperative within the revolutionary process plays an 
important role because it participates in all the tasks of the country: 
in defense and in politico-ideological work. It also participates in 
debates to analyse work and planning programmes and helps one 
way or another MIDINRA, UNAG, the police and some of the 
barrios. In this respect the cooperative helps the state and 
participates in the government."
Although this verbal description includes the cooperative’s political functions 
through the FSLN and UNAG, my feeling is that it appears to be more of a 
self-conscious "ideologically" correct line. Luis was familiar with UNAG or 
FSLN’s perspective on such a politicised topic as the role of the cooperative. 
Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that this statement also reflects the concept 
of the cooperative as an autonomous unit and one which through its other 
functions ultimately contributes to the state and government as was implied in 
the diagram.
7.1n fact he considered that he did a better job at political work within the 
cooperative than Jeronimo of whom he was critical. Lorenzo was concerned 
that Jeronimo did not pay sufficient attention to "educating" the cooperative 
members about the FSLN.
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Chapter 9
MACHISMO AND THE LEGACY OF EXCLUSION
This chapter continues with the efforts to disaggregate the cooperative experience of 
participation and is the last one which attempts to identify other facilitating and 
constraining factors. It focuses on the individual level - on men and women - and 
examines different participatory activities within the cooperatives, explaining the variation 
in participatory behaviour between the members who have essentially shared the same 
structural circumstances. It also assesses the nature of individuals’ participation in 
reference to the processes of individual and group empowerment.
Since analysis is aimed specifically at the actor level, the chapter provides the 
opportunity to examine the individuals’ interaction with and response to macro-level forces 
and agents such as mass organisations, state policies and international forces (which they 
experience directly and indirectly). Specific consideration of the situation of women 
within the cooperative requires further analysis of the impact of the cultural, ideological 
and material expressions of patriarchy and the extent to which subordinate female gender 
constructs are challenged by them. Thus, the chapter emphasises the strategies men and 
women developed in response to the situations they encountered as well as the subjective 
meanings they attached to their life worlds and experiences. The extent to which these 
peasants operated as passive objects to externally directed change or as constructive actors 
who shaped participatory outcomes are the theoretical concerns at stake here.
I Differential participation
It has been demonstrated in previous chapters both that the members of the cooperatives 
experienced similar historical conditions, structural circumstances and historical processes 
and intervening parties and that not everyone participated in the decision-making process 
in the same qualitative way. Quite simply, some were more involved and played a greater 
role than others. In fact, closer inspection indicates that there are three general groups 
into which individuals can be seen to conform. These categories are distinguished by the 
nature and intensity of their participation or rather, their participatory inputs in the 
decision-making process.
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At the one extreme were those who didn’t speak or very rarely spoke during the 
assemblies. The participation of these relatively passive individuals, the "quiet ones", was 
the minimum possible within the cooperative since it amounted to their physical presence 
at meetings (required according to cooperative rules) and the simple expression of policy 
preference by use of their vote. Within both cooperatives there was a core of about ten 
such members. A more involved participation in the decision-making process is 
represented by those who were able to comment critically about a particular project or 
issue, profer counter-arguments or suggest alternative solutions to problems. This was the 
largest group which is categorised here as the "active ones".
The last group were those who, in addition to those participatory inputs of the 
previous group, initiated topics for discussion or suggested projects to undertake. Also, 
when challenged on issues, individuals from this group would typically solicit support 
from others. They are categorised as the "initiators" in reference to their high intensity 
participation. Included in this group are those who were currently occupying officer 
positions and who by virtue of their posts were systematically fulfilling the role of 
initiating projects and topics for discussion concerning the cooperatives’ affairs. It also 
included individuals who had previously been leaders and a handful of others who as yet, 
had not held office.
In general, individuals were reasonably consistent in the nature of their participation
although normally passive individuals would intervene in proceedings under particular
circumstance, as the following indicates:
"I participate when I want something, to borrow money or ask for wood or 
medicine."
This statement, reiterated by the following one, suggests that their "silence" was not 
insurmountable and that they felt at liberty to intervene in proceedings when sufficiently 
moved:
"I only speak in the assembly when I think something is very wrong and 
unfair."
Again, Paul’s schema of distinct participatory "intensities", which was of analytical value 
for our earlier examination of the aggregate participatory activities of the cooperative, can 
be usefully applied to individuals. Thus, the participatory behaviour or activity of this 
group of quiet ones can be identified as low intensity since it involved only information
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sharing and consultation where individuals gave their opinions or were consulted by the 
leaders. The active ones had a more involved role in decision-making, for example by 
contributing to the development of ideas and by providing counter-opinions. The final 
group, the initiators, had a more intense involvement yet. Applied as such to the activities 
of individuals, these intensities suggest a hierarchy of political behaviour which increases 
from minimal involvement or "intensity" in the case of the silent ones, to the more 
complex participatory behaviour represented by the active ones and ultimately is expressed 
by the qualitatively distinct ability of being able to generate new projects or schemes, as 
represented by the initiators.
How can we account for the differences between individuals who have such similar 
backgrounds? What other factors were operating to shape individual participation? Here, 
a first step is to reject the interpretation of those political scientists such as Milbrath 
(1965) and Almond and Verba (1965) who have sought to explain the different categories 
of participatory inputs amongst social groups as a function of some "social" and 
organisational law'. This interpretation is clearly flawed because it ignores how power 
is distributed, asserted or resisted within groups and fails to account for the influence of 
socio-cultural or psychological factors which inhibit greater participation.
II Overcoming the ideological legacy of suppression
This section examines the extent to which the ideological legacy of Somoza continued to 
operate as a constraint on the participatory processes. This is then examined in relation 
to the factors and experiences which facilitated greater participation.
I ll  Consent to be dominated as a barrier to participation
In Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 the way socio-cultural factors can operate to inhibit 
participation through the peasants’ internalisation of the negative images of themselves 
that are perpetuated by the patrones and society was described with particular reference 
to Nicaragua. Ideas that peasants were inherently stupid and that the existing social order 
was natural in origin were reproduced in pre-revolutionary Nicaragua in the dominant 
culture and contributed to the maintenance of the dominant social order. However, this 
is not to state that oppositional actions of resistance did not evolve amongst the peasantry.
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since they certainly did, nor that they were not conscious of their subordination. What
it does mean is that these notions created a psychological barrier amongst this subaltern
group, that they were incompetent and incapable of effecting significant change.
There was strong evidence amongst the cooperative members in the aftermath of
Somoza that indeed this ideological system which legitimised the previous order had been
internalised by campesinos. The following statement by a woman cooperative member
is movingly illustrative of the extent to which these notions had influenced the peasants’
perceptions of themselves and of the system which exploited them:
"Before we used to think that to have healthy children was a privilege only 
of the rich: when mine died I believed it to be "natural"^.
After the revolution, these feelings of inferiority lingered amongst the silent members of
the cooperative who felt inferior and remained convinced of their own worthlessness.
Their behaviour, namely their peripheral role in the cooperative’s decision-making
processes, conformed to precisely the passiveness which the early development literature
pointed to as evidence of the poor’s inherent doeility. However, the explanation for this
was implicit in the explanations given by these "quiet ones" themselves. They typically
attributed their low participation to the "fear of saying something stupid" or of "not having
anything useful to add". Similarly, in more articulate terms their colleagues attributed it
to their being "conditioned not to value their worth". A couple of members expressed
remarkable insight into the historical and socio-psychological origins of the problem,
interestingly in terminology which mirrored precisely that of Freire (1972). In particular,
Auscencion Alvares, the veteran guerilla and one of the original founders of GP stated
that:
"Since Nicaragua is a marginalised country there are people who themselves 
haven’t emerged from their own condition of marginalisation and 
underdevelopment. The problem of us feeling oppressed is historic as is the 
feeling and belief that your voice isn’t worth a thing".
If the feelings of inferiority are the legacy of an ideological system which 
perpetuated the myth of an inherently incapable campesinos, then so too was the tendency 
for some of the members to defer the responsibility of resolving problems to others - 
including other members of the cooperative or its leaders, the government or the state. 
As we have seen in GP, this syndrome of dependency was convenient to the leaders and 
council members whose power remained unehallenged as a consequence. These
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individuals explained the relative inactivity of others unproblematically, in terms of their 
timid personalities or as a product of "not everyone (being) the same". This point is 
crucial since it indicates that their silence was not necessarily a consequence of being dis- 
empowered by others.
By contrast, in PJCh this passivity was a constant frustration to the leaders who 
constantly complained that some of the members lacked any resolve to confront the 
problems they collectively faced. Lorenzo from PJCh frequently gave vent to the 
frustration that:
"The problem is that they want everything done for them., they want the state
to do everything.
Hence, after cooperative discussions about education and improving the sanitary conditions 
of the encampment, members rejected proposals that they find their own solutions and 
instead stated that they thought the state ought to assist. As the leaders themselves 
stressed this - considering the limitations on the state - amounted to ensuring that nothing 
changed.
Augusto Espinola, the president of the UCA in Carazo, also lamented this problem 
of dependency:
the campesino is accustomed to a patron and not to think and the
Revolution has not managed to change that."^
Beyond recognising this problem, the fact was that neither Augusto, other leaders 
within the UCA nor indeed the majority of leaders within the cooperative movement, had 
self-critically analysed precisely what elements of cooperative organisation might have 
perpetuated this mentality of dependency. Evidently, the dominant ideological notion of 
the peasantry as backward, still dominant within MIDINRA and reproduced within other 
political institutions, had pervaded analysis. Thus, there was sparse reflection on the role 
of subjective notions of ownership of the land and externally imposed models of 
organisation in influencing individuals’ motivation to participate in cooperative decision­
making, that is of factors which this thesis has suggested influence the process.
Despite having experienced similar conditions during Somoza and being exposed to 
the opportunities created within the cooperative the question remains as to what makes an 
individual more participatory than another. So, now we need to examine the specific 
factors and experiences which contributed to some individuals overcoming these 
debilitating notions that had previously created a barrier to their participation.
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112 Facilitating factors
The following examines how individuals responded to the developments and changes 
evolving since the triumph of the revolution and how this interaction shaped their different 
responses and the strategies they adopted. Consistent with the complexity of reality itself, 
there is no one single factor which can be isolated as being the faciliter to greater 
participation. However, an examination of the characteristics of participants in the 
initiator, active and silent categories reveals that the most significant variables are gender, 
education, organisational and military experience. Each of these interacting variables are 
examined in detail below and a detailed consideration of gender is presented in the next 
section of the chapter.
II2a Education
In general higher educational levels were associated with more intense participatory 
activities. This positive correlation has already been illustrated in Table 6 of Chapter 8, 
which shows the characteristics distinguishing leaders from ordinary members. This 
serves our analysis here if we consider that the leaders represented a group which can be 
unambiguously distinguished for comparative purposes from other members, since this is 
the group which had the consistently highest intensity of participation and "initiating" 
activities. Moreover, the positive relationship between education and participation is 
further illustrated by the case of the women since Karla was the only woman from either 
cooperative to have obtained a leadership position and was the woman who had attended 
school for the longest.
The relationship between education and participation is also evident from the 
characteristics of the silent members who were with few exceptions, the least educated. 
Indeed, illiteracy inhibited the participation even of the founders since amongst the 
illiterate founders interviewed, two from each cooperative were categorically silent. That 
higher levels of education were facilitating factors is also evident from the advantages it 
gave newcomers. While new members with low educational levels claimed that "the older 
ones" were a primary source of ridicule or intimidation which prevented their immediate 
incorporation, the barrier was easily surmounted in the case of newcomers with more years 
of schooling. Carlos from GP, with six years schooling and Sergio from PJCh, with four 
years, had been members for less than a year but nonetheless maintained active and vocal
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profiles during the assemblies and what’s more, both went on to be elected to leadership 
positions. Of course, this was not their only facilitating advantage since both these men 
had prior organisational experience. As we shall see these two factors also tended to 
coincide anyway.
These findings reinforce the already well established recognition of the role of 
education in contributing to enable the poor to overcome the constraints to participation 
as identified by Freire (1972) and recognised in Nicaragua by the revolutionary authorities 
(Amove, 1986). Education contributes to the development of self-awareness and 
consciousness among the poor. It also generates a critical self-awareness of their life 
situation and engenders positive images about themselves and their potential as political 
subjects. Related to these subjective developments, education serves to improve the 
individuals’ skills in logic and general debate and endowes them with more confidence 
to use their voice within a social group. It was recognised by members themselves as one 
long-term guarantee of improving the participation of the passive members: out of a total 
of thirty five responses, twelve gave education as the solution to improve the participation 
of members. An alternative was suggested by a further twenty respondents who stated 
that passive individuals ought, in the immediate context of a meeting, be asked questions 
directly.
Most members had gained access to the educational opportunities created after the 
revolution by the state. These included the Literacy Cmsade (1981) and the Adult 
Education Programme which started in 1981 and was provided in Popular Education 
Collectives which met after working hours (Amove, 1986). More recently, re-formulated 
adult education programmes had been specifically directed at cooperative members 
(CIERA, 1989c:207). The younger members who joined in the years after the cooperative 
was created had attended school.
However, the benefits were unequal and illiteracy levels were high in both 
cooperatives: of the two cooperatives, 31% identified themselves as completely illiterate 
and a further 17% were only partially literate. Women were significantly less educated 
than the men: they averaged one year seven months of schooling compared with four 
years for the men. Of the twelve women interviewed, five described themselves as 
illiterate. The absence of technical training especially for them meant that their low 
educational levels were never addressed and this further marginalised them the
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participatory process and leadership opportunities. Coupled with the effects of patriarchy 
(which are examined later), women were less able to participate and were not eligible for 
leadership positions. The importance of directing education and technical training to 
women to enable them to gain access to leadership positions was a key to women’s greater 
participation since attention to gender specific issues could only have been guaranteed 
where women participated in the cooperative executive council.
While different educational levels can be accounted for by the extent to which 
individuals were able to assimilate the importance of education for their own 
improvement, objective circumstances also played a part. In particular, unlike their 
younger colleagues, the older members encountered specific difficulties because of their 
age and problems with their sight. At the time of research six of the interviewees from 
GP, all men, were currently studying. Four of these were undertaking basic literacy and 
two were studying at secondary level and all of them were members of the Council. By 
contrast, no adult within the whole PJCh cooperative was studying at the time of research. 
This is a combined product of the physical distance of the cooperative from adult 
education programmes and its collective decision not to arrange for another resident 
teacher to work with them. Access to education was not the only limitation. The Freirean 
methods of reflexive pedagogy on which the Literacy Campaign was devised in order to 
instil a critical consciousness in the learner, were in practice abandoned. Instead, and in 
the context of a Crusade which was limited to a five month period, methods of rote 
learning were adopted by teachers. Its full potential as a liberating ingredient was 
restricted as a result and so was the state’s positive intervention in participatory process 
(Amove, 1986).
Nonetheless, while education appears to be a facilitating factor it was not the only 
pre-requisite to more intense participation. This is most aptly illustrated in the case of 
Auscension of GP who, although never an officer of the cooperative, was a member of 
the council and was a prominent initiator in the cooperative despite being barely literate. 
Ascension, a "militant" Catholic, had become a Delegate of the Word thirty years 
previously and was also a veteran Sandinista guerilla.
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II2b Organisational experience 
If education contributed to the individuals’ liberation from an ideology which constrained 
them and enhanced their opportunities to operate as more effective participants within a 
social group, then so too did the organisational experience individuals gained before their 
incorporation into the cooperatives. As already described in Chapter 5, all the cooperative 
founders had prior involvement in either religious, trade union or other mass organisations 
organised around taking land and, in the case of GP, were directly involved in the struggle 
for the land. Social and political theory provides the basis from which to suggest that the 
involvement of peasants in organised movements contributes positively to the process of 
critical reflection on their social condition and increased political consciousness. The 
transformatory potential of praxis was consolidated by the discussions and debates within 
the organisations and institutions associated with cooperative development, thereby 
complementing their lived experiences by providing a formal education and reflexive 
perspective on their social history. In the case of these campesinos, where organised 
action led to the triumph itself and specifically to their gaining access to land and work 
through the cooperative, it served to generate a positive impression of collective action and 
what it could achieve.
These experiences enhanced the organisational and political skills of four of the 
founder members in particular and enabled them to overcome the disadvantage of their 
illiteracy, namely Ausencion and Joaquin from GP and Juan and Manuel from PJCh. 
These men were active and vocal contributors to the cooperative decision-making. This 
also contributed to the development of a strong politico-ideological identification with the 
revolution and the FSLN and was expressed either through formal membership of the 
party or their explicit self-identification as "soy Sandinista". This contrasts to other 
illiterate founders, who had also previously been incorporated into organisations but 
remained non-vocal in the assemblies despite their years of membership. They did not 
express any strong identification with the FSLN, on the contrary, one of them, Victoriano 
from GP, even stated:
"The cooperative has cooperated with the Sandinista Government, but were
haven’t received any benefit for this."
For the newer members who joined after its creation, prior organisational experience 
enabled them to incorporate themselves as active participants into the assemblies. The
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social and political skills they had acquired through active participation in other 
organisations enabled the two new members referred to previously, namely, Carlos from 
GP and Sergio from PJCh, to become cooperative leaders within a less than a year after 
joining the cooperative.
The relationship between organisational experience in participatory channels beyond 
the cooperative, leads us to consider the relationship between internal participation and the 
members’ current activities in other instances of participation. The cooperatives were not 
isolated organisations, but were linked either as a unit, or through the particular activities 
of individual members, with other channels of participation created by the revolution, 
including political parties, mass organisations and the military.
The incorporation of individuals to other organisations is represented in Figures 23 
and 24. Here, formal affiliation of individuals to organisations was noted (represented in 
the "affiliation" category), as well as the subjective interpretations of individuals about 
their membership to the organisations mentioned, specifically whether they stated it as as 
organisation to which they belonged (represented in the "identification with" category) and 
they perceived it was the most important organisation to them (in the "most important" 
category).
Analysis of an individual’s profile of participatory activities reveals that participation 
within the cooperative is related to participation outside the cooperative. Thus, passive 
cooperative members either didn’t participate in any other external organisation, as in the 
case of members within PJCh, or participated at low intensity activities in other 
organisations. Hence, the quiet members of GP participated during public events as 
members of the voluntary rural police force or as labourers in the material construction 
of local projects. Similarly, the high intensity participation of individuals within the 
cooperative correlates with participation in high intensity activities beyond the cooperative.
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine this external dimension of 
participation in any detail since this would entail a wider analysis of the socio-political 
implications of other participatory channels. Nonetheless, it seems that the politico- 
ideological identification was a factor facilitating their external participation, which 
implies that wider citizen participation in Nicaragua constituted a direct confirmation of 
politico-ideological identification of individuals with the revolution and the FSLN. By 
implication it suggests that identification of individuals with the revolution was a catalyst
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to internal and external participation.
II2c The military te da coraje 
Another variable which correlates positively with cooperative participation is that of 
military experience which itself can be seen as another participatory opportunity created 
by the revolution. As Chapter 6 indicated, the number of reservist duties carried out 
varied greatly between individuals and between the two cooperatives. Those in GP were 
mobilised more frequently and for longer periods than those in PJCh. Leaders went on 
reserve duties more times than ordinary members.
As with organisational experience and external participation a methodological 
problem arises from attempting to identify any causal relationship. However, this 
relationship can perhaps best be understood from the informants’ own interpretations of 
their military experiences. Although some of them were dismissive of their military 
duties, others reported that their experience had profoundly influenced them in ways which 
can be seen to have shaped the nature of their participation. Ex-combatants, particularly 
those from GP, alleged that it gave them "the courage of our own convictions" and the 
confidence to make a stand on the issues they thought important as the following remark 
illustrates:
"I was close to death several times when I was mobilised, but God is great 
and it never happened. Now I’m not frightened to defend myself and what 
I believe in."
This quote - apart from raising doubts about the prospects of a non-violent political
cultural - suggests that the military experience of individuals may have contributed to the
process of de-legitimising old ideological portrayals of the docile campesino.
National service, which constituted the first military experience for the men was also
an effective stimulator of their national and revolutionary political awareness, even for
those who had previous organisational or political experience in the ATC, CC or even
FSLN. In fact, the ideological preparation of the rank and file was systematically
addressed by the military forces (Marchetti, 1986:317). In an explicit reference to his own
political transformation during his military service, Wilfredo from GP reported that:
"The military was my real political formation, that’s what really gets you 
understanding the national problem, which before I didn’t.
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In other words, fulfilling his military service added a nationalist perspective to his political 
awareness since it served to place the revolution in the context of its international 
relations. The collective importance assigned to the military by those in GP, particularly 
those within the council, meant that participating in the reserve forces was the ultimate 
expression of their political commitment. Participation in the militia and reservist army 
was an explicit reaffirmation of identification with the revolution and the FSLN. In such 
a way the war against the US surrogate forces constituted a significant tutor in the 
political and ideological formation of young cooperativistas during the Sandinista 
Government. Given the more extensive and numerous mobilisations amongst the 
membership of GP, it is worth reflecting that perhaps the conventional military discipline 
of vertical style of commands may also have contributed to the development of its 
authoritarian leadership of GP as well as the generalised tolerance to it.
113 Discrepancies in participatory outcomes
The variation in intensities of participation between individuals within the cooperatives 
indicates that amongst the members there were different outcomes in the participatory 
processes. These can be evaluated in relation to their incremental process towards 
empowerment.
That the quiet members remained constrained by a sense of worthlessness and 
feelings of inadequacy which were exacerbated by more experienced, articulate and 
confident members would suggest that internal constraints had not been overcome and that 
psychologically they were not empowered. Nonetheless, their formal incorporation within 
the cooperative guaranteed them access to decision-making a process into which they 
contributed albeit at low intensities of participation. Given, the cooperatives’ articulation 
within wider political associations of the UNAG and cooperative movement this 
represented a degree of political empowerment in the sense that their minimal participatory 
inputs were channelled through these organisations which represented their strategic 
interests politically.
The active members had gained marginally more empowerment. Through either 
their own active experience in struggle or other channels of participation including the 
military and within the cooperative, they had overcome the internal psychological and 
social constraints and were able to engage more fully in the decision-making process.
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Their political empowerment was therefore heightened because they exercised greater 
levels of intervention in the decision-making process. They had acquired a louder voice.
The initiators were those who from the beginning had been able assimilate the 
importance of taking advantage of the opportunities created by the revolution and had not 
only overcome the internal constraints but had also managed to increase their social 
empowerment through their access to knowledge and training. Their participation and 
involvement with organisations beyond the cooperative increased their political power by 
providing them with more channels through which to channel their own voice, particularly 
since they also occupied prominent roles in those organisations. As we saw in Chapter 
8, these external participatory activities also consolidated their social power within the 
cooperative through the access to information, skills and resources it implied.
Ill Objective and subjective constraints of patriarchy
The participation of the women in cooperative decision-making in both GP and PJCh was 
limited. Typically, their involvement in the meetings was passive and rarely ever did 
women initiate a topic for discussion. In GP, neither Amanda or Auzcena spoke and in 
PJCh, the women usually remained silent during meetings, often grouped together. With 
the exception of Karla from PJCh (who had been an officer in the cooperative for a five 
month period) no woman had occupied a leadership position. There are several 
interrelated causal factors which account for women’s marginalisation from the 
participatory process.
n il Debilitating machismo: false notions and overwork
The incorporation of these women into the extra-domestic productive processes presented 
them with the opportunity to achieve a new dignity based on independence and equality 
as well as access to a public life. However, when women joined the cooperative they took 
with them the social devaluation of their productive and reproductive labour, the burden 
of their work in the domestic sphere plus the paralysing effects of an ideology that 
maintained that women were incapable of exercising leadership. These ideas (which were 
also internalised by women themselves) were embodied within the ideology of machismo
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and were reinforced through the many expressions of patriarchy^ They constituted a
serious barrier to womens’ participation in the cooperative.
Expressions of machismo were endemic throughout the two cooperatives and
appeared in both overt and subtle forms. Domestic violence was common in PJCh
although not evident in GP. Here one of the women was single: a status which enabled
her to escape this overt dimension of patriarchy as expressed in this cultural context. It
was particularly evident in PJCh given the existence of many couples and the proximity
of families in the compound in Santa Maxima. Here, a man could beat his wife
undisturbed because in the words of Pablo Ruiz, who himself lived there: :
"If I or anyone interferes he (the abuser) will say to me, ‘Hey, is she your 
wife?’"
This statement reflects the predominant idea that women were subordinate to men and 
were their possessions. Moreover, the fact that domestic violence was categorically 
excluded as an issue for collective debate in the assembly indicates that this was seen as 
a strictly private problem and not a social concern. In this way, members were rejecting 
the view of machismo as a social problem.
Some men also publicly ridiculed and intimidated women, a practice which further 
inhibited women from taking a more prominent role in cooperative affairs. Such 
harassment had led Karla to resign from her post after a brief spell as organisation officer. 
Similarly,
despite having been elected by the women of PJCh to represent them on a training 
workshop of the Women’s Section of UNAG, another woman, Margarita (a 33-year old 
mother of three and who lived with her partner) was forced to resign by the men after an 
angry debate in an assembly. The prediction of another, Fidelia (a long-serving member 
of the cooperative) that the men would not allow Margarita to be replaced by another 
representative proved correct.
Consistent with the dominant ideological conceptions about women there was a 
frequently expressed criticism from the men that women "wo rinden" (don’t produce 
equally). This is in keeping with observations made elsewhere in Latin America, which 
indicate that despite the indispensable economic contribution of peasant women to the 
household economy, their labour is undervalued (Phillip, 1987:114; Stephen, 1993:35). 
Although there was no evidence that men in GP explicitly devalued their colleague
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Amanda (who worked amongst them in their production commissions) this view had 
previously been institutionalised in the cooperative to the extent that the women were 
allocated fewer basic grains than the men for equal work. In 1987, after Amanda had 
complained to AMNLAE about this inequality, she had been sanctioned with the removal 
of her full share of the year’s profits.
The notion that women weren’t as productive as men was often repeated voiced 
some men in PJCh, but it was never substantiated with reduced pay: indeed, as we saw 
from Chapter 7, profits were divided in strict accordance to days worked. Moreover, the 
notion was refuted most vehemently by some of the more enlightened men, responding 
to a a proposal forwarded by a couple of men that the cooperative accept fewer new 
women as members, Juan, in an impassioned speech stressed the advantages of having 
women members. Women he stated, should join not only because it was their "social 
right to work as men" but also because they were conscientious workers and they 
benefltted the cooperative because production could be organised so as to make best use 
of the respective strengths of the men and women.
Nonetheless, the pervading portrayal that their productive work was not of equal 
value undermined women’s self-confidence and made them keen to avoid public 
confrontations, particularly on gender related issues. Consequently, women in PJCh were 
even reluctant to support proposals put before the assembly by the leadership which would 
have furthered their own gender interests. For instance, in the context of the predominant 
conception that the care of children was a "women’s" problem (not a social or joint- 
parental one) women rejected the suggestion that collective childcare provision be 
arranged. This would have entailed the release of a woman member from productive 
activities on a daily basis, an arrangement which required the support of all members 
including the men who the women did not want to alienate.
On another occasion in PJCh, and contrary to the recommendations of the 
leadership, the assembly voted to amend the regulations and withdraw economic assistance 
from expectant mothers. Ordinary male members stated that it was an unnecessary use 
of resources and as a policy had to be sacrificed, given the difficult economic 
circumstances. This issue of sexual politics had united the women to the extent that they 
had previously agreed that the matter was important and had to be addressed through a 
collective cooperative response. However, in the event only two women opposed it: the
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others withdrawing their public support. They subsequently admitted that they were 
fearful of giving the men further grounds to criticise them and were reluctant to do 
anything which made their position as members (all the more) vulnerable.
Yet, one remarkable incident indicates that confrontations could take place. It 
involved an issue which went beyond challenging gender constructs of themselves and 
comprised a profound challenge to the men. It concerned the weekly visits of Dona 
Santos, a seller from nearby Pedro de los Molinas, who came to the cooperative to sell 
them liquor. By taking alcohol directly to the cooperative this woman’s enterprising 
initiative had effectively removed a major deterrent from the men’s drinking: namely, their 
access to it. Alcohol abuse was common and often resulted in violence. It was an issue 
that moved one woman - urged by her female colleagues - to speak about the matter at 
the next assembly where she complained that the cooperative:
".. is not a bar, it’s a place of work and it’s our home!"
By contrast, gender-related issues were never discussed in the assembly in GP.
Apart from this above occasion, the women in PJCh as well as Amanda and Auzcena in
GP, were very reluctant to place gender-related issues on the agenda of the assembly even
though they considered that it failed to address the problems that they faced as women^.
Gender related issues were also absent from the agendas of the GP leaders and low on that
of the PJCh leaders although, as we saw previously, Lorenzo and Omar had tried in vain
to promote childcare provision for the cooperative. Instead, the leaders gave priority to
public-political matters above those of the private-political sphere: of which the exclusion
of wife-beating from the agenda is illustrative. Without women in leadership positions
these issues were fated to remain absent.
In addition to the subjective constraints on women’s greater participation within the
cooperative, it was also limited by their domestic commitments since their reality was that:
"We live always busy with the tasks of the house, cooking and looking after 
the children."^
This meant that they were unable to assume more responsibility within cooperative 
management or organisational activities. Women worked a double day of domestic and 
productive work, lasting between fourteen and sixteen hours. Typically, the women rose 
at 4.30am in order to cook breakfast, feed their children and their partners and start to 
prepare lunch. On return from work they would have to prepare a third meal, see to the
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children, collect water and wash clothes. Indeed, the women themselves noted that their 
own days started while their men still slept and intensified on return from productive 
agricultural work while "he lies down to rest off his feet".
While women’s incorporation into production represented one dimension of the 
satisfaction of their practical needs by securing an independent material basis for 
subsistence from men, their participation in the decision-making forum of the assembly 
was seriously constrained. Yet, although the above suggests that women’s political power 
was weakly expressed in the formal decision-making where they were denied the power 
of voice, it is wrong to base an assessment of their participation purely on their activities 
in this male-dominated fora, as the following indicates.
III2 The El Monte strategy
Since women preferred to avoid public debate, those in PJCh sought an alternative strategy 
for resolving their problems. This was found in el monte, that is, in the hills. Here, 
working together amongst the coffee in one commission and uninhibited in the absence 
of men, women found an environment which was conducive to discuss their common 
problems, resolve disputes and reach collective decisions. It was here, following a 
discussion about their fear of abuse and attack, that the women decided to abandon the 
outside cooking area in the encampment. It was also where they shared their grievances 
about the booze-seller. Dona Santos, agreed a strategy and delegated a representative to 
speak about it before the cooperative assembly.
Essentially el monte was an oppositional strategy, an act of resistance to male 
domination and but was significant because it was an informal committee which had been 
created by the women themselves and constituted a response to their particular needs and 
the conditions they faced. It did not aim to achieve their "emancipation" or gender 
equality: a distinction which perhaps qualifies it as a fulfilling a practical gender interest 
as conceptualised by Molyneux (1986) and outlined in Chapter 1.
As we saw in Chapter 7, male members also used el monte as an informal arena for 
discussion and as a result the leaders repeatedly warned against it. This prohibition was 
applied without distinction to that of the women’s group. Men habitually portrayed 
women’s discussions there as subversive, reinforcing the definition of the assembly as ^  
only legitimate arena for participation and thereby effectively delegitimizing the women’s
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forum. During one assembly the women were reprimanded for "creating rumours in the
fields" and in another when two women had attempted to resolve a dispute amongst
themselves in the hills, they were told that:
"..if you believe your partner is going with another women you must discuss 
it with him. If there are fights between women, both will be expelled."
Hardly justice! According to the all-male leadership officers the solution was simple: they
reiterated that the women had been assigned a "coordinator", Francisco (a man), who was
available to them for advice should they need it:
"..we don’t want to hear you all presenting different points of view when you 
have a representative who will speak on you behalf."*
Immediately after making the above comment and without consulting the women,
Lorenzo, the president, then suggested that the women should meet Francisco every one
or two weeks because:
"you women are more delicate than men and we must try to overcome these 
little problems (of sexual jealousies)."
Other studies on cooperatives in Nicaragua have indicated that women have greater 
opportunities to participate meaningfully when decisions are made in decentralised 
committees and then ratified in assembly meetings (CIERA, 1989d). Essentially, the 
absence of decentralised committees in the two cooperatives denied women an effective 
and legitimated fora in which to participate and channel collective action. However, these 
informal meetings provided women with an opportunity to act collectively. Commenting 
that, "ya juntas vemos los problemas que enfrentamos todas" (together we can resolve the 
problems that we confront), the meetings constituted a space for social interaction which 
sensitised them to their common problems and, as we shall see below, an arena in which 
new ideas were discussed. The value of such "small group models" has been shown 
elsewhere in Latin America to be an effective means of faciliting discussion amongst 
women, to enable them to challenge subordinate female gender roles and to begin to 
explore their gender identity in a different light (Stephen, 1993).
Despite its potential, the fact that el monte was prohibited and not formally 
structured into the cooperative’s mainstream decision-making structure prevented the 
women from effectively channeling their voice to wider political associations: including 
the cooperative itself, the UCA or UNAG.
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In GP, objective circumstances dictated that the two women would not be able to
develop any degree of solidarity between them since they had little social contact. They
did not work together in production and lived a significant distance apart from each other.
By contrast, the situation in PJCh was more conducive to the development of solidarity
since their opportunities for social interaction were numerous. They formed a substantial
proportion of the membership (approximately 35%), they worked together and many of
them were neighbours who also shared cooking and washing facilities and a common
water source. In addition to the use of el monte and the agreement to keep secret their
discussions there, gender solidarity was evident from their mutual assistance in domestic
tasks and other occasions. Once, when a woman became seriously ill after attempting to
abort an unwanted child, her companions were united in persuading the men in the
cooperative to support her morally and financially during her recovery.
Yet, the women in PJCh were not always united as a group and in other instances
expressions of sisterhood were clearly absent. Once, during an assembly when members
were discussion the proposal for children, the women with older children instead of
remaining neutral disclaimed their gender interests by announcing of their own children
that "Ya, no se necesista cuidarlos" (that they no longer needed care). Women also
became divided by sexual jealousies. This was either directed suspiciously at young
female newcomers or to the long-term member. Aura, a single woman (aged 29) who had
four young children who were allegedly fathered by different men on the cooperative.
This rumour led to her ostracisation by the other women, who described her unflatteringly
in variations of the following theme:
"Aura es como una chancha que se acuesta en el monte para culear" (Aura 
is like a sow who lies down in the fields to fuck).
These contradictory indications of gender solidarity necessarily had negative implications 
for their potential for collective action.
III3 Challenging female constructs
Nonetheless, women within both cooperatives had begun a process of conquering the fear 
of culturally sanctioned social norms concerning their gender. As regards gender roles in 
politics, all the women interviewed believed that women should participate in (public) 
political life and asserted this belief in a terminology which reflects their awareness of the
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social and legal basis of women’s equality. Typically, they stated that it was their "right" 
and that women "make important contributions to finding solutions". Moreover, women 
considered that their political roles within the cooperative were inhibited not because of 
some natural law which confined them to the domestic space but because of their objective 
circumstances, namely their low "cultural" levels, specifically their poor educational and 
training levels, their lack of organisational experience and finally their domestic 
commitments. There were exceptions: two young women from PJCh just thought that 
"politics wasn’t of interest to women". Beyond seeking explanations to account for why 
women participated less than men, Amanda from GP (aged 37, a single mother with six 
children), was clear that whatever the limitations it was imperative for women to 
participate in politics because:
"(i)f we don’t know about politics, the men take advantage of us".
While Amanda’s recognition that men attempted to manipulated women was not a 
view shared by other women, all the others were aware of the value of their productive 
work and contested the male dominated notion of theirs being a "help" to production. 
They expressed strong opinions about the value of their labour in the productive process 
asserting that "we work as well, if not better than the men". In most cases women 
reported that they participated in ^  the productive tasks, even though there was a minor 
division of labour since women not do the more strenuous slashing but this was a 
reflection of their confidence in the equality of their production work.
They were also conscious of the inequality of the amount of work they had to do 
daily compared to their partners. While there was no absence of expressions of their 
suffering this did not necessarily constitute a dimension of gender consciousness; indeed 
most women perceived the existing division of labour as uncontestably "natural". If the 
issue of renegotiating domestic duties was not on the women’s agenda then neither were 
their practical interests yet politicised. Indeed, there was scant evidence of challenges to 
gender roles in reproduction. As regards control over their reproductive capacity, most 
women thought it right that they bear all "los nines que Dios quera" (the children that 
God wishes). Only Maritza, the ex-teacher in PJCh, practiced any form of birth control.
However, the above indicates that the women had begun to develop a critical 
appreciation of their life conditions as women and as such an emergent gender
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consciousness is some aspects of their roles were being challenged and these represent 
advances for their process of psychological empowerment as peasant women.
At this point my analysis is enriched by the findings in the comparative study of 
Perez (1990). This demonstrated that women organised in communal and educational 
mass organisations in Nicaragua were more ready than those in the CAS to oppose the 
dominant patriarchal ideology. The author accounted for this in reference to the greater 
possibilities for women to assume leadership positions in organisations oriented to 
consumer and family needs, such as education, health and housing, that is in areas which 
correspond to the traditional domestic and private spheres of women. Perez also observed 
that most women involved in communal and educative activities were single and were 
therefore freed from the imposition of patriarchal notions within the confines of the 
household. The high instance of women cooperative members with male partners could 
therefore account for why women with CAS do not exhibit greater beligerance towards 
the notions embodied within the socially ascribed gender norms. Nonetheless, the author 
also identified that the consciousness of women within CAS was more developed than 
amongst women who were not organised at all or were incorporated into religious groups.
If there was a discourse amongst cooperative women about their gender roles this 
was not only a product of the daily experiences and the conflicts they encountered within 
the cooperative, but also the influence of "external" agents. It is worth examining this in 
order to identify the precise role of these forces in facilitating increased participation of 
women in the political process. Here, the Women’s Section of UNAG and AMNLAE 
before it had been influential in generating women’s awareness of their gender condition. 
Over the years, both organisations had attended rural women in Tola and San Marcos and 
had provided training workshops for cooperative women on practical and strategic gender 
interests. The former addressed practical and legal issues of cooperative production. Half 
the women had attended these at some time. The AMNLAE workshops addressed 
physical and mental health, family violence and women’s rights. The two women from 
GP and three of those interviewed from PJCh had attended these courses. AMNLAE had 
also provided the women from PJCh with transportation to attend national celebrations of 
International Women’s Day, held in Managua on 8th March. Since the work of 
AMNLAE proceeded that of the Women’s Section of UNAG, the women erroneously
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attributed the gender related workshops organised by UNAG, as being organised by the 
former^.
It is interesting here to note that the participation of the women in these workshops 
amounted to information sharing which qualifies it as a low intensity form of participation. 
Nonetheless, this was sufficient to equip them with information concerning their formal 
rights. The women appreciated these mass organisations because "they address women’s 
problems" and they acknowledged that they had been instrumental in raising their 
awareness of their problems and that they "enable us to know our rights in the revolution". 
To the extent that this knowledge of the politico-legal rights had been utilised successfully 
by the women to reduce their exploitation, these organisations can be seen to have been 
instrumental in contributing to their political empowerment.
The following illustrates how these workshops also provoked a questioning of 
traditional gender constructs and a process of collective reflection on the nature of their 
gender-specific condition of subordination. When Margarita (34-year old mother of two 
and heavily pregnant at the time) returned from a UNAG women’s workshop in San 
Marcos to share the information she had gained with her female colleagues, an angry 
debate with the men ensued. Margarita described in the privacy of her room what 
happened:
"In the assembly meeting after (attending) the course we addressed the 
problem and they agreed to pay the women maternity pay. But then the men 
said, "here in the cooperative we command, not those women from there (San 
Marcos)". The fact is that they don’t want me to go to the meetings since 
they say that all we talk about there is the theme of the economic assistance 
and the rights of pregnant women.
Apart from demonstrating the interesting strategy of the men to attempt to legitimise 
the pursuit of their own interests and reject the women’s perspective by recourse to a 
discourse about cooperative autonomy, the incident shows how external organisations 
fuelled debates around which a discourse on gender revolved. This also demonstrates the 
potential role for women’s organisations to stimulate women to challenge patriarchal 
authority through the development of gender consciousness. This role is particularly 
significant since, as Deere and Leon (1987:11) observe from international comparative 
studies, women’s participation in social production does not autonomatically produce 
gender consciousness.
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These organisations also provided institutional support of anothe kind for the 
women. In GP, AMNLAE had last intervened concerning the aforementioned case of 
unequal payment to women members. The organisation had also been called to help 
resolve a problem which arose in PJCh when the men were insisting that women do 
nightwatch. Here, AMNLAE had presented its perspective to the cooperative, explaining 
that women should be exempt since it meant the children were left alone and the jealousy 
it caused often provoked fights. Its proposal was subsequently accepted and the men then 
assumed sole responsibility for night-watch'\ While this matter had been resolved in the 
women’s favour, there were costs to them of having appealed to an external organisation 
for support. Afterwards, the women had to endure intense harassment from the men and 
were afraid of the repercussions of disclosing other cooperative issues to outside 
organisations as the following statement implies. After the aforementioned event 
involving Margarita (the women’s representative to the UNAG workshops), Fidelia 
remarked that:
"Women tell them yes, that the cooperative is giving economic assistance 
(during maternity leave) when in fact it is not. They don’t want to involve 
the cooperative in any problems because of the hassles the men then give us."
Ultimately, the fear of the men’s response deterred the women from seeking further
intervention from agencies beyond the cooperative. Nonetheless, they were clearly
involved in a process of negotiating strategies vis-a-vis the institutions around them and
in this case opted for the one which carried the least "costs" to themselves. Although the
strategy they adopted did not challenge male authority it was one consciously selected in
response to the anticipated consequences of their actions.
While ideological conceptions which perpetuated sexual discrimination endured in
the cooperatives, the process of organisation and participation of the women and their
everyday life experiences within the cooperatives facilitated an advance in the aspects of
their gender consciousness. In the light of the observations by Deere and Leon (1987:262)
based on comparative studies of other Latin American cases, it is clear that gender
consciousness among women is a necessary pre-condition which enables them to become
a political force and to challenge not just state policy but also gender relation in daily life.
Thus, it would seem that although the development of women’s consciousness concerning
their roles in production, reproduction, sexuality and politics was not uniform, there were
significant advances to suggest psychological empowerment and small steps towards their
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political empowerment. However, women in neither cooperative had elaborated an 
antagonistic response to machismo or to the problem of having to be responsible for all 
domestic commitments. Unless they were prepared educationally, emotionally and 
organisationally to do so, it is unlikely that they would have been able to develop 
themselves within the public arena.
The prevalence of patriarchy in the cooperatives as other studies have indicated 
existed elsewhere in Nicaragua (Padilla et al, 1987) demonstrates that despite structural 
changes it remained an ideologically dominant conception which had objective and 
subjective implications on the organisation and participation of women. After all, as the 
Nicaraguan sociologist Nunez (1988) emphasises machismo is the most resilient of all 
ideologies. Indeed, we are reminded from the studies of Cuba (as a socialist state which 
similarly sought to eliminate gender inequality), that the provision of new legislation and 
strategies, such as those embodied with the Nicaraguan RAS; other legal measures 
implemented by the Sandinistas; and the efforts of mass organisations cannot alone "will 
away" the cultural, ideological and material factors which have perpetuated women’s 
subordination (Deere and Leon, 1987:262). It is however, important that transformations 
in gender relations take place in daily life, in the household, family and - in the case of 
these rural women - in the cooperative. This is because it is at this loci that women can 
re-negotiate the reproductive tasks of the household and challenge the gender constructions 
which associate women with reproduction and men with privileges of authority.
When the cooperative de-collectivised some of its land following the UNO victory, 
many of the women with partners negotiated with them over the distribution of labour and 
withdrew into the private arena, opting to concentrate on domestic chores. While the price 
to be paid for this was exclusion from access to the public political arena, it cannot be 
judged to represent a lack of gender consciousness since the decision was motivated by 
short-term practical interests: namely to reduce their workload.
Conclusions
This chapter has indicated that involvement in struggle and mass organisations and access 
to education and training are necessary elements to ensure high intensity participation 
because these activities enable individuals to overcome the constraints, the negative
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constructs of themselves as peasants and women. The organisation of women within the 
cooperative incorporated them into a public space and removed a principle barrier to their 
developing consciousness of their gender condition. There was also evidence that they 
were developing a critical appreciation of their life condition as women. Both advances 
have implications for the process of psychological empowerment.
The positive contribution of education and training the programmes introduced by 
the mass organisations highlight the positive role of external agents in promoting 
participation amongst the peasantry and the women in particular. However, as this chapter 
has shown, the ideas from external sources cannot be seen to be simply imposed on these 
subjects, since they intervened into their lives through their interaction with the peasants’ 
own knowledge systems and experiences.
With its focus on the actor, this chapter has also indicated the features of the 
transformations underway in the cooperatives and has emphasised that they may be indeed 
be small and largely subjective in nature but that this should not be written off as 
insignificant. While it is wrong to judge a period of transformation by its consciousness, 
the type of oppositional constructions and strategies they develop imply that new 
worldviews and self-identities were emerging as important pre-requisites to political 
action.
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Notes to Chapter 9
1.Milbrath (1965) and Almond and Verba (1965) sought to establish the relative 
proportions of modes of participation within different societies in order to account for the 
organisational principles of society. Milbrath identified three categories apathetic, 
spectators and gladiators and observed that these categories occur uniformally in all 
societies in the relative proportions, respectively of 33%: 60%: 7%.
2.Maria Jesus, Sanchez II, Tola, personal interview, 4th December 1989.
3.Personal interview, 17 November 1989.
4.Personal interview, German Pomares, December 1989.
5.Here patriarchy is understood as a general definition which refers to power relations 
between the sexes and exercised by men over women and within institutions with various 
social relations and practices, such as the law, family and education and which varies 
between and within nations, cultures and communities.
6.Out of the twelve women interviewed, only four believed the assembly considered all 
of women’s problems.
7.Amanda Salinas, Personal interview, German Pomares, December 1990.
8.Lorenzo Ample, during General Assembly February 1990.
9.This history of this organisation’s involvement in the cooperative was the origin of the 
women’s confusion between it and Women’s Section of UNAG. In their minds 
AMNLAE was synonymous with "the women’s movement", to which they credited any 
training courses or women’s related developments.
10.Personal interview in Pedro Joaquin February 1990.
11.Yolanda Ramirez, personal interview, Casa de la Mujer, San Marcos, February 1990.
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Capter 10 
CONCLUSION
By 1979 Nicaragua had been ruled for forty five years by a dictatorship headed by the 
Somozan dynasty. This era was characterised by social inequality and authoritarianism 
where control over the country’s resources was maintained exclusively by a small elite of 
the Somoza family and its cohorts. The National Guard, a constabulary force which had 
been created and trained by the US government, was used as its primary instrument of 
oppression. Political opponents to the regime were not tolerated and were either co-opted 
or repressed: conditions which inhibited the development of effective opposition and 
popular organisations.
Historically, the peasantry had resisted their progressive marginalisation during the 
development of Nicaragua’s agroexport economy which had displaced them from their 
ancestral lands. Some supported General Sandino who recognised that the US presence 
in the country was an impediment to the possibilities of change given the extent of 
dependency of the national government on its support. Peasants filled the ranks of his 
Army for the Defence of National Sovereignty and fought against the US marines from 
1927 until they were forced to withdraw from the country in 1933. After Sandino’s 
assassination by the National Guard in 1934, the peasantry were systematically oppressed. 
In the absence of an alternative ideology in which to express themselves, the traditional 
Liberal/Conservative antagonisms served to divide the peasantry.
They lacked an organisational network to cohese them and remained illiterate. The 
dictatorship was overthrown in 1979 by the Sandinista Popular Revolution which 
comprised an alliance of social forces and was led by the FSLN. Some peasant sectors 
incorporated into the liberation movement not only because the Sandinistas aimed to 
overthrow a regime which oppressed them but also because the FSLN promised to fulfil 
the peasants’ historic demand for access to land.
On coming to power, the Sandinista Government declared a commitment to 
incorporating the masses into national political and economic development, maintaining 
that popular participation was the best guarantee to create a popular democracy based on 
socioeconomic and political equality. Representative forms of democracy were also 
adopted in order to accommodate the plurality of sectorial interests within the broad
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alliance of the revolution. In addition, it identified its political mission as that of the 
vanguard of the popular sectors which would lead the hitherto unstructured "masses" 
through the transition to socialism according to its own political and theoretical 
interpretation. Structural changes and radical reforms, including national literacy 
campaigns, were subsequently implemented to provide conditions conducive to the 
development of popular participation. The new national political environment guaranteed 
political freedoms and various mechanisms were created to encourage and harness popular 
participation. In response, mass organisations flourished and multiplied after the defeat 
of the Somozan dictatorship as people organised around the need to resolve collective 
social and economic problems. These were formally incorporated into the national 
decision-making structures, including the legislative processes.
In the countryside, agrarian reform radically transformed the structure of land 
tenure. From a situation under Somoza where the concentration of land-ownership was 
one of the most concentrated in Latin America, the Sandinista Government turned 
Nicaragua into one of the most equitable which also ensured women access to land. This 
redistribution not only gave landless and poor peasants increased access to land but 
simultaneously did away with the pre-existing relations of rural domination: the hacienda. 
Accompanying rural policies provided access to credit, technology and training, in addition 
to other basic education and health services. This increased the peasantry’s access to 
resources (material and otherwise) and increased the social power of rural households to 
the extent that their means of production and reproduction were improved.
The Sandinista Government encouraged cooperative formation because collective 
production fulfilled various political, economic and social objectives. Within the context 
of a mixed economy which included private ownership and a state sector, its policies 
towards the cooperative sector were therefore affected as much by the class alliance as the 
decision to prioritise socialist state production: a situation which gave the incipient peasant 
movement its dual character as defending its interests against the bourgeoisie and state. 
Cooperatives were seen as a superior form of organisation which could transform what the 
TP-dominated MIDINRA perceived to be a backward and individualist peasantry into a 
politically more advanced sector; and as a way of socialising the means of production. 
This was a clear indication that the concept of political pluralism did extent as far as 
accepting alternative ideological of developmental perspectives within the peasant sector.
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Cooperatives were also seen to facilitate administrative control of the countryside as well 
as the introduction of modern technology and production methods.
In addition to these instrumental purposes, cooperative organisation was perceived 
by the Sandinistas as a means by which to enable the hitherto excluded rural population 
to participate in economic management and political processes and thereby increase their 
power. With the recognition by peasant producers themselves and the FSLN, that there 
was no mass organisation following the triumph to represent their specific interests within 
the new political system, UNAG emerged as a hetergeneous association incorporating 
producers from the different social sectors. Declaring its support for the revolutionary 
process, UNAG’s influence expanded through its membership, economic significance and 
political weight. Its leadership was dominated by middle and large producer sectors.
The existing literature - to date - has placed analytical emphasis on such popular 
organisations which emerged as the most important channel of participation and has 
indicated that the outcomes of the participatory experience during the period of the 
Sandinista Government were disappointing. This, it is argued, is because the opportunities 
for autonomous action of the popular sectors became restricted through an unchecked 
tendency towards bureaucratisation of the mass organisations. In addition, observers 
account for this in terms of the impact of an externally imposed and prolonged war of 
attrition fought by the Contra mercenaries and an economic embargo imposed by the US 
in 1985 which exacerbated an economic crisis. Funds for social programmes were re­
directed towards the military effort and the demands and interests of popular organisations 
became subordinated to the national priority of defence of sovereignty, the right to self- 
determination and the need to maintain the multi-class policy of national unity. Criticism 
within the ranks of the FSLN and from within mass organisations became progressively 
closed.
Whilst accepting the above analysis, this thesis has aimed to analyse the processes 
of participation. Rather than evaluate the period in terms of the extent to which access 
to the decision-making processes in structural terms was secured and resources were 
redistributed, it focuses instead on the qualitative nature of the processes evolving at the 
grassroots level. It undertakes this task equipped with an operationalised framework for 
analysis which categorises different intensities of participation which correspond to the 
extent to which the control or voice of an individual is incorporated into an activity.
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These intensities are then related to the extent to which participation contributes to the 
interrelated processes of empowerment of individuals in the social, political and 
psychological dimensions as they apply in particular to the peasantry.
An integral part of the examination of these processes has involved the 
identification of various factors and agents operating at different levels of analysis which 
influenced and shaped participatory experiences at the micro-level. Consequently, the 
study has shown that while participation should be understood in terms of the historical, 
structural and macro-level phenomena which establish the contextual parameters - the 
opportunities and constraints for participation - these were only part of the story. It is also 
imperative to consider how these forces became translated into daily behaviour through 
a complex interaction with micro-level phenomena and processes. This is achieved in the 
thesis by adopting an actor model which emphasises how local processes shape the nature 
of participation. In such a way, the distinct and unique participatory character of each 
cooperative can be explained in reference to how historical, political, institutional and 
daily events converged at the local level with group dynamics and the interpretations and 
life experiences of individuals.
As elsewhere in the country, the founders of the two cooperatives studied here 
were granted access to redistributed land which was conditional on their organisation into 
collectivised production. After a brief period when they received minimal attention, they 
subsequently developed within the context of a state which considered them as objects to 
be subordinated to national development objectives. During this stage they endured high 
levels of state intervention in membership, productive and organisational aspects. After 
1985, state policy towards the cooperative sector became less interventionalist following 
a shift in agrarian reform towards a more pro-peasant state policy in response to peasant 
demands for land and the need to consolidate support for the revolution as the war 
escalated. Also, after a national process of "self-criticism" in 1987, when the negative 
effects of its intervention in production, organisation and internal democratic processes 
within cooperatives were acknowledged, the state reduced its direct intervention in 
cooperative affairs although it still retained a paternalistic notion of cooperative 
development.
By 1989, the two cooperatives studied enjoyed a relatively high degree of control 
and autonomy from external agents with the important exception of the imposition of the
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CAS organisational criterion which UNAG also enforced. This denied cooperative 
members control over this crucial dimension of their cooperative unit although macro- 
economic policies also ultimately determined production decisions, the cooperatives 
themselves controlled their own production plans. The reduced control of cooperative 
members over their own organisational structure and some aspects of their production, 
meant that their participation was of low intensity in these aspects: amounting to 
implementation of policies and information sharing and consultation with external agents 
and institutions. However, cooperative assemblies were also the arena for high intensity 
participation: for decision-making and initiating action concerning other aspects of 
collective life, including some aspects of economic management, finance, production tasks, 
welfare issues and political and social life.
In the GP cooperative the scope for ordinary members to participate in high 
intensity participation was particularly limited because its assembly was not the sole forum 
for decision-making. Here, power was concentrated in the council and leadership, both 
of which were dominated by FSLN members, who monopolised control of the key areas 
of cooperative management and development. Consequently, ordinary members were 
restricted in the issues and intensity with which they could participate. However, the role 
of the leadership was legitimized by ordinary members because the cooperative’s history, 
involvement through the reserve militia in national defence and the extent of support it 
had received from the state, meant that most of its members identified strongly with the 
FSLN. Their familiarity through habitus of non-consensual forms of leadership meant that 
the behaviour of officers went unchallenged and personalised forms of leadership 
prevailed. The incorporation of these leaders into other structures of revolutionary power 
rendered them effective resource deliverers and this enhanced their authority.
By contrast, the more egalitarian distribution of power amongst the members in 
PJCh meant that ordinary members had greater opportunities to participate at higher 
intensities in the decision-making processes and they enjoyed effective influence over 
issues of collective concern. Here, the participatory processes were more democratic than 
in GP. In the context of unfavourable economic conditions in general and in particular 
following the adjustment policies of 1988, the leaders were sapped of authority mainly 
because their involvement in the UCA was not seen as delivering the anticipated resources. 
Members were further alienated from the UCA because it was created without their direct
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involvement. In such circumstances they demanded that their leaders comply with their 
role as being representative of and accountable to the membership. In turn, this situation 
deprived leaders of the opportunity to implement progressive social policies which would 
have benefited women members.
At first sight, the participatory practices emerging within the two cooperatives may 
appear limited, constrained and indeed disappointing. However, our expectation of the 
possibilities of empowerment must be based firmly in an appreciation of both the 
historical context of Nicaragua and should be sensitised to the particular conditions 
confronting subaltern groups such as the peasantry where overt forms of "politically 
significant action" would be spectacular indeed. Instead, we must consider a more 
nuanced appreciation of the type of tranformations underway within these two 
cooperatives.
Thus, the study reveals that - independently of the relative power of the assembly - 
compared with the historical conditions facing these peasants, both cooperatives served to 
empower members in several dimensions, albeit in contradictory ways. Previously, 
peasants were marginalised from the political process and denied the opportunity to free 
speech and to debate matters which affected them. By contrast, these cooperatives 
provided members with a framework for continued and sustained participation during 
which individuals could channel their voice and assert control in the decision-making 
processes over some - if not all - of the areas which affected their lives. State 
intervention, the imposition of policies from UNAG and the national economic context 
limited the prospects of members for complete control over all aspects. Nonetheless, the 
cooperatives effectively served as schools where individuals gained unprecedented political 
experience and had the opportunity to learn new political skills and practices, including 
group discussion, debate, reaching consensus, the use of voice and vote and analytical 
thought.
The processes underway in the assemblies contributed to individuals’ awareness 
and knowledge of their own circumstances and rights and of the national political situation 
and institutional milieu. Previously constrained by localist worldviews or ideologies 
which corresponded to the immediate locality or geographical area defined by the sphere 
of production, these campesinos obtained a nationalist dimension to their consciousness 
which exposed them to national political discourses. This was significant for several
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reasons. It provided a basis for potential unity of a national peasant movement which had 
hitherto been divided by the traditional ideologies of Liberalism and Conservativism. 
Furthermore, assimilating the notions and principles of, amongst others: "democracy", 
"justice" and "rights" these peasants were provided with a new vocabulary with which to 
defend their interests. The assimilation of this national political discourse combined with 
new political practices also equipped the cooperatives and their members with sufficient 
political agility to enable them to challenge the encroaching bureaucratic tendencies of 
both the state and rural mass organisations which constantly attempted control them and 
limit their autonomy.
These elements equipped individuals with the pre-requisites which enabled them 
to become politically proactive and were accompanied by the empowerment of a 
subjective nature. Thus, through praxis within the cooperative, individuals were able to 
overcome the constraining ideological notions of themselves as passive peasants which 
were perpetuated under Somoza, making collective and organised action seem possible. 
The assemblies facilitated the members’ realisation that change could be achieve through 
concerted action.
Even if individuals only used their passive vote and not their active voice in 
decision-making, their incorporation into the wider cooperative movement effectively 
enhanced the political power of individuals in this sector. Before peasants may have been 
conscious of the subordination which they endured but then they had lacked the 
sophistication or the social cohesion to enable them to construct their own organisations. 
Here, by contrast, both cooperatives through their formal affiliation became incorporated 
into a wider peasant movement.
At the local level the political power of the two cooperative was enhanced by their 
incorporation into the peasant movement in quite distinct ways. Essentially, the GP was 
vertically integrated through its leadership, into instances of revolutionary power at the 
community and municipal level which incorporated it into bureaucratic structure of the 
government. Nonetheless, its formal affiliation within the MCC alongside other 
cooperatives rendered the sector a powerful and influential economic and political actor 
in municipal politics. By contrast, the political power of PJCh was based on its affiliation 
within a second level cooperative, the UCA, thereby extending the cooperative’s power 
base horizontally. This provided it with a broader front in which it could struggle to
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protect the economic and political interests of its sector against the state.
Moreover, not only were the cooperatives empowered at the municipal level within 
the MCC but they were also affiliated to the national cooperative movement which had 
political representation within UNAG. Thus, the power of individuals was increased 
through their representation within a larger organisation which represented them in the 
context of national politics. The economic significance of this movement, matched by its 
increasing political power, gained it important concessions in the competition with other 
economic sectors, including that of bourgeoisie and the state. At the same time, the 
military experience of the socios represented one dimension of "political capital" during 
which it enhanced its leadership and organisational capacity and collective discipline. 
Their acquisition of arms could also prove decisive in defending their interests in the face 
of unexpected attempts to re-establish a system of historical domination (Serra, 1993:26).
There is tangible evidence for this political empowerment. One such source does 
not relate specifically to the cooperative movement but more generally to the country, 
namely the newly established right to vote against the FSLN, which is precisely what 
several individuals within the two cooperatives did. Other indications of political 
empowerment are provided in the two case studies from the encounters and negotiations 
between the cooperatives with the various institutions around them, including those of the 
revolutionary authorities and the mass organisations. This demonstrates clearly that the 
cooperatives had gained the appropriate political skills to enable them to operate their 
institutional milieu and to assume a proactive political role. The conflictual nature of their 
assertions for autonomy from imposing external agents (UNAG and the state) and their 
demands for increasing control over cooperative matters constitute politically relevant 
actions.
Participation did not develop uniformly amongst members and despite shared social 
backgrounds, the input of members to the decision-making processes varied. Those who 
had been involved in the organised struggle for land or had higher educational and training 
levels and took part in other activities participated more intensely. These factors were 
significant in the process of empowering because they contributed to the process by which 
individuals could overcome the ideological barriers perpetuated by the old system, enhance 
their political and class consciousness and develop an awareness of themselves as potential 
political actors. The positive influence of education and training in facilitating
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participation suggests the positive role of external agents.
Women were consistently poor, relatively passive participators. Despite legal 
guarantees to ensure their equal incorporation into the productive process, their 
participation was inhibited by the persistence of a patriarchal ideology which perpetuated 
negative views of women and their capacity to fulfil political roles in the public domain. 
Women’s burden of the subordinate female gender social constructions and their low 
education and training levels meant that they were further marginalised from the 
participatory process. Despite these limitations, the organisation of women into the 
cooperatives represented a small advance since it gave them access to a public space for 
the first time and removed a major obstacle to their political and gender awareness. The 
women in the PJCh cooperative had the advantage over the two in GP primarily because 
there were more of them. Amongst them they had not only developed a discourse about 
the roles of the sexes but they had responded to their marginalisation by establishing their 
own forum for collective action. Although the el monte solution was essentially a strategy 
of resistance and not one which gained them access to the formal public and male 
dominated arena, it was significant because it represented an organisational and collective 
response. The women in GP had also developed a critical awareness of their gender 
condition but had not been able to devise an organised counter-strategy because they were 
socially isolated from each other.
The findings indicate that the women were challenging their socially ascribed 
domestic roles and did so as a product of their own daily experiences made coherent by 
the input of external agents. Here, AMNLAE and the Women’s Section of UNAG played 
an important role through both their provision of basic information to women about the 
issues relating to practical gender interests (concerning their incorporation into production 
and basic healthcare) as well as strategic gender interests (relating to the social and 
political discourse of women’s rights, gender equality and legal protection). They would 
also intervene directly in the cooperative to assist women in their demands.
Cooperative leaders were the most active participants who were capable of 
assuming high intensity initiating roles in the administration, management and 
development of cooperatives. They had been able to respond to the organisational, 
educational and training opportunities created around cooperative organisation and more 
generally by the Sandinista Revolution. As the main beneficiaries of the efforts of the
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State to consolidate a layer of competent rural administrators, then later of UNAG to 
consolidate the movement as a competitive economic sector, the leaders were essentially 
a product of the participatory and political process. In GP they emerged as rural caciques 
deriving their power from their access to resources from above while delivering members 
as loyal political subjects to the FSLN yet they also contributed to the extension of the 
rural mass organisations into the countryside. In PJCh, the power of the leaders was 
essentially based on their internal legitimacy. Here, unlike in GP, transparency was 
demanded by ordinary members from their representatives. This is significant because it 
indicates the importance of developments within the cooperative bases and civil society, 
where the notions of representation, consensus and legitimacy must not only be understood 
as basic democratic principles but also demanded from the bottom up.
The development of participatory processes within the cooperatives cannot be 
considered separately from other factors which influenced their viability. Here the 
positive effects of participation were largely masked by the negative impact of the other 
variables, in these cases the unfavourable economic situation and context of a war, which 
reduced productivity through lost material incentive and because members contributed to 
the military defence.
The empirical findings of this study have demonstrated here that in response to the 
macro-socioeconomic and political transformations in the Sandinista period, new practices 
of participation, sources of leadership and different values and modes of behaviour were 
emerging within these CAS cooperatives which conflicted with the previously held norms 
and dominant values. However, the processes of empowerment underway through 
individual participation within cooperatives were not linear nor uniform but developed in 
contradictory ways and were inconsistent in the various dimensions. The lack of 
democratic traditions, of experiences with the principles of representation and consent and 
the low educational levels of many members - all products inherited from the country’s 
"reactionary despotism" meant that authoritiarian forms of leadership and those based on 
personalised forms of power were reproduced and could prevail unchallenged. At the 
same time, the low educational levels of members required strong leadership.
Nonetheless, our actor-oriented perspective has revealed that the cooperatives 
secured the inclusion of peasants who were hitherto excluded from the political process, 
co-opted or repressed into an organisational configuration which enhanced their social.
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psychological and political power. By indicating how these peasants interacted with 
external forces, it has also shown that the peasantry cannot be viewed simply as being 
subjects on which policies or ideas can be imposed. Rather, their own life experiences, 
strategies, values and consciousness interacted and responded in a complex way to these 
phenomena, modifying them in the process.
Policy implications
The research findings illuminate three main areas which are relevant for their implications 
on policy as it relates to participation. These refer to the role of the state in promoting 
participation, the problems of rural cooperatives and policy approaches. Each of these 
issues is addressed below.
Firstly, is the state an appropriate sponsor of participation? The documentation of 
the shortcomings of Nicaraguan experience of participation might provide further evidence 
to the case of the community participation theorists. They consider that the state is unable 
to effect "meaningful participation" (defined as where individuals have effective influence 
and power) because of its inherent feature of perpetuating the top-down approach 
(Midgley, 1986:145-160). Commentators are generally agreed that the realisation of 
participatory ideals is blocked by administrative inefficiencies of government 
administration, bureaucratic indifference, procedural delays and other administrative 
problems (Lowy, 1986:286; Midgley, 1986:149). Advocates of community participation 
favour NGOs above officialdom as external sponsoring agents and argue that NGOs are 
less encumbered by bureaucratic rules and procedures. Thus they can enjoy relative 
independence from the state, can stimulate radical community action and can be more 
dynamic, innovative and flexible (Oakley and Marsden: 1984:88-9).
Nonetheless, I maintain that there are several reasons why the state is a potentially 
important sponsor of participation. The state has a central role in the development process 
(albeit currently rapidly diminishing in Latin America as elsewhere) and the gravity and 
extent of chronic poverty and deprivation in the developing world necessitate a systematic 
and global intervention by the state if these problems are to be tackled. Also, government 
agencies have access to central decision-making, greater resources and organisational 
capacity to enable them to carry out development programmes at national level (Midgley, 
1986).
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As in the country case of this study, the state can create conditions conducive for 
participation by implementing radical reforms to eliminate those structural constraints to 
participation in the form of sociopolitical and socioeconomic inequalities which are a main 
obstacle to participation. But, this alone is not enough. It can also provide education and 
training in programmes for rural populations aimed at generating critical consciousness 
about the conditions of their lives, since, as the thesis findings indicate, this plays a key 
role in influencing the quality of individuals’ participation. As importantly, the state has 
an important role in establishing the national political parameter in which participation 
may develop as a consequence of the initiatives of other agents, including popular 
organisations.
As regards women in particular, the state can provide legal guarantees to facilitate 
women’s equal access to the means of production which increases their social power and 
improves their access to resources for their families. It can direct training programmes 
at women to facilitate their greater incorporation into the participatory process. These 
would need to relate to issues concerning cooperative production and management in order 
that women’s opportunities for greater participation and ultimately for leadership improve. 
This would then enable them to address their gender practical needs.
In many respects, it is in the interests of governments to promote the participation 
of local people in order to mobilise local resources, save on costs and make the project 
efficient. Participation which incorporates local people such as peasants in determining 
objectives provides better information about the local area, its people, their needs and 
priorities and provides feedback on official initiatives. The use of local technical 
knowledge can be used to adapt programmes to local conditions also makes projects more 
effective and therefore more successful. By ensuring that the local people maintain the 
momentum of the project, also ensures the longer-term sustainability of the project and 
by incorporating more people in development activities, participation also ensures a wider 
coverage than those government or agency supported development projects which reach 
only a limited number of rural people (Oakley, 1991). But this perpective must be 
tempered with the recognition of "human agency" whereby the individual: the farmer or 
peasant is acknowledged as being conscious of and knowledgeable about the world around 
him or her, can come to grips with it and devises ways with which to resolve the problems 
encountered. It is this which accounts for different local response to specific policies and
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it is this which requires that we abandon the notion that the state alone can, should or is 
alone responsible for policy outcomes.
This view is validated, as is the role of the state as a potential sponsor, by the 
recognition which arises from the research that - contrary to the view of Oakley and 
Marsden (1984) - participation as a "means" has the potential to develop into participation 
as an "end". Under certain circumstances, given the correct political environment and 
sufficient democratic space, participation can develop by the interaction of individuals and 
groups with more remote social and political phenomena, into a force from below: such 
is the dynamic of participation and the influence of human agency.
A second question - namely, whether rural cooperatives are viable participatory 
mechanisms by which to incorporate the peasantry into development processes - arises 
from the research with policy-related implications. However, in the assessment of the 
cooperative experience of participation we must consider the debates about the role of 
cooperatives in development as well as the broader goals of the Sandinista regime as they 
relate to social, political objectives and the preservation of national sovereignty. Here, 
while the creation of cooperatives contributed to the démocratisation of the rural structure 
of land ownership and the socialisation of production, the economic and political 
contradictions arising from the CAS cooperative model, in particular, were inherently 
problematic. The CAS model frustrated peasant aspirations of integrating family labour 
into the productive process and, as this thesis suggests, may have served as a disincentive 
to greater efficiency. As such the imposition of organisational criterion on cooperatives 
was counter-productive to the extent that it denied members the opportunity to initiate and 
decide their own organisational structures and may have contributed as a factor reducing 
their motivation to work longer hours. Moreover, in the context of continuing land hunger 
and economic crisis, the official prioritisation of CAS alienated many poor and landless 
peasants as well as individual producers from state rural policies.
Thirdly, what do the research findings suggest about our approaches to 
participation? This study has clearly indicated that macro-processes find expression at the 
local level only as they are translated and modified through individual and group 
interpretations, action and behaviour. It also demonstrates the unpredictable nature of the 
participatory process which cannot be established a priori but which develops with its own 
dynamic to give its idiosyncratic outcomes in response to the local level circumstances.
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Participation is not a constant: it varies over time and has greater or lesser importance at 
different periods or stages of project or activity. These characteristics suggest that 
participation cannot be injected formally into a situation but instead must be 
accommodated by creating favourable conditions for its development which can be 
subsequently negotiated by the actors involved. The wider implications of this gives 
weight to the proposal of Hall (1986), that a "process" approach to development planning 
which emphasises continuous dialogue between state planners and beneficiaries should 
replace the "blueprint" style of development which sees projects as vehicles through which 
pre-determined government goals can be applied.
Participation: a modest reappraisal of the 1979-90 period
The findings of this study also contribute to an assessment of the importance of the 
Sandinista period of rule. It does this by highlighting the nature of some of the political 
transformations that were occurring; the quality and dimensions of the participatory 
process; and specifically, the role of the Sandinista Government in these developments.
Given that this study was based on two CAS case studies within one region, it 
would be inappropriate to generalise from these conclusions to the overall cooperative 
experience in the countryside let alone the experience of participation in other sectors. 
However, here, other studies are informative and suggest that some of these tendencies 
were more widespread. A study by Houtart and Lemercinier (1992) in Masaya (also in 
Region IV) of belief systems, values and worldviews, showed that socio-cultural and 
political changes were most consistently evident amongst rural inhabitants integrated into 
CAS cooperatives, compared with any other form of social organisation, including the 
CCS and individual producers. This supports my findings by demonstrating further the 
transformatory potential on subjective notions and political practices of organisational and 
participatory mechanisms facilitated by collective production. Another comparative study 
by Perez (1990), focused on Nicaraguan peasant women and demonstrated the extent of 
social and political transformations observed amongst rural women. The author concluded 
that women involved in the processes of organisation and participation exhibited a greater 
capacity to question and resist hierarchical relations compared with non-organised women. 
It was demonstrated that women organised around production were more critical of their 
socially ascribed roles than non-organised women. However, Perez also indicated that
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those in organisations oriented towards health and education services manifested more 
radical transformations in gender consciousness and belligerency than the women in CAS.
Beyond the organised countryside experience other studies have suggested that 
other participatory processes and channels created during the revolution profoundly 
affected the lives of the individuals involved in various ways. For example, based on 
observations of low-income women in urban communities of Managua, Vance (1987) 
noted that the processes of women’s participation in the formulation and execution of 
housing construction projects contributed to their development of a gender consciousness. 
Also, Amove (1986) has indicated that the participation of young people in the Literacy 
Crusade, which exposed mainly urban bred individuals to the realities of conditions in the 
rural areas, influenced their values and heightened their own political commitment. 
Suggestive of the psychologically and politically empowering effects of these experiences, 
Amove also claimed that they served to increase their confidence in themselves and in 
their own capacity to effect change. In addition. Amove (1986) and Olivera et al (1990) 
considered the significance of participation in the national literacy and health crusades for 
women. They were the major contributors to these campaigns - both as students and 
teachers - which presented them with opportunities to play a more prominent public role. 
Their participation at different levels and intensities also enabled them to develop political 
awareness and gender consciousness and awoke new ideas of their capacity to act 
collectively.
Taken with these studies, this thesis contributes to an understanding of the nature 
of the political transformation occurring under the auspices of FSLN mle and serves to 
explain the phenomenon observed in Nicaragua in the aftermath of the Febmary 1990 
UNO electoral victory. Then, there was an explosion of popular protest and 
demonstrations which were carried out independently of FSLN leadership and sometimes 
contrary to its directives, against the attempts of the new governments to reverse 
Sandinista property and labour laws. In the countryside, cooperative members united in 
collective political and military action in order to defend their cooperatives. Their various 
experiences, such as those documented in this thesis, accummulated through ten years of 
Sandinista mle facilitated them with the organisational, political and military capabilities 
to do so.
The interpretation originally put forward in the literature that participation failed
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or became over-bureaucratised cannot explain how this scale of mobilisation could occur. 
By contrast, this study of the grassroots participatory processes highlights the nature and 
extent of transformations at the local level and suggests how popular participation 
contributed to those changes. As we saw, the channels of participation created by the 
revolution, enabled these peasants to overcome the psychological obstacles to collective 
political action, assimilate national ideologies and political discourses which united them, 
enhanced their consciousness and provided them with critical analysis. It also enabled 
them to consolidate their organisational structures and gain the political skills. Moreover, 
these above mentioned studies reinforce my own in identifying the primary importance 
of the FSLN’s prior political commitment to the development of participation as 
enabling factor which facilitated it despite, as this study has shown, the numerous 
contradictions and unintended consequences.
The objective conditions inherited by the Sandinistas, of underdevelopment, a 
barely existent civil society, high illiteracy rates and the intense economic and military 
pressures the government encountered made it more difficult to resist the patterns which 
have emerged elsewhere in the South, where other governments have also embraced the 
notion of participation as an integral part of development policies. In Nicaragua, the mass 
organisations had a similar fate to those in Castroite Cuba (since 1959) which also 
developed as key channels of participation but where a tendency towards "bureaucratism" 
contributed to their under-use (Hernandez and Dilla, 1991). In Nicaragua, the 
restructuring of decision-making structures failed to guarantee the participatory function 
of grassroots organisations as it had done in Tanzania, under the Nyerere Government 
(following the Arusha Declaration of 1967), where local initiatives became blocked when 
ministries and their officials opposed challenges to their authority. Similarly, in Nicaragua 
as in Tanzania, the official interpretation increasingly equated participation and political 
awareness with conformity to official policies (Hall, 1986:95).
Under the prevailing conditions in Nicaragua, the state was assigned a central role 
in the transition which required its expansion in order to fulfil its new and varied tasks. 
In addition to fulfilling a number of social and political objectives, cooperatives provided 
a convenient administrative structure to enable the state to penetrate the countryside. 
Given the newfound role of the state in economic planning, its emphasis on modernised 
production and the dominant view of the peasantry as in need of radical reform, it
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intervened in cooperative development.
Directing limited resources to the emergent cooperative leaders was key to the 
consolidation of a new form of production and to the control of the cooperatives and the 
countryside. During the initial years - in the context of a weak state - the concentration 
of skills amongst leaders and their incorporation into the instances of revolutionary power 
provided the initial avenues for the state to penetrate local peasant cultures and become 
incorporated into the bureaucratic apparatus. Yet, this leadership did not responded 
uniformly to the new conditions created by the revolution but interacted with it according 
to the specific life experiences, economic circumstances and ideological perspectives of 
the individuals themselves and their social groups.
Those leaders who became party members represented the most blatant form of 
bureaucraticism of the rural areas. They emerged with all the features of caciques, 
deriving power from both the political patrons of the higher levels and the bases they 
represented. Others became incorporated into the bureaucratic structures of the rural mass 
organisations which gave them a beligerant role vis-a-vis the state as regards their own 
peasant sector. Whatever, the political function in relation to the state and mass 
organisations, personal forms of political power and authoritarian tendencies amongst the 
leadership were reproduced. As social agents shaped by the action of historical social 
forces during the "despotic oligarchy" of Nicaragua’s recent past these individuals were 
imbued with a disposition to behave and think in ways which reproduced hierarchical and 
non-consensual power relations. These tendencies were not negated - rather they were 
exacerbated - by the political model of the FSLN which was extended to the rural mass 
organisations, which identified a leadership role for a revolutionary elite to lead the 
unstructured popular sectors.
These problems highlight the serious obstacles to the creation of a mass- 
incorporating political system such as that which the Sandinistas intended to establish 
particularly in the countryside where contradictorily, the context of severe 
underdevelopment suggests that strong leadership forms are necessary to consolidate the 
economic base and organisational and political structure of the peasant sector in order that 
it be able to compete with other social sectors. In fact, under such circumstances 
caciquismo proves an efficient political "method". Yet, this phenomenon also constitutes 
the "labyrinth" with which innovative political systems are confronted. It is a feature of
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political culture which raises questions about the applicability of political principles such 
as those from the Liberal enlightenment which are based on the principles government by 
consent and equality before the law.
However, the Sandinista Government perhaps went further than most efforts in 
promoting participation. The revolution created favourable conditions for the participation 
of men and women in all aspects of social, economic and political life. It condemned 
exploitation, implemented measures to eradicate structural inequalities, redistributed wealth 
through credit, health and welfare programmes and educated its population to liberate 
them from their ignorance, exclusion and subordination. Importantly, the Sandinista 
Government’s adoption of political pluralism and participatory democracy also facilitated 
the opening of political spaces which could then be contested by social and political forces 
from below. Thus, agrarian policies were successfully challenged by UNAG and the 
national cooperative movement in their demands for a change in direction of agrarian 
reform and greater autonomy from state in cooperative development. At lower levels, 
from within the heart of civil society, this study has shown that essentially this space 
evolved as an loci for the contention not only for hegemony but also for the position of 
the line of demarcation between the state and civil society. The increasingly oppositional 
efforts of the two cooperatives to challenge external intervention and assert their autonomy 
can be conceptualised in precisely these terms, since they represent efforts to exclude state 
from the civil domain.
This period constituted a watershed in Nicaraguan history and the challenges of the 
processes set in motion were only put to the test in the context of the UNO victory. Then, 
the belligerent action of the popular sectors indicated their refusal to accept potential 
exclusions and a willingness to defend the democratic spaces obtained during the 
revolution. Evidence of the political strength of the popular sectors had important 
implications for the immediate post-electoral position of the FSLN, whose symbolic 
leadership of them enabled the party to negotiate with sections of the UNO Government 
using a political card which variously promised or threatened to "govern from below". 
Once it was clear that the workers within the state sector and the peasants within the 
reformed agricultural sector were prepared to defend their property and land, this was in 
turn one of the factors contributing to the separation of the UNO executive from its ultra­
right wing factions dominating its legislative branch, which aimed to reestablish the pre-
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revolutionary socioeconomic and political order.
312
ANNEX I: METHODOLOGICAL COMMENTS
This annex presents additional information concerning the research methodology and 
includes a discussion of its strengths and limitations.
Participant observation: strengths and weaknesses
This thesis, from conception through to completion, was steered by a theoretical interest 
in the factors which operated to influence participation. Consequently, the research 
questions, methodology and the selection of cases were guided by my pre-suppositions 
about the relative influence of certain phenomenon, which in turn informed the logic of 
my analysis. Desribed as such, the study appears to have been completely framed by my 
theoretically and analytically preconceived, culturally specific and ideologically informed 
position. However, despite such "outsider constructs" to my inquiries, the research was 
also interpretative and was guided by my attempt to understand the actors’ viewpoints and 
life-worlds. This was achieved through participant observation, in what I came to identify 
as two distinct research "modes" which I consciously adopted, namely the "all ears and 
eyes" and "initiator" mode which correspond to different degrees of intervention in the 
research context.
In the "all ears and eyes" mode, the researcher aims to merge as discretely as 
possible into the background and with minimal disruption to the processes and activities 
of social life, bear witness to normal interactions and behaviour. This constitutes the more 
"observational" dimension of participant observation and is typically accompanied by 
studious note taking in order to document events. Its strength lies in its potential to access 
culturally-specific values and subjective opinions that are not externally structured by the 
outsiders preconceived world view. Here, the themes discussed are informant-led and may 
include "situational analysis" or observing key or mundane events which enables the 
researcher to identify the networks and dynamics of relationships.
It is, of course, naive to suppose that the researcher can ever become the proverbial 
fly on the insiders’ wall, since the presence of an "outsider" will necessarily influence 
group dynamics. Moreover, in their interactions with outsiders (including researchers), 
individuals assert themselves through their actions and questions, as actors and 
constructors of their own circumstances. The researcher can be a resource and provide
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information which, as active subjects, the subjects of study are aware may serve them. 
Thus, the researcher’s presence affects them and can be of value. Nonetheless, the 
researcher’s aspiration to become "part of the furniture", can to some degree be achieved 
with the passing of time and the familiarity it breeds. Then, a degree of normality slowly 
settles down to "happen" conveniently in front of the researcher with her notebook.
To deny that one’s presence can influence and may even serve the communities of study 
is not only a conceptual and moral decision: it also has methodological implications.
Aspiring to reach a situation where the researcher does not intrude in the rhythm of 
everyday life is in fact undesirable, since it presupposes a total adaptation, a becoming of 
"sameness". This is a situation against which anthropologists have always forewarned 
since it necessitates surrendering one’s "otherness" which endows the researcher with 
observational insight and analytical objectivity. Returning now to consider that the 
"initiator" mode of research, this can be distinguished from the former relatively passive 
mode of data collection by its greater research intervention. Here, the research opens 
topics for discussion and inquiries about the links between phenomena and can succeed 
in gaining access to areas that informants are either unwilling to discuss because they are 
controversial or have not made consciously themselves. In such a way, asking a group 
of villagers, congregated and awaiting transport, why the school roof had not yet been 
completed, elicited responses which made the schisms between cooperative and community 
followers explicit.
The initiator mode represents that feedback potential of participant research to the 
extent that it can start an educative and reflexive process amongst the individuals 
themselves. In such a way, when in an initiator mode, I asked the entire cooperatives for 
their collective histories and obvious discrepancies in interpretation emerged, this then 
became the theme of wider debate about whose version was correct and why others saw 
it differently. This served to reveal for the group how subjective interpretations inform 
historical constructs. Similarly, asking the assembled cooperative memberships about their 
thoughts on the effects of state intervention in the cooperative generated a heated debate 
about precisely what constituted "external" intervention and cooperative development.
My formal introduction to the cooperatives came through the local promoters of the 
UNAG and by definition of my very research focus on the cooperatives this meant that 
I became associated with the revolutionary authorities. This perspective which was
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reinforced by my use of a Soviet made Lada jeep, symbolic of the Sandinista regime and 
my participant research in the political activities of the cooperative, which took me on 
demonstrations and election campaigning accompanying cooperative members. Individuals 
learnt about my Sandinista partner and in their eyes my panza (belly) progressively 
enlargening because I pregnant, made my association with this political perspective more 
concrete.
Initially, I was concerned that my apparent political allegiance would bias the 
information I obtained. In fact, my concern was only partially founded. In the 
cooperatives, responses to even overtly political questions concering the record of the 
Sandinistas or voting preferences did not necessarily conform to the official view. The 
two members interviewed who ultimately voted for the UNO had responded evasively to 
these questions, stating that they would not divulge their opinions. Other questions which 
provoked evasive responses were those relating to problems and advantages of the 
particular CAS cooperative model. Yet, even here, barriers were overcome with time 
amongst key informants who knew more about other models and articulated their views 
freely about their relative merits.
Non-cooperativist villagers in the surrounding comarcas also saw me as partisan. 
On one occasion my jeep was sabotaged and on another, I narrowly missed being hit by 
a large stone. However, villagers including UNO supporters were keen that I speak with 
them also and made themselves available to me when I visited. Their views on the 
cooperative were not inhibited and they unreservedly expressed their frustrations and 
grievances about the cooperatives, the members and the government. This itself is crucial 
research material, since it indicates that opposition and plurality of political opinions 
during the Sandinista period (outside the FSLN) were not stifled and that individuals felt 
at liberty to express explicitly anti-Sandinista sentiments generally, including to someone 
they identified as being a sympathiser.
Since my initial contact in the cooperatives was with the leaders, this exacerbated 
my apparent association with political elites, which I was concerned could have 
jeopardised the confidence of the ordinary members, women, partners and villagers. 
Indeed ordinary members were initially guarded until it was clear that I was systematically 
visiting those ordinary members who lived in the remotest locations. I became surprised 
at their compromising remarks and opinions about internal cooperative affairs. This
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perhaps has as much to do with increased confidence in me and the apparent neutrality 
of the questions as the different moral evaluation of specific behaviour. Hence, a typically 
unguarded remark, such as, "Oh, Santos is the one who decides everything round here", 
was presented unproblematically as a mere observation of the way things were and not as 
a deeper criticism of authoritarianism engendered by the new political system.
This type of study relies heavily on key informants, that is with individuals who are 
valuable communicators. Relationships with these individuals, which may develop into 
friendships, are consciously nurtured and must also be seen as the consequence of the 
individual’s own response or interest in the researcher. The social networks thus created 
from the dynamic of the research context provide an invaluable source of material, but it 
must also be recognised that they present an inevitable bias to the research, constructed 
as they are around such subjectivity. Informants as effective communicators are often, 
though not always, represented by those individuals who have the highest "cultural level", 
who can articulate their thoughts and opinions and reflect on different situations. Hence 
the tendency towards an elite bias which is particularly notable in research such as this 
which involves largely illiterate peasant populations. This tendency was tamed by my use 
of a survey, described later.
During my participant observation, I employed the use of supplimentary methods. 
One such, was to document the details of the proceedings in the assemblies for content 
analysis, identifying the nature of contributions and responses of different individuals. 
Discussions with members were subsequently initiated by me in order to elaborate 
responses and elicit further opinions. Other meetings, including those of the cooperatives’ 
leadership, with the adjacent communities, UNAG, other mass organisations and the 
military were also observed.
Formal and informal interviews
An integral part of the research process was interviews with a variety of people, local, 
regional and national, within the cooperative sector and beyond. These were conducted 
using semi- of "flexibly-" structured questionnaires, which covered the main areas of 
relevant information and enabled the interviewees to expand on issues they considered 
pertinent to my research.
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Here, my access to transportation was crucial in enabling me to carry out the 
interviewees. It was also a great advantage as regards further access to the cooperative 
leaders, since sometimes I took them to meetings beyond the locality in my jeep. This 
gave me the opportunity to document their activities and discuss general issues with them. 
On other occasions I travelled with the leaders in the cooperative’s transport.
Leaders organograms
Since cooperative leaders were one of the key focuses of the research, I not only 
accompanied them on errands and trips to meetings but attempted to assess how the 
cooperative leaders saw themselves within their institutional milieu. Consequently, I asked 
them to draw on paper how they perceived the relationship between the cooperatives and 
external organisations and institutions. They were then asked to describe these 
relationships orally. I adopted the use of this particular method as a way of accessing the 
worldviews, (or the cognitive map of their political world) because I believed that 
representation by drawing would complement verbal communication for several reasons. 
It is a more direct way of describing a complicated phenomenon and, since informants 
were relatively unfamiliar with expressing their ideas through this medium, they were less 
able to identify the implications of what they were representing, and were therefore less 
likely to conform to what they might perceive to be my expectations.
The leaders were only given one opportunity to draw the diagrams and did so in my 
presence so I could prevent their temptations to make modifications. I enforced this 
because I thought if they made modifications, they would inject their intellectualised and 
formalised schemas. Thus, while there was a methodological consistency in the 
production of the organograms, it should be borne in mind that they were the leaders’ 
relatively spontaneous first efforts.
Questionnaire
The questionnaire was initially devised, then piloted on two members in order to evaluate 
the substantive and linguistic suitability of questions and establish the categories of the 
responses. It was subsequently modified. Half the members in both cooperatives were 
selected randomly from complete membership lists and were visited for interview in the 
privacy of their own homes during the hours of rest. However, in the case of GP, both
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women were included as were half the women in PJCh. Each questionnaire took, on 
average, between two and three hours to conduct and was the basis for subsequent 
informal interviews.
The replies to questions in the survey on objective "facts" were relatively 
unproblematic to the extent that they appeared to conform to information obtained after 
crosschecking from other sources. Yet, interestingly (as the above has indicated) questions 
relating to opinions and perceptions - that is subjective data of apparently controversial 
issues, such as how power was distributed within the cooperative - were also freely given.
The benefits of using a questionnaire were many. The data obtained from the 
questionnaire provided a basis from which statistically significant observations about the 
cooperatives’ membership could be made. It also provided an initial point of social 
contact between myself and some of the less articulate and confident members whom I 
would not have had an opportunity to meet had I relied exclusively on informants. 
Moreover, the home context gave me the opportunity to meet and talk with respective 
spouses and family members, which was particularly valuable in providing their 
perspectives on the cooperative.
This data was analysed on return from the "field" with the computer package SPSS. 
Frequencies and variables were tested for significance using T-tests at 2-tailed probability 
and Crosstabulations where two variables are tested for significance using Chi-Square 
calculations. Those which indicate a significant correlation are referred to in the text as 
significant.
Honest appraisal
This research also suffered from many of the practical problems which commonly plague 
researchers working under difficult conditions and circumstances. Although I had a four 
wheel drive jeep which could access many areas, some of the communities were 
inaccessible by any form of transport. This presented a problem of distances involved in 
conducting the fieldwork. It meant that I could walk for several kilometres only to find 
that the person I had intended to interview was not there. This limited my time and 
ultimately restricted the number of interviews I could conduct, since my original plan was 
to interview all cooperative members. It also meant that I did not gain the same social 
access to those who lived in the more remote areas. I was also ill several times, which
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interrupted my periods of stay in the communities and ultimately reduced the fieldwork 
period.
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ANNEX II: QUESTIONNAIRE 
Questionnaire for members of CAS
DATOS PERSONALES
I Nombre y appellidos 2 Edad 3 Sexo
4 Lugar de origen
5 Nivel escolar alcanzado 6 Estudios actuales
7 Curses de capacitacion recibidos (UNAG, FSLN, MIDINRA, AMNLAE)
8 Cargo en la cooperativa: ahora
antes
ANTECEDENTES/FAMILIAR:
9 Antes de integrarse a la cooperativa a que se dedicaba?
a Finquero tierra propria/familiar b obrero agricolo/peon tierra alquilada
y donde
c obrero industrial d artesania
e estudiante c otro
10 A que se dedicaban sus padres? 
a agricultura peon
tierra propria 
alquilada
b otro
II Que religion practicaban sus padres?
12 Pertencian a algun partido politico?
13 Quienes de su familia viven con usted y que es su edad?
14 En que trabajan ellos? 
a agricultura
b industria 
c escuela
LA COOPERATIVA
15 Cuando se intégré usted a la cooperativa?
16 Porqué se intégré a la cooperativa?
320
17 Quien es al autoridad de la cooperativa?
18 Conoce usted quienes son los miembros de la Junta Directiva? 
a Si
b No
19 La Junta Directiva consulta a los socios antes de tomar decisiones? 
a Si
b No 
c A veces
20 Informa la Junta Directiva de sus actividades? 
a Si
b No, porqué
21 Se aplica el reglamiento? 
a Si, entonces, como
b No, porqué
22 Para qué sirve la Asamblea de socios de la cooperativa?
PARTICIPACION
23 Hay socios qué no participan en las discusiones? 
a Si
b No, porqué
24 Participa usted en las discusiones? 
a Si, en qué forma
b No, porqué
le gustaria poder participar
que le falta para que participe usted
25 En qué organizaciones pertenece?
cargo
duracion
26 Mobilizaciones en la defensa 
cuântos veces
donde
27 Tiene usted cargo en el proceso electoral?
28 Participa usted en actividades de la comarca (desarrollo comunal, cultural, deportiva, 
defensa, salud, educacion, religion)?
a Si, en cuâles 
b No, porqué
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29 Cuâles de las organizaciones en las que participa, es para usted la mas importante y 
porqué?
30 Ha participado en manifestaciones politicas (actos)? 
a Si, desde cuando
b No
31 Va a votar en las elecciones? 
a Si, por quién
b No, porqué
32 Qué significa "participacion" para usted?
33 Qué significan las elecciones para usted?
34 Tenemos una democracia aqui en Nicaragua?
SITUACION ECONOMICA
35 Le gusta trabajar en forma colectiva? 
a Si, porqué
b No, porqué
36 Trabaja una parcelita de tierra también? 
a Si, de la cooperativa
a Si, de otro 
b No
37 Cuântos manzanas es?
38 Quién decide la asignacion de las parcelas?
39 Con quién la trabaja?
40 Cuânto tiempo de trabajo le dedica usted a la parcela?
41 Qué produce ahi?
42 Para qué es la produccion? 
a consumo familiar
b venta 
c otro
43 Hace trabajo por fuera de la cooperativa? 
a Si, donde
b No
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OPINIONES
44 Qué tiene que ver la cooperativa con otras organizaciones comunales?
45 Como vean la gente de la comunidad a la cooperativa?
46 Como es la atenciôn de la UNAG?
47 Como ha sido la relaciôn con el MIDINRA?
48 Como ha sido la relaciôn con el Banco?
49 Como ha sido la relaciôn con el FSLN?
50 Qué papel ha jugado los miembros del FSLN en la cooperativa?
51 Siente usted que la cooperativa puede influir las decisiones del gobiemo? 
a Si, cômo
b No, porqué
52 Porqué, cree usted, ha impulsado el gobiemo sandinista las cooperativas en el campo?
53 Considéra que usted mismo es creyente? Qué religion?
54 El Dios ayuda en resolver los problemas de la cooperativa?
55 Siente usted dueno de la tierra de la cooperativa? 
a Si, porqué
b No, porqué
56 Qué le falta para que se sienta dueno?
57 Porqué no bay mas socios mujeres?
58 Han sido mujeres dirigentes antes?
59 Participan las mujeres en todas las tareas en al cooperativa?
Added questions for women members
60 Ademâs del trabajo de la cooperativa, qué otro trabajo tiene usted que bacer?
61 Cuânto tiempo dedica a este trabajo?
62 Quién la ayuda en el cuido de los ninos?
63 Participa en todo el trabajo productivo?
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64 Hace la vigilancia? 
a Si
b No, quién lo hace para usted
65 Peinsa usted que las mujeres deben participai en la politica?
66 Cuâles son los problemas por los que las mujeres no participan mas?
67 Las asambleas abordan los problemas que afectan a las mujeres? 
a Si
b No
Added questions for cooperative leaders
68 Porqué fue eligido para este cargo?
69 Trabaja usted en la produccion?
70 Cuales son los principales problemas de la cooperativa?
71 Cuales son los logros?
72 Cual es el role de la mujer en la cooperativa?
7 Como évalua la participacion en la cooperativa de todos los socios? 
a en produccion 
b en la toma de decisiones
74 Como évalua la participacion de la mujer? 
a en produccion
b en la toma de decisiones
75 Cada cuando hay cambio en la Junta Directiva?
76 Porqué se cambian?
77 Que aportes ha dado la cooperativa al desarrollo de la comunidad?
78 Tiene la cooperativa relacion con otras cooperativas cercanas?
79 Que relacion tiene la cooperativa con productores individuates?
80 Que relacion tiene la cooperativa con otras instituciones del estado, y como ha sido?
81 Para que sirve el Consejo Municipal de Cooperativas/ UCA?
82 Como anda la Tienda Campesina?
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ANNEX III: DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
There are several directions in which future research could logically be pursued in the 
light of the findings of this thesis. Given the change of government since the study, 
research would necessarily be conducted under different macro-contextual conditions 
which other questions pertaining to the participatory processes. Amongst other features, 
the period since the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas has been characterised by the 
removal of state patronage from the cooperative sector; radical structural adjustment and 
reduced state expenditure, such as preferential credits; an end to the war; and the 
emergence of FENACOOP as an independent third level cooperative.
Firstly, a longitudinal study of the two case studies would aim to identify how the 
new economic and political conditions have affected the cooperatives generally. 
Specifically, it would consider whether they have been able to shift towards economic 
efficiency in order to survive as a sector. Also, an examination of the organisational 
response to the new situation would indicate the relative strength of those forms 
established during the Sandinista Government and an assessment of the effect of these 
changes on leadership would highlight the relative primacy of the members-leadership- 
party/state as an internal organisational determinant.
A second area for future research would also be based on a longitudinal follow-up 
of the two case studies, focusing on the fact of the emergent local political power 
structures as described in this this. Here we saw, that in the context of an eradicated 
landlord class, cooperative leadership - with its access to resources of the revolutionary 
authorities - effectively served as mediators between the rural communities and the 
national political and economic system. Thus, further research would examine what has 
happened to this new rural leadership in the absence of external resources and would 
identify whether it remains significant or has been rendered impotent. Since the issue of 
the role of the leaders as mediators between macro- and micro-level forces is pertinent to 
the formation and extension of state structures in the countryside, research would also seek 
to establish how this relates to the development of the municipalities which following the 
implementation of municipality laws in 1990, gained greater autonomy.
Thirdly, a related research project of a more generalised nature would consider the 
viability of the cooperative sector without the direct patronage and examine the
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organisational, production, training and marketing strategies it has adopted. It would also 
examine the organisational responses adopted by FENACOOP and UNAG to establish 
how they have mobilised as social and political forces and what internal democratic 
procedures have been implemented to consolidate their representativeness.
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